If I'm a witness or attorney participating remotely in a Tennessee court hearing from my home or office, can I still carry a handgun there?

Subject

Scope of the phrase "inside any building in which judicial proceedings are in progress" in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306

Plain-English summary

Representative Bruce Griffey asked a question that became important during the COVID-era surge in remote court proceedings. If a judge dials into a hearing from chambers in the courthouse, the courthouse is clearly covered by § 39-17-1306. But what about the other end of the call? If an attorney joins by Zoom from their law office, or a witness joins by conference call from home, does the firearms ban sweep into those buildings too?

The AG concluded no. Tennessee's prohibition on carrying weapons "inside any building in which judicial proceedings are in progress" reaches only "those buildings in which a judge customarily conducts judicial proceedings, such as courthouses and criminal justice facilities." A judge's private residence, an attorney's office, a witness's home, and similar non-courthouse buildings are outside the statute's reach even when used for a remote court appearance.

The reasoning rests on four points. First, the statute's purpose, articulated in State v. Williams, 854 S.W.2d 904 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), is to keep "judges, lawyers, court personnel, litigants, witnesses, and observers" safe in physical courtroom settings. A lawyer arguing from home doesn't face that same physical-presence risk. Second, the statutory exemptions in § 39-17-1306(c)(1), security personnel and court officers, only make sense in a courthouse setting. Third, the statute was enacted in 1989, before commercial internet existed, and the legislature has had multiple opportunities to expand the building definition since but has not. Fourth, the constitutional-doubt canon: extending the statute to private residences would put it in tension with the Second Amendment under District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, and courts construe statutes to avoid constitutional problems where possible.

The opinion does not change the rule for actual courthouses; § 39-17-1306 still bars weapons there during judicial proceedings, as the AG explained more fully in Opinion 22-01. It just clarifies that the statute does not chase remote participants into their homes and offices.

What this means for you

If you are a Tennessee attorney attending a hearing remotely

Your home, your law office, or wherever else you are dialing in from is not "a building in which judicial proceedings are in progress" for purposes of § 39-17-1306. If you have a handgun carry permit and are otherwise lawfully carrying, the statute does not require you to lock up your firearm before logging onto the Zoom hearing. Other rules (your office's policy, the building owner's posting under § 39-17-1359 if applicable) may still apply, but the courthouse weapons statute does not.

If you are a witness joining by phone or video

Same answer. Joining a hearing remotely from a private residence or other private building does not trigger the § 39-17-1306 prohibition for that building. The prohibition is about the courthouse the judge is in, not the building you are in.

If you are a Tennessee judge conducting hearings remotely

The AG opinion specifically addresses this. The fact that you are presiding from chambers within the courthouse means the courthouse is covered. But your private residence, if you ever needed to conduct a remote hearing from home in an emergency, is not pulled into the prohibition. Practical implication: if you carry a firearm under the § 39-17-1306(c)(3) judge exemption while conducting court business in chambers, you don't carry the prohibition home with you when you leave.

If you are a court administrator

Internal policies for remote-hearing setups (which buildings, what equipment, what security) are a separate matter from § 39-17-1306. The AG's reading is that the criminal statute does not reach remote-participant locations, so you cannot enforce § 39-17-1306 against attorneys or witnesses for what they have at their homes or offices during a Zoom hearing. Building security inside the courthouse is unaffected.

Common questions

Q: Can a witness keep a gun in the same room while testifying by Zoom from home?
A: Under § 39-17-1306, yes, the AG concluded the statute does not reach the witness's home. Other laws (federal restrictions for prohibited persons, local ordinances, the witness's own status as a permit holder or under permitless carry) still apply.

Q: What if I'm the lawyer and I'm appearing remotely from inside another courthouse, like in a different county?
A: That courthouse is itself a "building in which judicial proceedings are in progress" if any judge there is conducting judicial work. § 39-17-1306 applies to that courthouse based on its own activity, not based on your remote appearance in the other county's case.

Q: What about a city or county building used as a temporary remote hearing site?
A: This is a closer call. The AG's "buildings in which a judge customarily conducts judicial proceedings" language suggests that an occasional remote site is not within the prohibition. But if a city or county has formally designated a building as a regular court venue, that fact pattern may be different. Check with counsel before relying on the carve-out.

Q: Does the answer change if the participant is the judge presiding remotely from somewhere outside the courthouse?
A: The AG concluded the statute "does not appear" to apply to a judge's private residence or another similar building from which a judge conducts a remote proceeding. The "customary" courthouse focus controls.

Q: Are there other statutes that might bar firearms at a remote hearing site?
A: Yes. § 39-17-1359 lets a property owner post the building to prohibit weapons regardless of judicial activity. § 39-17-1309 prohibits firearms on school property. Federal law has its own rules. The AG opinion addresses only § 39-17-1306.

Background and statutory framework

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a) makes it a criminal offense to carry a weapon "inside any building in which judicial proceedings are in progress." The full prohibition has two parts (analyzed in Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 22-01): one that bars carrying any of the specifically enumerated § 39-17-1302(a) weapons "for the purpose of going armed," and a separate, broader provision that bars all firearms in such buildings whether or not carried for that purpose.

The exemptions in subsection (c) are designed for courthouse settings: law enforcement officers, bailiffs, marshals, and other court officers with security responsibilities (subsection (c)(1)); persons directed by the court to bring a firearm as evidence (subsection (c)(2)); judges who meet the four-condition test in (c)(3); and elected officials who meet the conditions in (c)(4).

The statute was enacted in 1989 and has been amended several times to add or refine exemptions. None of the amendments have addressed remote participation. A 2017 amendment changed "any room" to "any building," 2017 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 467, § 5, expanding the geographic scope within a courthouse but not addressing remote scenarios.

The AG applies four canons of statutory construction:

1. Williams purpose-of-the-statute analysis: § 39-17-1306 protects people physically present in a courthouse during judicial proceedings. Remote participants do not face that risk.

2. Lee Medical and related canons: words are read in their statutory context, not in isolation. The exemption list and surrounding structure show a courthouse-focused statute.

3. Prodigy Services historical context: in 1989, the commercial internet did not exist, and remote hearings were not a common scenario. The General Assembly cannot have intended to reach buildings used for technology that did not exist.

4. The constitutional-doubt canon, articulated in Freeman Industries and Davis-Kidd Booksellers, instructs courts to read statutes to avoid constitutional problems. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), establish that the Second Amendment protects firearm possession in the home for self-defense. Reading § 39-17-1306 to reach private residences during a remote hearing would put the statute in tension with the Second Amendment. The narrower reading avoids that tension.

The AG's analysis cites Heller favorably for its observation that "longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings" are unchallenged by the Second Amendment, drawing the line at "sensitive places" like courthouses, not at private buildings.

Citations

Statutes:
- Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 (weapons in buildings with judicial proceedings)
- Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a) (general prohibition)
- Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(c)(1)-(4) (exemptions)
- Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1302(a) (enumerated weapons)
- Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-104 (criminal code construction rule)

Cases:
- State v. Williams, 854 S.W.2d 904, 907-908 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (statute's purpose)
- State v. Frazier, 558 S.W.3d 145, 152 (Tenn. 2018) (statutory construction)
- Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 526-28 (Tenn. 2010) (context-based reading)
- Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. King, 678 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Tenn. 1984) (avoiding single-phrase reading)
- In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 614, 624 n.13 (Tenn. 2009) (canons applied with attention to context)
- Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 522 (Tenn. 2005) (constitutional-doubt canon)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 626-27, 635 (2008) (Second Amendment)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporation against the states)
- Prodigy Servs. Corp., Inc. v. Johnson, 125 S.W.3d 413, 416-17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (commercial internet absent in 1989)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2022/op22-04.pdf

Original opinion text

STATE OF TENNESSEE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
March 14, 2022
Opinion No. 22-04
Scope of the phrase "inside any building in which judicial proceedings are in progress" in
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306

Question 1
Does the prohibition in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 against carrying weapons "inside
any building in which judicial proceedings are in progress" apply only to the building in which the
court's chambers or courtroom exists, or does the prohibition extend to the private residence of a
judge or to another similar building from which a judge participates in "judicial proceedings" by
conference call or video conference?

Opinion 1
The prohibition in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 against carrying weapons in buildings
in which judicial proceedings are in progress may be reasonably construed to apply only to those
buildings in which a judge customarily conducts judicial proceedings, such as courthouses and
criminal justice facilities. It does not appear that the General Assembly intended Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-17-1306 to apply to buildings from which a judge conducts a judicial proceeding remotely
by conference call or videoconference, such as the judge's private residence or another similar
building.

Question 2
Does the prohibition in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 against carrying weapons "inside
any building in which judicial proceedings are in progress" include buildings other than the
building in which the judge is physically present, such as an attorney's private residence or law
office or similar buildings from which non-judicial participants take part in judicial proceedings
remotely by conference call or video conference?

Opinion 2
The prohibition in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 against carrying weapons in buildings
in which judicial proceedings are in progress may be reasonably construed to apply only to those
buildings in which a judge customarily conducts judicial proceedings, such as courthouses and
criminal justice facilities. It does not appear that the General Assembly intended Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-17-1306 to apply to other buildings such as private residences, business offices or other
similar buildings from which non-judicial participants, e.g., attorneys or witnesses, might
participate in judicial proceedings by conference call or videoconference.

ANALYSIS

Tennessee law makes it a felony for a person to carry weapons while that person is "inside
any building in which judicial proceedings are in progress." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a)
(emphasis added). Law enforcement officers, bailiffs, marshals, and other court officers who
have "responsibility for protecting persons or property or providing security" are exempt from this
statutory ban on carrying weapons. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(c)(1). Also exempted are
persons who have been directed by a court "to bring" a firearm for the purpose of providing
evidence. Id. § 39-17-1306(c)(2).

Questions 1 and 2 are both essentially questions as to whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-
1306(a) applies only to buildings such as courthouses and criminal justice facilities in which
judicial proceedings are customarily conducted or whether it applies also to buildings from which
persons are remotely participating in judicial proceedings by conference call or video conference.
Both are questions of statutory construction, i.e., questions about the meaning and scope of the
phrase "any building in which judicial proceedings are in progress."

The most basic principle of statutory construction is to give effect to the legislative intent
without unduly restricting or expanding the coverage of a statute beyond its intended scope. State
v. Frazier, 558 S.W.3d 145, 152 (Tenn. 2018); Westgate Smoky Mountains v. Phillips, 426 S.W.3d
743, 747-48 (Tenn. 2013); State v. Alford, 970 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tenn. 1998) (courts cannot
expand the scope of a statute to create results not intended by the legislature). To fulfill this
directive, courts must begin with the plain language of the statute and the words that the General
Assembly has chosen. Frazier, 558 S.W.3d at 152; Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515,
526 (Tenn. 2010).

And because words are known by the company they keep, courts must construe these words
in the context in which they appear in the statute and in light of the general purpose of the statute.
Lee Med., 312 S.W.3d at 526-27. Accordingly, courts should avoid basing their interpretation on
a single phrase or word. Id. at 527 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. King, 678 S.W.2d 19, 23
(Tenn. 1984)). Indeed, canons of statutory construction may lead to incorrect results if applied
"without attention to context." In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 624 n.13 (Tenn. 2009).
"[T]he language of a statute cannot be considered in a vacuum, but 'should be construed, if
practicable, so that its component parts are consistent and reasonable.'" Id. at 614 (quoting Marsh
v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 42, 48, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196 (1968)).

Courts will also construe a statute in a way that avoids placing its constitutionality in doubt.
Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 522 (Tenn. 2005); Davis-Kidd
Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520, 529-30 (Tenn. 1993). This principle of statutory
construction is known as the "constitutional-doubt canon."

When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts need not look beyond the
four corners of the statute to ascertain its meaning. Lee Med., 312 S.W.3d at 527; Walker v. Sunrise
Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 249 S.W.3d 301, 309 (Tenn. 2008). On the other hand, when a statute
"is susceptible [to] more than one reasonable interpretation," Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Thompson,
38 S.W.3d 504, 512 (Tenn. 2001), it is appropriate to discern legislative intent from sources other
than the statutory language, such as the broader statutory scheme, the history and purpose of the
legislation, public policy, historical facts preceding or contemporaneous with the enactment of the
statute, earlier versions of the statute, the caption of the act, and the legislative history of the statute.
Womack v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 448 S.W.3d 362, 366 (Tenn. 2014); Lee Med., 312 S.W.3d
at 527-28. And in particular, the provisions in title 39 are to be "construed according to the fair
import of [their] terms, including reference to judicial decisions and common law interpretations,
to promote justice, and effect the objectives of the criminal code." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-104.

When the language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 is considered in its entirety and in
the appropriate context, one could reasonably conclude that the prohibition against carrying
weapons "inside any building in which judicial proceedings are in progress" applies only to
buildings in which judges customarily conduct judicial proceedings, such as courthouses and
criminal justice facilities.

First, "[t]he obvious intent of [Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306] is to ensure the safety of
judges, lawyers, court personnel, litigants, witnesses, and observers present in the courtroom and
to assure the proper decorum and deportment during judicial proceedings." State v. Williams, 854
S.W.2d 904, 907-908 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (emphasis added). In other words, the intent is to
protect people in courthouses, i.e., in buildings where their participation in judicial proceedings
requires them to come into contact with others who may pose a risk if they are armed. But a lawyer
or judge or witness participating in a judicial proceeding remotely from his or her own home or
office does not face the risks associated with physical presence in courthouses, so there is no reason
to extend the meaning of "building" to include buildings from which people are participating
remotely. Doing so would be outside the scope of the legislative intent behind § 39-17-1306.

Second, the exemptions specified above evince a legislative intent to include only such
buildings as courthouses and criminal justice facilities in which judicial proceedings are
traditionally and customarily conducted, because those exemptions apply to officials and other
persons who would only be in courthouses, namely, law enforcement officers, bailiffs, marshals,
and other court officers who have "responsibility for protecting persons or property or providing
security." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(c)(1).

Third, when Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 was enacted in 1989, the commercial internet
had not been developed, see Prodigy Servs. Corp., Inc. v. Johnson, 125 S.W.3d 413, 416-17 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2003) (observation by court while examining a 1989 tax statute), and remote participation
in judicial proceedings was by no means commonplace. Thus, it is unlikely that the legislature
intended "buildings" to include buildings from which people participate remotely in judicial
proceedings. Had that been the intent, the General Assembly could have and would have
implemented that intent by amending the statute as technology developed to allow remote
participation. To the contrary, while the statute has been amended several times since 1989, none
of the amendments evidence an intent to include buildings from which persons are remotely
participating in judicial proceedings by conference call or video conference.

Fourth, the constitutional-doubt canon would make a court disinclined to interpret the
prohibition in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 broadly to encompass private residences, since
firearm possession there is protected by the Second Amendment. See District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 635 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment confers an individual
right to possess a firearm and to use that firearm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-
defense, within the home); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (holding
that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms applies to the States by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment). Construing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 as applying only to those
buildings in which a judge customarily conducts judicial proceedings, such as courthouses and
criminal justice facilities, avoids constitutional conflict and safeguards Second Amendment rights.
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27 ("[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms . . . in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings . . . .").

In sum, the prohibition in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 against carrying weapons in
buildings in which judicial proceedings are in progress may be reasonably construed to apply only
to those buildings in which a judge customarily conducts judicial proceedings, such as courthouses
and criminal justice facilities. It does not appear that the General Assembly intended Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-17-1306 to apply to buildings from which a judge conducts a judicial proceeding
remotely by conference call or videoconference, such as the judge's private residence or another
similar building. Nor does it appear that the General Assembly intended Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
17-1306 to apply to other buildings such as private residences, business offices or other similar
buildings from which non-judicial participants, e.g., attorneys or witnesses, might participate in
judicial proceedings by conference call or videoconference.

HERBERT H. SLATERY III
Attorney General and Reporter

ANDRÉE SOPHIA BLUMSTEIN
Solicitor General

LAURA T. KIDWELL
Assistant Solicitor General

Requested by:
The Honorable Bruce Griffey
State Representative
425 Rep. John Lewis Way N.
Cordell Hull Building, Suite 578
Nashville, Tennessee 37243