Does Tennessee's property tax law unconstitutionally exclude small RVs and pop-up campers from being taxed as real property?

Subject

Whether the statutory exclusion of certain small recreational vehicles and camping facilities from the definition of "moveable structure" in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-501(7) is consistent with Article II, § 28 of the Tennessee Constitution, which requires that "house trailers, mobile homes, and all other similar movable structures" be assessed as real property.

Plain-English summary

Representative Gary Hicks asked whether assessors are violating the Tennessee Constitution when they don't tax small RVs and travel trailers as real property. The AG's answer: no.

Article II, § 28 of the Tennessee Constitution, adopted in 1972, classifies "house trailers, mobile homes, and all other similar movable structures" as real property for tax purposes. This was a deliberate choice. As the Tennessee Supreme Court explained in Belle-Aire Village (1978), the constitutional drafters wanted an effective tax mechanism for the explosion of mobile-home living that occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s. By treating mobile homes as improvements on the land, the system could collect the tax through the landowner.

But the constitutional language has a built-in limit. It reaches only structures "similar" to house trailers and mobile homes. Things designed for recreational, not residential or commercial, use are not similar in that key respect.

The General Assembly drew the line in § 67-5-501(7). A "moveable structure" includes a mobile home or other movable structure constructed as a trailer or semitrailer that may be used as a residence, apartment, office, storehouse, warehouse, or for any other commercial or industrial purpose. The definition explicitly excludes self-propelled vehicles and "sleeping and camping facilities attached to, or designed to be attached to, or drawn by a pick-up truck or an automobile, [] that contain[] less than three hundred square feet (300 sq. ft.) of enclosed space."

The AG holds that this exclusion is constitutional. The legislature has "very broad discretion" under article II, § 28 itself ("the value and definition of property in each class or subclass... [is] to be ascertained in such manner as the Legislature shall direct"). And the proceedings of the 1971 Constitutional Convention show that the framers had the same exclusion (in Chapter 199 of the 1971 Public Acts) in front of them, expressly endorsed it, and structured the constitutional amendment to confirm rather than override it. Mr. Edmondson at the convention specifically praised the bill that "excludes self-propelled vehicles used for sleeping and camping" and said "the whole thing is pretty clearly spelled out, which is fine."

For Question 2, the AG concludes that excluded structures (small RVs and pop-up campers) are statutorily classified as tangible personal property under § 67-5-501(8), (13). And as a practical matter, all tangible personal property in Tennessee is exempt from property tax unless it is public utility property or commercial and industrial property. So most travel trailers and small campers are effectively untaxed at the county level.

What this means for you

If you own a travel trailer, pop-up camper, or other small RV

If your unit is towed by a pickup or car (or self-propelled), and contains less than 300 square feet of enclosed space, you are not subject to the real property tax that applies to mobile homes. Your unit is tangible personal property, and tangible personal property in Tennessee is broadly exempt from property tax. There may be other registration or use-related fees (under the motor vehicle title and registration framework), but no annual ad valorem property tax. If your unit is over 300 square feet or is being used as a residence on land, the analysis can change; talk to your county assessor.

If you own a mobile home or large modular home

You're on the other side of the line. If your unit is constructed as a trailer or semitrailer, designed to be towed or parked, and used as a residence (or office, storehouse, warehouse, etc.), the unit is real property. The tax is collected through assessment as an improvement to the land. The landowner is liable for the tax on the structure.

If you operate a mobile home park or RV park

Distinguish carefully between long-stay residential mobile homes and short-stay recreational vehicles. The first are real property; the second are typically excluded. The 300-square-foot floor and the design-for-residential-use elements matter for the classification. For mixed-use parks, work with your county assessor on a unit-by-unit categorization.

If you are a county property assessor

The opinion blesses the line you are already drawing under the statutory exclusion. The exclusion is consistent with the constitution. Apply § 67-5-501(7) by its terms: only structures similar to house trailers and mobile homes are real property; sub-300-square-foot recreational units pulled by a pickup or car are not.

If you are a tax attorney

The constitutional analysis here is straightforward, and the legislative discretion granted by article II, § 28 is broad. The relevant cases (Sherwood, Belle-Aire Village, Williams v. Carr) and the 1971 convention proceedings together support the statutory line. If a client wants to challenge the exclusion as unconstitutional, the AG's analysis is a substantial barrier; if a client wants to challenge an assessor's inclusion of a sub-300-square-foot unit as real property, the statutory definition gives them strong textual support.

If you are a state legislator

The legislature could expand or narrow the definition of "moveable structure" within constitutional limits. The 300-square-foot exclusion has been stable since the 1971 Act. Any change must keep the definition consistent with article II, § 28's reference to structures "similar" to house trailers and mobile homes.

Common questions

Q: Is my small camper taxed as real property?
A: If it's a self-propelled vehicle or is attached to / designed to be drawn by a pickup or automobile and contains less than 300 square feet of enclosed space, no. It is tangible personal property, which is generally exempt from Tennessee property tax.

Q: What about a 350-square-foot park-model RV that I live in year-round?
A: A unit larger than 300 square feet may not fall within the exclusion. If it's used as a residence and is constructed as a trailer or semitrailer, it likely meets the "moveable structure" definition and is taxed as real property.

Q: What if I move my unit on and off my land seasonally?
A: The classification depends on the design and use, not on whether it physically moves often. A typical recreational travel trailer designed for camping use, even if parked on land for several months, is generally not within the moveable structure definition. The assessor's job is to look at the design and primary use.

Q: Are there other taxes that apply?
A: Yes, motor vehicle registration and title fees apply to RVs and travel trailers. Sales tax may apply on purchase. The opinion is about real property classification only.

Q: What about a tiny home on wheels?
A: It depends on the size, the way it is constructed, and the primary use. A tiny home over 300 square feet of enclosed space, used as a residence, looks like a "moveable structure" under the statute. Under 300 square feet and pulled by a pickup or car, it likely falls within the exclusion. The unit's design for residential or commercial use is the key.

Q: Can the General Assembly tax tangible personal property if it wants to?
A: Article II, § 28 allows it, but Tennessee currently exempts most tangible personal property. The exception is public utility property and commercial and industrial property, which can be subject to property tax. See Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 00-062 (Apr. 3, 2000).

Q: What's the difference between Williams v. Carr and Sherwood for this analysis?
A: Williams v. Carr (1966) reflects the principle that the Constitution is the superior law. Sherwood (1987) emphasizes the General Assembly's broad discretion to define property classes and subclasses. The two coexist: the legislature's discretion is broad, but it must operate within the inherent meaning of the constitutional terms.

Background and statutory framework

Article II, § 28 of the Tennessee Constitution, completely revised in 1972, classifies all property for taxation into three classes: real property, tangible personal property, and intangible personal property. Real property is further subclassified into public utility, industrial and commercial, residential, and farm property. The constitutional text specifies that "house trailers, mobile homes, and all other similar movable structures used for commercial, industrial, or residential purposes shall be assessed as Real Property as an improvement to the land where located."

The history matters. In May 1971, the General Assembly passed Chapter 199 of the Public Acts, which provided for the assessment of "mobile structures" as real property and excluded sub-300-square-foot recreational vehicles and camping facilities. The Limited Constitutional Convention of 1971 examined Chapter 199 directly. Mr. Edmondson commented that the bill "is a very fine bill" that "does make it clear that mobile homes will be taxed as real property" and "also excludes self-propelled vehicles used for sleeping and camping." The convention adopted Article II, § 28's mobile-home language to confirm the constitutionality of the legislative scheme.

The current statutory framework, in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-802(a)(1), requires "moveable structures" to be assessed as real property. Section 67-5-501(7) defines the term and includes the same exclusion that was in the 1971 Act.

For tangible personal property, § 67-5-501(8) defines "personal property" as "every species and character of property that is not classified as real property," and § 67-5-501(13) defines "tangible personal property" as "goods chattels, and other articles of value that are capable of manual or physical possession." All tangible personal property in Tennessee is exempt from property tax unless it falls within public utility property or commercial and industrial property classifications. Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 00-062 (Apr. 3, 2000).

The constitutional construction principle controlling this analysis is that "terms in a constitution must be given their ordinary and inherent meaning" (Cleveland Surgery Ctr., 30 S.W.3d at 282), informed by "the state of things when the provision originated" (Peay v. Nolan, 7 S.W.2d at 817), and that legislative discretion to define property classes is "very broad" (Sherwood Co., 734 S.W.2d at 321). When constitutional words are clear, courts do not resort to other interpretive aids (Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d at 426); when there is ambiguity, courts look first to the proceedings of the convention that adopted the provision.

Citations

Constitutional and statutory provisions:
- Tenn. Const. art. II, § 28
- Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-501(7) (moveable structure definition)
- Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-501(8), (13) (personal property definitions)
- Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-802(a)(1) (assessment as real property)
- 1971 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 199 (origin of statutory framework)
- Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-1-105(b) (motor vehicle definition)

Cases:
- Williams v. Carr, 404 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1966), Constitution is superior law
- Sherwood Co. v. Clary, 734 S.W.2d 318 (Tenn. 1987), broad legislative discretion
- Belle-Aire Village v. Ghorley, 574 S.W.2d 723 (Tenn. 1978), purpose of mobile-home tax provision
- In re All Assessments, 67 S.W.3d 805 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); 58 S.W.3d 95 (Tenn. 2000)
- Marion Cnty. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 710 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986)
- Gaskin v. Collins, 661 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1983), give effect to people's intent
- Dixie Rents, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 594 S.W.2d 397 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979)
- Cleveland Surgery Ctr., L.P. v. Bradley Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 30 S.W.3d 278 (Tenn. 2000)
- Peay v. Nolan, 7 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1928), historical context
- Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409 (Tenn. 2014); Shelby Cnty. v. Hale, 292 S.W.2d 745 (Tenn. 1956)
- State v. McCoy, 459 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2014), duty to uphold constitutionality where possible

Convention proceedings:
- Journal and Proceedings of the Limited Constitutional Convention of 1971, at 610, 612-13, 615-17

Prior AG opinion:
- Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 00-062 (Apr. 3, 2000): tangible personal property tax exemptions

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2023/op23-11.pdf

Original opinion text

STATE OF TENNESSEE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
October 30, 2023
Opinion No. 23-11

Constitutionality of Definition of "Moveable Structure" in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-501(7)

Question 1

Article II, section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution declares that "[h]ouse trailers, mobile homes, and all other similar movable structures" are to be assessed as "real property" for taxation purposes. Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-501(7) defines "moveable structure" for the statutory scheme that implements this constitutional provision. Expressly excluded from that definition are certain moveable structures that contain less than three hundred square feet of enclosed space.

When an assessor of property does not assess as real property those moveable structures that are expressly excluded under the statutory definition of "moveable structure" is the assessor constitutionally applying the law in accordance with article II, section 28, and Williams v. Carr, 218 Tenn. 564, 404 S.W.2d 522 (1966)?

Opinion 1

Yes. The exclusion of "self-propelled vehicles, sleeping and camping facilities attached to, or designed to be attached to, or drawn by a pick-up truck or an automobile, [] that contain[] less than three hundred square feet (300 sq. ft.) of enclosed space" from the definition of "moveable structure" in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-501(7) appears to be consistent with the plain language of article II, section 28 and reflective of the intent of the framers and the people who adopted that constitutional provision.

Question 2

If so, may the General Assembly authorize the assessor of property to assess the property to the owner of the excluded moveable structure instead of assessing it as real property as an improvement to the land on which it is located?

Opinion 2

Yes. Because the specified, excluded moveable structures with less than 300 square feet of enclosed space are not assessed as real property, they are assessed by statute to the owner as "tangible personal property." See Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-501(8), (13). As a practical matter, however, all tangible personal property in Tennessee is exempt from property taxation unless it falls within the classifications of public utility property or commercial and industrial property, as explained in Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 00-062 (Apr. 3, 2000).

ANALYSIS

The authority to tax property is established by article II, section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. In re All Assessments, 67 S.W.3d 805, 807 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Since 1972, when article II, section 28 was completely revised, this constitutional provision has classified all property "[f]or purposes of taxation" into three classes: (1) real property, (2) tangible personal property, and (3) intangible personal property. In re All Assessments, 58 S.W.3d 95, 97-98 (Tenn. 2000); see Sherwood Co. v. Clary, 734 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Tenn. 1987). Article II, section 28 further subclassifies "real property" into (a) public utility property, (b) industrial and commercial property, (c) residential property, and (d) farm property.

As relevant here, article II, section 28 classifies "[h]ouse trailers, mobile homes, and all other similar movable structures" as "real property" for taxation purposes. Belle-Aire Village, Inc. v. Ghorley, 574 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Tenn. 1978). And it specifically provides that

[h]ouse trailers, mobile homes, and all other similar movable structures used for commercial, industrial, or residential purposes shall be assessed as Real Property as an improvement to the land where located.

Tenn. Const. art. II, § 28 (emphasis added).

As explained by the Tennessee Supreme Court, the purpose of the italicized provision was to provide an effective manner for taxing mobile homes, which had proliferated in the years immediately preceding the Limited Constitutional Convention of 1971. Belle-Aire Village, Inc., 574 S.W.2d at 725. "The method chosen was to treat them as real property by taxing them as improvements to the land where located, thereby making such land liable for the taxes on the mobile homes." Id.

To implement this constitutional provision, Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-802(a)(1) requires "moveable structures" to be assessed as real property for tax purposes. As defined by the General Assembly,

"[m]oveable structure" includes any mobile home or such other movable structure that is constructed as a trailer or semitrailer and designed to either be towed along the highways or to be parked off the highways, and that may be used, temporarily or permanently, as a residence, apartment, office, storehouse, warehouse or for any other commercial or industrial purpose; but does not include self-propelled vehicles, sleeping and camping facilities attached to, or designed to be attached to, or drawn by a pick-up truck or an automobile, and that contains less than three hundred square feet (300 sq. ft.) of enclosed space.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-501(7) (emphasis added).

The question presented here is whether the express statutory exclusion of self-propelled vehicles, and the specified, limited-space sleeping and camping facilities from the statutory definition of "moveable structure," is consistent with the constitutional requirement that "[h]ouse trailers, mobile homes, and all other similar movable structures" are to be assessed as real property for taxation purposes.

For the reasons that follow, the definition of "moveable structure" in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-501(7) does not impermissibly exclude moveable structures that article II, section 28 intends to assess as real property for tax purposes.

To begin with, article II, section 28 itself states that "the value and definition of property in each class or subclass" of property is "to be ascertained in such manner as the Legislature shall direct." This provision gives the General Assembly "very broad discretion" to determine "the value and definition of property in each of the authorized classifications or subclassifications." Sherwood Co., 734 S.W.2d at 321.

Hence, as long as the General Assembly's definition is not inconsistent with the inherent meaning of the words in the Constitution, the General Assembly may define a "movable structure" for the purposes of the statutory scheme that implements the constitutional provision requiring "[h]ouse trailers, mobile homes, and all other similar movable structures" to be assessed as real property. See Williams v. Carr, 218 Tenn. 564, 578, 404 S.W.2d 522, 529 (1966) ("[T]he Constitution is the superior law . . . ."); Marion Cnty. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 710 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

When construing constitutional provisions, courts must give effect to the intent of the people who adopted those provisions. Gaskin v. Collins, 661 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tenn. 1983); see Dixie Rents, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 594 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979). "These intentions are reflected in the terms of the constitutional provision, and unless the context requires otherwise, terms in a constitution must be given their ordinary and inherent meaning." Cleveland Surgery Ctr., L.P. v. Bradley Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 30 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tenn. 2000). To accomplish this end, "the state of things when the provision originated is to be considered," Peay v. Nolan, 157 Tenn. 222, 230, 7 S.W.2d 815, 817 (1928), and provisions must be construed "reasonably in light of the practices and usages that were well-known when the provision was passed," Cleveland Surgery Ctr., L.P. 30 S.W.3d at 282.

When the words of a constitutional provision "are free from ambiguity and doubt and express plainly and clearly the sense of the framers of the Constitution, there is no need to resort to other means of interpretation." Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409, 426 (Tenn. 2014); (citing Shelby Cnty. v. Hale, 200 Tenn. 503, 510-11, 292 S.W.2d 745, 748 (1956)). "But if there is doubt about the meaning, the Court should look first to the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention which adopted the provision in question to determine the intent of the framers." Id.; see Gaskin, 661 S.W.2d at 867.

Article II, section 28 commands that "[h]ouse trailers, mobile homes, and all other similar movable structures" are to be assessed as real property. It follows that movable structures that are not similar to house trailers and mobile homes are not within the ambit of this command.

When article II, section 28 was adopted in 1972, the common understanding of a "house trailer" or a "mobile home" was "any vehicle or conveyance, not self-propelled, designed for travel upon the public highways, and designed for use as a residence, office, apartment, storehouse, warehouse, or any other similar purpose, . . . ." Tenn. Code Ann. § 59-105 (1968) (definition of "mobile home or house trailer" in motor vehicle title and registration law). Accordingly, as understood at the time, very small "self-propelled vehicles, sleeping and camping facilities attached to, or designed to be attached to, or drawn by a pick-up truck or an automobile, [] that contain[] less than three hundred square feet (300 sq. ft.) of enclosed space" were not typically considered to be house trailers or mobile homes. These excluded vehicles and facilities are typically viewed as designed for recreational use—not for use as a residence, office, apartment, storehouse, or warehouse. Thus, their exclusion from the definition of "movable structure" in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-501(7) appears to be a sound distinction—and an appropriate carve-out.

When the Sherwood Court recognized the "very broad discretion" bestowed on the General Assembly to determine the definition of property in each class or subclass of property under article II, section 28, it emphasized that "the General Assembly [is] not constitutionally required to attempt to administer and maintain an impractical system of taxation." Sherwood Co., 734 S.W.2d at 321.

Furthermore, to the extent there is any question about the scope of the phrase "[h]ouse trailers, mobile homes, and all other similar movable structures" in article II, section 28, the Journal and Proceedings of the Limited Constitutional Convention of 1971 explicitly reveals that the framers were not seeking to assess as real property "self-propelled vehicles, sleeping and camping facilities attached to, or designed to be attached to, or drawn by a pick-up truck or an automobile, [] that contain[] less than three hundred square feet (300 sq. ft.) of enclosed space." Immediately before the Limited Constitutional Convention of 1971 was convened, the General Assembly had passed an Act to provide for the assessment of "mobile structures" for property tax purposes. 1971 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 199. The Act provided that mobile structures covered by the Act were to be assessed with the land as an improvement on the land. Id. at § 2 (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-648 (Supp. 1971)). The Act defined a "mobile structure" in the same substantive manner as Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-501(7) currently defines a "moveable structure," and it excluded the identical structures from its definition of "mobile structure" that Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-501(7) does:

For the purposes of this Act, the term "mobile structure" means any mobile home or any structure, which is constructed as a trailer or semi-trailer and designed either to be towed along the highways or to be parked off the highways and used temporarily or permanently, as a residence, apartment, office, storehouse, warehouse or any other commercial purpose; but shall not include self-propelled vehicles, sleeping and camping facilities attached to or designed to be attached to or drawn by a pick-up truck or an automobile and which contains less than three hundred (300) square feet of enclosed space.

Id. at § 1 (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-647 (Supp. 1971)) (emphasis added).

The framers at the Limited Constitutional Convention of 1971 specifically examined the provisions of Chapter 199 of the Public Acts of 1971 and expressed their support for the General Assembly to assess "mobile homes" as real property, but several of the framers questioned whether the General Assembly could do so under article II, section 28 as the provision stood at that time. See Journal and Proceedings of the Limited Constitutional Convention of 1971, at 610, 612-13, 615-17. Thus, the framers proposed that the General Assembly's authority to assess "mobile homes" as real property be constitutionally confirmed. See id. The framers, however, took no issue with the General Assembly's exclusion of the "mobile structures" described in the italicized language above:

MR. EDMONDSON: Mr. Chairman, I also agree that we should not be legislating, at this time. The bill that the General Assembly passed, in May of this year, is a very fine bill. It does make it clear that mobile homes will be taxed as real property. It also excludes self-propelled vehicles used for sleeping and camping and the whole thing is pretty clearly spelled out, which is fine. The only problem, that I see in this, if anyone takes this to the Supreme Court and says I live in a mobile home that should be classified as tangible property and not as real property. I am not sure how the Supreme Court would look at that, unless we say specifically in our amended part of the constitution that we intend for mobile homes to be real property. . . .

Id. at 616 (emphasis added).

In sum, the exclusion of "self-propelled vehicles, sleeping and camping facilities attached to, or designed to be attached to, or drawn by a pick-up truck or an automobile, [] that contain[] less than three hundred square feet (300 sq. ft.) of enclosed space" from the definition of "moveable structure" in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-501(7) appears to be consistent with the plain language of article II, section 28 and reflective of the intent of the framers and the people who adopted article II, section 28. See State v. McCoy, 459 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tenn. 2014).

It therefore follows that "self-propelled vehicles, sleeping and camping facilities attached to, or designed to be attached to, or drawn by a pick-up truck or an automobile, [] that contain[] less than three hundred square feet (300 sq. ft.) of enclosed space" are to be assessed to the owner as "tangible personal property." See Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-501(8), (13). As a practical matter, however, all tangible personal property in Tennessee is exempt from property taxation unless it falls within the classifications of public utility property or commercial and industrial property, as fully explained in Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 00-062 (Apr. 3, 2000).

JONATHAN SKRMETTI
Attorney General and Reporter

ANDRÉE SOPHIA BLUMSTEIN
Solicitor General

LAURA T. KIDWELL
Assistant Solicitor General

Requested by:
The Honorable Gary Hicks
State Representative
425 Rep. John Lewis Way N.
Suite 608
Nashville, Tennessee 37243