Do the term-limit protections in Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-202(c) cover Shelby County's charter officers (sheriff, register, county clerk, assessor, trustee), even though the codified version of the statute does not match the public act the legislature passed in 2025?

Subject

Whether the term-limit protections in Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-202(c) apply to Shelby County's "charter" county officers (sheriff, register, county clerk, assessor of property, trustee), and what to do about the mismatch between the 2025 public act and the codified statutory text.

Plain-English summary

Representative Torrey C. Harris asked the AG a question that turns on a quirk in how Tennessee statutes get codified. The 2025 General Assembly passed Public Chapter 221, which amended § 5-1-202(c) to extend its term-limit-protection language to "charter or constitutional" county offices. The amendment matters because Shelby County operates under a charter form of government and has "county charter officers" that parallel the constitutional county offices (sheriff, register, county clerk, assessor of property, trustee) in non-charter counties. The Tennessee Code Commission codified part of the act correctly but failed to carry the new "charter or" phrase through to the concluding sentence of § 5-1-202(c)(1). So when you read the Code today, the language on terms still references only "the constitutional county offices."

The AG's answer is that the public act controls. Under Tennessee law, the Code is "prima facie evidence" of the statutes (§ 1-1-111), and the Code Commission has no power to add to, subtract from, or substantively amend laws (§ 1-1-108(a)). When the codified text and the duly enacted public act conflict, the public act wins. Tennessee courts have repeatedly held this. So the operative version of § 5-1-202(c)'s concluding sentence is the version in the public act, which protects "the terms of the charter or constitutional county offices of sheriff, register, county clerk, assessor of property, or trustee." That phrasing reaches Shelby County's charter officers as well as constitutional county officers elsewhere.

The AG explained the legislative backstory. The original 2019 enactment said § 5-1-202(c) "must not be construed to affect the terms of the constitutional county offices." Last year, in Op. 24-008 (May 30, 2024), the AG concluded the 2019 statute likely did not reach Shelby County's offices, because Shelby County had eliminated the constitutional offices and replaced them with parallel charter officers. The 2025 amendment was a direct legislative response: by inserting "charter or" before "constitutional," the legislature made clear that the protection extends to charter officers too. The Code Commission caught the substitution in one place (the duties/qualifications sentence in (c)(1)) but missed the parallel substitution in the terms sentence. The AG concluded that this is a codification gap, not a substantive change in the law, and the public act governs.

What this means for you

Shelby County charter officers (sheriff, register, county clerk, assessor of property, trustee)

The "terms" protection in § 5-1-202(c) reaches you. That means the protection against changes that "affect the terms" of your office, which existed for constitutional county officers since 2019, now explicitly covers Shelby County charter officers under the duly enacted text of the 2025 amendment. If a charter amendment or local ordinance is proposed that would alter the term of your office (length, start date, term limits), § 5-1-202(c) is now part of the analysis. The exact reach of the protection turns on what "affect the terms" means; that issue is not what the AG addressed here.

Election administrators and county clerks running candidate filings

Operationally, the practical change is small but worth flagging on training materials and candidate handbooks: the term-limit protection in § 5-1-202(c) extends to Shelby County's charter officers, not just to constitutional county officers in other counties. If a local Shelby County rule purports to shorten or restructure the term of a charter officer's seat in a way inconsistent with the public act, the public act governs.

Charter-county attorneys (Shelby and any other charter counties with parallel officers)

Build the analysis into your charter-amendment review checklist. When a proposed charter amendment touches the terms of any charter officer who corresponds to a constitutional county office, run the § 5-1-202(c) overlay. Cite the 2025 public act, not just the codified text, because the codified text is the prima facie source and your client may be confused by the mismatch. Note the Op. 24-008 background and the legislative correction.

Anyone reading the Tennessee Code

This opinion is a useful reminder. The Code is "prima facie evidence" of the law, not the law itself. If you find a mismatch between the codified text and the public act it purports to codify, the public act controls. The Code Commission can and does err. The courts will follow the public act. Always check the chapter law against the codified text on questions where the chapter law is recent.

State legislators and legislative staff

The opinion is also a heads-up that the Code Commission failed to memorialize part of Public Chapter 221. A clean fix would be a technical-corrections amendment in the next session that updates the concluding sentence of § 5-1-202(c)(1) to match the duly enacted "charter or constitutional county offices" language. That avoids future confusion without changing the substance.

Candidates for Shelby County charter offices

Your office's term is governed by the charter and by state law. The 2025 amendment, properly read, gives state-law protection to the "terms" of your charter officer position. If a campaign or rival candidate cites the bare codified text to argue that the protection does not reach you, point them to Public Chapter 221 and to this opinion.

Common questions

What is the difference between a "constitutional county office" and a "charter county office"?

Most Tennessee counties have a county executive plus a separate set of constitutional officers (sheriff, register, county clerk, assessor of property, trustee), each elected directly. Some counties, like Shelby, have adopted an "alternate" form of county government under a charter. In a charter county, the charter can replace the constitutional offices with parallel "county charter officers" who play the same operational role but exist as charter creatures rather than constitutional officers. The Tennessee Constitution (Article VII, § 1) authorizes both arrangements.

Why didn't the Code reflect the 2025 amendment?

The Tennessee Code Commission carried the "charter or" insertion into one sentence in § 5-1-202(c)(1) but missed the parallel substitution in the concluding sentence about "terms." The AG's view is that this is a codification mistake. The public act passed both chambers and was signed; that is the law.

Does the Code Commission's mistake invalidate anything?

No. The codified text is "prima facie evidence" of the statute, not the statute itself. When there is a discrepancy between codified text and the duly enacted public act, courts apply the public act. State v. Hicks, 835 S.W.2d 32 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), and other Tennessee cases say so directly.

What about the AG's earlier opinion (24-008)?

Op. 24-008 (May 30, 2024) concluded that the 2019 version of § 5-1-202(c) likely did not reach Shelby County's charter officers, because the 2019 statute referred only to "constitutional county offices" and Shelby County had replaced those with charter officers. The 2025 amendment was the legislature's response: by adding "charter or," the General Assembly broadened the protection to reach Shelby County's charter officers. So Op. 25-17 does not contradict Op. 24-008; it explains how the legislature changed the law in light of it.

Does this change term limits for Shelby County officers?

The opinion does not directly answer that. It says the protection in § 5-1-202(c) reaches Shelby County's charter officers. What that protection means in any specific factual case (a particular term limit, a particular charter amendment) is a separate question that would turn on the particular language at issue. The AG flagged that any analysis of "what affects the terms" is fact-specific.

Background and statutory framework

The Tennessee Constitution does not require uniform local county government. Article VII, § 1 contemplates three types: traditional (county executive plus county legislative body), consolidated, and alternate. Alternate forms can be chartered or unchartered, and the General Assembly may create "diverse" forms of county government without conforming to the general type in Article VII. State ex rel. Maner v. Leech, 588 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Tenn. 1979).

The chartered alternate form is the framework that Shelby County uses. The relevant statutory scheme is Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 5-1-201 to -215. Shelby County has adopted a charter under that scheme and has charter officers that parallel the constitutional county offices found in non-charter counties.

The 2019 General Assembly added Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-202(c) (2019 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 458). The original concluding sentence said that subsection (c) "must not be construed to affect the terms of the constitutional county offices of sheriff, register, county clerk, assessor of property, or trustee." Floor statements indicated the legislature's specific concern with preserving locally implemented term limits in Knox and Shelby Counties.

In Op. 24-008 (May 30, 2024), the AG concluded that the 2019 statute likely did not reach Shelby County's offices because Shelby had eliminated the constitutional offices in favor of charter officers and the statute referred only to "constitutional county offices."

The 2025 General Assembly responded by passing Public Chapter 221, § 1, which deleted "the constitutional county offices" and substituted "the charter or constitutional county offices." The concluding sentence of § 5-1-202(c) should therefore read: "subsection (c) must not be construed to affect the terms of the charter or constitutional county offices of sheriff, register, county clerk, assessor of property, or trustee." A new subsection (c)(2) was also added by Public Chapter 221, § 2.

The Code Commission carried the substitution into one sentence of § 5-1-202(c)(1) but not into the concluding sentence about "terms." So the current codified text under-protects relative to the public act.

The AG explained why the public act controls. The Tennessee Code is "prima facie evidence" of the law (Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-1-111). The Tennessee Code and Code Commission are statutory creatures (Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 1-1-101, 1-1-105). The Code Commission has no power to add to, subtract from, or otherwise substantively amend duly enacted laws (Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-1-108(a)). The constitutional process for enacting law is in Tenn. Const. art. II, § 18. It does not contemplate codification as a step. Tennessee courts have consistently held that when a discrepancy exists between codified text and the public act, the public act controls. State v. Hicks, 835 S.W.2d 32, 37 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); see also Jamesway Constr., Inc. v. Salyers, No. M2023-01704-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 4252809, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2024) (Usman, J., dissenting).

Citations

• Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-1-101 (Code creation)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-1-105 (Tennessee Code Commission)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-1-108(a) (Code Commission lacks substantive amendment power)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-1-111 (Code is prima facie evidence of the statutes)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-202(c) and (c)(1) (statute at issue)
• Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 5-1-201 to -215 (chartered alternate-form county scheme)
• Tenn. Const. art. II, § 18 (legislative process)
• Tenn. Const. art. VII, § 1 (forms of county government)
• 2019 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 458 (original enactment of § 5-1-202(c))
• 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 221 (the amendment that the Code Commission did not fully carry through)
• State ex rel. Maner v. Leech, 588 S.W.2d 534 (Tenn. 1979) (Tennessee's three forms of county government)
• State v. Hicks, 835 S.W.2d 32, 37 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (public act controls over discrepant codified text)
• Jamesway Constr., Inc. v. Salyers, No. M2023-01704-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 4252809 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2024) (collecting cases on Code Commission errors)
• Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 24-008 (May 30, 2024) (prior conclusion that 2019 statute did not reach Shelby County's charter officers)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2025/op25-017.pdf

Original opinion text

STATE OF TENNESSEE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
October 7, 2025
Opinion No. 25-017
Statutory Amendments to Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-202(c) and Their Relationship to County Offices in Shelby County

Question

As it relates to Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-202(c), does the statutory language "terms" apply to the offices of sheriff, register, county clerk, assessor of property, and trustee in Shelby County?

Opinion

Yes. Although Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-202(c) does not currently reflect the contents of 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 221, § 1, Tennessee courts recognize that a public act controls in the event of any discrepancy. Here, that means that the relevant portion of Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-202(c) should read that "subsection (c) must not be construed to affect the terms of the charter or constitutional county offices of sheriff, register, county clerk, assessor of property, or trustee." And because this provision concerning "terms" is thus partially directed at the listed "charter" offices, we believe it effectively speaks with respect to those offices in Shelby County, a county that has adopted a charter form of government and has "county charter officers" that parallel constitutional county offices.

ANALYSIS

It is well settled that the Tennessee Constitution does not demand statewide uniformity concerning the structure of local county governments. In fact, in "broad form," Article VII, § 1 of the Tennessee Constitution contemplates three types of county government. State ex rel. Maner v. Leech, 588 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Tenn. 1979). It authorizes a form of county government "wherein the basic units of government are the county executive and the county legislative body." Id. It also sanctions "consolidated" governments and "alternate" forms of county government. Id. "Alternate" forms of county government may be "either chartered or unchartered." Id. And the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained that the constitutional provision for "alternate" forms of government specifically authorizes the General Assembly to create "diverse" forms of county government "without regard to the general type established in Article VII." Id.

Here, an "alternate" form of county government is at the center of the request. The statute referenced, Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-202, fits within a larger statutory scheme enacted to allow counties the right to charter as an alternate form of county government. See generally Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 5-1-201 to -215. And the county implicated by the request, Shelby County, is one of the counties that has adopted a charter form of government pursuant to that broader legislation.

The question specifically asks whether the "terms" language referred to in Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-202(c) applies to the offices of sheriff, register, county clerk, assessor of property, and trustee in Shelby County. For the reasons stated below, we believe it does.

The General Assembly added Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-202(c) in 2019. In its original form, the enacted statutory language in part provided that "[n]o charter . . . may be interpreted or amended to alter, amend, or reduce the duties, qualifications, or privileges of the constitutional county offices of sheriff, register, county clerk, assessor of property, or trustee in a manner inconsistent with the laws of this state." See 2019 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 458 (emphasis added). And of relevance to the discussion here, it concluded by stating that "[t]his subsection (c) must not be construed to affect the terms of the constitutional county offices of sheriff, register, county clerk, assessor of property, or trustee." Id. (emphasis added).

Based on our review of the associated legislative history, it appears that some legislators shared a belief that the General Assembly's 2019 enactment would substantively impact, at least in part, the county offices in Shelby County. See, e.g., House Session, 111th Gen. Assem. (Apr. 15, 2019) (statement of Rep. Vaughan); Senate Session, 111th Gen. Assem. (Apr. 29, 2019) (statement of Sen. Akbari). And it also appears that the concluding portion of subsection (c) was inserted to clarify that term limits already implemented locally for county officials there would be unaffected by the legislation.

Last year, however, this Office was asked to address whether the 2019 enactment even applied to the offices of sheriff, register, county clerk, assessor of property, and trustee in Shelby County. The Office concluded that it likely did not. Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 24-008 (May 30, 2024). Among other things, we observed that the plain text of the statute applied to "constitutional county offices." Id. And as we further explained, Shelby County had "eliminated those offices from its charter form of government and explicitly created parallel 'county charter officers' in their place." Id.

In the wake of our assessment regarding this issue, the General Assembly worked to amend Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-202(c) during the 2025 legislative session. The first section of the resulting enactment is of relevance here. Under that section, the General Assembly deleted the language "the constitutional county offices" and substituted instead "the charter or constitutional county offices." 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 221, § 1. The duly enacted law therefore should provide that "subsection (c) must not be construed to affect the terms of the charter or constitutional county offices of sheriff, register, county clerk, assessor of property, or trustee." See id. (emphasis added). As is evident, the provision's reference to "terms" is not limited to modifying the "constitutional county offices of sheriff, register, county clerk, assessor of property, or trustee." Instead, the plain text signals that the provision refers to the "terms of the charter . . . offices" and the "terms of the . . . constitutional county offices." The provision's language relates to both.

The Tennessee Code Commission, however, did not memorialize this change effectuated by the 2025 enactment. To be sure, portions of the larger public act were properly codified. See generally Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-202(c). And in one place, the codification of the enactment even reflected a substitution of the added "the charter or constitutional county offices" language where "the constitutional county offices" language had formerly appeared. See id. § 5-1-202(c)(1). But the concluding portion of § 5-1-202(c)(1) currently reads that "subsection (c) must not be construed to affect the terms of the constitutional county offices of sheriff, register, county clerk, assessor of property, or trustee." Id. (emphasis added). Put simply, the codified text of § 5-1-202(c) does not match the law passed in 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 221.

But the Public Act governs. In fact, it is important to recognize that the Tennessee Code is not the law proper. Rather, it is only "prima facie evidence" of the statutory law of the State. Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-1-111. And being only prima facie evidence of the statutory law, its accuracy may be rebutted. See Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

This, of course, makes sense. Properly understood, the laws of this State are those bills that have undergone the process set forth in Tenn. Const. art. II, § 18. And notably, that process does not contemplate a Tennessee Code of any kind. Indeed, the Tennessee Code and Tennessee Code Commission are statutory creatures themselves. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 1-1-101, -105. And consistent with the primacy of the process outlined in Tenn. Const. art. II, § 18, the Tennessee Code openly acknowledges that the Tennessee Code Commission lacks authority to add to, subtract from, or otherwise substantively amend the laws enacted pursuant to constitutional procedures. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-1-108(a).

This obviously does not mean that the Tennessee Code Commission is beyond error. See Jamesway Constr., Inc. v. Salyers, No. M2023-01704-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 4252809, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2024) (Usman, J., dissenting). As is the case here, discrepancies may occasionally materialize during the codification process. But importantly, any discrepancies that do occur cannot impact the meaning of duly enacted law. And to this end, Tennessee courts have consistently recognized that whenever there is a discrepancy between the Tennessee Code and a public act, the latter controls. See, e.g., State v. Hicks, 835 S.W.2d 32, 37 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

It thus follows that the text currently codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-1-202(c)(1) does not govern the answer to your question. Analyzing the proper text, the text dictated by 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 221, we think the answer to your question becomes clear. As is apparent, the "terms" language referenced in your request is partially directed at the listed "charter" offices. And that being the case, we believe the provision refers to the offices held by the "county charter officers" in Shelby County.

JONATHAN SKRMETTI
Attorney General and Reporter

J. MATTHEW RICE
Solicitor General

MATTHEW KERNODLE
Assistant Attorney General

Requested by:
The Honorable Torrey C. Harris
State Representative
425 Rep. John Lewis Way North
Nashville, Tennessee 37243