Can a part-time Tennessee general sessions and juvenile court judge in one county also serve as an appointed juvenile magistrate in a different county?

Subject

Simultaneous Service as a Part-Time General Sessions Judge and Juvenile Magistrate

Plain-English summary

A part-time general sessions and juvenile court judge in a small (class five) county was offered an appointment as a juvenile magistrate in a larger (class one) county. The president of Tennessee's juvenile and family court judges' council asked the Attorney General whether the dual service would be legal.

Two restraints come into play. First, Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5002(b) authorizes part-time general sessions judges to maintain other employment, including the practice of law, unless that work creates a "conflict of interest." The AG sees no categorical conflict in the proposed dual service, although specific cases could create one.

Second, and more importantly, Article VI, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution forbids "Judges of the Supreme or Inferior Courts" from holding "any other office of trust or profit under this State or the United States." General sessions and juvenile court judges are inferior-court judges. The dispositive question is whether a juvenile magistrate holds an "office of trust or profit." Tennessee case law contains two competing frameworks. Under State ex rel. Harris v. Buck (1917), an "office" requires fixed tenure, fixed compensation, and prescribed duties; juvenile magistrates lack those features and would not qualify. But under Frazier v. Elmore (1943), which is the leading case on Article VI, Section 7 specifically, the term "office" gets a broad reading designed to prevent diversion of judges' time, energy, and labor.

The AG concludes that Frazier controls because it interprets the very provision at issue. Under Frazier's broad approach, a juvenile magistrate occupies an "office of trust or profit" given the magistrate's substantial judicial powers (including the same authority as the appointing judge to issue process, preside over dependency and neglect cases, and even transfer juveniles to adult court). Dual service would therefore likely violate Article VI, Section 7.

What this means for you

For sitting part-time general sessions or juvenile court judges

The opinion concludes that a part-time general sessions and juvenile court judge in one county is likely, under existing precedent, constitutionally prohibited from simultaneously serving as a juvenile magistrate in another county. It reaches that result under Frazier v. Elmore, which it treats as the controlling reading of Article VI, Section 7, even though it acknowledges the Buck framework would likely permit the dual role. The opinion expressly does not address whether the scenario raises any issue under the Code of Judicial Conduct, and notes that judges with ethical questions may consult the Judicial Ethics Committee.

For juvenile court judges making magistrate appointments

Under the opinion's analysis, appointing a sitting general sessions or juvenile court judge from another county as a magistrate would likely place that person in the dual-service situation the opinion concludes is constitutionally barred. The opinion's holding is about the constitutional eligibility of the person holding both positions.

For the Judicial Ethics Committee

The opinion explicitly declines to interpret the Code of Judicial Conduct, citing Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 01-116, and notes that a judge with ethical questions may wish to consult the Committee.

Common questions

What is a juvenile magistrate?

An officer appointed by a juvenile court judge under Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107 to hear cases the judge directs to them. Magistrates serve "at the pleasure" of the appointing judge, have "the powers of a judge" once a case is referred, and may preside over dependency and neglect cases, custody and visitation matters, terminations of parental rights, and even transfers of juveniles to adult criminal court.

Is a juvenile magistrate the same as a juvenile referee?

Yes. The position was renamed by the General Assembly in 2009. 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 235, § 1.

What are the two competing tests for "office of trust or profit"?

The Buck "characteristics" test (State ex rel. Harris v. Buck, 1917) requires fixed term, fixed compensation, and prescribed duties before a position counts as an "office." The Frazier "broad" test (Frazier v. Elmore, 1943) reads "office" expansively in the Article VI, Section 7 context to capture any "post, appointment, situation, place, [or] position" of public trust, regardless of whether the structural hallmarks are present.

Why does Frazier control over Buck here?

Because Frazier interpreted Article VI, Section 7 itself, while Buck construed similar language in the ouster statute (now Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101). The AG previously made this same distinction in Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 99-156: a person can hold an "office" for one purpose and not for another.

What is the rationale for the broad Frazier reading?

Article VI, Section 7's purpose, per Frazier, is to prevent "a diversion or division of the time and labor, energies and abilities of judges of our courts" and to "limit them to one source of compensation." Dual service in another county splits the judge's attention between competing demands and creates a second income stream from judicial work, both of which the constitutional prohibition was meant to prevent.

What about other employment that does not implicate the constitution?

A part-time general sessions judge can lawfully practice law or hold other "gainful employment" under Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5002(b), as long as the work does not create a conflict of interest. The Article VI, Section 7 issue arises only because the magistrate position is itself a public, judicial role.

Does this opinion create new law?

No. It applies existing precedent (Frazier, 1943) to the question presented. AG opinions are persuasive authority, not binding, and the opinion itself frames its conclusion as what a court "would likely" decide.

Is the conclusion certain?

No. The opinion is careful to say the dual service is "likely" prohibited and that a court "would likely" treat a juvenile magistrate as holding an "office of trust or profit." It rests on which line of precedent (Frazier or Buck) a court would apply, and concludes Frazier controls because it interpreted the constitutional provision at issue.

Background and statutory framework

Magistrates under § 37-1-107

A juvenile court judge "may appoint" one or more juvenile magistrates. Magistrates "shall hold office at the pleasure of the judge." Compensation is set by the appointing judge with "approval of the county legislative body or the pertinent governing body." The judge may direct which "case or class of cases" the magistrate hears. Magistrate orders are reviewable by the judge. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107(a)(1), (b), (c)-(d).

Once a case is referred, the magistrate has "the powers of a judge" and "the same authority as the judge to issue any and all process." Cases are "conducted in the same manner as cases heard by the judge." § 37-1-107(b). Magistrates can preside over dependency and neglect, custody and visitation, termination of parental rights, and (with judge approval) transfers of juveniles to adult criminal court. See In re Tamera W. (dependency and neglect); State v. Gray (transfer).

Magistrates are "officer[s] of the judicial system" with the duty "to perform judicial functions." Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-15-209(g)(1)(B), 17-2-118(f)(1)(B), 17-2-122(b).

Article VI, Section 7

The Tennessee Constitution provides that "Judges of the Supreme or Inferior Courts" shall not "hold any other office of trust or profit under this State or the United States." General sessions and juvenile court judges are inferior-court judges. Franks v. State, 772 S.W.2d 428, 429-30 (Tenn. 1989); Shelby County Election Commission v. Turner, 755 S.W.2d 774, 777 (Tenn. 1988).

The Buck and Frazier frameworks

The Tennessee Supreme Court has produced two strands of "office of trust or profit" analysis:

• Buck (1917): an "office" requires public-office characteristics: fixed term, fixed compensation, prescribed duties, mandatory rather than permissive appointment. Applied in the ouster-statute context. Followed in State ex rel. Byrge v. Yeager (2015) and recently in Patterson v. Tenn. Dep't of Safety & Homeland Sec. (2025).

• Frazier (1943): in the specific context of Article VI, Section 7, "office" gets a broad reading. Synonyms include "post, appointment, situation, place, [or] position." The Frazier court used this broad reading to capture military service positions even when the record did not disclose the position's tenure, duration, or compensation.

Why Frazier controls

The AG concludes that Frazier governs because it interpreted the constitutional provision at issue. Buck, by contrast, construed similar language in the ouster statute (Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101). A position can be an "office of trust or profit" for Article VI, Section 7 purposes without being one for ouster purposes, and vice versa. Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 99-156.

Applying Frazier, the magistrate position is a public role with substantial judicial authority, and dual service across counties would split the judge's time and energy across competing forums, the very harm Frazier identified.

Statutory restraint under § 16-15-5002(b)

Part-time general sessions judges may have other gainful employment unless it creates a "conflict of interest." Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5002(b). The AG sees no categorical conflict in the proposed dual service, though specific cases could generate one. The constitutional bar is the more significant one.

Citations

• Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 7 (no other office of trust or profit)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101 (ouster statute)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5002(b) (part-time general sessions judges' outside work)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107 (juvenile magistrate appointment and authority)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-103, -104 (juvenile court jurisdiction)
• Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-15-209(g)(1)(B), 17-2-118(f)(1)(B), 17-2-122(b) (magistrates as judicial officers)
• 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 235 (renaming referees as magistrates)
• Frazier v. Elmore, 173 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. 1943)
• State ex rel. Harris v. Buck, 196 S.W. 142 (Tenn. 1917)
• Day v. Sharp, 161 S.W. 994 (Tenn. 1913)
• U.S. v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385 (1867)
• Glass v. Sloan, 281 S.W.2d 397 (Tenn. 1955)
• State ex rel. Byrge v. Yeager, 472 S.W.3d 657 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015)
• Patterson v. Tenn. Dep't of Safety & Homeland Sec., 2025 WL 473547 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2025)
• Franks v. State, 772 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1989)
• Shelby County Election Commission v. Turner, 755 S.W.2d 774 (Tenn. 1988)
• McNabb v. Harrison, 710 S.W.3d 653 (Tenn. 2025)
• Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 98-215, 99-156, 01-116

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2025/op25-014.pdf

Original opinion text

Simultaneous Service as a Part-Time General Sessions Judge and Juvenile Magistrate Is a recurring part-time general sessions and juvenile court judge in a class five county allowed to accept an appointed position to serve as a juvenile magistrate in a different and distinct class one county and hold both positions simultaneously? Likely not. Article VI, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits the judge of an inferior court from holding any other office of trust or profit. And based on existing precedent, we believe a court would likely conclude that the position of juvenile magistrate constitutes an office of trust or profit within the meaning of this provision. The position of juvenile magistrate is provided for in Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107, and at the start, the statute signals that the position is largely subordinate to the juvenile court's power. Under the statute, a juvenile court judge "may appoint" one or more persons to act as magistrates, and each appointed magistrate "shall hold office at the pleasure of the judge." Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107(a)(1). And beyond the powers of appointment and dismissal, the statute extends the judge's control over magistrates to other areas too. For instance, the statute mandates that the judge set the magistrate's compensation with "approval of the county legislative body or the pertinent governing body," id., and it allows the judge to direct which "case or class of cases" the magistrate hears. Id. § 37-1-107(b). And on top of these features, the statute provides that the magistrate's orders are reviewable by the judge. Id. § 37-1-107(c)-(d). But through their positions, juvenile magistrates fulfill an important, and public, role within the State. Juvenile magistrates are known as "officer[s] of the judicial system" whose "duty it is to perform judicial functions." Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-15-209(g)(1)(B), 17-2-118(f)(1)(B), 17-2- 122(b). And once a juvenile court judge directs that a case or class of cases will be heard by a magistrate, the magistrate has "the powers of a judge" and "the same authority as the judge to issue any and all process." Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107(b). Cases handled in the first instance by a magistrate are "conducted in the same manner as cases heard by the judge," id., and under this framework, juvenile magistrates may preside over a variety of cases with a profound impact, such as those involving dependency and neglect, custody and visitation, and termination of parental rights. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-103 and -104 (outlining the juvenile court's jurisdiction); In re Tamera W., 515 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (juvenile magistrate ruled on STATE OF TENNESSEE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL July 29, 2025 Opinion No. 25-014 Simultaneous Service as a Part-Time General Sessions Judge and Juvenile Magistrate Question Is a recurring part-time general sessions and juvenile court judge in a class five county allowed to accept an appointed position to serve as a juvenile magistrate in a different and distinct class one county and hold both positions simultaneously? Opinion Likely not. Article VI, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibits the judge of an inferior court from holding any other office of trust or profit. And based on existing precedent, we believe a court would likely conclude that the position of juvenile magistrate constitutes an office of trust or profit within the meaning of this provision. ANALYSIS The position of juvenile magistrate is provided for in Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107, and at the start, the statute signals that the position is largely subordinate to the juvenile court’s power. Under the statute, a juvenile court judge “may appoint” one or more persons to act as magistrates, and each appointed magistrate “shall hold office at the pleasure of the judge.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107(a)(1). And beyond the powers of appointment and dismissal, the statute extends the judge’s control over magistrates to other areas too. For instance, the statute mandates that the judge set the magistrate’s compensation with “approval of the county legislative body or the pertinent governing body,” id., and it allows the judge to direct which “case or class of cases” the magistrate hears. Id. § 37-1-107(b). And on top of these features, the statute provides that the magistrate’s orders are reviewable by the judge. Id. § 37-1-107(c)-(d). But through their positions, juvenile magistrates fulfill an important, and public, role within the State. Juvenile magistrates are known as “officer[s] of the judicial system” whose “duty it is to perform judicial functions.” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-15-209(g)(1)(B), 17-2-118(f)(1)(B), 17-2- 122(b). And once a juvenile court judge directs that a case or class of cases will be heard by a magistrate, the magistrate has “the powers of a judge” and “the same authority as the judge to issue any and all process.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107(b). Cases handled in the first instance by a magistrate are “conducted in the same manner as cases heard by the judge,” id., and under this framework, juvenile magistrates may preside over a variety of cases with a profound impact, such as those involving dependency and neglect, custody and visitation, and termination of parental rights. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-103 and -104 (outlining the juvenile court’s jurisdiction); In re Tamera W., 515 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (juvenile magistrate ruled on dependency and neglect petition); Cipolla v. Coutras, No. M2023-00890-COA-R3-JV, 2024 WL 3672068, at * 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2024) (juvenile magistrate presided over "[m]ost of the proceedings" in connection with a petition to modify parenting plan); In re Jamie G., No. M2014- 01310-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 3456437, at 16 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2015) (juvenile magistrate suspended mother's visitation); State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. F.R.G., No. E2006- 01614-COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL 494996, at 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2007) (noting that a juvenile Juvenile Court Referee"). Juvenile magistrates have even decided whether a juvenile will be tried as an adult. State v. Gray, No. E2021-01134-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 17332569, at 1, 10-12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2022) (concerning juvenile magistrate's transfer of a juvenile to The question here is whether a recurring part-time general sessions and juvenile court judge in a class five county may accept appointment as a juvenile magistrate in a different and distinct class one county and hold both positions simultaneously. That question implicates both statutory The statutory restraint, found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5002(b), is a narrow one. The general rule under the statute is that part-time general sessions judges, including those in a class five county, "shall not be prohibited from the practice of law or other gainful employment while serving as judge." Tenn. Code. Ann. § 16-15-5002(b). But there is one exception: The statute prohibits extra-judicial employment for these judges if it "constitutes a conflict of interest." Id. There does not appear to be any categorical conflict of interest in the dual service contemplated, The more significant restriction, which is the focus of our discussion herein, is one grounded in Article VI, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. That constitutional provision states that the "Judges of the Supreme or Inferior Courts" shall not "hold any other office of trust or profit under this State or the United States." Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 7 (emphasis added). Both resolution of the question presented likely turns on whether the position of juvenile magistrate is constitutes such an office, then a part-time general sessions and juvenile court judge in one county could not constitutionally serve as a juvenile magistrate in another county simultaneously. The key question then is what constitutes an office of trust or profit under Article VI, Section 7. 2 dependency and neglect petition); Cipolla v. Coutras, No. M2023-00890-COA-R3-JV, 2024 WL 3672068, at 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2024) (juvenile magistrate presided over “[m]ost of the proceedings” in connection with a petition to modify parenting plan); In re Jamie G., No. M2014- 01310-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 3456437, at 16 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2015) (juvenile magistrate suspended mother’s visitation); State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. F.R.G., No. E2006- 01614-COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL 494996, at 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2007) (noting that a juvenile court referee1 “appropriately conducted the [termination] proceeding within his authority as Juvenile Court Referee”). Juvenile magistrates have even decided whether a juvenile will be tried as an adult. State v. Gray, No. E2021-01134-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 17332569, at 1, 10-12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2022) (concerning juvenile magistrate’s transfer of a juvenile to criminal court). The question here is whether a recurring part-time general sessions and juvenile court judge in a class five county may accept appointment as a juvenile magistrate in a different and distinct class one county and hold both positions simultaneously. That question implicates both statutory and constitutional constraints. The statutory restraint, found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5002(b), is a narrow one. The general rule under the statute is that part-time general sessions judges, including those in a class five county, “shall not be prohibited from the practice of law or other gainful employment while serving as judge.” Tenn. Code. Ann. § 16-15-5002(b). But there is one exception: The statute prohibits extra-judicial employment for these judges if it “constitutes a conflict of interest.” Id. There does not appear to be any categorical conflict of interest in the dual service contemplated, though a potential conflict of interest certainly could arise in certain factual scenarios. The more significant restriction, which is the focus of our discussion herein, is one grounded in Article VI, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. That constitutional provision states that the “Judges of the Supreme or Inferior Courts” shall not “hold any other office of trust or profit under this State or the United States.” Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 7 (emphasis added). Both general sessions and juvenile court judges are judges of “Inferior Courts,”2 and we thus agree that resolution of the question presented likely turns on whether the position of juvenile magistrate is considered an “office of trust or profit” within the meaning of Article VI, Section 7.3 If the position constitutes such an office, then a part-time general sessions and juvenile court judge in one county could not constitutionally serve as a juvenile magistrate in another county simultaneously. The key question then is what constitutes an office of trust or profit under Article VI, Section 7. 1 We note that juvenile magistrates were formerly known as “juvenile referees.” The referee terminology was utilized until 2009, when the General Assembly redesignated the position as “juvenile magistrate.” 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 235, § 1. 2 See Franks v. State, 772 S.W.2d 428, 429-30 (Tenn. 1989) (stating that “[g]eneral sessions courts are inferior courts within the meaning of Article VI, Section 7” and noting that “[a] juvenile judge is a judge of an inferior court”); Shelby Cnty. Election Comm’n v. Turner, 755 S.W.2d 774, 777 (Tenn. 1988) (stating that the “Juvenile Court is an inferior court within the meaning of the constitution”). 3 To be clear, nothing herein should be construed as expressing an opinion as to whether the proposed scenario underlying your question would present any issue under the Code of Judicial Conduct. Although your request engages with that subject and arguably invites this Office to weigh in on the matter, we note that “[t]his Office does not interpret the Code of Judicial Conduct.” Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. 01-116 (July 20, 2001). Judges with ethical questions “may wish to consult the Judicial Ethics Committee.” Id. Neither the Tennessee Constitution nor statutory authority define the phrase "office of trust or profit." Patterson v. Tenn. Dep't of Safety & Homeland Sec., No. M2022-00740-COA-R3-CV 2025 WL 473547, at 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2025), perm. app. filed, No. M2022-00740-SC- R11-CV (Tenn. June 16, 2025). In the absence of a definition, courts begin "by reading the plain language and giving terms 'their ordinary and inherent meaning." McNabb v. Harrison, 710 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tenn. 2025) (quoting State v. Phillips, 159 Tenn. 546, 21 S.W.2d 4, 5 (1929)). And here, that task should naturally start by engaging with the term "office." Within the broader body of Tennessee case law, the term "office" has not always been subject to a consistent manner of presentation or definitional understanding. Of relevance to our later discussion, we note that some conceptions of "office" have focused on the term as implicating an "assigned duty or function," or a "post, appointment, situation, place, [or] position." Frazier v. Elmore, 173 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn. 1943). But at the same time, a more detailed connotation has also long been a part of this States's-and Nation's-jurisprudence. In the early 1900s, for instance, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that the term "office" implies "not merely place," but also "term or tenure." Day v. Sharp, 161 S.W. 994, 996 (Tenn. 1913). And in an earlier 1867 understanding beyond mere "place" was also touted. See U.S. v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 393 (1867) (stating that "office" "embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties"). Because judicial decisions have sometimes accorded "office" different variants in meaning depending on the case or issue at hand, a similar malleability has emerged in how courts have construed the phrase "office of trust or profit." Cf. State ex rel Byrge v. Yeager, 472 S.W.3d 657, 662 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (noting that the dividing line between public office and public employment "is sometimes not too clearly marked by judicial decisions" (quoting Glass v. Sloan, 281 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tenn. 1955))). As a general proposition, this makes it somewhat difficult- perhaps even impossible-to state that there is a uniform vision for what an "office of trust or profit" might mean in the abstract. Indeed, a universal standard for what it means to hold an "office of trust or profit" does not appear to be readily derivable from Tennessee case law. On the one hand, some cases have focused on whether public office "characteristics" are associated with a given position to determine whether it is an "office of trust or profit." See Patterson, 2025 WL 473547, at 6. This approach is similar to how courts have often decided whether something is an "office" within the meaning of the Tennessee Constitution or statutory provisions, see generally Glass, 281 S.W.2d at 398-99 (noting there are various "criteria" that inform what is a "public office"), and it is the approach courts have taken when determining whether someone holds an "office of trust or profit" for S.W.3d at 663. Public office "characteristics" that Tennessee courts typically consider include "a fixed term of duration, prescribed compensation, delineation of rights and duties, and a mandatory 4 See, e.g., State v. Crump, 183 S.W. 505, 507 (Tenn. 1916). 5 Although the statute excepts certain officers from its scope, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101 generally outlines grounds for removal for "[e]very person holding any office of trust or profit, under and by virtue of any of the laws of the state, either state, county, or municipal." Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101. 3 Neither the Tennessee Constitution nor statutory authority define the phrase “office of trust or profit.” Patterson v. Tenn. Dep't of Safety & Homeland Sec., No. M2022-00740-COA-R3-CV, 2025 WL 473547, at 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2025), perm. app. filed, No. M2022-00740-SC- R11-CV (Tenn. June 16, 2025). In the absence of a definition, courts begin “by reading the plain language and giving terms ‘their ordinary and inherent meaning.’” McNabb v. Harrison, 710 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tenn. 2025) (quoting State v. Phillips, 159 Tenn. 546, 21 S.W.2d 4, 5 (1929)). And here, that task should naturally start by engaging with the term “office.” Within the broader body of Tennessee case law, the term “office” has not always been subject to a consistent manner of presentation or definitional understanding. Of relevance to our later discussion, we note that some conceptions of “office” have focused on the term as implicating an “assigned duty or function,” or a “post, appointment, situation, place, [or] position.” Frazier v. Elmore, 173 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn. 1943). But at the same time, a more detailed connotation has also long been a part of this States’s—and Nation’s—jurisprudence. In the early 1900s, for instance, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that the term “office” implies “not merely place,” but also “term or tenure.” Day v. Sharp, 161 S.W. 994, 996 (Tenn. 1913). And in an earlier 1867 decision from the United States Supreme Court, which Tennessee courts have cited,4 an understanding beyond mere “place” was also touted. See U.S. v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 393 (1867) (stating that “office” “embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties”). Because judicial decisions have sometimes accorded “office” different variants in meaning depending on the case or issue at hand, a similar malleability has emerged in how courts have construed the phrase “office of trust or profit.” Cf. State ex rel Byrge v. Yeager, 472 S.W.3d 657, 662 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (noting that the dividing line between public office and public employment “is sometimes not too clearly marked by judicial decisions” (quoting Glass v. Sloan, 281 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tenn. 1955))). As a general proposition, this makes it somewhat difficult— perhaps even impossible—to state that there is a uniform vision for what an “office of trust or profit” might mean in the abstract. Indeed, a universal standard for what it means to hold an “office of trust or profit” does not appear to be readily derivable from Tennessee case law. On the one hand, some cases have focused on whether public office “characteristics” are associated with a given position to determine whether it is an “office of trust or profit.” See Patterson, 2025 WL 473547, at 6. This approach is similar to how courts have often decided whether something is an “office” within the meaning of the Tennessee Constitution or statutory provisions, see generally Glass, 281 S.W.2d at 398-99 (noting there are various “criteria” that inform what is a “public office”), and it is the approach courts have taken when determining whether someone holds an “office of trust or profit” for purposes of the State’s ouster statute at Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101.5 See, e.g., Yeager, 472 S.W.3d at 663. Public office “characteristics” that Tennessee courts typically consider include “a fixed term of duration, prescribed compensation, delineation of rights and duties, and a mandatory 4 See, e.g., State v. Crump, 183 S.W. 505, 507 (Tenn. 1916). 5 Although the statute excepts certain officers from its scope, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101 generally outlines grounds for removal for “[e]very person holding any office of trust or profit, under and by virtue of any of the laws of the state, either state, county, or municipal.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-47-101. rather than permissive appointment." Patterson, 2025 WL 473547, at 6 (citing State ex rel. Harris v. Buck, 196 S.W. 142, 144 (Tenn. 1917)). On the other hand, a recent appellate decision considering the ouster statute's "office of trust or profit" language indicated that characteristics were not fully determinative of whether someone holds an "office of trust or profit." See Yeager, 472 S.W.3d at 663 (finding it useful to also consider the purpose of the ouster law). Still, though, it can be expected that a consideration of public office characteristics will largely drive the analysis of what constitutes an "office of trust or profit" in ouster cases. The Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. Harris V. Buck illustrates this point. There, the Tennessee Supreme Court examined whether a county engineer held an "office of trust or profit" within the meaning of Tennessee's ouster law. Buck, 196 S.W. at 142. The Buck court ultimately answered this question in the negative and observed that several characteristics of a public office were not provided for by the underlying legislation connected to the position. Id. at 143-44. The way the court viewed things, if the General Assembly had intended to create an office, it would have "at least fixed the tenure, the duration, the fees or emoluments, the rights and powers, as well as the duties of the office." Id. at 144. These features were, after all, "important essentials in the creation of a public office." Id. But as alluded to earlier, not all cases appear to have followed a characteristics-based approach in analyzing what constitutes an "office of trust or profit." Indeed, whereas Buck's "essentials" generally mirror the attributes underlying the more detailed understanding of "office" mentioned earlier, the Tennessee Supreme Court appeared to take a different tack when it unpacked the meaning of "office" in Frazier v. Elmore. According to the Frazier court, in the context of Article VI, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution-the very provision at issue here- "office" must be given its broad meaning, so as to effectuate the apparent intent of the constitutional prohibition against a diversion or division of the time and labor, capacity to discharge the exacting duties of their responsible positions; and also to Frazier, 173 S.W.2d at 565. In connection with this "broad" approach to the term "office" and gleaned constitutional concern relating to judges' time, energies, and labor, the Frazier court cited definitions of "office" that largely pertained to place and function. For instance, in addition to noting that "office" meant an "assigned duty or function," the court noted that synonyms for the term were "post, appointment, situation, place, [and] position." Id. And the court added that "office" "commonly suggests a position of (especially public) trust or authority." Id. Even outside of highlighting these more general understandings of "office," the Frazier court's discussion appeared to eschew the type of characteristics-based analysis the Buck court had promoted. For one, even though Buck was decided before Frazier, the Frazier court did not mention it. In addition, the broad meaning that the Frazier court gave to "office" allowed the court to not concern itself with knowing all the attributes of the other "office" at the center of its review. 4 rather than permissive appointment.” Patterson, 2025 WL 473547, at 6 (citing State ex rel. Harris v. Buck, 196 S.W. 142, 144 (Tenn. 1917)). On the other hand, a recent appellate decision considering the ouster statute’s “office of trust or profit” language indicated that characteristics were not fully determinative of whether someone holds an “office of trust or profit.” See Yeager, 472 S.W.3d at 663 (finding it useful to also consider the purpose of the ouster law). Still, though, it can be expected that a consideration of public office characteristics will largely drive the analysis of what constitutes an “office of trust or profit” in ouster cases. The Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in State ex rel. Harris v. Buck illustrates this point. There, the Tennessee Supreme Court examined whether a county engineer held an “office of trust or profit” within the meaning of Tennessee’s ouster law. Buck, 196 S.W. at 142. The Buck court ultimately answered this question in the negative and observed that several characteristics of a public office were not provided for by the underlying legislation connected to the position. Id. at 143-44. The way the court viewed things, if the General Assembly had intended to create an office, it would have “at least . . . fixed the tenure, the duration, the fees or emoluments, the rights and powers, as well as the duties of the office.” Id. at 144. These features were, after all, “important essentials in the creation of a public office.” Id. But as alluded to earlier, not all cases appear to have followed a characteristics-based approach in analyzing what constitutes an “office of trust or profit.” Indeed, whereas Buck’s “essentials” generally mirror the attributes underlying the more detailed understanding of “office” mentioned earlier, the Tennessee Supreme Court appeared to take a different tack when it unpacked the meaning of “office” in Frazier v. Elmore. According to the Frazier court, in the context of Article VI, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution—the very provision at issue here— “office” must be given its broad meaning, so as to effectuate the apparent intent of the constitutional prohibition against a diversion or division of the time and labor, energies and abilities of judges of our courts, which might destroy, or diminish their capacity to discharge the exacting duties of their responsible positions; and also to limit them to one source of compensation. Frazier, 173 S.W.2d at 565. In connection with this “broad” approach to the term “office” and gleaned constitutional concern relating to judges’ time, energies, and labor, the Frazier court cited definitions of “office” that largely pertained to place and function. For instance, in addition to noting that “office” meant an “assigned duty or function,” the court noted that synonyms for the term were “post, appointment, situation, place, [and] position.” Id. And the court added that “office” “commonly suggests a position of (especially public) trust or authority.” Id. Even outside of highlighting these more general understandings of “office,” the Frazier court’s discussion appeared to eschew the type of characteristics-based analysis the Buck court had promoted. For one, even though Buck was decided before Frazier, the Frazier court did not mention it. In addition, the broad meaning that the Frazier court gave to “office” allowed the court to not concern itself with knowing all the attributes of the other “office” at the center of its review. Whereas the Buck court had expressed concern for knowing whether a position involved certain "essentials" of a public office, Buck, 196 S.W. at 144, the Frazier court was able to determine that the position at issue implicated Article VI, Section 7 even though the court was largely in the dark as to the position's details. Although the Frazier court discussed how the other position at issue there was one of military service, the court acknowledged the specific position "does not appear" in the record. Frazier, 173 S.W.2d at 564. And in the same vein, the court acknowledged that the record did not disclose "the precise character of the duties," "the nature of the military service," nor "the [specifics of] compensation." Id. at 565. But this was all deemed to be of no moment. Ultimately, the Frazier court remarked that, "[w]hatever may be the post or station in the military service of the United States which complainant is occupying, he is in a place of trust and honor and is receiving compensation therefrom." Id. at 565-66. And in the end, the Frazier court commented that, "if not technically holding another 'office,' within the letter of the prohibition, he is certainly within its spirit." Id. at 566. As the court stated, "[t]he letter killeth, the spirit The differences manifested through the juxtaposition of the above approaches are far from trivial. The Buck and Frazier courts appear to have respectively offered fundamentally different frameworks for deciphering what an "office of trust or profit" might mean. Those differences may For instance, if a court were to assess the position of juvenile magistrate under Buck's framework, we think it would be unlikely that the court would regard the position as an "office of trust or profit." When previously heeding Buck's direction, this Office noted that the General Assembly reflects a clear intent to create an "office" when, among other things, it provides for "the term of office" and "its compensation." Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 98-215 (Nov. 23, 1998). Such typical hallmarks of a public office are of course lacking here. As noted earlier, juvenile magistrates serve "at the pleasure" of the juvenile court judge that appoints them. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107(a)(1). And they also have no fixed compensation by statute. That, too, is subject to the involvement of the appointing judge. See id. (providing that the judge sets the magistrate's compensation with "approval of the county legislative body or the pertinent governing body"). Overall, then, we think that the framework articulated by Buck generally counsels against the understanding that a juvenile magistrate holds an "office of trust or profit." See Patterson, 2025 WL 473547, at 6 (relying on Buck for the notion that when a position is a mere appointee and works at the discretion of another official, it is evidence that the position is employment rather than a position of trust or profit); see also Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 98-215 (Nov. 23, 1998) (opining that an appointed superintendent did not hold an office of trust or profit, "particularly in view of the fact that a superintendent has no fixed term of office"). But if a court were to view this question under Frazier's framework, its conclusion would probably be different. As we outlined earlier, the Frazier court adopted a broad meaning of 6 Beyond what we have already mentioned-but further illustrating that the "essentials" discussed in Buck did not carry the same type of weight in Frazier-we note that the Frazier court appeared to favorably reference another Tennessee Supreme Court case in the course of its discussion, one in which, in the context of another provision, the court had determined that someone was an "officer" even though they were "without a fixed term or compensation,
[and were] dependent on fees." Frazier, 173 S.W.2d at 565.
5
Whereas the Buck court had expressed concern for knowing whether a position involved certain “essentials” of a public office, Buck, 196 S.W. at 144, the Frazier court was able to determine that the position at issue implicated Article VI, Section 7 even though the court was largely in the dark as to the position’s details. Although the Frazier court discussed how the other position at issue there was one of military service, the court acknowledged the specific position “does not appear” in the record. Frazier, 173 S.W.2d at 564. And in the same vein, the court acknowledged that the record did not disclose “the precise character of the duties,” “the nature of the military service,” nor “the [specifics of] compensation.” Id. at 565. But this was all deemed to be of no moment. Ultimately, the Frazier court remarked that, “[w]hatever may be the post or station in the military service of the United States which complainant is occupying, he is in a place of trust and honor and is receiving compensation therefrom.” Id. at 565-66. And in the end, the Frazier court commented that, “if not technically holding another ‘office,’ within the letter of the prohibition, he is certainly within its spirit.” Id. at 566. As the court stated, “[t]he letter killeth, the spirit maketh alive.” Id.6 The differences manifested through the juxtaposition of the above approaches are far from trivial. The Buck and Frazier courts appear to have respectively offered fundamentally different frameworks for deciphering what an “office of trust or profit” might mean. Those differences may matter here. For instance, if a court were to assess the position of juvenile magistrate under Buck’s framework, we think it would be unlikely that the court would regard the position as an “office of trust or profit.” When previously heeding Buck’s direction, this Office noted that the General Assembly reflects a clear intent to create an “office” when, among other things, it provides for “the term of office” and “its compensation.” Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. 98-215 (Nov. 23, 1998). Such typical hallmarks of a public office are of course lacking here. As noted earlier, juvenile magistrates serve “at the pleasure” of the juvenile court judge that appoints them. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107(a)(1). And they also have no fixed compensation by statute. That, too, is subject to the involvement of the appointing judge. See id. (providing that the judge sets the magistrate’s compensation with “approval of the county legislative body or the pertinent governing body”). Overall, then, we think that the framework articulated by Buck generally counsels against the understanding that a juvenile magistrate holds an “office of trust or profit.” See Patterson, 2025 WL 473547, at *6 (relying on Buck for the notion that when a position is a mere appointee and works at the discretion of another official, it is evidence that the position is employment rather than a position of trust or profit); see also Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. 98-215 (Nov. 23, 1998) (opining that an appointed superintendent did not hold an office of trust or profit, “particularly in view of the fact that a superintendent has no fixed term of office”). But if a court were to view this question under Frazier’s framework, its conclusion would probably be different. As we outlined earlier, the Frazier court adopted a broad meaning of 6 Beyond what we have already mentioned—but further illustrating that the “essentials” discussed in Buck did not carry the same type of weight in Frazier—we note that the Frazier court appeared to favorably reference another Tennessee Supreme Court case in the course of its discussion, one in which, in the context of another provision, the court had determined that someone was an “officer” even though they were “without a fixed term or compensation,
[and were] dependent on fees.” Frazier, 173 S.W.2d at 565.
"office" out of its concern for "effectuat[ing] the apparent intent" of Article VI, Section 7. Frazier, 173 S.W.2d at 565. And here, we think it is likely that simultaneous service as a juvenile magistrate in another county would impede the intent of Article VI, Section 7 that the Frazier court identified. Such dual service would invariably lead to competition between counties for a judicial officer's time, labor, and attention. So it makes sense that the position of juvenile magistrate falls within the broad definition of "office." That position clearly involves labor in another "appointment," "place," and "position." Id. And whereas the Frazier court also noted that "office commonly suggests a position of (especially public) trust or authority," id., we think juvenile magistrates certainly serve in such a capacity given their role in Tennessee's court system. As we detailed earlier, once a juvenile court judge directs that a case or class of cases will be heard by a magistrate, the magistrate has "the powers of a judge" and "the same authority as the judge to issue any and all process." Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107(b). And cases handled in the first instance by a magistrate are "conducted in the same manner as cases heard by the judge." Id. And as we also noted, juvenile magistrates may preside over a variety of cases that can have a profound impact on the citizens of this State. Ultimately, given the Frazier court's emphasis on according "office" a broad meaning, Frazier, 173 S.W.2d at 565, and given its concern for the "spirit" of the constitutional prohibition it interpreted, id. at 566, a court following its direction would probably regard a juvenile magistrate as holding an "office of trust or profit." And because Frazier specifically gave meaning to the constitutional provision at issue in your request, courts would be likely to follow its lead in resolving the question you have posed. No doubt, the Frazier court's approach appears to be in tension with how other decisions, like Buck, have given meaning to the "office of trust or profit" language in other contexts. But this Office has previously alluded to the potential for tension in this area, noting that "[u]nder Tennessee case law a person can hold an 'office' for one purpose and not for another." Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 99-156 (Aug. 19, 1999). And in the same opinion, we observed that Buck was "not controlling" of inquiries related to Article VI, Section 7, as it "was not construing the phrase 'office of trust or profit' for purposes of [that provision]." Id. By contrast, we noted that Frazier was a "leading case construing the phrase 'office of trust or profit' for purposes of Article VI, Section 7." Id. In summary, therefore, we believe that a court would likely conclude that the position of

7. And as a result, it is this Office's opinion that a part-time general sessions and juvenile court
   judge in one county is likely, under existing precedent, constitutionally prohibited from 6 “office” out of its concern for “effectuat[ing] the apparent intent” of Article VI, Section 7. Frazier, 173 S.W.2d at 565. And here, we think it is likely that simultaneous service as a juvenile magistrate in another county would impede the intent of Article VI, Section 7 that the Frazier court identified. Such dual service would invariably lead to competition between counties for a judicial officer’s time, labor, and attention. So it makes sense that the position of juvenile magistrate falls within the broad definition of “office.” That position clearly involves labor in another “appointment,” “place,” and “position.” Id. And whereas the Frazier court also noted that “office commonly suggests a position of (especially public) trust or authority,” id., we think juvenile magistrates certainly serve in such a capacity given their role in Tennessee’s court system. As we detailed earlier, once a juvenile court judge directs that a case or class of cases will be heard by a magistrate, the magistrate has “the powers of a judge” and “the same authority as the judge to issue any and all process.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107(b). And cases handled in the first instance by a magistrate are “conducted in the same manner as cases heard by the judge.” Id. And as we also noted, juvenile magistrates may preside over a variety of cases that can have a profound impact on the citizens of this State. Ultimately, given the Frazier court’s emphasis on according “office” a broad meaning, Frazier, 173 S.W.2d at 565, and given its concern for the “spirit” of the constitutional prohibition it interpreted, id. at 566, a court following its direction would probably regard a juvenile magistrate as holding an “office of trust or profit.” And because Frazier specifically gave meaning to the constitutional provision at issue in your request, courts would be likely to follow its lead in resolving the question you have posed. No doubt, the Frazier court’s approach appears to be in tension with how other decisions, like Buck, have given meaning to the “office of trust or profit” language in other contexts. But this Office has previously alluded to the potential for tension in this area, noting that “[u]nder Tennessee case law . . . a person can hold an ‘office’ for one purpose and not for another.” Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. 99-156 (Aug. 19, 1999). And in the same opinion, we observed that Buck was “not controlling” of inquiries related to Article VI, Section 7, as it “was not construing the phrase ‘office of trust or profit’ for purposes of [that provision].” Id. By contrast, we noted that Frazier was a “leading case construing the phrase ‘office of trust or profit’ for purposes of Article VI, Section 7.” Id. In summary, therefore, we believe that a court would likely conclude that the position of juvenile magistrate constitutes an office of trust or profit within the context of Article VI, Section
8. And as a result, it is this Office’s opinion that a part-time general sessions and juvenile court
   judge in one county is likely, under existing precedent, constitutionally prohibited from simultaneously serving as a juvenile magistrate in another county. JONATHAN T. SKRMETTI Attorney General and Reporter J. MATTHEW RICE Solicitor General Chattanooga, Tennessee 37404 7 MATTHEW KERNODLE Assistant Attorney General SAMANTHA MORRIS Assistant Attorney General Requested by: The Honorable Robert D. Philyaw President, Tennessee Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges 1600 East Third Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37404