Who controls a county juvenile detention center, the juvenile court or a private company hired to run it?

Plain-English summary

Bell County contracted with a private corporation to operate, staff, and manage its juvenile detention facility. Under the management agreement, the corporation wrote its own policies and ran day-to-day operations (subject to the juvenile board's approval), and the only role spelled out for the designated juvenile court was inspection. The county attorney asked the Attorney General how much authority the juvenile court actually has, given Family Code section 51.12(b), which says the juvenile court "shall control the conditions and terms of detention and detention supervision."

Two readings were on the table. A private attorney for the county argued the language only lets the juvenile court control detention of the particular juveniles before it, not the facility in general. The Texas Juvenile Probation Commission argued the language gives the court real control over the conditions and terms of detention, which requires some ability to influence how the facility operates. The Attorney General sided with the Commission. Reading the statute against its 1973 history (drawn from law professor Robert O. Dawson's commentary), the opinion explained that the language was meant to move supervisory authority over detained juveniles away from the sheriff who ran the county jail and place it with the juvenile court, the ultimate authority over the juvenile process. The statute vests that control regardless of who operates a given facility, which signals an intent to give juvenile courts authority over conditions of detention in all county facilities used to detain juveniles.

The opinion acknowledged the original reason for the language has largely disappeared (children are now held in juvenile detention facilities, not county jails) and that the overlapping grants of authority among the juvenile court, the juvenile board, and the commissioners court may be "unwieldy and unmanageable" in a county like Bell. But it found no implied repeal and said it is for the Legislature, not the Attorney General, to decide whether the authority is outdated and to amend the statute. The bottom line: section 51.12(b) gives the juvenile court authority over the county juvenile detention facility separate from the juvenile board and commissioners court, and because a county cannot contract in conflict with state law, a county's contract with a private corporation to operate the facility is void to the extent it conflicts with section 51.12(b).

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1997. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

What the opinion meant at the time

For counties and commissioners courts: The opinion held a county could not, by contract, strip the juvenile court of its section 51.12(b) control over detention conditions. A management agreement with a private operator was valid only so far as it did not conflict with that authority; conflicting terms were void.

For juvenile courts and juvenile boards: The opinion read the juvenile court's control over conditions and terms of detention as a year-round authority that exists separately from the annual inspect-and-certify duty in subsection (c) and separately from the juvenile board's role.

For private juvenile-detention operators: The opinion meant a private contractor running a county facility took its contract subject to the juvenile court's statutory control, so contract provisions that displaced that control could not be enforced.

Common questions

Does the juvenile court only control detention of the specific kids before it?

No. The opinion rejected that narrow reading. It concluded section 51.12(b) gives the juvenile court authority over the county juvenile detention facility itself, not just over the individual juveniles in the court's cases.

Can a county hand full operational control to a private company by contract?

Not entirely. The opinion said a county cannot contract in a way that conflicts with state law, so a management agreement with a private operator is void to the extent it conflicts with the juvenile court's authority under section 51.12(b).

Did the juvenile court's authority disappear because kids aren't held in county jails anymore?

No. The opinion recognized the original 1973 purpose (taking control away from the jail-running sheriff) has faded, but found no implied repeal of the language. The authority remains until the Legislature changes it.

Isn't the juvenile court's inspection role under subsection (c) the limit of its power?

No. The opinion held the annual inspect-and-certify duty in subsection (c) does not bar the juvenile court from exercising control over conditions and terms of detention throughout the year under subsection (b).

Background and statutory framework

Family Code section 51.12 directs the proper county authorities to provide a suitable place of detention for children, while subsection (b) provides that the juvenile court "shall control the conditions and terms of detention and detention supervision." Subsection (c) requires the juvenile court judge and juvenile board members to inspect and certify detention facilities at least annually against the standards of the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission (or, at the board's election, American Correctional Association standards), and subsection (d) bars placing a child in a facility not certified as suitable. The Human Resources Code requires the Commission to adopt minimum standards for juvenile detention facilities (§ 141.042(a)(4)) and governs the makeup of county juvenile boards (§ 152.0201). The juvenile board designates which court serves as the juvenile court (Fam. Code § 51.04(b)); Bell County had designated County Court at Law No. 1.

The opinion traced the "control the conditions and terms" language to the 1973 adoption of title 3 of the Family Code and to Professor Robert O. Dawson's contemporaneous commentary, which explained the provision shifted supervisory authority over detained juveniles from the sheriff (who controlled county jails under former Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 2338-1 and 5116) to the juvenile court. A later Dawson article noted that, with children no longer held in county jails, some of subsection (b)'s jail-era provisions had become obsolete, but the opinion found no implied repeal, observing that the Legislature amended subsections (a) and (c) in 1995 without touching subsection (b). Reading the grants together, the opinion held the juvenile court's authority is separate from the juvenile board and commissioners court, and that a conflicting county contract with a private operator is void to the extent of the conflict.

Citations

Statutes

• Fam. Code §§ 51.12, 51.12(b), 51.12(c), 51.04(b)
• Hum. Res. Code §§ 141.042(a)(4), 152.0201
• Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 2338-1, § 17, and 5116 (former law)

Secondary authority

• Robert O. Dawson, Delinquent Children and Children in Need of Supervision: Draftsman's Comments to Title 3 of the Texas Family Code, 5 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 509 (1974)
• Robert O. Dawson, Title 3, Delinquent Children and Children in Need of Supervision, 21 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1747 (1990)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/dan-morales/dm-0439
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1997/dm0439.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

Office of the Attorney General
State of Texas

DAN MORALES
ATTORNEY GENERAL

May 7, 1997

The Honorable Richard J. Miller
Bell County Attorney
P.O. Box 1127
Belton, Texas 76513

Opinion No. DM-439

Re: Whether a juvenile court's authority under Family Code section 51.12(b) to "control the conditions and terms of detention and detention supervision" supersedes the terms of a county contract with a private corporation regarding the operation of the county juvenile detention facility (RQ-921)

Dear Mr. Miller:

On behalf of Bell County (the "county"), you ask about the relationship between Family Code section 51.12(b), which gives the juvenile court of a county the authority to "control the conditions and terms of detention and detention supervision," and a county contract authorizing a private corporation to operate the county juvenile detention facility. We conclude that section 51.12(b) is intended to authorize the juvenile court to control the conditions of the county juvenile facility and that any contract entered into by the county for the operation of a county juvenile facility is void to the extent it is inconsistent with section 51.12(b).

Section 51.12 of the Family Code provides in pertinent part as follows:

(b) The proper authorities in each county shall provide a suitable place of detention for children who are parties to proceedings under this title, but the juvenile court shall control the conditions and terms of detention and detention supervision and shall permit visitation with the child at all reasonable times;

(c) In each county, the judge of the juvenile court and the members of the juvenile board shall personally inspect the detention facilities and any public or private secure correctional facilities used for post-adjudication confinement that are located in the county and operated under the authority of the juvenile board at least annually and shall certify in writing to the authorities responsible for operating and giving financial support to the facilities and to the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission that they are suitable or unsuitable for the detention of children in accordance with:

(1) the requirements of Subsections (a), (f) and (g); and

(2) minimum professional standards for the detention of children in pre-adjudication or post-adjudication secure confinement promulgated by the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission or, at the election of the juvenile board, the current standards promulgated by the American Correctional Association.

(d) No child shall be placed in a facility that has not been certified under Subsection (c) of this section as suitable for the detention of children. . . .

In addition, we note that section 141.042(a)(4) of the Human Resources Code requires the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission to adopt reasonable rules that provide minimum standards for juvenile detention facilities.

The Bell County Juvenile Board (the "juvenile board") is governed by section 152.0201 of the Human Resources Code and is composed of the county judge, the district judges of the county, the judge of County Court at Law No. 1 and the judge of County Court at Law No. 2. You inform us that the juvenile board has designated the County Court at Law No. 1 as the juvenile court for the county. See Fam. Code § 51.04(b) ("In each county, the county's juvenile board shall designate one or more district, criminal district, domestic relations, juvenile, or county courts or county courts at law as the juvenile court . . . .").

You refer to the contract at issue as a "management agreement." You state that the management agreement authorizes the private corporation to operate, maintain and manage the juvenile detention facility according to standards of the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission, subject to the approval of the juvenile board. "The corporation is to develop its own written policies, procedures, and operation manuals concerning operation of the facility 'and juvenile supervision for which it is responsible' under the agreement, which policies must comply with legal requirements." The private corporation is responsible for "day-to-day management of the facility, staffing employee training, program services for juvenile detainees (with the advice and consent of the Juvenile Board), and providing security and supervision of the juveniles." You also state that "[t]he only role spelled out in the Management Agreement for the designated Juvenile Court is one of inspection." Given this background, you ask the following series of questions:

What is the specific authority of the designated Juvenile Court . . .? If the required policies of the private corporation are adopted by the Juvenile Board, is the Juvenile Court empowered by Section 51.12(b) to order different activities or policies independent of those adopted by the Juvenile Board, so long as minimum standards are met? Does the Juvenile Court have the statutory authority to specifically direct all aspects of the day-to-day operation of the detention facility within the standards established by the Juvenile Probation Commission, regardless of any agreement between a private corporation and the Juvenile Board and Commissioners Court? How does [section 51.12(b)] co-exist with other statutes . . . [given that it seems] the legislature intended that the Juvenile Board play the primary role in operating and supervising detention facilities?

Your query requires us to construe the language in section 51.12(b) that gives the juvenile court of a county the authority to "control the conditions and terms of detention and detention supervision." With your query, you enclose a letter brief written on behalf of the county by a private attorney expressing the view that this language in section 51.12(b) merely authorizes the juvenile court to control the terms and conditions of detention of the particular juveniles coming before the court, but that it gives the juvenile court no general supervisory authority over the juvenile detention facility: "[T]he extent of the Juvenile Court's authority is limited to those juveniles directly under the court's jurisdiction, and only then to the extent necessary to insure that the facility to which these specific juveniles are entrusted is operated in accordance with law." A letter from the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission, however, rejects this narrow interpretation of the language and insists that section 51.12(b) gives juvenile courts control over the conditions and terms of detention and that to exercise this authority juvenile courts "must have some ability to influence operations of the facility."

We believe that the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission has the better of the two positions. The relevant language in section 51.12 was enacted in 1973 when the legislature adopted title 3 of the Family Code. As the following commentary explains, when title 3 was adopted, juveniles were often detained in county jails controlled by the county sheriff; when understood in this context, it is apparent that the intent of the language at issue was to transfer supervisory authority for the detention of juveniles from the sheriff, the official responsible for supervising and controlling county jails, to the juvenile court:

Subsection (b), like prior Texas law, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2338-1, § 17, places the responsibility on local authorities to provide the space needed for the detention of children. The proper authorities in each county clearly includes the commissioners court; however, if the detention facility is in the county jail the proper authorities would also include the sheriff. The juvenile court control of "the conditions and terms of detention and detention supervision" is new to Texas law. The concept, however, is an old principle in juvenile proceedings: The juvenile court judge is the ultimate authority for the entire juvenile process and he, not the sheriff, should control the conditions of detention and detention supervision. Subsection (b), therefore, supersedes the general rule of Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5116 that "the Sheriff shall exercise a supervision and control over the jail," to the extent that a county jail is used as a place of detention for children. . . .

Robert O. Dawson, Delinquent Children and Children in Need of Supervision: Draftsman's Comments to Title 3 of the Texas Family Code, 5 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 509, 530-31 (1974).

In enacting the language at issue in 1973, the legislature clearly intended to vest juvenile courts with authority over county facilities used to detain juveniles. It is now the case that juveniles across the state are housed in juvenile detention facilities rather than county jails. As the same commentator wrote in 1990, "When Title 3 was enacted in 1973, many children in pretrial detention status were detained in county jails. Today, no children are detained in county jails but are instead detained in local or Regional detention facilities. That makes some of the provisions of subsection (b) relating to county jails obsolete." Dawson, supra note 3, at 1776. While the original impetus for this language in section 51.12(b) may no longer exist, we have no basis to conclude that the language has been impliedly repealed.

Furthermore, we note that although the above-quoted commentary suggests that the sole purpose of the language regarding juvenile court control of "the conditions and terms of detention and detention supervision" was to give juvenile courts authority over the conditions of the detention of juveniles in county jails, section 51.12(b) vests juvenile courts with this authority without regard to whether a particular facility is operated by the sheriff or the commissioners court. This suggests legislative intent to vest juvenile courts with authority over the conditions of detention in all county facilities used to detain juveniles. The legislature last revisited section 51.12 in 1995, amending subsections (a) and (c), but did not see fit to amend subsection (b).

We also note that the authority granted to the juvenile court in subsection (b) is not inconsistent with the requirement in subsection (c) that "the judge of the juvenile court and the members of the juvenile board shall personally inspect the detention facilities" and certify their suitability for the detention of children. The duty of the juvenile court and the juvenile board annually to inspect and certify to a facility's compliance with statutory requirements and minimum standards selected by the juvenile board does not preclude the juvenile court from exercising authority over conditions and terms of juvenile detention 365 days of the year. Furthermore, the express inclusion of the judge of the juvenile court in inspection in subsection (c), which dates from 1975, indicates that the legislature intended to ensure that the juvenile court judge participate in the inspection of juvenile detention facilities even if the judge is not a member of the juvenile board. In the many times the legislature has amended subsection (c) since 1975, it has left this express and separate reference to the juvenile court unaltered.

Finally, we note that since 1973 the role of juvenile boards in the administration of the county-level juvenile justice system has been significantly expanded across the state. In addition, today, as a general rule, the juvenile court judge must be a member of the juvenile board. It may be the case that the legislature has failed to amend subsection (b) to delete the juvenile court's separate statutory authority to control the county juvenile detention facility because it views this authority as fully consistent with the juvenile court's role as a member of the juvenile board. While the separate statutory grants of authority with respect to juvenile detention facilities in Family Code section 51.12, subsections (b) and (c) (and other statutes) may be "unwieldy and unmanageable" in Bell County, it is for the legislature, not this office, to assess whether the authority granted to juvenile courts in subsection (b) is outdated or universally unworkable and to amend the statute if necessary.

In sum, section 51.12(b) vests the juvenile court with authority over the county juvenile detention facility separate and apart from the authority of the juvenile board and commissioners court. A county is not authorized to enter into a contract that conflicts with state law. A county contract with a private corporation regarding the operation of a juvenile detention facility is void to the extent it conflicts with section 51.12(b).

SUMMARY

Family Code section 51.12(b) vests a county juvenile court with authority over county juvenile detention facilities separate and apart from the authority of the juvenile board and commissioners court. A county contract with a private corporation regarding the operation of a juvenile detention facility is void to the extent it conflicts with section 51.12(b).

DAN MORALES
Attorney General of Texas

JORGE VEGA
First Assistant Attorney General

SARAH J. SHIRLEY
Chair, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Mary R. Crouter
Assistant Attorney General

Footnotes

[Several footnotes in the scanned source identify the enacting and amending legislation and a secondary source: the 1973 enactment of title 3 (Act of May 25, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 544, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1460, 1465-66); the 1995 amendment of subsections (a) and (c) (Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 262, § 12, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2517, 2523); and Robert O. Dawson, Title 3, Delinquent Children and Children in Need of Supervision, 21 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1747, 1776 (1990). Other footnotes were not fully legible in the scanned source; see the linked PDF for their exact text.]