Can a part-time Tennessee general sessions and juvenile court judge in one county also serve as an appointed juvenile magistrate in a different county?

Subject

Simultaneous Service as a Part-Time General Sessions Judge and Juvenile Magistrate

Plain-English summary

A part-time general sessions and juvenile court judge in a small (class five) county was offered an appointment as a juvenile magistrate in a larger (class one) county. The president of Tennessee's juvenile and family court judges' council asked the Attorney General whether the dual service would be legal.

Two restraints come into play. First, Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5002(b) authorizes part-time general sessions judges to maintain other employment, including the practice of law, unless that work creates a "conflict of interest." The AG sees no categorical conflict in the proposed dual service, although specific cases could create one.

Second, and more importantly, Article VI, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution forbids "Judges of the Supreme or Inferior Courts" from holding "any other office of trust or profit under this State or the United States." General sessions and juvenile court judges are inferior-court judges. The dispositive question is whether a juvenile magistrate holds an "office of trust or profit." Tennessee case law contains two competing frameworks. Under State ex rel. Harris v. Buck (1917), an "office" requires fixed tenure, fixed compensation, and prescribed duties; juvenile magistrates lack those features and would not qualify. But under Frazier v. Elmore (1943), which is the leading case on Article VI, Section 7 specifically, the term "office" gets a broad reading designed to prevent diversion of judges' time, energy, and labor.

The AG concludes that Frazier controls because it interprets the very provision at issue. Under Frazier's broad approach, a juvenile magistrate occupies an "office of trust or profit" given the magistrate's substantial judicial powers (including the same authority as the appointing judge to issue process, preside over dependency and neglect cases, and even transfer juveniles to adult court). Dual service would therefore likely violate Article VI, Section 7.

What this means for you

For sitting part-time general sessions judges considering an outside appointment as a juvenile magistrate

You should treat this opinion as a stop sign. Even though the Buck framework would have permitted the dual role, the AG concludes that Frazier governs Article VI, Section 7 questions and produces the opposite result. Going forward without a court ruling exposes you to ouster proceedings under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101 and to ethical questions under the Code of Judicial Conduct. The AG opinion expressly does not address the Code of Judicial Conduct issue and refers you to the Judicial Ethics Committee. If you have already accepted such an appointment, consult counsel about an exit strategy before more cases pile up.

For juvenile court judges making magistrate appointments

Be aware that appointing a sitting general sessions or juvenile court judge from another county may put that person in violation of Article VI, Section 7. Vet candidates' current judicial positions before issuing the appointment.

For county legislative bodies setting magistrate compensation

The lack of "fixed compensation" was one feature that some courts (Buck framework) treated as evidence the magistrate position is not an "office." Under Frazier, that does not change the constitutional result, but counties should still be careful when setting magistrate pay to avoid creating a structure that resembles a salaried public office, since that would also tighten the analysis under any future re-examination.

For lawyers practicing in juvenile court

The opinion does not change the magistrate's substantive authority. It addresses only who may simultaneously hold the magistrate position. If your magistrate accepts a part-time judgeship in another county, that is a separate concern about the magistrate's eligibility, not about the validity of orders entered before the dual service began.

For the Judicial Ethics Committee

The AG explicitly defers to your Committee on the Code of Judicial Conduct question. Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 01-116. A judge in this situation should also seek your guidance.

Common questions

What is a juvenile magistrate?

An officer appointed by a juvenile court judge under Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107 to hear cases the judge directs to them. Magistrates serve "at the pleasure" of the appointing judge, have "the powers of a judge" once a case is referred, and may preside over dependency and neglect cases, custody and visitation matters, terminations of parental rights, and even transfers of juveniles to adult criminal court.

Is a juvenile magistrate the same as a juvenile referee?

Yes. The position was renamed by the General Assembly in 2009. 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 235, § 1.

What are the two competing tests for "office of trust or profit"?

The Buck "characteristics" test (State ex rel. Harris v. Buck, 1917) requires fixed term, fixed compensation, and prescribed duties before a position counts as an "office." The Frazier "broad" test (Frazier v. Elmore, 1943) reads "office" expansively in the Article VI, Section 7 context to capture any "post, appointment, situation, place, [or] position" of public trust, regardless of whether the structural hallmarks are present.

Why does Frazier control over Buck here?

Because Frazier interpreted Article VI, Section 7 itself, while Buck construed similar language in the ouster statute (now Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101). The AG previously made this same distinction in Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 99-156: a person can hold an "office" for one purpose and not for another.

What is the rationale for the broad Frazier reading?

Article VI, Section 7's purpose, per Frazier, is to prevent "a diversion or division of the time and labor, energies and abilities of judges of our courts" and to "limit them to one source of compensation." Dual service in another county splits the judge's attention between competing demands and creates a second income stream from judicial work, both of which the constitutional prohibition was meant to prevent.

What about other employment that does not implicate the constitution?

A part-time general sessions judge can lawfully practice law or hold other "gainful employment" under Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5002(b), as long as the work does not create a conflict of interest. The Article VI, Section 7 issue arises only because the magistrate position is itself a public, judicial role.

Does this opinion create new law?

No. It applies existing precedent (Frazier, 1943) to a new factual scenario. AG opinions are not binding, but the analysis is well-grounded.

Can the General Assembly fix this?

Constitutional amendment would be required to change Article VI, Section 7. Statutory changes to the magistrate position's structure could shift the analysis, but the constitutional rule cannot be overridden by ordinary legislation.

Background and statutory framework

Magistrates under § 37-1-107

A juvenile court judge "may appoint" one or more juvenile magistrates. Magistrates "shall hold office at the pleasure of the judge." Compensation is set by the appointing judge with "approval of the county legislative body or the pertinent governing body." The judge may direct which "case or class of cases" the magistrate hears. Magistrate orders are reviewable by the judge. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107(a)(1), (b), (c)-(d).

Once a case is referred, the magistrate has "the powers of a judge" and "the same authority as the judge to issue any and all process." Cases are "conducted in the same manner as cases heard by the judge." § 37-1-107(b). Magistrates can preside over dependency and neglect, custody and visitation, termination of parental rights, and (with judge approval) transfers of juveniles to adult criminal court. See In re Tamera W. (dependency and neglect); State v. Gray (transfer).

Magistrates are "officer[s] of the judicial system" with the duty "to perform judicial functions." Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-15-209(g)(1)(B), 17-2-118(f)(1)(B), 17-2-122(b).

Article VI, Section 7

The Tennessee Constitution provides that "Judges of the Supreme or Inferior Courts" shall not "hold any other office of trust or profit under this State or the United States." General sessions and juvenile court judges are inferior-court judges. Franks v. State, 772 S.W.2d 428, 429-30 (Tenn. 1989); Shelby County Election Commission v. Turner, 755 S.W.2d 774, 777 (Tenn. 1988).

The Buck and Frazier frameworks

The Tennessee Supreme Court has produced two strands of "office of trust or profit" analysis:

• Buck (1917): an "office" requires public-office characteristics: fixed term, fixed compensation, prescribed duties, mandatory rather than permissive appointment. Applied in the ouster-statute context. Followed in State ex rel. Byrge v. Yeager (2015) and recently in Patterson v. Tenn. Dep't of Safety & Homeland Sec. (2025).

• Frazier (1943): in the specific context of Article VI, Section 7, "office" gets a broad reading. Synonyms include "post, appointment, situation, place, [or] position." The Frazier court used this broad reading to capture military service positions even when the record did not disclose the position's tenure, duration, or compensation.

Why Frazier controls

The AG concludes that Frazier governs because it interpreted the constitutional provision at issue. Buck, by contrast, construed similar language in the ouster statute (Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101). A position can be an "office of trust or profit" for Article VI, Section 7 purposes without being one for ouster purposes, and vice versa. Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 99-156.

Applying Frazier, the magistrate position is a public role with substantial judicial authority, and dual service across counties would split the judge's time and energy across competing forums, the very harm Frazier identified.

Statutory restraint under § 16-15-5002(b)

Part-time general sessions judges may have other gainful employment unless it creates a "conflict of interest." Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5002(b). The AG sees no categorical conflict in the proposed dual service, though specific cases could generate one. The constitutional bar is the more significant one.

Citations

• Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 7 (no other office of trust or profit)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101 (ouster statute)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5002(b) (part-time general sessions judges' outside work)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107 (juvenile magistrate appointment and authority)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-103, -104 (juvenile court jurisdiction)
• Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-15-209(g)(1)(B), 17-2-118(f)(1)(B), 17-2-122(b) (magistrates as judicial officers)
• 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 235 (renaming referees as magistrates)
• Frazier v. Elmore, 173 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. 1943)
• State ex rel. Harris v. Buck, 196 S.W. 142 (Tenn. 1917)
• Day v. Sharp, 161 S.W. 994 (Tenn. 1913)
• U.S. v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385 (1867)
• Glass v. Sloan, 281 S.W.2d 397 (Tenn. 1955)
• State ex rel. Byrge v. Yeager, 472 S.W.3d 657 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015)
• Patterson v. Tenn. Dep't of Safety & Homeland Sec., 2025 WL 473547 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2025)
• Franks v. State, 772 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1989)
• Shelby County Election Commission v. Turner, 755 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1988)
• McNabb v. Harrison, 710 S.W.3d 653 (Tenn. 2025)
• Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 98-215, 99-156, 01-116

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2025/op25-014.pdf

Original opinion text

Simultaneous Service as a Part-Time General Sessions Judge and Juvenile Magistrate
Is a recurring part-time general sessions and juvenile court judge in a class five county
allowed to accept an appointed position to serve as a juvenile magistrate in a different and distinct
class one county and hold both positions simultaneously?
Likely not. Article VI, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits the judge of an
inferior court from holding any other office of trust or profit. And based on existing precedent,
we believe a court would likely conclude that the position of juvenile magistrate constitutes an
office of trust or profit within the meaning of this provision.
The position of juvenile magistrate is provided for in Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107, and at
the start, the statute signals that the position is largely subordinate to the juvenile court's power.
Under the statute, a juvenile court judge "may appoint" one or more persons to act as magistrates,
and each appointed magistrate "shall hold office at the pleasure of the judge." Tenn. Code Ann. §
37-1-107(a)(1). And beyond the powers of appointment and dismissal, the statute extends the
judge's control over magistrates to other areas too. For instance, the statute mandates that the
judge set the magistrate's compensation with "approval of the county legislative body or the
pertinent governing body," id., and it allows the judge to direct which "case or class of cases" the
magistrate hears. Id. § 37-1-107(b). And on top of these features, the statute provides that the
magistrate's orders are reviewable by the judge. Id. § 37-1-107(c)-(d).
But through their positions, juvenile magistrates fulfill an important, and public, role within
the State. Juvenile magistrates are known as "officer[s] of the judicial system" whose "duty it is
to perform judicial functions." Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-15-209(g)(1)(B), 17-2-118(f)(1)(B), 17-2-
122(b). And once a juvenile court judge directs that a case or class of cases will be heard by a
magistrate, the magistrate has "the powers of a judge" and "the same authority as the judge to issue
any and all process." Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107(b). Cases handled in the first instance by a
magistrate are "conducted in the same manner as cases heard by the judge," id., and under this
framework, juvenile magistrates may preside over a variety of cases with a profound impact, such
as those involving dependency and neglect, custody and visitation, and termination of parental
rights. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-103 and -104 (outlining the juvenile court's jurisdiction); In
re Tamera W., 515 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (juvenile magistrate ruled on
STATE OF TENNESSEE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
July 29, 2025
Opinion No. 25-014
Simultaneous Service as a Part-Time General Sessions Judge and Juvenile Magistrate
Question
Is a recurring part-time general sessions and juvenile court judge in a class five county
allowed to accept an appointed position to serve as a juvenile magistrate in a different and distinct
class one county and hold both positions simultaneously?
Opinion
Likely not. Article VI, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits the judge of an
inferior court from holding any other office of trust or profit. And based on existing precedent,
we believe a court would likely conclude that the position of juvenile magistrate constitutes an
office of trust or profit within the meaning of this provision.
ANALYSIS
The position of juvenile magistrate is provided for in Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107, and at
the start, the statute signals that the position is largely subordinate to the juvenile court’s power.
Under the statute, a juvenile court judge “may appoint” one or more persons to act as magistrates,
and each appointed magistrate “shall hold office at the pleasure of the judge.” Tenn. Code Ann. §
37-1-107(a)(1). And beyond the powers of appointment and dismissal, the statute extends the
judge’s control over magistrates to other areas too. For instance, the statute mandates that the
judge set the magistrate’s compensation with “approval of the county legislative body or the
pertinent governing body,” id., and it allows the judge to direct which “case or class of cases” the
magistrate hears. Id. § 37-1-107(b). And on top of these features, the statute provides that the
magistrate’s orders are reviewable by the judge. Id. § 37-1-107(c)-(d).
But through their positions, juvenile magistrates fulfill an important, and public, role within
the State. Juvenile magistrates are known as “officer[s] of the judicial system” whose “duty it is
to perform judicial functions.” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-15-209(g)(1)(B), 17-2-118(f)(1)(B), 17-2-
122(b). And once a juvenile court judge directs that a case or class of cases will be heard by a
magistrate, the magistrate has “the powers of a judge” and “the same authority as the judge to issue
any and all process.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107(b). Cases handled in the first instance by a
magistrate are “conducted in the same manner as cases heard by the judge,” id., and under this
framework, juvenile magistrates may preside over a variety of cases with a profound impact, such
as those involving dependency and neglect, custody and visitation, and termination of parental
rights. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-103 and -104 (outlining the juvenile court’s jurisdiction); In
re Tamera W., 515 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (juvenile magistrate ruled on
dependency and neglect petition); Cipolla v. Coutras, No. M2023-00890-COA-R3-JV, 2024 WL
3672068, at * 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2024) (juvenile magistrate presided over "[m]ost of the
proceedings" in connection with a petition to modify parenting plan); In re Jamie G., No. M2014-
01310-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 3456437, at 16 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2015) (juvenile
magistrate suspended mother's visitation); State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. F.R.G., No. E2006-
01614-COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL 494996, at 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2007) (noting that a juvenile
Juvenile Court Referee"). Juvenile magistrates have even decided whether a juvenile will be tried
as an adult. State v. Gray, No. E2021-01134-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 17332569, at 1, 10-12
(Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2022) (concerning juvenile magistrate's transfer of a juvenile to
The question here is whether a recurring part-time general sessions and juvenile court judge
in a class five county may accept appointment as a juvenile magistrate in a different and distinct
class one county and hold both positions simultaneously. That question implicates both statutory
The statutory restraint, found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5002(b), is a narrow one. The
general rule under the statute is that part-time general sessions judges, including those in a class
five county, "shall not be prohibited from the practice of law or other gainful employment while
serving as judge." Tenn. Code. Ann. § 16-15-5002(b). But there is one exception: The statute
prohibits extra-judicial employment for these judges if it "constitutes a conflict of interest." Id.
There does not appear to be any categorical conflict of interest in the dual service contemplated,
The more significant restriction, which is the focus of our discussion herein, is one
grounded in Article VI, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. That constitutional provision
states that the "Judges of the Supreme or Inferior Courts" shall not "hold any other office of trust
or profit under this State or the United States." Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 7 (emphasis added). Both
resolution of the question presented likely turns on whether the position of juvenile magistrate is
constitutes such an office, then a part-time general sessions and juvenile court judge in one county
could not constitutionally serve as a juvenile magistrate in another county simultaneously. The
key question then is what constitutes an office of trust or profit under Article VI, Section 7.
2
dependency and neglect petition); Cipolla v. Coutras, No. M2023-00890-COA-R3-JV, 2024 WL
3672068, at 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2024) (juvenile magistrate presided over “[m]ost of the
proceedings” in connection with a petition to modify parenting plan); In re Jamie G., No. M2014-
01310-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 3456437, at 16 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2015) (juvenile
magistrate suspended mother’s visitation); State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. F.R.G., No. E2006-
01614-COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL 494996, at 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2007) (noting that a juvenile
court referee1
“appropriately conducted the [termination] proceeding within his authority as
Juvenile Court Referee”). Juvenile magistrates have even decided whether a juvenile will be tried
as an adult. State v. Gray, No. E2021-01134-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 17332569, at 1, 10-12
(Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2022) (concerning juvenile magistrate’s transfer of a juvenile to
criminal court).
The question here is whether a recurring part-time general sessions and juvenile court judge
in a class five county may accept appointment as a juvenile magistrate in a different and distinct
class one county and hold both positions simultaneously. That question implicates both statutory
and constitutional constraints.
The statutory restraint, found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5002(b), is a narrow one. The
general rule under the statute is that part-time general sessions judges, including those in a class
five county, “shall not be prohibited from the practice of law or other gainful employment while
serving as judge.” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 16-15-5002(b). But there is one exception: The statute
prohibits extra-judicial employment for these judges if it “constitutes a conflict of interest.” Id.
There does not appear to be any categorical conflict of interest in the dual service contemplated,
though a potential conflict of interest certainly could arise in certain factual scenarios.
The more significant restriction, which is the focus of our discussion herein, is one
grounded in Article VI, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. That constitutional provision
states that the “Judges of the Supreme or Inferior Courts” shall not “hold any other office of trust
or profit under this State or the United States.” Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 7 (emphasis added). Both
general sessions and juvenile court judges are judges of “Inferior Courts,”2
and we thus agree that
resolution of the question presented likely turns on whether the position of juvenile magistrate is
considered an “office of trust or profit” within the meaning of Article VI, Section 7.3
If the position
constitutes such an office, then a part-time general sessions and juvenile court judge in one county
could not constitutionally serve as a juvenile magistrate in another county simultaneously. The
key question then is what constitutes an office of trust or profit under Article VI, Section 7.
1
We note that juvenile magistrates were formerly known as “juvenile referees.” The referee terminology was utilized
until 2009, when the General Assembly redesignated the position as “juvenile magistrate.” 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch.
235, § 1.
2
See Franks v. State, 772 S.W.2d 428, 429-30 (Tenn. 1989) (stating that “[g]eneral sessions courts are inferior courts
within the meaning of Article VI, Section 7” and noting that “[a] juvenile judge is a judge of an inferior court”); Shelby
Cnty. Election Comm’n v. Turner, 755 S.W.2d 774, 777 (Tenn. 1988) (stating that the “Juvenile Court is an inferior
court within the meaning of the constitution”).
3
To be clear, nothing herein should be construed as expressing an opinion as to whether the proposed scenario
underlying your question would present any issue under the Code of Judicial Conduct. Although your request engages
with that subject and arguably invites this Office to weigh in on the matter, we note that “[t]his Office does not interpret
the Code of Judicial Conduct.” Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. 01-116 (July 20, 2001). Judges with ethical questions “may
wish to consult the Judicial Ethics Committee.” Id.
Neither the Tennessee Constitution nor statutory authority define the phrase "office of trust
or profit." Patterson v. Tenn. Dep't of Safety & Homeland Sec., No. M2022-00740-COA-R3-CV
2025 WL 473547, at 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2025), perm. app. filed, No. M2022-00740-SC-
R11-CV (Tenn. June 16, 2025). In the absence of a definition, courts begin "by reading the plain
language and giving terms 'their ordinary and inherent meaning." McNabb v. Harrison, 710
S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tenn. 2025) (quoting State v. Phillips, 159 Tenn. 546, 21 S.W.2d 4, 5 (1929)).
And here, that task should naturally start by engaging with the term "office."
Within the broader body of Tennessee case law, the term "office" has not always been
subject to a consistent manner of presentation or definitional understanding. Of relevance to our
later discussion, we note that some conceptions of "office" have focused on the term as implicating
an "assigned duty or function," or a "post, appointment, situation, place, [or] position." Frazier v.
Elmore, 173 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn. 1943). But at the same time, a more detailed connotation
has also long been a part of this States's-and Nation's-jurisprudence. In the early 1900s, for
instance, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that the term "office" implies "not merely place,"
but also "term or tenure." Day v. Sharp, 161 S.W. 994, 996 (Tenn. 1913). And in an earlier 1867
understanding beyond mere "place" was also touted. See U.S. v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 393 (1867)
(stating that "office" "embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties").
Because judicial decisions have sometimes accorded "office" different variants in meaning
depending on the case or issue at hand, a similar malleability has emerged in how courts have
construed the phrase "office of trust or profit." Cf. State ex rel Byrge v. Yeager, 472 S.W.3d 657,
662 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (noting that the dividing line between public office and public
employment "is sometimes not too clearly marked by judicial decisions" (quoting Glass v. Sloan,
281 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tenn. 1955))). As a general proposition, this makes it somewhat difficult-
perhaps even impossible-to state that there is a uniform vision for what an "office of trust or
profit" might mean in the abstract.
Indeed, a universal standard for what it means to hold an "office of trust or profit" does not
appear to be readily derivable from Tennessee case law. On the one hand, some cases have focused
on whether public office "characteristics" are associated with a given position to determine
whether it is an "office of trust or profit." See Patterson, 2025 WL 473547, at 6. This approach
is similar to how courts have often decided whether something is an "office" within the meaning
of the Tennessee Constitution or statutory provisions, see generally Glass, 281 S.W.2d at 398-99
(noting there are various "criteria" that inform what is a "public office"), and it is the approach
courts have taken when determining whether someone holds an "office of trust or profit" for
S.W.3d at 663. Public office "characteristics" that Tennessee courts typically consider include "a
fixed term of duration, prescribed compensation, delineation of rights and duties, and a mandatory
4 See, e.g., State v. Crump, 183 S.W. 505, 507 (Tenn. 1916).
5 Although the statute excepts certain officers from its scope, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101 generally outlines grounds
for removal for "[e]very person holding any office of trust or profit, under and by virtue of any of the laws of the state,
either state, county, or municipal." Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101.
3
Neither the Tennessee Constitution nor statutory authority define the phrase “office of trust
or profit.” Patterson v. Tenn. Dep't of Safety & Homeland Sec., No. M2022-00740-COA-R3-CV,
2025 WL 473547, at 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2025), perm. app. filed, No. M2022-00740-SC-
R11-CV (Tenn. June 16, 2025). In the absence of a definition, courts begin “by reading the plain
language and giving terms ‘their ordinary and inherent meaning.’” McNabb v. Harrison, 710
S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tenn. 2025) (quoting State v. Phillips, 159 Tenn. 546, 21 S.W.2d 4, 5 (1929)).
And here, that task should naturally start by engaging with the term “office.”
Within the broader body of Tennessee case law, the term “office” has not always been
subject to a consistent manner of presentation or definitional understanding. Of relevance to our
later discussion, we note that some conceptions of “office” have focused on the term as implicating
an “assigned duty or function,” or a “post, appointment, situation, place, [or] position.” Frazier v.
Elmore, 173 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn. 1943). But at the same time, a more detailed connotation
has also long been a part of this States’s—and Nation’s—jurisprudence. In the early 1900s, for
instance, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that the term “office” implies “not merely place,”
but also “term or tenure.” Day v. Sharp, 161 S.W. 994, 996 (Tenn. 1913). And in an earlier 1867
decision from the United States Supreme Court, which Tennessee courts have cited,4
an
understanding beyond mere “place” was also touted. See U.S. v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 393 (1867)
(stating that “office” “embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties”).
Because judicial decisions have sometimes accorded “office” different variants in meaning
depending on the case or issue at hand, a similar malleability has emerged in how courts have
construed the phrase “office of trust or profit.” Cf. State ex rel Byrge v. Yeager, 472 S.W.3d 657,
662 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (noting that the dividing line between public office and public
employment “is sometimes not too clearly marked by judicial decisions” (quoting Glass v. Sloan,
281 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tenn. 1955))). As a general proposition, this makes it somewhat difficult—
perhaps even impossible—to state that there is a uniform vision for what an “office of trust or
profit” might mean in the abstract.
Indeed, a universal standard for what it means to hold an “office of trust or profit” does not
appear to be readily derivable from Tennessee case law. On the one hand, some cases have focused
on whether public office “characteristics” are associated with a given position to determine
whether it is an “office of trust or profit.” See Patterson, 2025 WL 473547, at 6. This approach
is similar to how courts have often decided whether something is an “office” within the meaning
of the Tennessee Constitution or statutory provisions, see generally Glass, 281 S.W.2d at 398-99
(noting there are various “criteria” that inform what is a “public office”), and it is the approach
courts have taken when determining whether someone holds an “office of trust or profit” for
purposes of the State’s ouster statute at Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101.5
See, e.g., Yeager, 472
S.W.3d at 663. Public office “characteristics” that Tennessee courts typically consider include “a
fixed term of duration, prescribed compensation, delineation of rights and duties, and a mandatory
4
See, e.g., State v. Crump, 183 S.W. 505, 507 (Tenn. 1916).
5
Although the statute excepts certain officers from its scope, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101 generally outlines grounds
for removal for “[e]very person holding any office of trust or profit, under and by virtue of any of the laws of the state,
either state, county, or municipal.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101.
rather than permissive appointment." Patterson, 2025 WL 473547, at 6 (citing State ex rel.
Harris v. Buck, 196 S.W. 142, 144 (Tenn. 1917)). On the other hand, a recent appellate decision
considering the ouster statute's "office of trust or profit" language indicated that characteristics
were not fully determinative of whether someone holds an "office of trust or profit." See Yeager,
472 S.W.3d at 663 (finding it useful to also consider the purpose of the ouster law). Still, though,
it can be expected that a consideration of public office characteristics will largely drive the analysis
of what constitutes an "office of trust or profit" in ouster cases.
The Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. Harris V. Buck illustrates this
point. There, the Tennessee Supreme Court examined whether a county engineer held an "office
of trust or profit" within the meaning of Tennessee's ouster law. Buck, 196 S.W. at 142. The Buck
court ultimately answered this question in the negative and observed that several characteristics of
a public office were not provided for by the underlying legislation connected to the position. Id.
at 143-44. The way the court viewed things, if the General Assembly had intended to create an
office, it would have "at least fixed the tenure, the duration, the fees or emoluments, the rights
and powers, as well as the duties of the office." Id. at 144. These features were, after all,
"important essentials in the creation of a public office." Id.
But as alluded to earlier, not all cases appear to have followed a characteristics-based
approach in analyzing what constitutes an "office of trust or profit." Indeed, whereas Buck's
"essentials" generally mirror the attributes underlying the more detailed understanding of "office"
mentioned earlier, the Tennessee Supreme Court appeared to take a different tack when it
unpacked the meaning of "office" in Frazier v. Elmore. According to the Frazier court, in the
context of Article VI, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution-the very provision at issue here-
"office"
must be given its broad meaning, so as to effectuate the apparent intent of the
constitutional prohibition against a diversion or division of the time and labor,
capacity to discharge the exacting duties of their responsible positions; and also to
Frazier, 173 S.W.2d at 565.
In connection with this "broad" approach to the term "office" and gleaned constitutional
concern relating to judges' time, energies, and labor, the Frazier court cited definitions of "office"
that largely pertained to place and function. For instance, in addition to noting that "office" meant
an "assigned duty or function," the court noted that synonyms for the term were "post,
appointment, situation, place, [and] position." Id. And the court added that "office" "commonly
suggests a position of (especially public) trust or authority." Id.
Even outside of highlighting these more general understandings of "office," the Frazier
court's discussion appeared to eschew the type of characteristics-based analysis the Buck court had
promoted. For one, even though Buck was decided before Frazier, the Frazier court did not
mention it. In addition, the broad meaning that the Frazier court gave to "office" allowed the court
to not concern itself with knowing all the attributes of the other "office" at the center of its review.
4
rather than permissive appointment.” Patterson, 2025 WL 473547, at 6 (citing State ex rel.
Harris v. Buck, 196 S.W. 142, 144 (Tenn. 1917)). On the other hand, a recent appellate decision
considering the ouster statute’s “office of trust or profit” language indicated that characteristics
were not fully determinative of whether someone holds an “office of trust or profit.” See Yeager,
472 S.W.3d at 663 (finding it useful to also consider the purpose of the ouster law). Still, though,
it can be expected that a consideration of public office characteristics will largely drive the analysis
of what constitutes an “office of trust or profit” in ouster cases.
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in State ex rel. Harris v. Buck illustrates this
point. There, the Tennessee Supreme Court examined whether a county engineer held an “office
of trust or profit” within the meaning of Tennessee’s ouster law. Buck, 196 S.W. at 142. The Buck
court ultimately answered this question in the negative and observed that several characteristics of
a public office were not provided for by the underlying legislation connected to the position. Id.
at 143-44. The way the court viewed things, if the General Assembly had intended to create an
office, it would have “at least . . . fixed the tenure, the duration, the fees or emoluments, the rights
and powers, as well as the duties of the office.” Id. at 144. These features were, after all,
“important essentials in the creation of a public office.” Id.
But as alluded to earlier, not all cases appear to have followed a characteristics-based
approach in analyzing what constitutes an “office of trust or profit.” Indeed, whereas Buck’s
“essentials” generally mirror the attributes underlying the more detailed understanding of “office”
mentioned earlier, the Tennessee Supreme Court appeared to take a different tack when it
unpacked the meaning of “office” in Frazier v. Elmore. According to the Frazier court, in the
context of Article VI, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution—the very provision at issue here—
“office”
must be given its broad meaning, so as to effectuate the apparent intent of the
constitutional prohibition against a diversion or division of the time and labor,
energies and abilities of judges of our courts, which might destroy, or diminish their
capacity to discharge the exacting duties of their responsible positions; and also to
limit them to one source of compensation.
Frazier, 173 S.W.2d at 565.
In connection with this “broad” approach to the term “office” and gleaned constitutional
concern relating to judges’ time, energies, and labor, the Frazier court cited definitions of “office”
that largely pertained to place and function. For instance, in addition to noting that “office” meant
an “assigned duty or function,” the court noted that synonyms for the term were “post,
appointment, situation, place, [and] position.” Id. And the court added that “office” “commonly
suggests a position of (especially public) trust or authority.” Id.
Even outside of highlighting these more general understandings of “office,” the Frazier
court’s discussion appeared to eschew the type of characteristics-based analysis the Buck court had
promoted. For one, even though Buck was decided before Frazier, the Frazier court did not
mention it. In addition, the broad meaning that the Frazier court gave to “office” allowed the court
to not concern itself with knowing all the attributes of the other “office” at the center of its review.
Whereas the Buck court had expressed concern for knowing whether a position involved certain
"essentials" of a public office, Buck, 196 S.W. at 144, the Frazier court was able to determine that
the position at issue implicated Article VI, Section 7 even though the court was largely in the dark
as to the position's details. Although the Frazier court discussed how the other position at issue
there was one of military service, the court acknowledged the specific position "does not appear"
in the record. Frazier, 173 S.W.2d at 564. And in the same vein, the court acknowledged that the
record did not disclose "the precise character of the duties," "the nature of the military service,"
nor "the [specifics of] compensation." Id. at 565. But this was all deemed to be of no moment.
Ultimately, the Frazier court remarked that, "[w]hatever may be the post or station in the military
service of the United States which complainant is occupying, he is in a place of trust and honor
and is receiving compensation therefrom." Id. at 565-66. And in the end, the Frazier court
commented that, "if not technically holding another 'office,' within the letter of the prohibition,
he is certainly within its spirit." Id. at 566. As the court stated, "[t]he letter killeth, the spirit
The differences manifested through the juxtaposition of the above approaches are far from
trivial. The Buck and Frazier courts appear to have respectively offered fundamentally different
frameworks for deciphering what an "office of trust or profit" might mean. Those differences may
For instance, if a court were to assess the position of juvenile magistrate under Buck's
framework, we think it would be unlikely that the court would regard the position as an "office of
trust or profit." When previously heeding Buck's direction, this Office noted that the General
Assembly reflects a clear intent to create an "office" when, among other things, it provides for "the
term of office" and "its compensation." Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 98-215 (Nov. 23, 1998). Such
typical hallmarks of a public office are of course lacking here. As noted earlier, juvenile
magistrates serve "at the pleasure" of the juvenile court judge that appoints them. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 37-1-107(a)(1). And they also have no fixed compensation by statute. That, too, is subject
to the involvement of the appointing judge. See id. (providing that the judge sets the magistrate's
compensation with "approval of the county legislative body or the pertinent governing body").
Overall, then, we think that the framework articulated by Buck generally counsels against the
understanding that a juvenile magistrate holds an "office of trust or profit." See Patterson, 2025
WL 473547, at 6 (relying on Buck for the notion that when a position is a mere appointee and
works at the discretion of another official, it is evidence that the position is employment rather
than a position of trust or profit); see also Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 98-215 (Nov. 23, 1998) (opining
that an appointed superintendent did not hold an office of trust or profit, "particularly in view of
the fact that a superintendent has no fixed term of office").
But if a court were to view this question under Frazier's framework, its conclusion would
probably be different. As we outlined earlier, the Frazier court adopted a broad meaning of
6 Beyond what we have already mentioned-but further illustrating that the "essentials" discussed in Buck did not
carry the same type of weight in Frazier-we note that the Frazier court appeared to favorably reference another
Tennessee Supreme Court case in the course of its discussion, one in which, in the context of another provision, the
court had determined that someone was an "officer" even though they were "without a fixed term or compensation,
[and were] dependent on fees." Frazier, 173 S.W.2d at 565.
5
Whereas the Buck court had expressed concern for knowing whether a position involved certain
“essentials” of a public office, Buck, 196 S.W. at 144, the Frazier court was able to determine that
the position at issue implicated Article VI, Section 7 even though the court was largely in the dark
as to the position’s details. Although the Frazier court discussed how the other position at issue
there was one of military service, the court acknowledged the specific position “does not appear”
in the record. Frazier, 173 S.W.2d at 564. And in the same vein, the court acknowledged that the
record did not disclose “the precise character of the duties,” “the nature of the military service,”
nor “the [specifics of] compensation.” Id. at 565. But this was all deemed to be of no moment.
Ultimately, the Frazier court remarked that, “[w]hatever may be the post or station in the military
service of the United States which complainant is occupying, he is in a place of trust and honor
and is receiving compensation therefrom.” Id. at 565-66. And in the end, the Frazier court
commented that, “if not technically holding another ‘office,’ within the letter of the prohibition,
he is certainly within its spirit.” Id. at 566. As the court stated, “[t]he letter killeth, the spirit
maketh alive.” Id.6
The differences manifested through the juxtaposition of the above approaches are far from
trivial. The Buck and Frazier courts appear to have respectively offered fundamentally different
frameworks for deciphering what an “office of trust or profit” might mean. Those differences may
matter here.
For instance, if a court were to assess the position of juvenile magistrate under Buck’s
framework, we think it would be unlikely that the court would regard the position as an “office of
trust or profit.” When previously heeding Buck’s direction, this Office noted that the General
Assembly reflects a clear intent to create an “office” when, among other things, it provides for “the
term of office” and “its compensation.” Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. 98-215 (Nov. 23, 1998). Such
typical hallmarks of a public office are of course lacking here. As noted earlier, juvenile
magistrates serve “at the pleasure” of the juvenile court judge that appoints them. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 37-1-107(a)(1). And they also have no fixed compensation by statute. That, too, is subject
to the involvement of the appointing judge. See id. (providing that the judge sets the magistrate’s
compensation with “approval of the county legislative body or the pertinent governing body”).
Overall, then, we think that the framework articulated by Buck generally counsels against the
understanding that a juvenile magistrate holds an “office of trust or profit.” See Patterson, 2025
WL 473547, at *6 (relying on Buck for the notion that when a position is a mere appointee and
works at the discretion of another official, it is evidence that the position is employment rather
than a position of trust or profit); see also Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. 98-215 (Nov. 23, 1998) (opining
that an appointed superintendent did not hold an office of trust or profit, “particularly in view of
the fact that a superintendent has no fixed term of office”).
But if a court were to view this question under Frazier’s framework, its conclusion would
probably be different. As we outlined earlier, the Frazier court adopted a broad meaning of
6
Beyond what we have already mentioned—but further illustrating that the “essentials” discussed in Buck did not
carry the same type of weight in Frazier—we note that the Frazier court appeared to favorably reference another
Tennessee Supreme Court case in the course of its discussion, one in which, in the context of another provision, the
court had determined that someone was an “officer” even though they were “without a fixed term or compensation,
[and were] dependent on fees.” Frazier, 173 S.W.2d at 565.
"office" out of its concern for "effectuat[ing] the apparent intent" of Article VI, Section 7. Frazier,
173 S.W.2d at 565. And here, we think it is likely that simultaneous service as a juvenile
magistrate in another county would impede the intent of Article VI, Section 7 that the Frazier court
identified. Such dual service would invariably lead to competition between counties for a judicial
officer's time, labor, and attention. So it makes sense that the position of juvenile magistrate falls
within the broad definition of "office." That position clearly involves labor in another
"appointment," "place," and "position." Id. And whereas the Frazier court also noted that "office
commonly suggests a position of (especially public) trust or authority," id., we think juvenile
magistrates certainly serve in such a capacity given their role in Tennessee's court system. As we
detailed earlier, once a juvenile court judge directs that a case or class of cases will be heard by a
magistrate, the magistrate has "the powers of a judge" and "the same authority as the judge to issue
any and all process." Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107(b). And cases handled in the first instance by
a magistrate are "conducted in the same manner as cases heard by the judge." Id. And as we also
noted, juvenile magistrates may preside over a variety of cases that can have a profound impact on
the citizens of this State. Ultimately, given the Frazier court's emphasis on according "office" a
broad meaning, Frazier, 173 S.W.2d at 565, and given its concern for the "spirit" of the
constitutional prohibition it interpreted, id. at 566, a court following its direction would probably
regard a juvenile magistrate as holding an "office of trust or profit."
And because Frazier specifically gave meaning to the constitutional provision at issue in
your request, courts would be likely to follow its lead in resolving the question you have posed.
No doubt, the Frazier court's approach appears to be in tension with how other decisions, like
Buck, have given meaning to the "office of trust or profit" language in other contexts. But this
Office has previously alluded to the potential for tension in this area, noting that "[u]nder
Tennessee case law a person can hold an 'office' for one purpose and not for another." Tenn.
Att'y Gen. Op. 99-156 (Aug. 19, 1999). And in the same opinion, we observed that Buck was "not
controlling" of inquiries related to Article VI, Section 7, as it "was not construing the phrase 'office
of trust or profit' for purposes of [that provision]." Id. By contrast, we noted that Frazier was a
"leading case construing the phrase 'office of trust or profit' for purposes of Article VI, Section
7." Id.
In summary, therefore, we believe that a court would likely conclude that the position of
7. And as a result, it is this Office's opinion that a part-time general sessions and juvenile court
judge in one county is likely, under existing precedent, constitutionally prohibited from
6
“office” out of its concern for “effectuat[ing] the apparent intent” of Article VI, Section 7. Frazier,
173 S.W.2d at 565. And here, we think it is likely that simultaneous service as a juvenile
magistrate in another county would impede the intent of Article VI, Section 7 that the Frazier court
identified. Such dual service would invariably lead to competition between counties for a judicial
officer’s time, labor, and attention. So it makes sense that the position of juvenile magistrate falls
within the broad definition of “office.” That position clearly involves labor in another
“appointment,” “place,” and “position.” Id. And whereas the Frazier court also noted that “office
commonly suggests a position of (especially public) trust or authority,” id., we think juvenile
magistrates certainly serve in such a capacity given their role in Tennessee’s court system. As we
detailed earlier, once a juvenile court judge directs that a case or class of cases will be heard by a
magistrate, the magistrate has “the powers of a judge” and “the same authority as the judge to issue
any and all process.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107(b). And cases handled in the first instance by
a magistrate are “conducted in the same manner as cases heard by the judge.” Id. And as we also
noted, juvenile magistrates may preside over a variety of cases that can have a profound impact on
the citizens of this State. Ultimately, given the Frazier court’s emphasis on according “office” a
broad meaning, Frazier, 173 S.W.2d at 565, and given its concern for the “spirit” of the
constitutional prohibition it interpreted, id. at 566, a court following its direction would probably
regard a juvenile magistrate as holding an “office of trust or profit.”
And because Frazier specifically gave meaning to the constitutional provision at issue in
your request, courts would be likely to follow its lead in resolving the question you have posed.
No doubt, the Frazier court’s approach appears to be in tension with how other decisions, like
Buck, have given meaning to the “office of trust or profit” language in other contexts. But this
Office has previously alluded to the potential for tension in this area, noting that “[u]nder
Tennessee case law . . . a person can hold an ‘office’ for one purpose and not for another.” Tenn.
Att’y Gen. Op. 99-156 (Aug. 19, 1999). And in the same opinion, we observed that Buck was “not
controlling” of inquiries related to Article VI, Section 7, as it “was not construing the phrase ‘office
of trust or profit’ for purposes of [that provision].” Id. By contrast, we noted that Frazier was a
“leading case construing the phrase ‘office of trust or profit’ for purposes of Article VI, Section
7.” Id.
In summary, therefore, we believe that a court would likely conclude that the position of
juvenile magistrate constitutes an office of trust or profit within the context of Article VI, Section
7. And as a result, it is this Office’s opinion that a part-time general sessions and juvenile court
judge in one county is likely, under existing precedent, constitutionally prohibited from
simultaneously serving as a juvenile magistrate in another county.
JONATHAN T. SKRMETTI
Attorney General and Reporter
J. MATTHEW RICE
Solicitor General
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37404
7
MATTHEW KERNODLE
Assistant Attorney General
SAMANTHA MORRIS
Assistant Attorney General
Requested by:
The Honorable Robert D. Philyaw
President, Tennessee Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
1600 East Third Street
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37404