Could a vandalism victim inspect or copy a child's confidential Texas juvenile-court records for use in a related civil damages case?

TX AG Opinion DM-0334: Could a vandalism victim obtain juvenile-court records?

Plain-English summary

The Texas Attorney General concluded that a juvenile court could, in some circumstances, treat a vandalism victim as a person with a "legitimate interest" in a delinquency proceeding under Family Code section 51.14(a)(4). The victim's interest in obtaining compensation for malicious property damage could justify access to records for a civil lawsuit arising from the same conduct. Whether a particular victim qualified remained a matter for the juvenile court's sound discretion.

The phrase stating that juvenile files were "open to inspection only by" listed people limited who could inspect them. It did not mean those people could do nothing beyond looking at the records. Still, permission to inspect did not automatically include permission to copy.

A juvenile court could permit a narrowly limited copy when the public interest required it, such as when information was essential to a related civil claim and was not otherwise reasonably available. If the same information could be obtained from another record or an available witness, the court could find that copying was unnecessary.

The opinion also concluded that Family Code section 51.13(b) likely did not exclude relevant evidence from a civil case merely because the evidence had also been offered in juvenile court. A transcript or markings revealing what occurred in the juvenile proceeding would be barred, but a witness's independent recollection or documentary or physical evidence that did not reveal the juvenile case could be used. Juvenile adjudications remained unavailable for ordinary credibility impeachment.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1995. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Who this opinion affected (as of 1995)

Victims and property owners: A related civil damages claim could support a legitimate-interest request, but access was not automatic and depended on the juvenile court's weighing of the evidence and competing policies.

Juvenile court judges: The opinion described broad discretion to grant inspection, conduct an in-camera review, limit disclosure to necessary information, restrict use to the related lawsuit, and decide whether copies were needed.

Children and their counsel: The confidentiality and rehabilitation interests protected by juvenile law remained part of the balance. Disclosure orders were to be narrowly tailored.

Civil litigators: Evidence did not become unusable solely because it had appeared in juvenile court. The proposed use and whether the material revealed the juvenile proceeding mattered.

Common questions

Was a vandalism victim automatically entitled to inspect juvenile records?
No. The opinion said that compensation policy could justify a finding of legitimate interest, but only the juvenile court could decide whether a particular request met that standard.

Did "open to inspection only by" mean that authorized people could not obtain copies?
No. The word "only" limited the class of people allowed access, not the method of access.

Did permission to inspect automatically permit copying?
No. Copying required a further public-interest justification. The opinion identified essential information not otherwise reasonably available as an example.

Could the victim use the child's juvenile-court admission in the civil case?
The opinion did not decide admissibility of the specific document. It concluded more generally that a transcript or material revealing what happened in juvenile court would be barred, while independently available evidence of the underlying facts might not be.

Could a court restrict how disclosed material was used?
Yes. Section 51.14(a)(4) implicitly allowed conditions consistent with juvenile-law purposes, and the opinion also identified Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a as a possible sealing mechanism in the civil case.

Background and statutory framework

Family Code section 51.14(a) made juvenile-court, clerk, and prosecutor files available only to identified people and to another person whom the juvenile court found had a legitimate interest. Section 51.13 limited the civil consequences and later use of juvenile adjudications and evidence. Section 51.01(3) balanced rehabilitation and freedom from stigma against protection of the public interest.

Texas law also imposed civil liability on minors for their own torts and made parents liable, within a statutory cap, for specified willful and malicious property damage by a child. The opinion treated compensation of property owners as a public policy that could support access.

Decisions from Nevada, Louisiana, Alabama, and Wisconsin allowed disclosure of juvenile material for related civil claims under standards requiring necessity, lack of reasonable alternatives, in-camera review, and careful limits. The opinion did not declare those procedures binding in Texas, but found them consistent with Texas policy.

For later use of evidence, the opinion relied on the Colorado decision in Gallegos. It distinguished evidence of what was said or done in juvenile court from independent proof of the same underlying facts. It also stressed that the evidence had to be relevant to a material issue, not offered only to impeach a witness through a juvenile record.

Citations

Statutes and rules:

• Tex. Fam. Code §§ 51.01(3), 51.13(a)-(b), 51.14(a), 51.14(a)(4), 51.14(d), 33.01, 33.02
• Former V.T.C.S. art. 2338-1, § 15
• Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 609
• Tex. R. Civ. P. 76a

Cases:

• Hickey v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 782 P.2d 1336 (Nev. 1989)
• Daniels v. National Fire Insurance Co., 394 So. 2d 683 (La. Ct. App. 1981)
• Ex parte State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 529 So. 2d 975 (Ala. 1988)
• State ex rel. Herget v. Circuit Court, 267 N.W.2d 309 (Wis. 1978)
• Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978)
• Gallegos v. Colorado, 358 P.2d 1028 (Colo. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 370 U.S. 49 (1962)
• Hall v. State, 745 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1988, pet. ref'd)
• Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)

Related opinions:

• Tex. Att'y Gen. Ops. H-264 (1974); DM-166 (1992)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/dan-morales/dm-0334
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1995/dm0334.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

Office of the Attorney General
State of Texas

DAN MORALES

ATTORNEY GENERAL March 21, 1995
Honorable D. August Boto Opinion No. DM-334
Cooke County Attorney
3rd Floor, Courthouse Re: Whether a victim of delinquent
Gainesville, Texas 76240 conduct by a child may be a person

having a “legitimate interest in the
proceeding” for purposes of section
51.14(a)(4) of the Family Code, and
related questions (RQ-728)

Dear Mr. Boto:

Your request for an opinion involves a victim of vandalism by a child who has been
the subject of a juvenile delinquency proceeding arising out of the vandalism. You ask
whether a court may grant leave to such a victim--as a “person ... having a legitimate
interest in the proceeding” under Family Code (“code”) section 51.14(a)(4)--to inspect the
juvenile court file of the child to prepare for trial of a civil action by the victim against the
child arising out of the same incident of vandalism. You specifically ask whether such a
victim may obtain “a certified copy of the admission of guilt on the part of the juvenile,” a
sworn stipulation of evidence by a child that has been admitted into evidence in support of
the child’s plea of true to a delinquency charge. This document would be “use[d] . . . in
an offer of proof to establish liability for the [property] damage” suffered by the victim.
The victim also would wish to “examine . . . judicial records . . . in an effort to secure the
names of witnesses who could testify to prove liability on the part of” the child.

Code section 51.14(a) provides in part as follows:

(a) ... [AJll files and records of a juvenile court, a clerk of
court, or a prosecuting attorney relating to a child who is a party to a
proceeding under this title are open to inspection only by:

(1) the judge, probation officers, and professional staff or
consultants of the juvenile court;

(2) an attorney for a party to the proceeding;

(3) a public or private agency or institution providing supervision of the child by arrangement of the juvenile court, or having
custody of the child under juvenile court order; or
Honorable D. August Boto - Page 2. (DM-334)

(4) with leave of juvenile court, any other person, agency, or
institution having a legitimate interest in the proceeding or in the
work of the court. [Emphasis added.]

The code does not define what such a “legitimate interest” would be. . We believe,
however, that a person’s interest in access to juvenile records and files would not be
“legitimate” if the person’s purposes for seeking access were inconsistent with the
purposes of code title 3, which deals with delinquent children and children in need of
supervision. In this regard, we will consider section 51.14 in connection with code section
51.13, which provides in part as follows:

(a) An order of adjudication or disposition in a proceeding
under this title is not a conviction of crime, and does not impose any
civil disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction or operate to
disqualify the child in any civil service application or appointment.

(b) The adjudication or disposition of a child or evidence
adduced in a hearing under this title may be used only in subsequent
proceedings under this title in which the child is a party or in
subsequent sentencing proceedings in criminal court against the child
to the extent permitted by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
1965. [Emphasis added. ]

One of the purposes of section 51.13(a) and (b) and section 51.14(a) is found in
code section 51.01: “consistent with the protection of the public interest, to remove from
children committing unlawful acts the taint of criminality and the consequences of criminal
behavior and to substitute a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation.” Fam.
Code § 51.01(3) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
inferred that a predecessor of section 51.13(b) was intended to protect children from the
“odium and stigma attached to any act of youthful indiscretion which had eventuated in a
prosecution.” Smith v. State, 18 S.W.2d 1070, 1072 (1929). Thus, for example, the fact
that a person has been the subject of a juvenile court proceeding generally is not
admissible to discredit that person’s testimony in another proceeding. Rivas v. State, 501
S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Smith, 18 S.W.2d at 1072; Carmona v. State,
670 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1984), aff'd, 698 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1985). Accordingly, Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 609 makes clear that, generally,
“[e]vidence of juvenile adjudications is not admissible” to impeach a witness's credibility.

Recognizing the legislature’s intention to protect a person from the permanent
stigma of an adjudication of delinquency, we also recognize that such protection is not
absolute but must be “consistent with the protection of the public interest.” Fam. Code
§ 51.01(3). In Texas, minors generally are civilly liable for their own tortious conduct.
E.g., Chandler v. Deaton, 37 Tex. 406 (1872-1873). Furthermore, section 33.01 of the
code provides that “[a] parent . . . is liable for any property damage proximately caused by
... the wilful and malicious conduct of a child who is at least 12 years of age but under 18

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Honorable D. August Boto - Page 3 (DM-334)

years of age.” The purpose of this provision and code section 33.02, which limits
recovery for such damage to actual damages not exceeding $15,000 per act, “is to protect
and compensate property owners from the wilful and malicious destruction of their

property by minors.” Buie v. Longspaugh, 598 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.--Fort
Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Although there is no Texas case in point, our research has uncovered cases from
other states in which the reviewing court, construing similar confidentiality statutes,
upheld a lower court’s determination that a victim’s interest in inspecting records of a
juvenile proceeding was a “legitimate” or “proper” interest. One such case is Hickey v.
Eighth Judicial District Court, 782 P.2d 1336 (Nev. 1989). There the person requesting
inspection was the administrator of the estate of a boy who had accidentally killed himself
with a gun his friend Chris had removed from an unlocked cabinet while being left home
alone by vacationing parents. Id. at 1337. The administrator had filed suit in district court
on behalf of the estate, alleging that Chris’s parents had been negligent in leaving him
home alone with access to the gun, and she also had filed a petition for inspection of
Chris’s juvenile records relating to the shooting incident. Id. The Supreme Court of
Nevada held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the estate
was a person with a “legitimate interest” in juvenile court records sought in connection
with the estate’s pending wrongful death action arising out of the same occurrence that
was the basis of the juvenile court proceeding. Id. at 1339.

Another case, Daniels v. National Fire Insurance Co., 394 So. 2d 683, 683
& nn.1-2 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 397 So. 2d 806 (La. 1981), involved a plaintiff in a
wrongful death action who had been admitted, as a person with a “proper interest,” to a
juvenile adjudication hearing arising out of the same occurrence, under a Louisiana law
providing that “[t]he court may admit [to a juvenile adjudication hearing] any other person
who has a proper interest in the [juvenile case] proceedings or the work of the court.”
The Louisiana appellate court interpreted this statute as permitting the plaintiff to obtain a
copy of the transcript of the hearing for use in the wrongful death action in spite of
another Louisiana law providing that “juvenile records shall be confidential.” Id. at 684.
The court commented, “The shield of confidentiality was not designed and cannot be
permitted to fraudulently defeat civil reparation of juvenile wrong.” Id. at 683-84.

In another case, the reviewing court reversed a lower court’s order denying access
to juvenile court files sought for use in a civil suit arising out of conduct that was the
subject of the juvenile proceeding. That case, Ex parte State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 529 So. 2d 975 (Ala. 1988), is even closer
factually to the kind of situation that you inquire about than the Hickey and Daniels cases
because it involves a civil claim arising out of conduct causing property damage rather
than death. There, a trial court had denied a motion by two insurance companies for
access to the juvenile court files of two seventeen-year-olds whom the companies had
sued for a declaration of the companies’ rights and obligations under policies insuring the
children. Id. at 975. Because the children had allegedly caused a fire and the policies

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Honorable D. August Boto - Page 4 = (DM-334)

excluded coverage for property damage intentionally caused by insureds older than
thirteen years, the companies desired access to law enforcement records and the testimony
of police and fire investigators regarding the fire in a juvenile proceeding that had
adjudicated both children to be delinquent for the commission of arson. Id. at 975-76.
The Alabama high court concluded that the confidentiality right in that state’s analogue to
section 51.13 must yield, id. at 976, when information in juvenile records and files “is
essential and not otherwise reasonably available” in a civil litigant’s lawsuit, id. at 977.
The court thus implicitly held that a civil litigant, as a matter of law, is a
“person .. . having a legitimate interest in the case,” Ala. Code § 12-15-101(b)(3), to the
extent that the juvenile records contain such essential and otherwise unavailable
information. See 529 So. 2d at 976 (concluding that trial judge erred “as a matter of law”
in denying request). The court distinguished its earlier decision in Ex parte Guerdon
Industries, 373 So. 2d 322 (Ala. 1979)--which had upheld a lower court’s order denying
access to juvenile court files--on the ground that, there, the juvenile was not a litigant in
the civil action for which access was requested. State Farm, 529 So. 2d at 976. The State
Farm court reversed the trial court’s order with instructions to review the requested
records and files in camera and to make available for inspection and use at trial, in
accordance with the rules of evidence, any information found to be “essential and not
otherwise reasonably available in the petitioners’ civil action.” Id. at 977.

Finally, the court in Wisconsin ex rel. Herget v. Circuit Court, 267 N.W.2d 309
(Wis. 1978), adopted a standard similar to State Farm’s standard of “essential and not
otherwise reasonably available” as proper for determining whether to grant access to
police records of a juvenile investigation when such records are sought in connection with
a civil claim arising out of conduct that was the subject of the investigation. Herget was a
proceeding by a juvenile for a writ of prohibition to determine the lower court’s power to
release the juvenile’s police records for discovery in a civil action for damages arising from
an incident of vandalism that was the subject of the police investigation and a juvenile
court proceeding. Id. at 310-12. The Wisconsin statute at issue provided in part, “‘Peace
officers’ records of children shall be kept separate from records of persons 18 or older and
shall not be open to inspection or their contents disclosed except by order of the court.’”
Id. at 310 n.2 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 48.26(1)). The statute thus lacked any general express
limitation, such as “legitimate interest,” to the court’s discretion to grant access to the
records.! Nevertheless, the court held discovery of law enforcement records to be
permissible only when “the need for confidentiality is outweighed by the exigencies of the
circumstances.” Id. at 317.2

!Compare code section 51.14(d), which contains no general express provision for access to law
enforcement files concerning a child by anyone other than the juvenile court having jurisdiction of the
child “in any proceeding,” an attorney of record in such a proceeding, and law enforcement officers “when
necessary for the discharge of their official duties.” You do not ask about, and we do not consider, the
scope of this confidentiality provision.

2The court in Hickey similarly stated as follows, in regard to the determination of whether a
person has a “legitimate interest” in the disclosure of juvenile court records: “In exercising its discretion,

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Honorable D. August Boto - Page 5 = (DM-334)

The Herget court then articulated procedures and standards for determining
whether and how to grant access to juvenile police records. Id. at 317. We do not
presume that the courts of this state will necessarily recognize exactly the same procedures
and standards for determining whether to grant inspection of juvenile court records to
persons with a “legitimate interest” under section 51.14(a), but we believe the procedures
and standards announced in Herget are consistent with the policies of Texas and therefore
are worthy of quotation at length as a helpful suggestion:

So that the court may determine plaintiffs’ need for the
information requested, the plaintiffs must describe to the court as
specifically as possible the type of information they seek, the basis of
their belief that the information is contained in the police records, the
relevance of the information to plaintiffs’ cause of action, the
probable admissibility of the information as evidence at trial, the
efforts they have made to obtain the information from other sources,
and the hardship to plaintiffs’ cause should the discovery order not
issue. The defendant should be given the opportunity to present to
the court its position concerning disclosure of all or part of the
records.

The court must then make an in camera inspection of [the
child’s] police file.

If the court determines that certain information contained in [the
child’s police file is essential to plaintiffs’ cause and cannot be
obtained with reasonable effort from other sources, the court must
then determine whether plaintiffs’ need for that information
outweighs society’s interest in protecting its confidentiality. In
making this determination the . . . court must balance two private and
two societal interests: the victim’s interest in recovering for the
damage he has suffered and the juvenile’s interest in rehabilitation
and avoiding the stigma of revelation; the redress of private wrongs
through private litigation and the protection of the integrity of the
juvenile justice system.

If, after balancing these interests, the ... court determines that
certain information should be disclosed, the court must carefully
tailor its discovery order to permit disclosure of only that
information. The trial court shall make a record of the reasons for its

(footnote continued)

the . . . court must balance the need of the requesting party for the records against the interests of society
in keeping confidential certain juvenile court records. See Ex Parte State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 529
So.2d 975 (Ala. 1988).” 782 P.2d at 1339.

p. 1766
Honorable D. August Boto - Page 6 (DM-334)

determination to allow or not to allow discovery, and the record shall
be sealed.

Id. (footnotes omitted).3

The consensus of similar holdings in other states convinces us that a Texas court
would likely hold that in some circumstances the public policy in favor of the
compensation of property owners for damages resulting from vandalism may justify a
juvenile court’s determination that a victim of delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a
need for supervision is a “person . . . having a legitimate interest in the proceeding” under
subsection (a)(4) of section 51.14. Nothing in subsection (a)(4) limits the class of persons
who may have a “legitimate interest in the proceeding.” As this office said in Attorney
General Opinion H-264, the determination of whether a person has such an interest “rests
in the sound discretion of the juvenile court.” Attorney General Opinion H-264 (1974) at

2. Similarly, in Hickey the Supreme Court of Nevada held that Nevada’s statutory
   analogue to code section 51.14(a)(4) “clearly vests in the ... court wide discretion to
   determine the persons ‘having a legitimate interest’ in juvenile court records.” 782 P.2d at
3. Because the determination of “legitimate interest” would involve the weighing of
   evidence and the exercise of judicial discretion, we would not be able to determine in an

advisory opinion whether a particular victim would succeed in a request for access under
section 51.14(a)(4).

Next you ask whether the phrase “open to inspection only by [the persons and
entities set forth in subsection (a)],” as used in subsection (a) of section 51.14, means that
juvenile files and records may only be inspected, as opposed to copied, or that only the
persons and entities set forth in subsection (a) may inspect juvenile files and records, or
both. Your question draws attention to the ambiguity that arises from the placement of
the word “only” between an adverbial phrase (“to inspection,” which modifies “open”) and
an adjectival phrase (“by [the persons and entities set forth in subsection (a)],” which
modifies “inspection”), both of which it might modify.

In written English the normally proper position of only within a sentence is usually
immediately before the word or phrase only modifies. See THEODORE M. BERNSTEIN,
THE CAREFUL WRITER: A GUIDE TO MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 315-17 (1965). If the
legislature intended to follow this rule, the meaning of subsection (a) is that only the
persons and entities set forth therein may inspect juvenile files and records, not that such
persons and entities may only inspect juvenile files and records.

3The court in Herget further ruled that police officers could not be deposed regarding the
contents of their own records of the juvenile investigation at issue unti] the court granted disclosure of
their records, and then only regarding the portions that were released for disclosure. 267 N.W.2d at 318.
To distinguish between the information in the records themselves and the officers’ own independent
recollections of that information, the court concluded, would violate the intent of the confidentiality
statute. Id.

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Honorable D. August Boto - Page 7 (DM-334)

This construction of subsection (a) is consistent with prior law, which provided,
“Juvenile Court Records shall not be inspected by persons other than probation officers or
other officers of the Juvenile Court unless otherwise directed by the court.” V.T.C.S. art.
2338-1, § 15 (1971) (repealed by Act of May 24, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 544, § 3, 1973
Tex. Gen. Laws 1460, 1485). “[W]ith respect to juvenile court legal and social records,
the only material variation from the old law is to specify those persons who are deemed to
have a legitimate interest in the proceedings such that they should have access to those
records without special leave of the juvenile court.” Robert O. Dawson, Delinquent
Children and Children in Need of Supervision: Draftman's Comments to Title 3 of the
Texas Family Code, 5 TEX. TECH L. REV. 533-34 (1974). We therefore conclude that the
word “only” in subsection (a) does not modify the phrase “to inspection.”

This conclusion does not end the inquiry into the meaning of subsection (a),
however, but rather leads us to your third question:

If the foregoing question is answered in a way that specifies that the
word “only” limits the class of persons who may obtain access, does

the word “inspection” ... mean that the paperwork can only be
looked at, or does it permit paperwork to be copied and certified for
proper purposes?

In this regard, it is important to consider that denial of access to inspect effectively
constitutes denial of access to copy, for allowing access to a copy would thwart the
purpose of denying access to inspect the original. A statutory grant of access to inspect,
however, does not necessarily include permission to obtain a copy. Therefore, the
meaning of the provision depends on whether the provision grants access to inspect or
restricts access to inspect.

The legislature’s purpose in enacting section 51.14(a) and its statutory
predecessors was not to grant access to inspect juvenile court files and records, for the
public generally has a common-law right to inspect and copy court records. See Nixon v.
Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978); Times Herald Printing Co. v.
Jones, 717 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1986), vacated on other grounds per
curiam, 730 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1987); see also Attorney General Opinion DM-166 (1992)
at 3 (discussing common-law right of access to court records).4 Rather, the intention was

4 In 1990 the Supreme Court of Texas adopted Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a, which provides
that court records other than adjudicative orders and opinions, which may not be sealed,

are presumed to be open to the general public and may be sealed only upon a
showing of all of the following:

(a) a specific, serious and substantial interest which clearly outweighs:
(1) this presumption of openness;

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Honorable D. August Boto - Page 8 (DM-334)

to restrict access to inspect, and concomitantly to copy, juvenile records. Therefore, to
the extent the provision leaves prior law undisturbed, its language does not address the
question of whether copying also is permitted. We conclude that the word “inspection”

does not indicate any legislative intent regarding whether records may only be inspected or
may also be copied.

We further believe, however, that subsection (a)(4) does potentially limit the mode
of access to records, although not for the reason that your third question suggests. As we
said above, one of the purposes of sections 51.13 and 51.14 is to protect a person from
the permanent stigma of an adjudication of delinquency insofar as such protection would
be “consistent with the protection of the public interest.” Fam. Code § 51.01(3). The
effectuation of this purpose requires that a grant of access to records to a “person . . .
having a legitimate interest” under section 51.14(a)(4) should not include permission to
copy the records unless the public interest requires that the records be copied.

The public interest may require in some circumstances that a victim of delinquent
conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision have a copy of a document in a
juvenile court file. If the document contains information that, in the words of the court in
the State Farm case, “is essential and not otherwise reasonably available in” a related civil
action between the victim and the juvenile, 529 So. 2d at 977, it may be within the juvenile
court’s discretion under section 51.14(a)(4) to issue a narrowly tailored order that permits
the release of a copy but limits the use of the copy to the related action. On the other
hand, if the information in the document also exists in another admissible record outside
the juvenile court file or is adducible by examination of an available witness, then the court
may be justified in concluding that the information is otherwise reasonably available and
therefore that a copy of the information is not necessary. (Of course, we are unable to
review the appropriateness of a court’s exercise of discretion under section 51.14(a)(4).)

We realize that our conclusion that the public interest sometimes may justify the
release of a copy of a record in a juvenile court file, in light of the facts you pose regarding
the stipulation of evidence, suggests that documentary evidence that has been adduced in a
juvenile court hearing may be admissible in a proceeding other than those expressly
permitted under code section 51.13(b): “subsequent proceedings under ... title [3] in
which the child is a party or ... subsequent sentencing proceedings in criminal court

(footnote continued)
(2) any probable adverse effect that sealing will have upon the general
public health or safety;

(b) no less restrictive means than sealing records will adequately and
effectively protect the specific interest asserted. [Emphasis added.]

Paragraph 2 of rule 76a excepts from the definition of court records “documents filed in an action
originally arising under the Family Code.” Paragraph 9 provides in part, “Access to documents in court
files not defined as court records by this rule remains governed by existing law.”

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Honorable D. August Boto - Page 9 (DM-334)

against the child to the extent permitted by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 1965.”
It is arguable, to the contrary, that section 51.13(b) bars the use of any evidence,
testimonial, documentary, or real, in any proceeding other than those excepted by the
statute if that evidence was offered in a juvenile court hearing.

Once again, we have found no Texas case in point, but our research has uncovered
a case from another state that bears directly on the meaning of statutory language that is
similar to the prohibition in section 51.13(b) against the use of “evidence adduced in a
[juvenile court] hearing.” Gallegos v. Colorado, 358 P.2d 1028 (Colo. 1960), rev’d on
other grounds, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), was a murder conviction appeal in which the Supreme
Court of Colorado dealt with the contention that a similar statute, prohibiting the use of
“any evidence given in any such [juvenile court] case,”5 barred the use of certain evidence
for the reason that the same evidence had been offered in a juvenile delinquency
proceeding against the defendant. Id. at 1032. In that case the defendant challenged the
trial court’s admission into evidence of the prosecutor’s reading of portions of a
stenographically transcribed oral statement that the defendant had made while he was in
custody at a police station and that he had signed later, when he was taken to juvenile hall.
Id. at 1030. In the statement the defendant confessed that he had attacked and robbed the
decedent. Id. at 1031. The statement also included a written certification, above the
defendant’s signature, that the “statement is entirely true.” Id. Before the decedent died,
the defendant had been adjudicated delinquent for the robbery of the decedent “and [had
been] sentenced to the Industrial School.” Id. It was undisputed that the statement had

been offered in evidence in the defendant’s delinquency proceeding in the juvenile court.
Id. at 1032.

The supreme court disagreed with defense counsel’s contention on appeal that the
reading of the statement into the record was barred by the Colorado statute merely
because the statement had “formed the basis of testimony considered in the juvenile
court.” Id. The supreme court explained its disagreement as follows:

Contrary to the contention of counsel we hold the statute to
mean that a transcript of the testimony given by any witness,
including the defendant, in a proceeding before the juvenile court
cannot be used in any manner in a subsequent action against the child

5The court quoted the pertinent part of the Colorado statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-8-1(3) (1953),
as follows:

A disposition of any child under this article, or any evidence given in any
such case, shall not in any criminal or other cause or proceeding whatever be
lawful or proper evidence against such child for any purpose excepting in
subsequent cases against the child under this article.

Gallegos v. Colorado, 358 P. 2d 1028, 1032 (Colo. 1960).

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alleged to be a delinquent in the juvenile proceeding. Nor can any
evidence be admitted as to what a witness said in the juvenile court
hearing. There is nothing in the statute to prevent the district
attorney from establishing the same facts by the same witnesses and
by the same real and documentary evidence that may have been used
in the earlier proceeding in the juvenile court. It is only the evidence
as introduced at the hearing in the juvenile court which cannot be
used against said child in subsequent court proceedings. Ex parte
Walter, 92 OkI.Cr. 1, 221 P.2d 659.

The reasons for the statute are well stated in Commonwealth ex
rel. Hendrickson v. Myers, 393 Pa. 224, 144 A.2d 367, and in
Volume 3, Wigmore on Evidence, section 1040. As there stated,
these reasons are consistent with the interpretation we give the
statute and inconsistent with the contention of counsel for defendant.
It is not the purpose of the statute to foreclose from all future
revelation the facts relating to conduct which formed the basis of a
prior delinquency proceeding in the juvenile court. When oral
testimony is offered for its intrinsic value with relation to the issue to
be tried--rather than to establish what was said or done in
proceedings before the juvenile court--the statute does not prevent
the giving of testimony because the same witness was previously
called upon to give evidence relating to the same transaction in
juvenile court proceedings. For a comparable example involving the
federal rule which prevents disclosure of proceedings before a grand
jury, see United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 2 Cir., 280
F.2d 52.

Id. at 1032-33.

Although the Texas courts have not decided this question, we believe it is likely
that the courts would find the holding and reasoning of the Gallegos case to be
persuasive. We doubt that a court would read section 51.13(b) so broadly as to bar
evidence that is essential to a victim’s claim for civil damages merely because the same
evidence was offered in juvenile court. Such a broad construction would go beyond the
rehabilitative purpose of code title 3; it would tend to excuse a person from civil
accountability for injurious conduct. We believe the courts would interpret section
51.13(b) as not prohibiting the use of juvenile-proceeding evidence in another case when
the evidence is directly relevant to a material issue in the case and the evidence is not
offered “to establish what was said or done in proceedings before the juvenile court.” Id.
at 1033.

Thus, a transcript of juvenile court testimony would be inadmissible because it
would show what was said in the juvenile court proceeding. Id. at 1032. But cf. Daniels

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v. National Fire Ins. Co., 394 So. 2d at 683 n.1 (quoting statute as providing that
“juvenile case records shall be confidential”), 684 (extract from juvenile court hearing
transcript would be admissible). Likewise, language or markings on documentary or real
evidence tending to show that the evidence had been adduced in a juvenile case would be
inadmissible. On the other hand, the recollection of a witness, or real or documentary
evidence that does not tend to show that a person was the subject of a juvenile court
proceeding, would not be barred merely because the witness had testified about the same
facts or the same real or documentary evidence had been offered in a juvenile case.6 Cf.
Missouri v. Owens, 582 S.W.2d 366, 376 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (citing Gallegos as
support for holding that Missouri statute precluding “all evidence given in [juvenile]
cases” from being used in subsequent criminal or other proceedings did not prevent
prosecutor from using witnesses in State’s case who had testified earlier at juvenile waiver
hearing on same subject matter).

Furthermore, it is not sufficient to its admissibility that the juvenile court record
will not tend “to establish what was said or done in proceedings before the juvenile court,”
Gallegos v. Colorado, 358 P.2d at 1033. In addition, the record must be offered as proof
of a relevant and material issue, that is, “for its intrinsic value with relation to the issue to
be tried,” id., and not solely for the purpose of impeaching the subject of the juvenile court
proceeding. Various Texas cases support this interpretation of the provision. For
example, in Hall v. State, 745 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1988, pet. ref'd), the
court concluded that section 51.13(b) did not prohibit the State’s cross-examination of a
witness in a trial for attempted murder regarding the fact of her release from reform school
earlier on the day of the shooting in question, where the evidence was relevant to material
issues, namely, the motive for the shooting and the underlying cause of the argument
leading up to the shooting. Id. at 586. The court warned, however, “that the admission of
a juvenile record or evidence of events occurring subsequent to a juvenile hearing would
be improper, if the State was attempting to use the evidence to try to impeach the
credibility of a juvenile witness.” Id. at 583; accord Robinson v. State, 7 S.W.2d 571, 574
(Tex. Crim. App. 1928) (on motion for rehearing). The court in Rivas v. State noted that
“it has been held that a juvenile delinquency record may not be used for impeachment of a
witness because a provision of the Juvenile Act prohibits the introduction of such
evidence.” 501 S.W.2d at 920 (citing Robinson v. State, 7 S.W.2d 571, and Smith v.
State, 18 S.W.2d 1070). Similarly, the court in Carmona v. State cited section 51.13 for
proposition that “[a] juvenile’s record is ordinarily inadmissible for impeachment
purposes.” 670 S.W.2d at 698; cf. 3A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAw § 1040, at 1051-52 & n.11 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1970) (result of

6We reiterate, however, that a juvenile court may have discretion under section 51.14(a)(4) to
deny a copy of evidence adduced in a juvenile court proceeding--even when the evidence is relevant to a
material issue in a related civil action and would not be used to show what happened in the juvenile
court--if evidence of the same facts is adducible in the related civil action through the testimony of an
available witness or is otherwise reasonably available. See State Farm, 529 So. 2d at 977.

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usual combination in various states’ juvenile court statutes of language forbidding use of
juvenile court conviction in other proceedings with language forbidding use of “any
evidence” given in juvenile court in other proceedings is “to forbid the discrediting of the
party’s testimony in any later proceeding by comparing it with the same person’s
testimony in the juvenile court”); see also Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 609 (“[e]vidence of juvenile
adjudications is not admissible” to impeach a witness's credibility). But see Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317-18 (1974) (criminal defendant has constitutional right, under
Confrontation Clause of Sixth Amendment, to attempt to show bias of witness based on
evidence that witness was on probation following adjudication of delinquency,
notwithstanding state statute prohibiting use of juvenile court evidence in other court
proceedings).

Finally, you ask whether “there is a vehicle which would permit the Juvenile Court
to limit the use of [court file] documents for a specific purpose so as to address the right
of both parties, at least to a limited degree.” You do not suggest the “vehicle” that you
wish us to consider. We believe, however, that section 51.14(a)(4), in granting the
juvenile court discretionary control over the granting of leave to inspect documents,
implicitly authorizes that court to impose limitations on such leave that will be consistent
with the purposes of code title 3.7 We also note that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a
may provide a vehicle for obtaining an order to seal the evidence in the separate civil
proceeding.

SUMMARY

In some circumstances the public policy in favor of
compensating property owners for the malicious destruction of their
property may justify a juvenile court’s determination that a victim of
vandalism seeking access to court files and records under section
51.14(a)(4) of the Family Code for use in a civil action for damages
caused by the vandalism is a “person . . . having a legitimate interest”
in a proceeding adjudicating a child to have engaged in delinquent
conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision.

7The court in Hickey v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 782 P.2d 1336, noted with approval
certain limitations in the juvenile court’s order granting the request for inspection: (1) a specification that
the district judge presiding over the negligence suit would have to review the juvenile court records in
camera and determine which ones were relevant to the lawsuit, (2) a provision that the records would be
used only in the district court proceeding, and (3) a reservation of subsequent decision on the part of the
district court concerning the extent to which the material would be allowed to become a part of the record.
Id. at 1337, 1339. The court concluded in light of these conditions that “the [lower] court entered an
order that was narrowly tailored to safeguard society’s interests in the confidentiality of Chris’ juvenile
records, while preserving [the administrator’s right to access information that is relevant to her cause of
action below.” Id. at 1339.

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The provision in section 51.14(a) that the “files and records of a
juvenile court ... are open to inspection only by [the persons and
entities set forth in subsection (a)]” means that only those persons
and entities may inspect juvenile files and records, not that those
persons and entities may only inspect juvenile files and records. A
grant of access to records under section 51.14(a)(4) does not include
permission to copy the records unless the public interest requires that
the requestor have copies.

Yours very truly,
S
DN Qu Vi om

DAN MORALES
Attorney General of Texas

JORGE VEGA

First Assistant Attorney General

SARAH J. SHIRLEY

Chair, Opinion Committee

Prepared by James B. Pinson

Assistant Attorney General

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