Can Tennessee state and local governments stop their employees from storing handguns in their cars at work?

Plain-English summary

Tennessee's "parking-lot storage" law, § 39-17-1313, was enacted to protect handgun-permit holders against employer or property-owner policies that would force them to leave their firearms at home rather than carry them while traveling to and from work. The statute provides that "any person possessing a valid handgun permit" can "transport and store" a handgun in their privately owned motor vehicle on any parking lot or grounds, public or private, as long as the firearm is "kept from ordinary observation" and complies with several technical conditions.

In 2021, the General Assembly amended the statute to extend the protection beyond formally permitted carriers to anyone "authorized" to carry under Tennessee law (which now includes constitutional-carry holders since the 2021 permitless-carry amendments). A legislator asked the AG whether a Tennessee state or local government employer could nonetheless adopt an employment policy forbidding employees from storing their handguns in vehicles parked on government property at work.

AG Slatery answered no. § 39-17-1313 is unambiguous about the right to store. Government employers, like private property owners, cannot lawfully forbid the storage. The statute does carve out specific places (e.g., schools and certain regulated facilities), but the parking-lot storage right runs across both public and private parking grounds for those properties not statutorily excepted.

The opinion also addresses two follow-up questions. (2) Whether an employee whose government employer adopts an unlawful policy has standing to seek a declaratory ruling depends on whether the employee was "adversely affected" within the meaning of § 39-17-1314(g)(1). That is a fact question for a court. (3) Whether a local government can adopt an ordinance prohibiting a judge or judicial magistrate from carrying when they hold an enhanced handgun permit under § 39-17-1351 is no, because the enhanced-permit statute and § 39-17-1306 (the courtroom-firearm exception for judges) preempt that field.

What this means for you

If you work for a Tennessee state or local government

§ 39-17-1313 protects your right to store a handgun in your privately owned vehicle while parked at work, as long as you are otherwise authorized to carry. An employment policy purporting to forbid storage is unenforceable to that extent. The protection applies only to the vehicle and the parking lot, however; it does not cover bringing a firearm into the office building.

If you are a government HR officer or municipal attorney

Review your employment policies. Any blanket prohibition on storing firearms in employee vehicles on government parking grounds is unenforceable under § 39-17-1313. You can prohibit firearms inside the workplace, but not in employee vehicles in the parking lot.

If you are a judge or judicial magistrate

If you hold an enhanced handgun permit under § 39-17-1351, you can carry your handgun, including in the courtroom and the courthouse, under the exception in § 39-17-1306. A local ordinance purporting to bar you from carrying is unenforceable because the General Assembly has preempted the field by statute.

If you have a handgun permit and are unsure of your rights at work

Read § 39-17-1313 carefully. It applies to "transporting and storing" the firearm in a privately owned vehicle. It does not authorize you to carry the firearm into your workplace, regardless of whether the workplace itself is government or private property. The protection is the right to leave the firearm in the locked vehicle while you work.

If you want to challenge an employer's unlawful policy

§ 39-17-1314(g) provides a declaratory-judgment cause of action, but you have to establish that you were "adversely affected" by the policy. The AG opinion says standing turns on specific facts (e.g., were you disciplined, threatened with discipline, or otherwise placed in a worse position because of the policy?). Talk with an attorney before filing.

Common questions

Q: Does the parking-lot storage right apply at schools?
A: With limits. § 39-17-1313 has historically interacted with the schools-as-firearm-free-zone rules in § 39-17-1309. The 2021 framework has further nuances. Anyone trying to apply the right to a school setting should consult current Tennessee law and recent legislative developments.

Q: What if my government employer disciplines me for storing a firearm in my vehicle on government property?
A: That discipline would be an "adverse action" arguably triggering § 39-17-1314(g) standing for a declaratory action. You may also have a claim for wrongful discipline; consult a Tennessee employment lawyer.

Q: Can the government post "No firearms allowed" signs on its parking lots?
A: Generally no, with respect to handguns covered by § 39-17-1313. § 39-17-1359 governs how firearm-prohibition signs work on government property, but the parking-lot storage right was specifically designed to override property-owner prohibitions for the storage scenario.

Q: Does this apply to constitutional-carry, or only permit holders?
A: The 2021 amendments to § 39-17-1313 extended the protection to anyone "authorized" to carry. With Tennessee's 2021 permitless-carry law (§ 39-17-1307), the class of authorized carriers expanded. The opinion uses the new "authorized" language.

Q: What about judges and magistrates with enhanced permits?
A: They have a separate carve-out under § 39-17-1306 that lets them carry a handgun "while engaged in the actual discharge of official duties," and § 39-17-1351 governs the enhanced permit itself. Local governments cannot impose contrary rules.

Background and statutory framework

Tennessee has a robust statewide preemption of firearm regulation. § 39-17-1314 prohibits local governments from "occupy[ing] any part of the field of regulation of the transfer, ownership, possession, or transportation of firearms" beyond what state law allows, and provides a declaratory-judgment remedy for persons "adversely affected" by a non-conforming local ordinance.

§ 39-17-1313, the parking-lot storage law, sits within this framework. It was enacted in 2013 and amended in subsequent sessions to expand who qualifies for the protection. The core protection is the right to "transport and store" a handgun in a privately owned vehicle on any parking grounds. The 2021 amendments responded to the concurrent move toward permitless carry by replacing the "valid handgun permit" reference with "authorized" carry.

The opinion's reasoning on the employment question is straightforward. § 39-17-1313 directly addresses the protection. There is no employer carve-out. State and local governments, like private employers, cannot enforce policies that conflict with the statute's protection. The opinion's reasoning on judicial carry similarly invokes the field-preemption doctrine and the specific judicial-carry exceptions.

Citations

• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1313 (parking-lot storage law)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314 (state preemption; declaratory action)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(g) (standing for "adversely affected" persons)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 (courtroom-firearm exception for judges)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351 (enhanced handgun carry permit)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1359 (firearm-prohibition signage on government property)

Subject

Governmental Employment Policies Prohibiting the Possession, Carrying, Storage, and Transportation of Handguns

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2021/op21-13.pdf

Original opinion text

STATE OF TENNESSEE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
August 31, 2021
Opinion No. 21-13
Governmental Employment Policies Prohibiting the Possession, Carrying, Storage, and
Transportation of Handguns
Question 1
In light of Tenn. Code Ann. § § 39-17-1313 and/or 39-17-1314, or other applicable law,
may a Tennessee state- or local-government employer enforce an employment policy prohibiting
its employees or independent third parties who are authorized to carry a handgun from storing that
handgun in the person's vehicle while the person is at work and the vehicle is parked in space
provided by the governmental employer?
Opinion 1
Question 2
If a local government employer adopts an employment policy potentially in violation of
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1313, would an employee have standing to seek a declaratory ruling
pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(g) on that issue?
Opinion 2
Whether a local government employee would have standing to seek a declaratory ruling
that a particular employment policy violates Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1313 would depend on the
specific facts and circumstances in any given instance. Only a court of competent jurisdiction
could determine, based on the specific facts and circumstances, whether a particular employee has
demonstrated, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(g)(1), that he or she has been
"adversely ffected" by the particular employm policy and whether the employee has presented
a justiciable claim under the particular facts involved.
Question 3
In light of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 or other applicable law, may a local government
adopt ordinances, rules, or policies, including employment policies, that prohibit a judge or judicial
magistrate from carrying a handgun if the judge or judicial magistrate has an enhanced handgun
permit under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351?
STATE OF TENNESSEE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
August 31, 2021
Opinion No. 21-13
Governmental Employment Policies Prohibiting the Possession, Carrying, Storage, and
Transportation of Handguns
Question 1
In light of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-1313 and/or 39-17-1314, or other applicable law,
may a Tennessee state- or local-government employer enforce an employment policy prohibiting
its employees or independent third partieswho are authorized to carry a handgun from storing that
handgun in the person’s vehicle while the person is at work and the vehicle is parked in space
provided by the governmental employer?
Opinion 1
No.
Question 2
If a local government employer adopts an employment policy potentially in violation of
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1313, would an employee have standing to seek a declaratory ruling
pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(g) on that issue?
Opinion 2
Whether a local government employee would have standing to seek a declaratory ruling
that a particular employment policy violates Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-17-1313 would depend on the
specific facts and circumstances in any given instance. Only a court of competent jurisdiction
could determine,based on the specific facts and circumstances, whether a particular employee has
demonstrated, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(g)(1), that he or she has been
“adversely affected” by the particularemploymentpolicy and whetherthe employee haspresented
a justiciable claim under the particular facts involved.
Question 3
In light of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 or other applicable law, may a local government
adoptordinances,rules,orpolicies,includingemploymentpolicies, thatprohibita judge orjudicial
magistrate from carrying a handgun if the judge or judicial magistrate has an enhanced handgun
permit under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351?
Opinion 3
A local government may not adopt an ordinance, rule, or policy that prohibits a judge or
judicial magistrate who is vested with judicial powers under Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-101 and who
holds an enhanced handgun permit under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351 from carrying his or her
handgun if that regulation or policy conflicts with Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306.
The Tennessee legislature has reserved to itself exclusive authority to regulate firearms in
this State by expressly "preempt[ing] the whole field" of firearms regulation, subject only to
specific exceptions. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(a). In sum and substance, the plain language
of § 39-17-1314(a) completely removes from local governments the authority to regulate the
"possession, carrying, storage, and transportation" of firearms and ammunition, "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by state law or as specifically provided in subsection (b)."¹ See Tennessee
Firearms Assoc. v. Metropolitan Gov't, M2016-01782-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 2590209, at 7
(Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2017) (observing that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314 "preempts the field
of firearm regulation to the exclusion of metropolitan governments '[e]xceptas otherwise provided
by state law") (emphasis added).
When the General Assembly expressly preempts a particular field of regulation-as it has
done with respect to firearms-local governments may not effectively nullify state law on the same
subject by enacting ordinances or other regulations² that ignore applicable state laws, that grant
rights that state law denies, or that deny rights that state law grants. State ex. rel. Beasley V. Mayor
& Aldermen of Town of Fayetteville, 196 S.W.2d 407, 415-16, 268 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Tenn. 1954).
Put another way, a local government may not adopt regulations or ordinances that "infringe the
spirit of a state law or are repugnant to the general policy of the state." Capitol News Co., Inc. V.
Metropolitan Gov't, 562 S.W.2d 430, 434 (Tenn. 1978); Nichols v. Tullahoma Open Door, Inc.,
640 S.W.2d 13, 18 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982). But a local regulation in the field may nevertheless be
1 The fulltext of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(a) is as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by state law or as specifically provided in subsection (b), the general
assembly preempts the whole field of the regulation of firearms, ammunition, or components of
firearms or ammunition, or combinations thereof including, but not limited to, the use, purchase,
transfer, taxation, manufacture, ownership, possession, carrying, sale, acquisition, gift, devise,
licensing, registration, storage, and ansportation thereof, to the exclusion of all county, city, town,
municipality, or metropolitan government law, ordinances, resolutions, enactments or regulation.
No county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan government nor any local agency, department,
or official shall occupy any part of the field regulation of firearms, ammunition or components of
firearms or ammunition, or combinations thereof.
2 For purposes of the legal analysis here, there is no material ference between the "employment policies" referred
to in the questions and "ordinances" or "other regulations." "It is a well settled principle of law that one cannot do
indirectly what cannot be done directly." Haynes v. City of Pigeon Forge, 883 S.W.2d 619, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1994); see, e.g Allmandv. Pavletic, 292S.W.3d618, 625-29 (Tenn. 2009) (finding that a municipality was prohibited
from entering into contracts that exceeded the authority granted to it by charter or statute). Thus, if an ordinance or
other regulation prohibiting the possession, carrying, storage, or transportation of handguns would be preempted by
state law, that same prohibition embodied in an employment policy would be invalid, as well.
2
Opinion 3
A local government may not adopt an ordinance, rule, or policy that prohibits a judge or
judicialmagistrate who is vested with judicialpowersunderTenn.Code Ann.§ 16-1-101and who
holds an enhanced handgun permit under Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-17-1351 from carrying his or her
handgun if that regulation or policy conflicts with Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306.
ANALYSIS
The Tennessee legislature has reserved to itself exclusive authority to regulate firearmsin
this State by expressly “preempt[ing] the whole field” of firearms regulation, subject only to
specific exceptions. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(a). In sum and substance, the plain language
of § 39-17-1314(a) completely removes from local governments the authority to regulate the
“possession, carrying, . . . storage, and transportation” of firearms and ammunition, “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by state law or as specifically provided in subsection (b).”1 See Tennessee
Firearms Assoc. v. Metropolitan Gov’t, M2016-01782-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 2590209, at 7
(Tenn. Ct. App. May 17,2017) (observing that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314 “preempts the field
of firearm regulation to the exclusion ofmetropolitan governments‘[e]xceptasotherwise provided
by state law’”) (emphasis added).
When the General Assembly expressly preempts a particular field of regulation—as it has
done with respectto firearms—localgovernmentsmay noteffectively nullifystate lawon the same
subject by enacting ordinances or other regulations2 that ignore applicable state laws, that grant
rights that state law denies, or that deny rights that state law grants. State ex.rel. Beasley v. Mayor
& Aldermen of Town of Fayetteville, 196 S.W.2d 407, 415-16, 268 S.W.2d 330,334 (Tenn. 1954).
Put another way, a local government may not adopt regulations or ordinances that “infringe the
spirit of a state law or are repugnant to the general policy of the state.” Capitol News Co., Inc. v.
Metropolitan Gov’t, 562 S.W.2d 430, 434 (Tenn. 1978); Nichols v. Tullahoma Open Door, Inc.,
640 S.W.2d 13, 18 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982). But a local regulation in the field may nevertheless be
1
The fulltext of Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-17-1314(a)isasfollows:
Except asotherwise providedby state laworasspecifically provided in subsection (b),the general
assembly preempts the whole field of the regulation of firearms, ammunition, or components of
firearms or ammunition, or combinations thereof including, but not limited to, the use, purchase,
transfer, taxation, manufacture, ownership, possession, carrying, sale, acquisition, gift, devise,
licensing,registration,storage,andtransportationthereof, to theexclusionof allcounty,city,town,
municipality, or metropolitan government law, ordinances, resolutions, enactments or regulation.
No county,city,town,municipality,ormetropolitan governmentnoranylocalagency,department,
or official shall occupy any part of the field regulation of firearms, ammunition or components of
firearmsorammunition,orcombinationsthereof.
2
For purposesof the legalanalysishere,there isno materialdifference betweenthe “employment policies” referred
to in the questions and “ordinances” or “other regulations.” “It is a well settled principle of law that one cannot do
indirectly what cannot be done directly.” Haynes v. City of Pigeon Forge, 883 S.W.2d 619, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1994); see,e.g.,Allmandv.Pavletic,292S.W.3d618,625-29(Tenn.2009)(findingthata municipality wasprohibited
from enteringinto contractsthat exceeded the authority granted to it by charterorstatute). Thus,if an ordinanceor
other regulation prohibiting the possession, carrying, storage, or transportation of handguns would be preempted by
state law,thatsame prohibition embodiedin an employmentpolicy would be invalid,aswell.
valid as long as there is no conflict between the state statute and the local regulation and the
requirements of the local regulation are not unreasonable or discriminatory. Capitol News, 562
S.W.2d at 434; Tenn. Att'y Gen Op. 18-04 (Jan. 31, 2018).
1. Validity of Government Employment Policies That Prohibit Employees and Independent
Third Parties from Storing Handguns in Personal Vehicles Parked in Areas Provided by
the Governmental Employer
Tennessee state law makes special provision for the transportation and storage of firearms and
firearm ammunition in motor vehicles that are "on or utilizing any public or private parking area."
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1313. Specifically,
a person who has a valid enhanced handgun permit³ or concealed handgun carry
permit⁴ or who lawfully carries a handgun pursuant to § 39-17-1307(g)⁵ may, unless
expressly prohibited by federal law, transport and store a firearm or firearm
ammunition in the person's motor vehicle while on or utilizing any public or
private parking area if:
Id. § 39-17-1313(a).
"Persons" covered by Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1313 include employees of governmental entities,
as well as independent third parties, who are "on or utilizing any public parking area" because
"parking area" is defined as "any property provided by a business entity, public or private
employer, or the owner, manager, or legal possessor of the property for the purpose of permitting
its invitees, customers, clients or employees to park privately owned motor vehicles." See id. § 39-
17-1313(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
3 See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351.
4 See id. § 39-17-1366.
5 Tennessee Code Ann. § 39-17-1307(g), which permits "constitutional carry," became effective July 1, 2021. See
2021 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 108.
3
valid as long as there is no conflict between the state statute and the local regulation and the
requirements of the local regulation are not unreasonable or discriminatory. Capitol News, 562
S.W.2d at 434; Tenn. Att’y Gen Op. 18-04 (Jan. 31, 2018).
1. Validity of GovernmentEmploymentPoliciesThat Prohibit Employeesand Independent
Third Parties from Storing Handguns in Personal Vehicles Parked in Areas Provided by
the Governmental Employer
Tennessee state law makes special provision for the transportation and storage of firearms and
firearm ammunition in motor vehicles that are “on or utilizing any public or private parking area.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1313. Specifically,
a person who has a valid enhanced handgun permit3 or concealed handgun carry
permit4 or who lawfully carries a handgun pursuant to § 39-17-1307(g)5 may, unless
expressly prohibited by federal law, transport and store a firearm or firearm
ammunition in the person’s motor vehicle . . . while on or utilizing any public or
private parking area if:
(1) The person’s motor vehicle is parked in a location where the motor vehicle is
permitted to be; and
(2) The firearm or ammunition being transported or stored in the motor vehicle:
(A) Is kept from ordinary observation if the person is in the motor vehicle; or
(B) Is kept from ordinary observation and locked within the trunk, glove box,
or interior of the person’s motor vehicle or a container securely affixed to
the motor vehicle if the person is not in the motor vehicle.
Id. § 39-17-1313(a).
“Persons” covered by Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-17-1313 include employeesof governmentalentities,
as well as independent third parties,who are “on or utilizing any public . . . parking area” because
“parking area” is defined as “any property provided by a business entity, public or private
employer, or the owner, manager, or legal possessor of the property for the purpose of permitting
its invitees,customers,clientsoremployeesto park privately owned motorvehicles.” See id.§ 39-
17-1313(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
3
See Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-17-1351.
4
See id.§ 39-17-1366.
5
Tennessee Code Ann. § 39-17-1307(g), which permits “constitutional carry,” became effective July 1, 2021. See
2021 Tenn.Pub.Acts,ch.108.
No state law grants governmental entities the authority to override Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
17-1313 to enforce employment policies that prohibit the storage of firearms and ammunition in
personal motor vehicles parked in public parking areas. In fact, state law precludes such measures.
First, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1313(a) itself allows the transportation and storage of
firearms in motor vehicles as outlined above "[n]otwithstanding any law or any ordinance or
resolution adopted by the governing body of a city, county or metropolitan government."
Second, state law that gives governmental entities some specified authority to regulate
firearms expressly excepts Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1313. See id. § 39-17-1314(b)(1) (providing
that local governmental entities are authorized to regulate "[t]he carrying of firearms by employees
or independent contractors of the [local governmental entity] when acting in the course and scope
of their employment or contract, except as otherwise provided in § 39-17-1313") (emphasis
added); § 39-17-1359(a)(1) (providing that governmental entities are authorized to prohibit the
possession of weapons by any person who is on property owned, operated, or managed or under
the control of the government entity "[e]xcept as provided in § 39-17-1313") (emphasis added). 6
Hence, a governmental employment policy that prohibits employees or independent third
parties authorized to carry handguns from storing their handguns in their personal vehicles while
they are at work and their vehicles are parked in an area provided by the governmental employer
would be at cross-purposes with state law, which permits the conduct that the employment policy
would prohibit. Because such a policy promulgated by a local governmental entity would be
repugnant to state law, it would be preempted by the State's exclusive right to regulate firearms
under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(a).⁷
A like state policy would also not be enforceable. While Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(a)
would not preempt such a policy, 8 Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1359(a)(1) provides that the State is
authorized to prohibit the possession of weapons by any person who is on property owned,
operated, or managed or under control of a governmental entity [e]xcept as provided in § 39-17-
1313." Because state agencies are creatures of statute, they may exercise only such power as the
legislature delegates to them. Sanifill of Tennessee, Inc. v. Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal
Control Bd., 907 S.W.2d 807, 810 (Tenn. 1995); In re Sentinel Trust Co., 206 S.W.3d 501, 519
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Accordingly, state agencies cannot take any action that the General
Assembly, by statute, prohibits them from taking. See id.
6 Significantly, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1359 expressly applies to the State, as well as local governmental entities,
unlike Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314 which applies to local governmental entities only.
7 The statement in Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 13-41 (May 28, 2013) that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1313 "doesnot a ddress
and thus has no impact on the employment relationship between an employer and an employee" must be confined to
its context of employment relationships between private employers and their employees. See note 2, supra.
Significantly, two years after Opinion 13-41 was issued, the General Assembly amended Title 50 to prohibit a private
employer from discharging or ta king adverse action against its employees "solely for transporting or storing a firearm
or firearm ammunition in an employer parking area in a manner consistent with § 39-17-1313(a)." 2015 Tenn. Pub.
Acts, ch. 80, § 1 (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-312).
8 See note 6, supra.
4
No state law grants governmental entities the authority to override Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
17-1313 to enforce employment policies that prohibit the storage of firearms and ammunition in
personalmotorvehicles parked in public parkingareas. In fact, state lawprecludessuchmeasures.
First, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1313(a) itself allows the transportation and storage of
firearms in motor vehicles as outlined above “[n]otwithstanding any law or any ordinance or
resolution adopted by the governing body of a city, county or metropolitan government.”
Second, state law that gives governmental entities some specified authority to regulate
firearms expressly excepts Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-17-1313. See id. § 39-17-1314(b)(1) (providing
that localgovernmentalentitiesare authorizedto regulate “[t]he carryingof firearmsby employees
or independent contractors of the [local governmental entity] when acting in the course and scope
of their employment or contract, except as otherwise provided in § 39-17-1313”) (emphasis
added); § 39-17-1359(a)(1) (providing that governmental entities are authorized to prohibit the
possession of weapons by any person who is on property owned, operated,or managed or under
the control of the government entity “[e]xcept as provided in § 39-17-1313”) (emphasis added).6
Hence, a governmental employment policy that prohibits employees or independent third
parties authorized to carry handguns from storing their handguns in their personal vehicles while
they are at work and their vehicles are parked in an area provided by the governmental employer
would be at cross-purposes with state law, which permits the conduct that the employment policy
would prohibit. Because such a policy promulgated by a local governmental entity would be
repugnant to state law, it would be preempted by the State’s exclusive right to regulate firearms
under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(a).7
A like state policy would also notbe enforceable. While Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-17-1314(a)
would not preempt such a policy,8 Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-17-1359(a)(1) providesthat the State is
authorized to prohibit the possession of weapons by any person who is on property owned,
operated, or managed or under control of a governmental entity “[e]xcept as provided in § 39-17-
1313.” Because state agencies are creatures of statute, they may exercise only such power as the
legislature delegates to them. Sanifill of Tennessee, Inc. v. Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal
Control Bd., 907 S.W.2d 807, 810 (Tenn. 1995); In re Sentinel Trust Co., 206 S.W.3d 501, 519
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Accordingly, state agencies cannot take any action that the General
Assembly, by statute, prohibits them from taking. See id.
6
Significantly,Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-17-1359expressly appliesto the State,aswellaslocalgovernmentalentities,
unlike Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-17-1314which appliesto localgovernmentalentitiesonly.
7
The statementin Tenn.Att’yGen.Op.13-41(May28,2013)that Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-17-1313“doesnotaddress
and thushasno impact onthe employment relationship between anemployerand anemployee” must be confinedto
its context of employment relationships between private employers and their employees. See note 2, supra.
Significantly,twoyearsafterOpinion13-41wasissued,theGeneralAssembly amendedTitle 50 toprohibit a private
employerfromdischargingortakingadverseaction against itsemployees“solely fortransportingorstoringa firearm
or firearm ammunition in an employerparkingarea in a mannerconsistent with § 39-17-1313(a).” 2015Tenn.Pub.
Acts,ch.80,§ 1 (codified atTenn.Code Ann.§ 50-1-312).
8
See note 6,supra.
2. Standing of Employee to Seek Declaration under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(g) That
Local Government Employment Policy Violates Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1313
Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1314(g) creates a private cause of action for a party
who is "adversely affected" by "[a]n ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment that is
adopted or nforced by a county, city, town, municipality, or metropolitan government or any local
agency, department, or official" that violates Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314. An individual party
is "adversely affected" if the individual "[l]awfully resides within the United States, [m]ay legally
possess a firearm under Tennessee law, and [i]s or was subject to the ordinance, resolution, policy,
rule, or other enactment." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(h)(1) (emphasis added). An individual
"is or was subject to" a regulation if the individual "[i]s or was physically present within the
boundaries of the political subdivision for any reason." Id. § 39-17-1314(h)(1)(C).
Standing is a judicial doctrine used to determine whether a particular party is entitled to
judicial relief. State v. Harrison, 270 S.W.3d 21, 27 (Tenn. 2008). To have standing, the party
must have a justiciable claim, 10 Huntsville Util. Dist. v. General Trust Co., 839 S.W.2d 397, 401
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), and must also have a sufficiently personal stake in a matter to warrant a
judicial resolution of the dispute. SunTrust Bank v. Johnson, 46 S.W.3d216, 222 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2000); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Oak Ridge, 644 S.W.2d 400, 402
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1982). Persons whose rights or interests have not been affected have no standing
and are, therefore, not entitled to judicial relief. See Lynch v. City of Jellico, 205 384, 395
(Tenn. 2006). "The sort of distinct and palpable injury that will create standing must be an injury
to a recognized legal right or interest." Wood v. Metropolitan Gov't, 196 S.W.3d 152, 158 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2005).
Because the primary focus of a standing inquiry is on the party, not on the merits of the
party's claim, Wood, 196 S.W.3d at 158, the outcome of the inquiry is dependent on the particular
facts and circumstances in any given instance. The court must carefully examine a party's
allegations "to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the
particular claims asserted." Cox v. Shell Oil Co., 196 S.W.3d 747, 758 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
Accordingly, whether a particular local government employee would have standing to seek
a declaration that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314 preempts an employment policy because it
violates Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1313 would depend on the specific facts and circumstances
involved. Only a court of competent jurisdiction could determine, based on the specific facts and
circumstances in any given case, whether a particular individual has demonstrated, as required by
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(g)(1), that he or she has been "adversely ffected" by the particular
employment policy and whether that individual has presented a justiciable claim under the
particular facts involved.
9 The ordinance, resolution, policy, rule, or other enactment must be one that is adopted or enforced on or after July
1, 2017. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(g)(2).
10 As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained, Tennessee's doctrine of justiciability includes the concept of
standing and limits judicial decisions to contro versies that in volve real and existing disputes that are not theoretical or
abstract. See Westv. Schofield, 468 S.W.3d482, 490 (Tenn. 2015).
5
2. Standing of Employee to Seek DeclarationunderTenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(g)That
Local Government Employment Policy Violates Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1313
Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1314(g) creates a private cause of action for a party
who is “adversely affected” by “[a]n ordinance, resolution,policy, rule, or other enactment that is
adopted orenforced by a county,city,town,municipality,ormetropolitan governmentorany local
agency,department,orofficial” thatviolatesTenn.Code Ann.§ 39-17-1314.9 An individualparty
is “adversely affected” if the individual “[l]awfully resides within the United States, [m]ay legally
possessa firearm underTennessee law,and [i]sorwassubjectto the ordinance,resolution,policy,
rule, or other enactment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314(h)(1) (emphasis added). An individual
“is or was subject to” a regulation if the individual “[i]s or was physically present within the
boundaries of the political subdivision for any reason.” Id. § 39-17-1314(h)(1)(C).
Standing is a judicial doctrine used to determine whether a particular party is entitled to
judicial relief. State v. Harrison, 270 S.W.3d 21, 27 (Tenn. 2008). To have standing, the party
must have a justiciable claim,10 Huntsville Util. Dist. v. General Trust Co., 839 S.W.2d 397, 401
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), and must also have a sufficiently personal stake in a matter to warrant a
judicial resolution of the dispute. SunTrust Bank v. Johnson, 46 S.W.3d 216, 222 (Tenn.Ct. App.
2000); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Oak Ridge, 644 S.W.2d 400, 402
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1982). Persons whose rights or interests have not been affected have no standing
and are, therefore, not entitled to judicial relief. See Lynch v. City of Jellico, 205 S.W.3d 384, 395
(Tenn. 2006). “The sort of distinct and palpable injury that will create standing must be an injury
to a recognized legal right or interest.” Wood v. Metropolitan Gov’t, 196 S.W.3d 152, 158 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2005).
Because the primary focus of a standing inquiry is on the party, not on the merits of the
party’s claim, Wood, 196 S.W.3d at 158, the outcome of the inquiry is dependent on the particular
facts and circumstances in any given instance. The court must carefully examine a party’s
allegations “to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the
particular claims asserted.” Cox v. Shell Oil Co., 196 S.W.3d 747, 758 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
Accordingly,whethera particularlocalgovernmentemployeewould have standingto seek
a declaration that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1314 preempts an employment policy because it
violates Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1313 would depend on the specific facts and circumstances
involved. Only a court of competent jurisdiction could determine, based on the specific facts and
circumstances in any given case, whether a particular individual has demonstrated,as required by
Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-17-1314(g)(1),thathe orshe hasbeen “adversely affected” by the particular
employment policy and whether that individual has presented a justiciable claim under the
particular facts involved.
9
The ordinance,resolution,policy,rule,or otherenactment must be one that isadopted orenforced on orafterJuly
1, 2017. Tenn.CodeAnn.§ 39-17-1314(g)(2).
10
As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained, Tennessee’s doctrine of justiciability includes the concept of
standingandlimitsjudicialdecisionsto controversiesthatinvolve realandexistingdisputesthatarenottheoreticalor
abstract. See Westv.Schofield,468 S.W.3d482,490(Tenn.2015).
3. Validity of Local Government Regulations That Prohibit Judges and Judicial
Magistrates from Carrying Handguns
For the reasons explained above, a local government may only adopt an ordinance, rule, or
policy that prohibits judges and judicial magistrates who possess enhanced handgun permits under
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351 from carrying their handguns if the State has made a positive grant
of authority to local governments to regulate the carrying of handguns by judges and the local
regulation is not repugnant to state law.
Here, there are two positive state grants of authority which permit governmental entities to
regulate the possession and carrying of firearms. First, Tenn. Code Ann. 39-17-1313(b)(1)
authorizes local governmental entities to regulate the carrying of firearms by employees acting in
the course and scope of their employment.¹¹ Second, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1359(a)(1)
authorizes governmental entities to prohibit the possession of weapons by any person who is on
property owned, operated, or managed or under control of a governmental entity.
State law, though, also permits judges who possess enhanced handgun permits under Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-17-1351 to carry their handguns under certain circumstances. As explained below,
this law partially forecloses local government regulation.
Tennessee Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 generally prohibits persons from carrying firearms
while in buildings where "judicial proceedings are in progress" 12 regardless of whether the firearm
is carried for the purpose of going armed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a); see State v. Williams,
854 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). But judges are exempt from the general
prohibition against the possession of firearms in any building in which judicial proceedings are
being conducted when the judge (1) is engaged in the "actual discharge of official duties as a
judge"; (2) is authorized to carry a handgun pursuant to § 39-17-1351; (3) keeps the handgun
concealed at all times when in the discharge of such duties; and (4) is vested with judicial powers
under § 16-1-101. 13 See id. § 39-17-1306(c)(3).
Accordingly, a local government may not adopt an ordinance, rule, or policy that prohibits
a judge or judicial magistrate who is vested with judicial powers under Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-
101 and holds an enhanced handgun permit under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351 from carrying
his or her handgun if that regulation conflicts with Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306. See id. § 39-
17-1314(a); State ex. rel. Beasley, 196 S.W.2d at 415-16, 268 S.W.2d at 334 (local government
cannot nullify state law on the same subject by enacting regulations that ignore applicable state
laws, nor can it deny rights that state law grants).
11 This provision, though, would not a llow a local government to regulate any judge who was not an employee of the
local government.
12 See Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 19-07 (June 18, 2019) (discussing meaning and scope of the phrase "judicial proceedings
are in progress" as used in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306(a)).
13 Tennessee Code Ann. § 16-1-101 provides: "The judicial power of the state is vested in judges of the courts of
general sessions, recorders of certain towns and cities, circuit courts, criminal courts, common law and chancery
courts, chancery courts, courts of appeals, and the supreme court, and other courts created by law."
6
3. Validity of Local Government Regulations That Prohibit Judges and Judicial
Magistrates from Carrying Handguns
For the reasons explained above, a local government may only adopt an ordinance, rule, or
policy that prohibits judges and judicial magistrates who possessenhanced handgun permits under
Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-17-1351 from carrying their handguns if the State has made a positive grant
of authority to local governments to regulate the carrying of handguns by judges and the local
regulation is not repugnant to state law.
Here, there are two positive state grants of authority which permit governmental entities to
regulate the possession and carrying of firearms. First, Tenn. Code Ann. 39-17-1313(b)(1)
authorizes local governmental entities to regulate the carrying of firearms by employees acting in
the course and scope of their employment.11 Second, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1359(a)(1)
authorizes governmental entities to prohibit the possession of weapons by any person who is on
property owned, operated,or managed or under control of a governmental entity.
State law, though,also permitsjudgeswho possessenhanced handgun permitsunderTenn.
Code Ann.§ 39-17-1351to carry theirhandgunsundercertain circumstances. Asexplained below,
this law partially forecloseslocal government regulation.
Tennessee Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 generally prohibits persons from carrying firearms
while in buildingswhere “judicialproceedingsare in progress”12 regardlessof whetherthe firearm
is carried forthe purpose of goingarmed. Tenn.CodeAnn.§ 39-17-1306(a);see State v.Williams,
854 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). But judges are exempt from the general
prohibition against the possession of firearms in any building in which judicial proceedings are
being conducted when the judge (1) is engaged in the “actual discharge of official duties as a
judge”; (2) is authorized to carry a handgun pursuant to § 39-17-1351; (3) keeps the handgun
concealed at all times when in the discharge of such duties; and (4) is vested with judicial powers
under § 16-1-101.13 See id. § 39-17-1306(c)(3).
Accordingly, a local government may not adopt an ordinance, rule, or policy that prohibits
a judge or judicial magistrate who is vested with judicial powers under Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-
101 and holds an enhanced handgun permit under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1351 from carrying
his or her handgun if that regulation conflicts with Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306. See id. § 39-
17-1314(a); State ex. rel. Beasley, 196 S.W.2d at 415-16, 268 S.W.2d at 334 (local government
cannot nullify state law on the same subject by enacting regulations that ignore applicable state
laws, nor can it deny rights that state law grants).
11
Thisprovision,though,would notallowa localgovernmentto regulateany judge whowasnot an employeeof the
localgovernment.
12
See Tenn.Att’yGen.Op.19-07(June 18,2019)(discussingmeaningandscopeof the phrase “judicialproceedings
are in progress” asused in Tenn.Code Ann.§ 39-17-1306(a)).
13
Tennessee Code Ann. § 16-1-101 provides: “The judicial power of the state is vested in judges of the courts of
general sessions, recorders of certain towns and cities, circuit courts, criminal courts, common law and chancery
courts,chancery courts,courtsof appeals,andthesupreme court,andothercourtscreated bylaw.”
Other local regulation that does not conflict with Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 remains
permissible. For instance, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1359 allows a local government to prohibit
persons, including persons possessing an enhanced gun permit under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-
1351, from carrying handguns into a courtroom when it is being used for an administrative
meeting, as opposed to a judicial proceeding. Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 12-32 (Mar. 9, 2012). There
is no state law provision that would preclude the application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1359 to
judges or judicial magistrates when there are no judicial proceedings in progress in the building.
HERBERT H. SLATERY III
Attorney General and Reporter
ANDRÉE SOPHIA BLUMSTEIN
LAURA T. KIDWELL
Assistant Solicitor General
Requested by:
The Honorable Bruce Griffey
State Representative
425 Rep. John Lewis Way N.
Suite 578 Cordell Hull Building
7
Other local regulation that does not conflict with Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1306 remains
permissible. For instance, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1359 allows a local government to prohibit
persons, including persons possessing an enhanced gun permit under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-
1351, from carrying handguns into a courtroom when it is being used for an administrative
meeting, as opposed to a judicial proceeding. Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. 12-32 (Mar. 9, 2012). There
is no state law provision that would preclude the application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1359 to
judges or judicial magistrates when there are no judicial proceedings in progress in the building.
HERBERT H. SLATERY III
Attorney General and Reporter
ANDRÉE SOPHIA BLUMSTEIN
Solicitor General
LAURA T. KIDWELL
Assistant Solicitor General
Requested by:
The Honorable Bruce Griffey
State Representative
425 Rep. John Lewis Way N.
Suite 578 Cordell Hull Building
Nashville, Tennessee 37243