Can a Tennessee qualified electronic monitoring provider also own, operate, or work for a professional bail bondsman, given that the legislature passed two laws in 2025 that seem to clash on the question?

Subject

How two 2025 Tennessee public acts (Chapter 253 and Chapter 491) interact in regulating dual service as a qualified electronic monitoring provider and a professional bail bondsman, including how a "grandfather" carveout in Chapter 491 affects the analysis on and after January 1, 2026.

Plain-English summary

Senator Janice Bowling asked the AG to untangle two 2025 Tennessee statutes that both touch the relationship between bail bondsmen and electronic monitoring providers. The first, Public Chapter 253, took effect July 1, 2025. It says an owner, operator, or employee of a professional bondsman cannot own, operate, direct, or serve as an employee or agent of a qualified electronic monitoring provider. The second, Public Chapter 491, was passed shortly after the first. Its main relevant section makes it "unlawful" for a person to act as a professional bondsman while owning, operating, or being an employee of a qualified electronic monitoring provider, but it carves out anyone who was a professional bondsman and owned a qualified electronic monitoring provider before January 1, 2025. Section 11 of Chapter 491, which contains both the prohibition and the carveout, does not take effect until January 1, 2026.

The AG split the analysis into two periods.

For the period July 1, 2025 through December 31, 2025, only Chapter 253 is operative. Chapter 491's prohibition and carveout are not yet effective and have no legal force. So a Tennessee statute cannot become operative until its effective date; that is settled law. Chapter 253's flat ban controls, and a qualified electronic monitoring provider cannot be a bondsman or work for one, full stop, with no grandfather protection.

For the period starting January 1, 2026, the analysis changes. Chapter 491's prohibition and grandfather carveout become effective. The AG had to decide whether the grandfather clause in Chapter 491 carves out a real exception or just protects covered persons from one form of discipline while leaving them exposed under Chapter 253. The AG concluded the more sensible reading is that Chapter 491's carveout creates a real exception. Otherwise, the carveout has essentially no effect: covered bondsmen would still be banned from dual service under Chapter 253, making Chapter 491's grandfather clause meaningless. Tennessee courts presume the legislature does not pass meaningless statutes, presume the General Assembly knows about its prior enactments, and try to harmonize statutes on the same subject. So the AG concluded that, on or after January 1, 2026, a qualified electronic monitoring provider may also be a professional bondsman if the Chapter 491 grandfather carveout applies, meaning that person was a professional bondsman and owned a qualified electronic monitoring provider before January 1, 2025.

The AG was careful to call this a likely judicial conclusion, not a certainty. AG opinions are persuasive authority and the analysis here turns on a statutory-harmony argument. A court could read the statutes differently, but the AG thinks the harmonized reading wins.

What this means for you

Bail bondsmen who also own or work for an electronic monitoring company

If you fall within the grandfather carveout (you were a professional bondsman and owned a qualified electronic monitoring provider before January 1, 2025), here is the practical timeline. Right now, through December 31, 2025, Chapter 253 bans your dual role with no grandfather. Continuing the dual role exposes you to discipline. The AG is unequivocal on that point. Starting January 1, 2026, the AG's likely reading is that you can continue the dual role, but you should still get specific legal advice and document your pre-January 1, 2025 status. Keep ownership records, employment dates, license dates, and operational history that prove the carveout applies to you.

If you do not fall within the carveout (you started either business after January 1, 2025, or you do not own the monitoring provider), Chapter 253's ban applies in 2025, and once Chapter 491 kicks in on January 1, 2026, both statutes will reach you. Wind down the conflicting role before December 31, 2025 to avoid discipline.

Qualified electronic monitoring providers

The same analysis runs in reverse. If you operate or work for a monitoring provider, you cannot also serve as an owner, operator, or employee of a professional bondsman during 2025 unless you fall within the post-January 1, 2026 grandfather carveout. The carveout requires your pre-2025 dual status, so anyone newly entering the monitoring business in 2025 to expand a bondsman business will not qualify.

Sheriffs and jail administrators

If your jurisdiction uses qualified electronic monitoring providers for pretrial release supervision, ask your providers and bonding agencies whether they have any common ownership relationships and whether those relationships predate January 1, 2025. The conflicts-of-interest concern that drove these statutes (a bondsman's financial incentive vs. an electronic monitor's neutral oversight role) is something you may want to manage through procurement and reporting practices regardless of the statutory minimum. Note that the Chapter 253 ban is unqualified and operative now; even grandfathered relationships that may eventually qualify under Chapter 491 are still unlawful through December 31, 2025.

Criminal defense attorneys

If your client's pretrial release involves an electronic monitoring provider that has any common ownership with a bonding company, the dual-service issue may affect the integrity of the supervision arrangement. Through December 31, 2025, that arrangement may be unlawful under Chapter 253. Starting January 1, 2026, it may be lawful only under the narrow Chapter 491 grandfather. Raise the issue at the pretrial release hearing if it bears on impartiality.

Bondsman regulators (clerks, judges, statutory committees)

Update your enforcement guidance to reflect the two-period rule. From July 1, 2025 through December 31, 2025, Chapter 253 governs and there is no grandfather. Starting January 1, 2026, Chapter 491's grandfather carveout creates a narrow exception. In screening license renewals or new applications, ask whether the applicant has any relationship with a qualified electronic monitoring provider, and if so, whether the relationship predates January 1, 2025.

State legislators

The opinion identifies a real codification problem. The two acts as drafted produced confusion, and the AG had to do a harmony exercise to reconcile them. A clean statutory cleanup in the next session would be valuable: either align the effective dates, repeal the redundant provisions, or carry the grandfather carveout into Chapter 253. The AG explicitly said that "what a statutory text does not provide is simply unprovided," signaling that the courts will not paper over legislative oversights. If the policy goal was a uniform pre-2025 grandfather across both regimes, the legislature has to say so.

Common questions

What is a "qualified electronic monitoring provider"?

The term was added to the Tennessee Code by Public Chapter 253. It refers to providers regulated under the new section the act created. Practically, these are companies that supply ankle bracelets, GPS-tracking, alcohol-monitoring equipment, and related devices used for pretrial release supervision and post-conviction monitoring. The detailed definitional language is in the act and the corresponding code section.

What is a "professional bondsman" under § 40-11-301?

A professional bondsman is a person or entity licensed to write bail bonds in Tennessee for compensation. The statutory definition in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-301 is the reference point that both 2025 acts use.

Why did the legislature ban this dual role?

The opinion does not give the legislative motivation directly, but the obvious policy concern is conflict of interest. A bondsman has a financial stake in keeping a defendant out on bond. An electronic monitoring provider is supposed to objectively report compliance. If one entity wears both hats, the monitor's reports may favor the bond's continuation and obscure violations. Separating the two roles protects the integrity of the pretrial supervision system.

What if my electronic monitoring company started after January 1, 2025?

You do not qualify for the grandfather carveout. The carveout requires that you were both a professional bondsman and owned the monitoring provider before January 1, 2025. So a post-2024 startup does not get protection under Chapter 491, and Chapter 253's ban governs you in 2025 and beyond.

What if I am only an employee, not an owner?

The Chapter 491 grandfather requires you to have been a bondsman and "owned" a monitoring provider before January 1, 2025. The opinion focuses on ownership. If you are an employee or operator without ownership, the grandfather likely does not reach you. Chapter 253 reaches both owners and employees, so if you do not fit the grandfather, you are barred.

Can a court reach a different conclusion than the AG?

Yes. AG opinions are persuasive authority, not binding precedent. The AG was explicit that the harmonized reading is the most likely judicial conclusion, but courts can disagree. If you are betting your license on the dual role, get legal advice and consider seeking a declaratory judgment before relying on the grandfather alone.

Background and statutory framework

The 2024-2025 General Assembly passed several acts touching bail bondsmen and pretrial release. Two are at issue here.

Public Chapter 253, § 1, defined "qualified electronic monitoring providers" and prohibited an "owner, operator, or employee of a professional bondsman, as defined in § 40-11-301," from owning, operating, directing, or serving as an employee or agent of a qualified electronic monitoring provider. The act took effect July 1, 2025 (2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 253, § 8). It contains no grandfather clause.

Public Chapter 491, § 11, separately makes it "unlawful for a person to act as a professional bondsman, directly or indirectly," while "owning, operating, or being an employee of a qualified electronic monitoring provider." It then states the prohibition "does not apply to a person who was a professional bondsman and owned a qualified electronic monitoring provider prior to January 1, 2025." Section 11 takes effect January 1, 2026 (2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 491, § 20).

The interaction question splits into two periods.

For July 1, 2025 through December 31, 2025: only Chapter 253 is operative. Tennessee law is settled that "a statute cannot become operative until its effective date" (State v. Keese, 591 S.W.3d 75, 84 (Tenn. 2019)) and that the effective date "becomes an expression of the legislative will" specifying that "the people shall not be compelled or permitted to act thereunder until the expiration of a time fixed" (Wright v. Cunningham, 91 S.W. 293, 295 (Tenn. 1905)). Chapter 491's prohibition and grandfather carveout have no force during this period. Chapter 253's flat ban governs, and "what a statutory text does not provide is simply unprovided" (Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 19-16, Sept. 17, 2019).

For January 1, 2026 forward: both acts are operative. The interpretive question becomes what work the Chapter 491 grandfather does. The AG applied standard Tennessee statutory interpretation rules. Courts begin with text and use the natural and ordinary meaning of the language (Worrall v. Kroger Co., 545 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tenn. 1977)). They presume each word was chosen purposely (Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tenn. 1998)) and that the legislature knew its prior enactments (Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tenn. 1995)). They construe statutes on the same subject together (Wilson v. Johnson Cnty., 879 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tenn. 1994)), seek the most reasonable construction that avoids conflict (Frye v. Blue Ridge Neuroscience Ctr., P.C., 70 S.W.3d 710, 716 (Tenn. 2002)), and presume the General Assembly did not intend an absurdity (New v. Dumitrache, 604 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tenn. 2020)). They do not read provisions as meaningless or useless (Hammond v. Harvey, 410 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tenn. 2013); Goodman v. City of Savannah, 148 S.W.3d 88, 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)).

Applying those rules, the AG concluded that the only meaningful reading of Chapter 491's grandfather is that it carves out a real exception, including from the parallel Chapter 253 ban. Reading the carveout as a discipline-only protection would render it ineffectual, since Chapter 253 would still ban the underlying dual role. So the AG concluded that, on or after January 1, 2026, a person may serve as both a qualified electronic monitoring provider and a professional bondsman if that person was both a bondsman and owned a monitoring provider before January 1, 2025.

Citations

• Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-301 (definition of professional bondsman, used by both acts)
• 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 253, § 1 (qualified electronic monitoring provider regime; flat ban on bondsman dual service)
• 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 253, § 8 (Chapter 253 effective date: July 1, 2025)
• 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 491, § 11 (parallel ban with grandfather carveout for pre-2025 dual operators)
• 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 491, § 20 (Chapter 491 § 11 effective date: January 1, 2026)
• State v. Keese, 591 S.W.3d 75, 84 (Tenn. 2019) (statute cannot become operative until effective date)
• Wright v. Cunningham, 91 S.W. 293 (Tenn. 1905) (effective date as legislative will)
• Worrall v. Kroger Co., 545 S.W.2d 736 (Tenn. 1977) (natural and ordinary meaning rule)
• Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W.2d 308 (Tenn. 1998) (every word presumed purposeful)
• Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn. 1995) (presumption of legislative knowledge of prior enactments)
• Wilson v. Johnson Cnty., 879 S.W.2d 807 (Tenn. 1994) (statutes on same subject construed together)
• Frye v. Blue Ridge Neuroscience Ctr., P.C., 70 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2002) (harmonious operation of statutes)
• Carver v. Citizen Utils. Co., 954 S.W.2d 34 (Tenn. 1997) (same)
• New v. Dumitrache, 604 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2020) (absurdity-avoidance canon)
• Hammond v. Harvey, 410 S.W.3d 306 (Tenn. 2013) (no provision read as meaningless)
• Goodman v. City of Savannah, 148 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (same)
• Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 19-16 (Sept. 17, 2019) (courts do not supply legislative omissions)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2025/op25-015.pdf

Original opinion text

STATE OF TENNESSEE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
August 4, 2025
Opinion No. 25-015
Statutory Restrictions Pertaining to Dual Service as a Qualified Electronic Monitoring Provider and Professional Bondsman

Question 1

In light of 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 491, may a qualified electronic monitoring provider be an owner, operator, or employee of a professional bondsman, as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-301, during the period July 1, 2025, to January 1, 2026?

Opinion 1

No.

Question 2

May a qualified electronic monitoring provider be an owner, operator, or employee of a professional bondsman, as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-301, on or after January 1, 2026, if the "grandfathering" carveout clause in 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 491, §11 applies to that provider?

Opinion 2

Likely so.

ANALYSIS

During the past year, the Tennessee General Assembly passed several acts implicating bail bondsmen, the pretrial release of criminal defendants, or both. Two of these acts notably contain a restriction pertaining to dual service as a professional bondsman and a qualified electronic monitoring provider. Both are at the center of your request.

The first of the acts at issue is 2025 Tenn. Pub Acts, ch. 253 ("Public Chapter 253"). Among other statutory amendments, Public Chapter 253 added a new section to the Tennessee Code concerning "qualified electronic monitoring providers." 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 253, § 1. And as is relevant here, it provides that "[a]n owner, operator, or employee of a professional bondsman, as defined in § 40-11-301," "shall not own, operate, direct, or serve as an employee or agent of a qualified electronic monitoring provider." Id. Public Chapter 253 took effect on July 1, 2025. 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 253, § 8.

The second act at issue is 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 491 ("Public Chapter 491"). Passed shortly after Public Chapter 253, and involving the regulation of bondsmen, Public Chapter 491 provides under a different Code section that "[i]t is unlawful for a person to act as a professional bondsman, directly or indirectly," while "[o]wning, operating, or being an employee of a qualified electronic monitoring provider." 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 491, § 11. But of note, Public Chapter 491 also states that this prohibition "does not apply to a person who was a professional bondsman and owned a qualified electronic monitoring provider prior to January 1, 2025." Id.

This carveout is unique to Public Chapter 491, as similar qualifying language does not accompany the restriction applicable to the regulation of "qualified electronic monitoring providers" under Public Chapter 253. But Public Chapter 491 is different in another respect too. Unlike Public Chapter 253, the portions from Public Chapter 491 cited above are not presently operative. Instead, under the act's terms, the provisions included in its § 11 will not take effect until January 1, 2026. 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 491, § 20.

Your request refers to these acts as evidencing a "legislative discrepancy" and "conflict," and you seek guidance as to how they might be reconciled. As discussed below, our assessment inevitably differs depending on the period at issue.

1. Your primary concern appears to be related to whether Public Chapter 253 and Public Chapter 491 can be reconciled to govern present conduct. And as we understand it, you want to know whether, because of Public Chapter 491, a qualified electronic monitoring provider may also be an owner, operator, or employee of a professional bondsman during the period July 1, 2025, to January 1, 2026. The law compels us to answer that question in the negative.

It is a "long-standing rule" that a statute cannot become operative until its effective date. State v. Keese, 591 S.W.3d 75, 84 (Tenn. 2019). And when the General Assembly provides an effective date, that effective date "become[s] an expression of the legislative will in the form of a rule of action prescribed for the regulation of the conduct and affairs of the people." Wright v. Cunningham, 91 S.W. 293, 295 (Tenn. 1905). In other words, it signals "that the people shall not be compelled or permitted to act thereunder until the expiration of a time fixed." Id.

Here, the provisions from Public Chapter 491 that are related to your request will not take effect until January 1, 2026. 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 491, § 20. Given the principles above, this means that they are not presently binding. And so, whatever impact those provisions may have starting January 1, 2026, a question we address later in this Opinion, they have none before that date.

There is therefore nothing to reconcile between Public Chapter 253 and Public Chapter 491 insofar as your request is concerned with conduct during the period July 1, 2025, to January 1, 2026. The potentially relevant provisions of Public Chapter 491 are simply not operative.

Public Chapter 253, on the other hand, is operative. And under its terms, the General Assembly has spoken without equivocation. "An owner, operator, or employee of a professional bondsman" "shall not own, operate, direct, or serve as an employee or agent of a qualified electronic monitoring provider." 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 253, § 1. This is current law, and it can be expected that a court would apply Public Chapter 253 as written insofar as the period from July 1, 2025, to January 1, 2026, is concerned. That there may be a "legislative discrepancy" between the acts does not alter our assessment. Indeed, as this Office has stated before, "it is not the function of the courts to supply or correct a legislative oversight or omission." Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 19-16 (Sept. 17, 2019). And in the end, "what a statutory text does not provide is simply unprovided." Id.

2. The analysis differs in a post-2025 universe. Beginning January 1, 2026, § 11 of Public Chapter 491 becomes effective. 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 491, § 20. And it thus becomes necessary to consider how, on and after that date, Public Chapter 491 may impact the prohibition enacted by Public Chapter 253. Squarely at issue is the "grandfathering" carveout clause in § 11 pertaining to those who were "a professional bondsman and owned a qualified electronic monitoring provider prior to January 1, 2025." 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 491, § 11.

Questions of statutory interpretation invariably begin with a statute's text. And at the start, legislative intent is "to be ascertained primarily from the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used." Worrall v. Kroger Co., 545 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tenn. 1977). Courts will "assume that the legislature used each word in the statute purposely," Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tenn. 1998), and they will further presume that the General Assembly had knowledge of its prior enactments. Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tenn. 1995). If statutes relate to the same subject, courts will construe those statutes together. Wilson v. Johnson Cnty., 879 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tenn. 1994).

Courts ultimately "seek the most 'reasonable construction which avoids statutory conflict and provides for harmonious operation of the laws.'" Frye v. Blue Ridge Neuroscience Ctr., P.C., 70 S.W.3d 710, 716 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting Carver v. Citizen Utils. Co., 954 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tenn. 1997)). And importantly, they will presume that the General Assembly did not intend an absurdity. New v. Dumitrache, 604 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tenn. 2020). Likewise, when courts construe statutory provisions, they will "do so in a manner that will not render them meaningless or useless." Hammond v. Harvey, 410 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tenn. 2013); see also Goodman v. City of Savannah, 148 S.W.3d 88, 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

As noted earlier, the referenced prohibition pertaining to "qualified electronic monitoring providers" within Public Chapter 253 is itself unqualified: "An owner, operator, or employee of a professional bondsman, as defined in § 40-11-301," "shall not own, operate, direct, or serve as an employee or agent of a qualified electronic monitoring provider." 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 253, § 1. This has been the law since July 1, 2025. 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 253, § 8. And in general, Public Chapter 491's parallel restriction governing professional bondsmen certainly aligns with this law.

The question here, though, concerns what meaning should be given to the grandfathering carveout clause in Public Chapter 491. Indeed, although Public Chapter 491 generally provides that it is "unlawful" for a professional bondsman to simultaneously serve as a qualified electronic monitoring provider, its grandfathering carveout clause states that this prohibition "does not apply to a person who was a professional bondsman and owned a qualified electronic monitoring provider prior to January 1, 2025." 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 491, § 11. And it is that carveout, and its relationship to Public Chapter 253, that demands our present attention.

If a court were to conclude that Public Chapter 253 will remain in full, unqualified force starting January 1, 2026, it might reason that Public Chapter 491's carveout clause is somehow intended only to foreclose the disciplining of the implicated bondsmen who would otherwise be subject to discipline for contravening the base restriction that Public Chapter 491 imposes. That is, if a professional bondsman that also "owned a qualified electronic monitoring provider prior to January 1, 2025," continued to own that monitoring provider, that bondsman would violate the restriction imposed by Public Chapter 253, but he would not be subject to discipline in his capacity as a professional bondsman.

We are skeptical, however, that a court would find harmony between the respective public acts in this way. In fact, we believe there is a strong chance that a court would regard that construction as leading to an absurd result. Practically speaking, the reading would appear to strip the grandfathering carveout of any real utility considering that, under Public Chapter 253, no professional bondsman may "own, operate, direct, or serve as an employee or agent of a qualified electronic monitoring provider." 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 253, § 1. And ultimately, we do not think a court would interpret Public Chapter 491 so narrowly.

In our view, a court would be more likely to conclude that the General Assembly clearly intended the carveout in Public Chapter 491 to make it "lawful" to be a professional bondsman and a qualified electronic monitoring provider if one was "a professional bondsman and owned a qualified electronic monitoring provider prior to January 1, 2025." 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 491, § 11. This seems to be what Public Chapter 491 is signaling. After all, if the provision making such dual service "unlawful" does not apply to those falling within the parameters of the grandfathering carveout, does the grandfathering carveout not effectively countenance that behavior in limited circumstances? When read naturally and reasonably, we think the carveout does. By stating that the prohibition on professional bondsmen "[o]wning, operating, or being an employee of a qualified electronic monitoring provider" does not apply to those persons meeting its terms, the grandfathering carveout clause signals that dual service is not categorically disallowed. And in this respect, we think it is probable that a court would regard the grandfathering carveout in Public Chapter 491 to serve as a limited exception to what is otherwise prohibited under Public Chapter 253. All things considered then, we believe a court faced with the question would likely conclude that, on or after January 1, 2026, a qualified electronic monitoring provider may be an owner, operator, or employee of a professional bondsman if the grandfathering carveout clause from Public Chapter 491 applies to that provider.

JONATHAN SKRMETTI
Attorney General and Reporter

JAMES P. URBAN
Senior Deputy Attorney General

MATTHEW KERNODLE
Assistant Attorney General

Requested by:
The Honorable Janice Bowling
State Senator
425 Rep. John Lewis Way North
Nashville, Tennessee 37243