Does soliciting bail bond business inside a jail count as a crime of moral turpitude in Texas?

TX AG Opinion GA-0299: Is soliciting bail bond business inside a jail a crime of moral turpitude?

Plain-English summary

A Denton County prosecutor asked about a former bail bond surety who had been convicted of violating Occupations Code section 1704.304(c), which makes it a Class B misdemeanor for a bail bond surety or agent to solicit bonding business inside a police station, jail, prison, or other place where people are held in law enforcement custody. The man gave up his bail bond license after the conviction but was later hired by a licensed bail bond business. A separate statute, section 1704.302(c), makes it a Class A misdemeanor to accept payment for bail bond employment if, within the preceding ten years, the person has been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. The question was whether the jail-solicitation conviction counted as a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, which would bar the man's current employment.

The opinion concluded it did not. Courts have historically defined a crime of moral turpitude in sweeping terms, shameful wickedness, baseness, or vileness contrary to the accepted rules of right conduct between people, but more recent Texas cases have settled on a narrower test built around specific elements: dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or deliberate violence. Section 1704.304(c) bars mere solicitation in a prohibited location, regardless of motive or method. The opinion reasoned that soliciting clients inside a jail is intentional and may show poor judgment or nerve, but it does not, by itself, involve deception, fraud, or violence. Since the request did not suggest the surety misrepresented himself or used fraud or deceit to recruit clients, simply announcing himself as a bail bond surety inside a prohibited location did not meet the moral turpitude test, so the ten-year employment bar in section 1704.302(c) did not apply to him.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2005. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Who this opinion affected (as of 2005)

Bail bond sureties and their employers: The opinion meant that a person convicted of illegally soliciting bail bond business inside a jail or similar facility was not automatically barred for ten years from being paid for bail bond employment, since that particular conviction did not qualify as a crime of moral turpitude.

Bail bond boards and licensing authorities: The opinion gave these bodies a concrete answer on how to classify a section 1704.304(c) conviction when evaluating whether an individual could be paid for bail bond work under section 1704.302(c)'s ten-year look-back rule.

Prosecutors and defense counsel handling bail bond licensing disputes: The opinion supplied a specific application of the moral turpitude test (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or deliberate violence) to the bail bond solicitation statute, useful in similar disputes over other bail bond industry convictions.

Common questions

Is illegally soliciting bail bond business inside a jail a crime of moral turpitude in Texas?
No, according to this opinion. The offense involves mere solicitation in a prohibited location, without an element of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or deliberate violence, so it does not meet the modern test for moral turpitude that Texas courts apply.

What is the legal test Texas courts use for a crime of moral turpitude?
The opinion pointed to the more recent, narrower test: a crime of moral turpitude involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or deliberate violence, or otherwise reflects adversely on a person's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness in their professional capacity.

Can someone convicted of illegal jail solicitation still work for a Texas bail bond business?
Based on this opinion's conclusion that the offense is not a crime of moral turpitude, the ten-year bar in section 1704.302(c) on accepting payment for bail bond employment after a moral-turpitude misdemeanor or felony conviction would not apply on that basis alone.

Are all bail bond related misdemeanors treated as crimes of moral turpitude?
No. The opinion's analysis turned on the specific elements of the particular offense; it noted, for comparison, that Texas courts have found offenses like issuing a bad check without intent to defraud, or misdemeanor DWI, are also not crimes of moral turpitude, while offenses like tax evasion or conspiring to defraud the United States have been found to qualify.

Background and statutory framework

Occupations Code section 1704.304(c) prohibits a bail bond surety or an agent of a bail bond surety from soliciting bonding business in a police station, jail, prison, detention facility, or other place of detainment for persons in law enforcement custody, making a violation a Class B misdemeanor. Section 1704.302(c) separately prohibits a person from accepting or receiving money, property, or anything of value as payment for employment with a bonding business if, within the preceding ten years, that person has been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, making a violation a Class A misdemeanor. Whether the ten-year bar applies to a person convicted under section 1704.304(c) turns entirely on whether that jail-solicitation offense is a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, since it is undisputed that a violation of section 1704.304(c) is a misdemeanor rather than a felony.

Historically, Texas authorities defined moral turpitude broadly, as conduct denoting shameful wickedness, an extreme departure from ordinary standards of honesty, good morals, justice, or ethics, shocking to the community's moral sense, or an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the duties owed between people or to society. Texas courts have found a range of offenses to qualify under this kind of broad definition, including conspiring to defraud the United States, tax evasion, and assault by a man against a woman, while finding other offenses, like misdemeanor driving while intoxicated, driving with a suspended license, and issuing a bad check without an intent-to-defraud element, do not qualify.

More recently, Texas courts, including the Texas Supreme Court in the attorney-discipline context, have converged on a narrower and more workable definition: a crime of moral turpitude is one involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or deliberate violence, or that otherwise reflects adversely on a person's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness in their professional capacity. A Texas court of appeals extended this same framework from lawyers to licensed insurance agents, and the opinion applied it here to bail bond sureties. Measured against those specific elements, illegally soliciting business inside a jail or similar facility is an intentional violation of the statute's location restriction, but it does not inherently involve dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or violence; a surety who simply identifies himself as a bail bond surety to a potential client, even somewhere he is not allowed to be, is not thereby lying to, defrauding, or assaulting that client. Because the request did not indicate the surety used any dishonest or fraudulent means to solicit clients, the opinion concluded the offense fell outside the moral turpitude test.

Citations

Statutes:

• Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 1704.304(c) (Vernon 2004)
• Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 1704.304(e)
• Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 1704.302(c) (Vernon 2004)
• Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 1704.302(d)

Cases:

• In re Birdwell, 20 S.W.3d 685, 688-89 (Tex. 2000)
• In re Humphreys, 880 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex. 1994)
• Hardeman v. State, 868 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993), pet. dism'd, improvidently granted, 891 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)
• Lopez v. State, 990 S.W.2d 770, 778 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.)
• Dallas County Bail Bond Bd. v. Mason, 773 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ)
• Duncan v. Bd. of Disciplinary Appeals, 898 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex. 1995)
• Brown v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 34 S.W.3d 683, 690 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.)

Other authorities:

• Black's Law Dictionary 1026 (7th ed. 1999) (quoting 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 165, at 454 (1995))

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/greg-abbott/ga-0299
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2005/ga0299.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

GREG ABBOTT

January 25, 2005

The Honorable Bruce Isaacks
Denton County Criminal District Attorney
127 North Woodrow Lane
Denton, Texas 76205

Opinion No. GA-0299

Re: Whether a bail bond surety who is convicted of violating section 1704.304(c) of the Occupations Code has committed a crime of moral turpitude for purposes of section 1704.302(c) thereof (RQ-0259-GA)

Dear Mr. Isaacks:

You ask whether a bail bond surety who is convicted of violating section 1704.304(c) of the Occupations Code has committed a crime of moral turpitude for purposes of section 1704.302(c) thereof.[1]

You indicate that a former bail bond surety was convicted after September 1, 2001 of violating section 1704.304(c) of the Occupations Code, a Class B misdemeanor. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1. That provision states:

A bail bond surety or an agent of a bail bond surety may not solicit bonding business in a police station, jail, prison, detention facility, or other place of detainment for persons in the custody of law enforcement.

TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1704.304(c) (Vernon 2004).[2] An offense under this provision is a Class B misdemeanor. See id. § 1704.304(e). You state that although the individual in question gave up his bail bond license at the time of his conviction, he is presently employed by a bail bond license holder. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1.

Section 1704.302(c) of the Occupations Code provides:

A person may not accept or receive from a license holder money, property, or any other thing of value as payment for employment with a bonding business if, within the preceding 10 years, the person has been convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude or of a felony.

TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1704.302(c) (Vernon 2004). An offense under this provision is a Class A misdemeanor. See id. § 1704.302(d). You ask whether section 1704.302(c) is applicable to the person in question. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1. The answer to that question depends upon whether section 1704.304(c) describes a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude or a felony. Because a violation of that provision under the terms of the statute is a misdemeanor, we need to determine only whether a bail bond surety's solicitation of bonding business in a police station, jail, prison, detention facility, or other such place of detainment constitutes a crime of moral turpitude.

Historically, a crime of moral turpitude has been broadly construed to be one that denotes

shameful wickedness, so extreme a departure from ordinary standards of honest[y], good morals, justice, or ethics as to be shocking to the moral sense of the community. It has also been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which one person owes to another, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between people.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1026 (7th ed. 1999) (quoting 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 165, at 454 (1995)). Texas courts have held a number of offenses to be crimes of moral turpitude. See, e.g., In re Birdwell, 20 S.W.3d 685, 688-89 (Tex. 2000) (conspiring to defraud the United States); In re Humphreys, 880 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex. 1994) (tax evasion); Hardeman v. State, 868 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993), pet. dism'd, improvidently granted, 891 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (assault by a man against a woman). Other cases have determined that a particular offense is not a crime of moral turpitude. See, e.g., Lopez v. State, 990 S.W.2d 770, 778 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.) (misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated and driving while license is suspended); Dallas County Bail Bond Bd. v. Mason, 773 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ) (offense of issuing bad check is not a crime of moral turpitude because it does not contain element of intent to defraud). We have found no Texas case that has held that a bail bond license surety's solicitation of business inside an area prohibited by section 1704.304(c) is a crime of moral turpitude. Likewise, we are not aware of any out-of-state judicial decision that has found similar conduct to be a crime of moral turpitude.

More recently, courts have settled upon a somewhat less baroque definition. See Duncan v. Bd. of Disciplinary Appeals, 898 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex. 1995); Brown v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 34 S.W.3d 683, 690 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.). The Supreme Court of Texas has declared that with regard to attorneys, "crimes involving moral turpitude are those that involve dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, deliberate violence, or that reflect adversely on a lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." Duncan, 898 S.W.2d at 761; accord In re Humphreys, 880 S.W.2d at 408. A Texas appeals court has in turn determined that the same elements that implicate crimes of moral turpitude by attorneys are applicable to crimes of moral turpitude by licensed insurance agents. See Brown, 34 S.W.3d at 690 ("[M]oral turpitude is implicated by crimes that involve dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, deliberate violence, or that reflect adversely on a [licensee's] honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a [licensee] in other respects.") (citation omitted). Attorneys are of course bound by the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. If we disregard those aspects of the definition that relate exclusively to attorneys, we are left with the following elements, any one of which may constitute a crime of moral turpitude: dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or deliberate violence. Section 1704.304(c) of the Occupations Code prohibits mere solicitation, without regard to motive or means. Although a bail bond surety's solicitation of clients inside an area prohibited by section 1704.304(c) is certainly an intentional crime, it is not one of deliberate violence. Neither can that offense be clearly labeled as one of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. You do not suggest that the surety misrepresented himself to a potential client, or that he recruited clients by means of fraud, deceit, or dishonesty. Apparently, what this individual did was simply to boldly declare himself to be a bail bond surety soliciting clients. That he did so inside an area prohibited by section 1704.304(c), while it may bear on his temerity, does not bear on his honesty.

We conclude that a bail bond surety who is convicted of soliciting clients inside an area prohibited by section 1704.304(c) of the Occupations Code has not committed a crime of moral turpitude for purposes of section 1704.302(c) of the Occupations Code.

SUMMARY

A bail bond surety who is convicted of soliciting clients inside an area prohibited by section 1704.304(c) of the Occupations Code has not committed a crime of "moral turpitude" for purposes of section 1704.302(c) of the Occupations Code.

Very truly yours,

BARRY R. McBEE
First Assistant Attorney General

DON R. WILLETT
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

NANCY S. FULLER
Chair, Opinion Committee

Rick Gilpin
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee

Footnotes

[1] Letter from Honorable Bruce Isaacks, Denton County Criminal District Attorney, to Honorable Greg Abbott, Texas Attorney General (Aug. 16, 2004) (on file with Opinion Committee, also available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us) [hereinafter Request Letter].

[2] Subsection (c) has not been amended since September 1, 2001.