When several 1993 Texas bills changed the same truancy-fine law, which fines applied?

Plain-English summary

A district attorney asked the Attorney General to untangle what happened to one statute that three separate bills amended in the same legislative session. Education Code section 4.25 was the compulsory-school-attendance law. Subsection (a) made it an offense for a parent (or a person standing in parental relation) to fail to make a child attend school after a written warning, set the fines, and routed the case to court; subsection (b) gave a defense for a parent unable to compel attendance. In 1993, the Seventy-third Legislature passed House Bill 681, House Bill 1372, and Senate Bill 7, and each one re-enacted subsection (a) while changing different pieces of it. The DA specifically wanted to know whether the legislature meant to double the fines and to split the fine money between the school and local government.

The office said yes on both counts, after applying the Government Code rule for amendments to the same statute passed in one session: harmonize them if you can, and if two changes are truly irreconcilable, the one enacted later wins. Most of the three bills' changes fit together. The one real clash was the fine sentence. House Bill 681 rewrote it to make the offense a Class C misdemeanor (a fine up to $500), while Senate Bill 7 rewrote the same sentence to double the existing tiered fines: $10 to $50 for a first offense, $20 to $100 for a second, and $50 to $200 for a later one. Those two could not both stand. Because Senate Bill 7 was enacted on May 28, 1993, after House Bill 681's May 10 enactment, the office concluded Senate Bill 7's tiered fines control. Senate Bill 7 had also rewritten subsection (b) to split any collected fine, half to the school district's operating fund and half to the county or municipality depending on which court heard the case, and that change took effect too.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1994. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Texas later moved its compulsory-attendance and truancy provisions out of former Education Code section 4.25, recodified the Education Code, and at times decriminalized or restructured the parent-contributing-to-truancy offense. The bill numbers, section numbers, and dollar figures here describe the state of the law right after the 1993 session. Read this page for the office's reasoning on harmonizing same-session amendments, and verify the current truancy statutes before relying on any specific fine or procedure.

What the opinion meant for those who asked

For prosecutors and courts handling truancy cases: The opinion concluded that, after the 1993 session, the fine for a parent's compulsory-attendance offense was the Senate Bill 7 tiered schedule ($10 to $50, then $20 to $100, then $50 to $200), not House Bill 681's flat Class C misdemeanor. It also concluded the collected fine was split between the school district and the county or municipality under Senate Bill 7's rewrite of subsection (b).

For school districts and local governments: The opinion treated Senate Bill 7's deposit formula as effective: half of any fine to the school district's operating fund, and half to the general fund of the county (for a complaint in county or justice court) or the municipality (for a complaint in municipal court).

Common questions

Why did it matter which bill controlled?
Because House Bill 681 and Senate Bill 7 rewrote the same sentence of the truancy statute in incompatible ways, one making the offense a Class C misdemeanor and the other setting specific doubled fines. Only one could apply, so the office had to decide which.

How did the Attorney General pick the winner?
By the Government Code rule (section 311.025) for amendments to the same statute passed in one session: harmonize them where possible, and if two are irreconcilable, the later-enacted one prevails. Senate Bill 7 was enacted after House Bill 681, so its fine schedule won.

What were the resulting fines for a parent's truancy offense?
Under Senate Bill 7, not less than $10 nor more than $50 for the first offense, $20 to $100 for the second, and $50 to $200 for a later offense.

Did the school district get any of the fine money?
Yes. Under Senate Bill 7's rewrite of subsection (b), half of a collected fine went to the school district's operating fund and half to the county or municipality, depending on which court heard the complaint.

Background and statutory framework

The puzzle was a creature of how Texas amends statutes. Article III, section 36 of the Texas Constitution requires that an amended section be "reenacted and published at length," so each of the three 1993 bills reprinted the entire text of subsection (a) even though each changed only parts of it. The Government Code's construction rules account for this: under section 311.025(c), text reenacted only to satisfy that constitutional requirement is not treated as irreconcilable with another amendment's changes to the same text, and does not signal an intent that the reprinted version prevail. So the office disregarded the mere re-enactments and looked only at the actual changes each bill made.

House Bill 1372 (Acts 1993, 73d Leg., ch. 930) changed the third sentence's venue language. House Bill 681 (ch. 358) added a sentence routing the complaint to the court handling a related juvenile referral, rewrote the sixth sentence to make the offense a Class C misdemeanor, and added a sentence allowing two or more offenses to be consolidated. Senate Bill 7 (ch. 347) tied the offense and the juvenile referral to the child having unexcused voluntary absences for the time specified in Family Code section 51.03(b)(2), doubled the dollar amounts in the sixth sentence, and rewrote subsection (b) to split collected fines between the school district and local government. Under section 311.025(b), same-session amendments enacted without reference to each other are harmonized where possible; the office found everything harmonized except the sixth sentence. There, House Bill 681's Class C misdemeanor (a fine up to $500 under Penal Code section 12.23) and Senate Bill 7's specific doubled tiers could not coexist, so the later-enacted bill prevailed. House Bill 681 was enacted May 10, 1993, and Senate Bill 7 on May 28, 1993, making Senate Bill 7's tiered fines the operative punishment.

Citations

Constitutional and statutory provisions discussed:

• Education Code § 4.25(a), (b) (compulsory school attendance; parent's offense, fines, fine deposits)
• Gov't Code § 311.025(b), (c) (same-session and reenacted-text amendment rules)
• Tex. Const. art. III, § 36 (amended section must be reenacted and published at length)
• Penal Code § 12.23 (Class C misdemeanor; fine up to $500)
• Family Code § 51.03(b)(2) (conduct indicating a need for supervision; unexcused absences)
• Acts 1993, 73d Leg., ch. 347 (Senate Bill 7), ch. 358 (House Bill 681), ch. 930 (House Bill 1372)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/dan-morales/dm-0304
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1994/dm0304.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

Office of the Attorney General
State of Texas

DAN MORALES
ATTORNEY GENERAL

September 28, 1994

Honorable John Vance
Dallas County District Attorney
Frank Crowley Courts Building
Dallas, Texas 75207-4313

Opinion No. DM-304

Re: Effect of amendments to Education Code section 4.25(a), (b) by the Seventy-third Legislature's House Bills 681 and 1372 and Senate Bill 7 (RQ-646)

Dear Mr. Vance:

You ask for our opinion on how section 4.25(a), (b) of the Education Code was affected by three statutes from the Seventy-third Legislature, House Bill 681, Acts 1993, 73d Leg., ch. 358; House Bill 1372, id. ch. 930; and Senate Bill 7, id. ch. 347. Before these statutes became effective, subsections (a) and (b) of section 4.25 provided as follows:

(a) [1.] If any parent or person standing in parental relation to a child, within the compulsory school attendance ages and not lawfully exempt or properly excused from school attendance, fails to require such child to attend school for such periods as required by law, it shall be the duty of the proper attendance officer to warn, in writing, the parent or person standing in parental relation that attendance must be immediately required. [2.] If after this warning the parent or person standing in parental relation intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence fails to require the child to attend school as required by law, the parent or person standing in parental relation commits an offense. [3.] The attendance officer shall file a complaint against him in the county court, in the justice court of his resident precinct, or in the municipal court of the municipality in which he resides or in the municipality or justice of the peace precinct in which the school is located. [4.] In addition, if the child has been voluntarily absent from school for 10 or more days or parts of days within a six-month period or three or more days or parts of days within a four-week period without the consent of his parents, the attendance officer shall refer the child to the county juvenile probation department for action as conduct indicating a need for supervision under Section 51.03(b), Family Code. [5.] A court in which a complaint is filed under this subsection shall give preference to a hearing on the complaint over other cases before the court. [6.] An offense under this section is punishable by a fine of not less than $5 nor more than $25 for the first offense, not less than $10 nor more than $50 for the second offense, and not less than $25 nor more than $100 for a subsequent offense. [7.] Each day the child remains out of school after the warning has been given or the child ordered to school by the juvenile court may constitute a separate offense. [8.] If the court probates the sentence, the court may require the defendant to render personal services to a charitable or educational institution as a condition of probation.

(b) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (a) of this section that the parent or person standing in parental relation to the child is unable to compel the child to attend school.

Educ. Code § 4.25(a), (b) (1991) (bracketed sentence numbers have been added to subsection (a) and will be used in discussion below).

House Bill 1372 re-enacted the full text of subsection (a) but changed the third sentence of subsection (a) as follows: "The attendance officer shall file a complaint against him in the county court, in the justice court of his resident precinct, or in the municipal court of the municipality in which he resides or in any [the] municipality or justice of the peace precinct in which the school district is located." Acts 1993, 73d Leg., ch. 930, § 1. (Italic type indicates insertion; bracketed overstrike indicates deletion.) House Bill 1372 did not otherwise change subsection (a), nor did it change subsection (b).

House Bill 681 also re-enacted the full text of subsection (a) but made a few changes to the subsection. First, the statute added a new sentence after the third sentence of subsection (a): "The attendance officer shall file a complaint under this section in the court to which the parent's child has been referred for engaging in conduct described in section 51.03(b)(2), Family Code, if a referral has been made for the child." Id. ch. 358, § 2. This statute also changed the sixth sentence of subsection (a) as follows: "An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor [. . .]." Id. Finally, this statute added a new sentence after the seventh sentence of subsection (a): "Two or more offenses under this section may be consolidated and prosecuted in a single action." Id. House Bill 681 did not change subsection (b).

Senate Bill 7 also re-enacted the full text of subsection (a) but made a few changes to the subsection. First, the statute changed the second sentence of subsection (a) as follows: "If after this warning the parent or person standing in parental relation intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence fails to require the child to attend school as required by law and the child has unexcused voluntary absences for the amount of time specified under Section 51.03(b)(2), Family Code, the parent or person standing in parental relation commits an offense." Id. ch. 347, § 6.01. This statute also changed the fourth sentence of subsection (a) as follows: "In addition, if the child has unexcused voluntary absences for the amount of time specified under Section 51.03(b)(2), Family Code [. . .], the attendance officer shall refer the child to the county juvenile probation department for action as conduct indicating a need for supervision under that section [. . .]." Id. Finally, this statute doubled all the monetary amounts in the sixth sentence of subsection (a). Id.

Senate Bill 7 also changed all of subsection (b) as follows:

(b) A fine collected under this section shall be deposited as follows:

(1) one-half shall be deposited to the credit of the operating fund of the school district in which the child attends school; and

(2) one-half shall be deposited to the credit of:

(A) the general fund of the county, if the complaint is filed in the county court or justice court; or

(B) the general fund of the municipality, if the complaint is filed in municipal court.

Id.

You ask specifically whether the legislature intended to double the fines in the sixth sentence of subsection (a) and to divide the proceeds between the school and other local entities in subsection (b). For the following reasons we believe the legislature did so intend.

To find the answer to your question, we apply the following rules of construction found in section 311.025 of the Government Code:

(b) . . . [I]f amendments to the same statute are enacted at the same session of the legislature, one amendment without reference to another, the amendments shall be harmonized, if possible, so that effect may be given to each. If the amendments are irreconcilable, the latest in date of enactment prevails.

(c) In determining whether amendments are irreconcilable, text that is reenacted because of the requirement of Article III, Section 36, of the Texas Constitution is not considered to be irreconcilable with additions or omissions in the same text made by another amendment. Unless clearly indicated to the contrary, an amendment that reenacts text in compliance with that constitutional requirement does not indicate legislative intent that the reenacted text prevail over changes in the same text made by another amendment, regardless of the relative dates of enactment.

Gov't Code § 311.025(b), (c). The constitutional provision referred to above in subsection (c) provides:

No law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title; but in such case the act revived, or the section or sections amended shall be reenacted and published at length.

Tex. Const. art. III, § 36.

Applying the foregoing rules of construction to the three amendatory acts, we find no indication that the legislature intended in any of the three acts that the re-enacted language of subsection (a) should prevail over any of the changes to the provisions of that subsection in either of the other two acts. We therefore will disregard a reenactment of language in one act pursuant to constitution article III, section 36, where the reenactment conflicts with a change in language in another act.

Because the amendments to subsection (a) were enacted without reference to each other in the same legislative session, the amendments must be harmonized as much as possible. Gov't Code § 311.025(b). We find that all the amendments may be harmonized except for the changes to the sixth sentence. House Bill 681 changes the sixth sentence to read as follows: "An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor." Acts 1993, 73d Leg., ch. 358, § 2. A class C misdemeanor is punishable by a fine not to exceed $500. Penal Code § 12.23. Senate Bill 7, however, changes the sixth sentence to read as follows: "An offense under this section is punishable by a fine of not less than $10 nor more than $50 for the first offense, not less than $20 nor more than $100 for the second offense, and not less than $50 nor more than $200 for a subsequent offense." Acts 1993, 73d Leg., ch. 347, § 6.01. These two amendments are irreconcilable, so the later enacted bill prevails. Gov't Code § 311.025(b). House Bill 681 was enacted on May 10, 1993; and Senate Bill 7 was enacted on May 28, 1993. Because Senate Bill 7 was enacted last, its amendment to the sixth sentence prevails over the amendment to the sixth sentence in House Bill 681.

We conclude that section 4.25(a), (b) has been amended to provide as follows:

The opinion next set out the full consolidated text of amended section 4.25(a), (b) as a redline of insertions and deletions. That block is too degraded in the scanned copy to transcribe faithfully; see the linked PDF for the complete consolidated text. The operative result is stated in the summary below.

SUMMARY

Senate Bill 7 of the Seventy-third Legislature was enacted after House Bill 681 of the same session, so its amendment to the punishment provision of Education Code section 4.25 prevails over the conflicting amendment in House Bill 681. Therefore, "[a]n offense under . . . section [4.25] is punishable by a fine of not less than $10 nor more than $50 for the first offense, not less than $20 nor more than $100 for the second offense, and not less than $50 nor more than $200 for a subsequent offense." Educ. Code § 4.25(a), (b), amended by Acts 1993, 73d Leg., ch. 347, § 6.01.

DAN MORALES
Attorney General of Texas

JORGE VEGA
First Assistant Attorney General

DREW DURHAM
Deputy Attorney General for Criminal Justice

JAVIER AGUILAR
Special Assistant Attorney General

RENEA HICKS
State Solicitor

SARAH J. SHIRLEY
Chair, Opinion Committee

Prepared by James B. Pinson
Assistant Attorney General