Can a Texas municipal management district use eminent domain to condemn private property?

TX AG Opinion GA-0268: Management District Eminent Domain

Plain-English summary

A state senator asked whether Texas municipal management districts, special local entities that fund commercial-area improvements, have the power of eminent domain, and if so how far that power reaches. The question arose after the Harris County Improvement District No. 3 (formerly the Upper Kirby Management District) threatened to condemn a Houston building that the Girl Scouts of San Jacinto Council was trying to buy; the district and the Girl Scouts settled that dispute, but the senator still wanted the broader legal question answered because similar districts exist across the state under a patchwork of statutes.

The opinion drew a sharp line based on which chapter of the Local Government Code created the district. Districts formed generally under chapter 375 have no eminent domain power whatsoever; the statute says so in plain terms. Chapter 376, by contrast, creates seventeen specific named districts by individual statute, and each one's own enabling law controls whether it has eminent domain power, either by saying so expressly or by necessary implication from the powers the legislature gave it. Applying that framework to the Harris County Improvement District No. 3 itself, the opinion found its enabling statute borrows powers from several other kinds of entities, some of which do have eminent domain power and some of which do not, and concluded that this contradiction meant the legislature's intent to grant the power was not clear enough, so the district does not have it.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2004. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Who this opinion affected (as of 2004)

Chapter 375 municipal management districts statewide: The opinion held these districts have no eminent domain power at all, because section 375.094 expressly states "[a] district may not exercise the power of eminent domain."

The seventeen chapter 376 districts named in the opinion, including the Harris County Improvement District No. 3: The opinion found nine of the seventeen districts have eminent domain expressly withheld by their own enabling statutes. For the Harris County Improvement District No. 3 specifically, the opinion concluded the district does not have eminent domain power, because its enabling statute incorporates the powers of entity types with conflicting eminent domain status. The opinion did not analyze the remaining chapter 376 districts individually and stated each one's enabling statute would need its own review.

Any management district that does hold eminent domain power: The opinion made clear such a district may use that power only to acquire property consistent with the district's own legitimate purposes, and that whether a particular condemnation serves a legitimate purpose is a fact question the opinion process cannot resolve.

Common questions

Do all Texas management districts have the power to condemn private property?
No. This 2004 opinion held that management districts created generally under Local Government Code chapter 375 have no eminent domain power, full stop, because the statute expressly withholds it.

What about districts created by their own individual statute under chapter 376?
Those are different, according to the opinion. Each of the seventeen districts chapter 376 creates has to be checked against its own specific enabling law; the opinion found nine of them have eminent domain expressly withheld, and it did not reach a conclusion on the rest beyond the Harris County Improvement District No. 3.

Does the Harris County Improvement District No. 3 (formerly Upper Kirby Management District) have eminent domain power?
No. The opinion concluded it does not, because its enabling statute pulls in powers from multiple other kinds of entities whose eminent domain authority conflicts, leaving the legislature's intent to grant the power unclear.

If a district does have eminent domain power, can it condemn property just because it wants that specific property?
Not for that reason alone. The opinion explained that a district with eminent domain power may use it only to acquire property consistent with the district's legitimate purposes, even if doing so interferes with a private transaction between other parties, and whether a given condemnation serves a legitimate purpose is a fact question the opinion process cannot answer.

Background and statutory framework

Chapter 375 of the Local Government Code lets the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality create a municipal management district in an area devoted primarily to commercial development or business activity, governed by a board of nine to thirty directors on staggered four-year terms. A chapter 375 district generally has the powers of a conservation and reclamation district under Water Code chapter 49, and the Water Code expressly gives conservation and reclamation districts condemnation authority for water, sewer, and drainage purposes. But chapter 375 itself carves that back out for management districts: "A district may not exercise the power of eminent domain."

Chapter 376 instead creates seventeen specific named management districts by individual statute, and the opinion listed them with their creating sections: Houston Downtown Management District, Westchase Area Management District, Greater Greenspoint Management District, First Colony Management District, Harris County Improvement District No. 3, Harris County Improvement District No. 2, Greater East End Management District, East Downtown Management District, Midtown Management District, Harris County Municipal Management District No. 1, Near Northwest Management District, Greater Northside Management District, Old Town Spring Improvement District, Harris County Improvement District No. 4, Frisco Square Management District, Aldine Community Improvement District, and Greater Southeast Management District. The opinion noted that the names of the nine districts whose eminent domain power is expressly withheld were underlined in its list, and separately cited the specific Local Government Code subsections stating that "the district may not exercise the power of eminent domain" for those nine.

Turning to the Harris County Improvement District No. 3, the opinion found its enabling statute, section 376.160, gives it the rights and powers of several other kinds of entities: a chapter 375 municipal management district (which lacks eminent domain), a district or water supply corporation under Water Code chapter 49, subchapter H (which the Water Code gives condemnation authority under section 49.222(a)), and a corporation under section 4B of the Development Corporation Act of 1979 (which can condemn property only with the eligible city's governing body's approval). Because the district's own governing chapter 375 forbids eminent domain while two of the other entity types whose powers it borrows do allow it, and because those two allowance provisions themselves disagree about whether another government body's approval is required first, the opinion concluded the legislature's intent was too unclear to say the power was conferred by necessary implication, citing Burch v. City of San Antonio and Anderson v. Teco Pipeline Co. for the rule that eminent domain must be conferred expressly or by necessary implication. The opinion expressly declined to analyze the remaining seven chapter 376 districts whose statutes are silent, stating each one's enabling statute would need the same kind of individual review.

On the senator's third question, whether a district with eminent domain power could use it to acquire property from a private buyer simply because the district wanted it too, the opinion applied the general rule that eminent domain in Texas may be exercised only for a public purpose, citing article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution and Maher v. Lasater, and that a government body exceeds its eminent domain power only when it condemns property for a use unconnected to its legitimate purposes (citing Atwood v. Willacy County Navigation Dist.). The opinion concluded a district with the power could use it for a purpose consistent with its own legitimate purposes even if that interfered with a private transaction, but that whether a specific condemnation serves a legitimate purpose is a fact question the opinion process cannot resolve.

Citations

Statutes:

• TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. chs. 375-76 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2004-05)
• TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7k, § 2.01 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05)
• TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 376.151(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05)
• TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. ch. 375 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2004-05)
• TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 375.021 (Vernon 1999)
• TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 375.027
• TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 375.061
• TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 375.064(a)
• TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 375.091
• TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 49.222(a) (Vernon 2000)
• TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 375.094 (Vernon 1999)
• TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 376.160 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05)
• TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5190.6, § 4B(i) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05)
• TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17

Cases:

• Burch v. City of San Antonio, 518 S.W.2d 540, 544 (Tex. 1975)
• Anderson v. Teco Pipeline Co., 985 S.W.2d 559, 564 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied)
• Maher v. Lasater, 354 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. 1962)
• Atwood v. Willacy County Navigation Dist., 271 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/greg-abbott/ga-0268
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2004/ga0268.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

GREG ABBOTT

November 4, 2004

The Honorable Rodney Ellis
Chair, Committee on Government Organization
Texas State Senate
Post Office Box 12068
Austin, Texas 78711

Opinion No. GA-0268

Re: Whether municipal management districts have eminent domain powers (RQ-0228-GA)

Dear Senator Ellis:

You ask whether municipal management districts have eminent domain powers, and if so, the extent of those powers.[1] Although you specifically ask about "management districts" without limitation, we limit our response to municipal management districts created under chapters 375 and 376 of the Local Government Code because the type of district that prompts your question is a municipal management district. See Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1; see also TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. chs. 375-76 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2004-05). We do not consider any other type of management district. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7k, § 2.01 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05) (creating the Upper Sabine Valley Solid Waste Management District, a conservation and reclamation district).

I. Factual Background

Earlier this year, the Harris County Improvement District No. 3 (the "HCID3"), formerly known as the "Upper Kirby Management District,"[2] a municipal management district created under chapter 376, subchapter E threatened to condemn a building in Houston that the Girl Scouts of San Jacinto Council was attempting to acquire from the owner, AAA of Southern California.[3] See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 376.151(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05) (creating the HCID3). The HCID3 also wished to acquire the building. See March 9 Letter, supra note 3, at 1. At that time, the HCID3's power of eminent domain was questioned in a lawsuit. See id.[4] You inform us, however, that the HCID3 and the Girl Scouts of San Jacinto Council "reached an agreement, and ended all legal action." Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1.

Nevertheless, you ask us to "clarify the extent of the power of eminent domain for all management districts," not just the HCID3. Id. As you aver, "management districts have been formed around the state" under a variety of statutes. Id. Some of these statutes, you suggest, "have conflicting provisions regarding eminent domain." Id. You therefore ask us to resolve these perceived conflicts.

II. Chapters 375 and 376 of the Local Government Code

Chapter 375 of the Local Government Code provides generally for municipal management districts. See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. ch. 375 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2004-05). The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (the "TCEQ")[5] may create a municipal management district (a "district") only:

(1) in an area devoted primarily to commercial development and business activity inside the boundaries of a municipality with a population of at least 25,000; or

(2) in an area devoted primarily to commercial development or business activity.

Id. § 375.021 (Vernon 1999). But see id. § 375.027 (limiting the creation of a district in a municipality with a population of more than 1.5 million). Once created by TCEQ order, the district is governed by a board of "at least nine but not more than 30 directors who serve staggered four-year terms." Id. § 375.061. The TCEQ order lists the initial board members, but the municipal governing body appoints succeeding board members. See id. § 375.064(a). A municipal management district has the general powers of a conservation and reclamation district subject to Water Code chapter 49. See id. § 375.091 ("General Powers"). The Water Code expressly gives eminent domain powers to conservation and reclamation districts that are subject to its provisions. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 49.222(a) (Vernon 2000) (granting a conservation and reclamation district authority to condemn property "inside or outside the district boundaries . . . necessary for water, sanitary sewer, storm drainage, or flood drainage or control purposes for any other of its projects or purposes"). By contrast, chapter 375 of the Local Government Code expressly withholds eminent domain powers from municipal management districts: "A district may not exercise the power of eminent domain." TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 375.094 (Vernon 1999).

Chapter 376 provides for the creation of 17 specific municipal management districts. In the following list, the names of the districts from which eminent domain powers are expressly withheld are underlined:[6]

1. Houston Downtown Management District, see id. § 376.001(a);

2. Westchase Area Management District, see id. § 376.041(a);

3. Greater Greenspoint Management District, see id. § 376.081(a);

4. First Colony Management District, see id. § 376.111(a);

5. Harris County Improvement District No. 3, see id. § 376.151(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05);

6. Harris County Improvement District No. 2, see id. § 376.211(a) (Vernon 1999);

7. Greater East End Management District, see id. § 376.261(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05);

8. East Downtown Management District, see id. § 376.301(a);

9. Midtown Management District, see id. § 376.351(a);

10. Harris County Municipal Management District No. 1, see id. § 376.401(a);

11. Near Northwest Management District, see id. § 376.451(a);[7]

12. Greater Northside Management District, see id. § 376.451(a);[8]

13. Old Town Spring Improvement District, see id. § 376.451(a);[9]

14. Harris County Improvement District No. 4, see id. § 376.451(a);[10]

15. Frisco Square Management District, see id. § 376.451(a);[11]

16. Aldine Community Improvement District, see id. § 376.451(a);[12] and

17. Greater Southeast Management District, see id. § 376.451(a).[13]

[Transcription note: the source scan's underlining marking which nine of the seventeen districts above have eminent domain expressly withheld did not survive OCR extraction. The specific withholding subsections are listed in the next paragraph.]

See id. §§ 376.052(b), .222, .272, .312, .462,[14] .462,[15] .463,[16] .465,[17] .474[18] (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2004-05) (stating, with respect to certain districts, that "[t]he district may not exercise the power of eminent domain").

III. Analysis and Conclusions

A. Questions 1 and 2

The legislature must confer the power of eminent domain "either expressly or by necessary implication." Burch v. City of San Antonio, 518 S.W.2d 540, 544 (Tex. 1975); Anderson v. Teco Pipeline Co., 985 S.W.2d 559, 564 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). Because chapter 375 expressly withholds eminent domain authority from municipal management districts created under that chapter, such a municipal management district does not possess eminent domain powers. With respect to a particular district created under chapter 376, on the other hand, the special statute must be analyzed to determine whether the power of eminent domain is conferred expressly or by necessary implication.

With respect to the nine districts from which the power of eminent domain is expressly withheld, whose names are underlined in the list supra, we conclude, in answer to your first two questions, that the legislature did not intend to confer and indeed did not confer the power of eminent domain. Consequently, these districts have no power of eminent domain.

The enabling statutes of the remaining districts are silent on the issue of eminent domain. None of the districts are expressly authorized to exercise that power. Looking specifically at HCID3, the subject of your original question, as an example, section 376.160 of the Local Government Code provides it with the powers of certain other types of districts, including a municipal management district created under chapter 375:

The district has:

(1) all powers necessary or required to accomplish the purposes for which the district was created;

(2) the rights, powers, privileges, authority, and functions of a district created under Chapter 375 ["Municipal Management Districts in General," discussed supra at pp. 2-3];

(3) the powers, duties, and contracting authority specified in Subchapters H and I, Chapter 49, Water Code;

(4) the powers given to a corporation under Section 4B, Development Corporation Act of 1979 . . . and the power to own, operate, acquire, construct, lease, improve, and maintain projects described by that section;

(5) the power of a housing finance corporation created under Chapter 394;

(6) the power to impose, assess, charge, or collect ad valorem taxes, assessments, impact fees, or other fees in accordance with Chapter 49, Water Code . . . ;

(7) the power to contract with the municipality or county for the provision on a fee basis of law enforcement and security services by the county or municipality; and

(8) the power to contract with a private entity for the provision of supplemental security services.

TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 376.160 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05) (footnote omitted).

Of the types of entities whose powers the HCID3 is given under section 376.160, two have certain express eminent domain powers. Section 49.222 of the Water Code, part of chapter 49, subchapter H and incorporated by section 376.160(3), provides a district or water supply corporation subject to the chapter with authority to acquire certain real property by condemnation, or eminent domain. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 49.222(a) (Vernon 2000). A corporation created under section 4B of the Development Corporation Act of 1979, whose powers are among those of the HCID3 by virtue of section 376.160(4), has the power to condemn real property but only if the eligible city's governing body approves the action. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5190.6, § 4B(i) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05). Because section 376.160(3) of the Local Government Code provides the HCID3 with powers given a water district or water supply corporation under chapter 49, subchapter H of the Water Code, and the powers given a corporation under section 4B of the Development Corporation Act of 1979, arguably the HCID3 has the power of eminent domain. On the other hand, chapter 375 of the Local Government Code, which applies to the HCID3 through section 376.160(2) and which applies generally to management districts like the HCID3, expressly forbids a management district to exercise the power of eminent domain. See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 375.094 (Vernon 1999). Moreover, if the HCID3's powers included that of eminent domain, we would have to determine whether the district may exercise that power without the approval of another governmental body, as section 49.222 of the Water Code would allow, or only with the approval of some governmental body, as section 4B of the Development Corporation Act of 1979 would require.

Given the contradictory nature of the HCID3's powers, we cannot say that its enabling statute, chapter 376, subchapter E, implicitly confers the power of eminent domain. In particular here, given the fact that the eminent domain powers of two of the entities whose powers are incorporated into the HCID3's powers conflict, the legislature's intent is unclear. We consequently conclude that the HCID3 does not have the power of eminent domain.

We have not considered whether the remaining seven management districts have the power of eminent domain, notwithstanding their lack of express eminent domain power. The enabling statute for each district must be analyzed as we have done here for the HCID3, with possible consideration of the statute's legislative history, to determine whether the particular district has eminent domain power.

B. Question 3

You finally ask whether a municipal management district that has the power of eminent domain, assuming there are any, may use its power to "interfere with a transaction between two interested parties solely because the [d]istrict desires to acquire the property for its own use." Request Letter, supra note 1, at 1. A governmental body in Texas may exercise the power of eminent domain for a public purpose only. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17; Maher v. Lasater, 354 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. 1962). A governmental body exceeds its eminent domain powers "when and only when" it condemns property "for a use unconnected with its legitimate purposes." Atwood v. Willacy County Navigation Dist., 271 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.); accord Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. X-0179 (2000) at 5. Thus, a district with the power of eminent domain may use the power to acquire property for a use consistent with the district's legitimate purposes even if exercise of the eminent domain power may interfere with a transaction between private parties. Whether property is being condemned, in any particular circumstance, for a legitimate purpose of the condemning municipal management district is a question of fact that cannot be resolved in the opinion process. See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0156 (2004) at 10 (stating that fact questions cannot be answered in the opinion process).

SUMMARY

A municipal management district created under chapter 375 of the Local Government Code has no power of eminent domain. A municipal management district created under chapter 376 has eminent domain power only if the power is conferred expressly or implicitly. Those districts whose enabling statutes expressly withhold eminent domain power do not have such power. The Harris County Improvement District No. 3 does not have eminent domain power. The enabling statute of any other municipal management district must be analyzed to consider whether the statute confers expressly or implicitly the power of eminent domain. A municipal management district with the power of eminent domain may use the power to acquire property for a use consistent with the district's legitimate purposes even if exercise of the eminent domain power may interfere with a transaction between private parties. Whether property is being condemned, in any particular circumstance, for a legitimate purpose of the condemning municipal management district is a question of fact.

Very truly yours,

BARRY R. MCBEE
First Assistant Attorney General

DON R. WILLETT
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

NANCY S. FULLER
Chair, Opinion Committee

Kymberly K. Oltrogge
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee

Footnotes

[1] Letter from Honorable Rodney Ellis, Chair, Committee on Government Organization, Texas State Senate, to Honorable Greg Abbott, Texas Attorney General, at 1 (May 12, 2004) (on file with the Opinion Committee, also available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us) [hereinafter Request Letter].

[2] See Act of June 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 766, § 8(a), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 2224, 2226.

[3] See Letter from Honorable Rodney Ellis, Chair, Committee on Government Organization, Texas State Senate, to Honorable Greg Abbott, Texas Attorney General, at 1 (Mar. 9, 2004) (on file with the Opinion Committee) [hereinafter March 9 Letter].

[4] See also Letter from Nancy S. Fuller, Chair, Opinion Committee, Texas Attorney General, to Honorable Rodney Ellis, Chair, Committee on Government Organization, Texas State Senate, at 1 (Apr. 21, 2004) (on file with the Opinion Committee) (stating the policy of this office "to refrain from issuing an attorney general opinion" on a matter that is "the subject of pending litigation").

[5] Chapter 375 expressly provides that the "Commission," which term is defined as the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, see TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 375.003(3) (Vernon 1999), has sole authority to create a district. See id. §§ 375.022, .041 (referring in numerous places to the "commission"). The Natural Resource Conservation Commission is now the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. See http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/about/.

[6] With the exception of subchapter K, as added by Act of May 26, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1380, § 1, sec. 376.451, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 3542, 3542, creating the Port Bolivar Improvement District, chapter 376 has been repealed effective April 1, 2005. See Act of May 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1277, § 6(6)(B)-(I), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 4454, 4653-54. Effective April 1, 2005, these subchapters (again with the exception of the subchapter creating the Port Bolivar Improvement District) will be codified in the new Special District Local Laws Code. See id. § 1, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws at 4489-4591; id. § 9, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws at 4654 ("Effective Date"). Subchapter K, as added by Act of May 26, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1380, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 3542, 3542-48, expired on January 1, 2003, "unless before that date the district [was] confirmed at an election." Act of May 26, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1380, § 3, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 3542, 3548. We have found no information that such an election was ever conducted.

[7] As adopted by Act of May 15, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 418, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 797, 798.

[8] As adopted by Act of May 23, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1356, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 3349, 3349.

[9] As adopted by Act of May 17, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1371, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 3460, 3460.

[10] As adopted by Act of May 23, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1376, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 3528, 3528.

[11] As adopted by Act of May 23, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1384, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 3557, 3557.

[12] As adopted by Act of May 17, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1433, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 5131, 5131.

[13] As adopted by Act of May 25, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1476, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 5245, 5246.

[14] As adopted by Act of May 23, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1356, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 3349, 3352.

[15] As adopted by Act of May 25, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1476, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 5245, 5250.

[16] As adopted by Act of May 15, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 418, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 797, 798.

[17] As adopted by Act of May 17, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1371, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 3460, 3464.

[18] As adopted by Act of May 17, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1433, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 5131, 5136.