Can a Tennessee city or county re-authorize the $5 electronic traffic citation fee after its first five-year authorization expires?

Plain-English summary

Attorney General Herbert Slatery III addressed the lifecycle of the $5 electronic traffic citation fee that Tennessee cities and counties could authorize under Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-207(e)(4). The statute let local legislative bodies adopt an ordinance or resolution authorizing court clerks to collect the $5 fee on traffic citations resulting in conviction, but built in a self-executing sunset: "[a]ny electronic traffic citation fee imposed pursuant to an ordinance or resolution under this subdivision (e)(4) shall terminate five (5) years from the date on which the ordinance or resolution is adopted."

The question was whether a local government could pass a fresh ordinance after the first five-year period ran out, in effect kicking off a new five-year window. The AG said no. The reasoning was textual and historical: the General Assembly had not provided for re-authorization, the fee statute was a fee-creation statute (which the courts read narrowly under the "expressly provided by law" rule from § 8-21-101 and § 40-25-102), and the legislative history of the 2014 enabling Act showed the sunset was a deliberate ceiling, not a renewable license. Legislators had described the provision in committee as a "sunset" and had voiced concern that the $5 fee not "be imposed in perpetuity."

The contrast with Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-315(a), which authorized specific municipalities to levy a similar fee with no sunset, reinforced the read. Where the General Assembly wanted an open-ended fee, it said so. Where it wrote in a sunset, the sunset meant what it said.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2021. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: What was the $5 electronic traffic citation fee?
A: A surcharge added to traffic citations that resulted in a conviction. The General Assembly enacted it in 2014 to defray local costs of implementing electronic citation systems. One dollar went to the court clerk for computer-related expenses; four dollars went to the law enforcement agency that prepared the citation, restricted to electronic citation system spending.

Q: What did "shall terminate" mean in practice?
A: Once five years had passed from the date a city or county adopted the authorizing ordinance, the local government's authority to collect the fee ended automatically. Clerks could not lawfully collect the fee after that date, even if the local ordinance had not been formally repealed.

Q: Why couldn't local governments just pass a new ordinance after the first one expired?
A: Because under Tennessee law, "[n]o officer is allowed to demand or receive fees . . . for any service further than is expressly provided by law" (Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-21-101). The General Assembly had only expressly authorized one five-year window per local government. Re-authorization would be by implication, and Tennessee courts treat fee-creation by implication as insufficient.

Q: What was the contrast with § 55-10-315(a)?
A: Section 55-10-315(a) gave certain specific municipalities authority to levy a separate fee of up to $0.75 on traffic conviction violations, with no sunset. The AG used this contrast to show that the General Assembly knew how to omit a sunset when it wanted to. The presence of a sunset in § 55-10-207(e)(4) was therefore deliberate.

Q: Did legislative history support this reading?
A: Yes. The opinion cited March 18, 2014 hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance, Ways and Means and corresponding House hearings. Legislators referred to the provision as a "sunset" and expressed concern about the fee being "imposed in perpetuity even after a local government had recouped its initial start-up costs."

Q: What were local options after the five-year window expired?
A: The opinion did not catalog options, but the practical paths at the time were (a) absorb the costs through general clerk and law enforcement budgets, (b) seek a separate state-level authorization for a continued fee, or (c) seek legislative amendment to allow re-authorization. The AG's reading specifically foreclosed the path of simply passing a new local ordinance.

Background and statutory framework

Before 2014, Tennessee law enforcement officers could issue traffic citations only on paper. The 2014 General Assembly added an electronic option (2014 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 750) and, to defray implementation costs, paired it with a $5 conviction-based fee. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-207(e)(1) commanded clerks to "charge and collect" the fee; subsections (e)(2) and (e)(3) restricted how the law enforcement agency and clerk shares could be spent.

Subsection (e)(4) was the local-option provision. It allowed each local legislative body to authorize collection of the fee by ordinance or resolution, and it included the termination clause that drove this opinion: any fee so imposed "shall terminate five (5) years from the date on which the ordinance or resolution is adopted."

The opinion harmonized (e)(1) and (e)(4) by reading (e)(1) as setting the amount of the fee in places where it was lawfully imposed, and (e)(4) as the authorization mechanism. That construction avoided the absurd result of requiring clerks in non-electronic-system jurisdictions to collect a fee that the local government had never adopted (or whose authorization had expired).

The "expressly provided by law" rule was load-bearing for the conclusion. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-21-101 prohibits officers from demanding fees beyond those expressly authorized; § 40-25-102 carries a parallel rule for criminal cases. The AG cited In re Estelle's Estate, 593 P.2d 663 (Ariz. 1979), and Lightfoot v. Bass, 76 Tenn. 350 (1881), for the proposition that "expressly" excludes implication or inference. Re-authorization by implication therefore failed.

The opinion also leaned on the limited-government-authority canon from City of Lebanon v. Baird, 756 S.W.2d 236 (Tenn. 1988), and Bayless v. Knox County, 199 Tenn. 268 (1956): cities and counties have only those powers expressly granted or necessarily implied by statute. A second five-year window was neither expressly granted nor necessarily implied; it was foreclosed.

Citations and references

Statutes (as of 2021):
- Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-207 (general traffic citation procedure)
- Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-207(e)(1)–(e)(4) (electronic citation fee scheme)
- Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-315(a) (separate, non-sunset fee for specified municipalities)
- Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-21-101; § 8-21-106(a); § 8-21-401 (clerk-fee limits)
- Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-25-102 (no fees beyond those expressly provided in criminal cases)
- 2014 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 750 (electronic citation enabling Act)

Cases:
- State v. Strode, 232 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2007); Spires v. Simpson, 539 S.W.3d 134 (Tenn. 2017); Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515 (Tenn. 2010); Keen v. State, 398 S.W.3d 594 (Tenn. 2012); State v. Marshall, 319 S.W.3d 558 (Tenn. 2010); Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827 (Tenn. 2008) (statutory construction)
- Hill v. City of Germantown, 31 S.W.3d 234 (Tenn. 2000); Bible & Godwin Constr. Co. v. Faener Corp., 504 S.W.2d 370 (Tenn. 1974); State v. Turner, 913 S.W.2d 158 (Tenn. 1995); Martin v. Powers, 505 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. 2016) (harmonization and absurd-results canons)
- Lyons v. Rasar, 872 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn. 1994) (in pari materia)
- In re Estelle's Estate, 593 P.2d 663 (Ariz. 1979); State ex rel. Ashauer v. Hostetter, 344 Mo. 665 (1939); Lightfoot v. Bass, 76 Tenn. 350 (1881) (meaning of "expressly")
- City of Lebanon v. Baird, 756 S.W.2d 236 (Tenn. 1988); Bayless v. Knox County, 199 Tenn. 268, 286 S.W.2d 579 (1956) (limited municipal/county powers)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2021/op21-02.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort reproduction; the linked PDF is authoritative.

STATE OF TENNESSEE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
February 10, 2021

Opinion No. 21-02

Electronic Traffic Citation Fees

Question

Tennessee Code Annotated § 55-10-207(e)(4) allows the legislative body of any county or municipality to adopt a resolution or ordinance to authorize a county or municipal court clerk to impose an electronic traffic citation fee of five dollars for each traffic citation that results in a conviction. If a local government passes such legislation, does the provision of Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-207(e)(4) that "[a]ny electronic traffic citation fee imposed pursuant to an ordinance or resolution under this subdivision (e)(4) shall terminate five (5) years from the date on which the ordinance or resolution is adopted" prohibit that local government from adopting another resolution or ordinance again authorizing such a fee after the expiration of the initial five-year period for which the fee had been authorized?

Opinion

Yes.

ANALYSIS

Under Tennessee law, a law enforcement officer is authorized to issue a citation in lieu of arrest for certain misdemeanor traffic offenses. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-207. Before 2014, an officer's only option was to prepare a paper citation and deliver it to the court. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-207 (2001). In 2014, the General Assembly amended this law to also allow law enforcement officers to prepare electronic citations and file them with the court having jurisdiction over the alleged offense. 2014 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 750.

To defray the costs of implementing such electronic citation systems, the General Assembly provided that each court clerk "shall charge and collect an electronic traffic citation fee of five dollars ($5.00) for each traffic citation resulting in a conviction." 2014 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 750, § 4 (codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-207(e)(1)). The fee is in addition to all other fees, taxes, and charges. Id. One dollar of each fee is retained by the clerk, and the remaining four dollars are transmitted to the law enforcement agency that prepared the citation. Id. The law enforcement agency may use its portion of the fees only on electronic citation systems and related expenditures. See id. (codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-207(e)(2)). Similarly, the portion of the fee retained by court clerks may only be used for computer-related expenditures. See id. (codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-207(e)(3)).

"The local legislative body of any county or municipality may, by majority vote, adopt a resolution or ordinance to authorize a county or municipal court clerk to charge and collect electronic traffic citation fees . . . ." Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-207(e)(4). If a local government adopts such a resolution or ordinance, "[a]ny electronic traffic citation fee . . . shall terminate five (5) years from the date on which the ordinance or resolution is adopted." Id. For the reasons that follow, this five-year automatic-termination provision precludes a local legislative body from adopting another resolution or ordinance again authorizing the imposition of such a fee after the initial five-year period for which the fee was imposed by the original resolution or ordinance has elapsed.

In construing statutes, a court's role is "to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope." State v. Strode, 232 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tenn. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, the first step in construing a statute is to "look . . . at the plain language." Spires v. Simpson, 539 S.W.3d 134, 143 (Tenn. 2017); see Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 526 (Tenn. 2010). If the language is clear and unambiguous, the task is at an end. Keen v. State, 398 S.W.3d 594, 610 (Tenn. 2012). When the language is ambiguous, however, it is appropriate to examine the broader statutory scheme, the legislative history, and other sources, including established canons of statutory construction. Spires, 539 S.W.3d at 144; State v. Marshall, 319 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tenn. 2010); Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 836 (Tenn. 2008).

Here, the General Assembly has expressly provided that "[a]ny electronic traffic citation fee imposed pursuant to an ordinance or resolution . . . shall terminate five (5) years from the date on which the ordinance or resolution is adopted." The General Assembly has not provided for a legislative body to pass another resolution or ordinance again authorizing the clerk to charge and collect an electronic traffic citation fee once the initial five-year authorization period has elapsed. Since it is well settled that counties and municipalities have only those powers expressly granted by, or necessarily implied from, statutes, City of Lebanon v. Baird, 756 S.W.2d 236, 241 (Tenn. 1988); Bayless v. Knox County, 199 Tenn. 268, 281, 286 S.W.2d 579, 585 (1956), the plain language of the statute does not suggest a construction that would allow local legislative bodies to re-authorize the collection of the electronic traffic citation fee after the five-year period has elapsed. Compare Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-207(e)(4) with Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-315(a) (General Assembly authorizes specific municipalities, by ordinance, to levy a fee of up to seventy-five cents (75¢) on all convictions for certain traffic violations without providing that the fee under this provision will terminate after a specified time-period).

To the extent that there is any ambiguity about the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-207(e)(4), the ambiguity is resolved by statutory construction rules and the legislative history of this provision.

Statutes in pari materia, that is, statutes relating to the same subject or having a common purpose, are to be construed together, and the construction of one such statute, if doubtful, may be aided by considering the words and legislative intent indicated by the language of another, related statute. Lyons v. Rasar, 872 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn. 1994) (citations omitted).

Title 8, Chapter 21 of the Tennessee Code governs the fees that may be charged by various public officials. The right of court clerks to receive fees in civil and other cases is addressed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-21-401. While the fees listed therein are not inclusive of all fees that court clerks may collect, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-21-106(a), the General Assembly has made clear that "[n]o officer is allowed to demand or receive fees . . . for any service further than is expressly provided by law," id. § 8-21-101 (emphasis added). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-25-102 ("Officers are entitled to no other fees in criminal cases, except those expressly provided for by law[.]") (emphasis added).

"Expressly" means in direct or unmistakable terms. In re Estelle's Estate, 593 P.2d 663, 667 (Ariz. 1979) (citation omitted). Stated another way, the word "expressly" means "directly and distinctly stated; expressed, not merely implied or left to inference." Id. (quoting State ex rel. Ashauer v. Hostetter, 344 Mo. 665, 670, 127 S.W.2d 697, 699 (1939)). See Lightfoot v. Bass, 76 Tenn. 350, 354, 1881 WL 229, at *2 (1881) (court examined a statute declaring the power to convey property shall exist unless it be "expressly withheld" and determined that "the intention to withhold the power must be expressed, and not left to inference or intendment").

If the General Assembly had intended to allow a legislative body to pass another resolution or ordinance re-authorizing the electronic traffic citation fee after the initial five-year period had elapsed, it could have easily and clearly expressed that intention, and not left it to mere implication, which under Tennessee law is insufficient because an officer may not impose fees unless "expressly provided" for by law.

Finally, legislative history reinforces the construction of Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-207(e)(4) as precluding re-authorization of the fee once the initial authorization has terminated by operation of the statute. During the debates, legislators voiced the concern that the five-dollar fee would be imposed in perpetuity even after a local government had recouped its initial start-up costs to implement an electronic citation system. Thus, a final amendment to the bill was introduced that "[a]ny electronic traffic citation fee . . . shall terminate five (5) years from the date on which the ordinance or resolution is adopted." This amendment was referred to in a shorthand manner as a "sunset" provision several times during the legislative process.

Accordingly, the statutory provision that "any electronic traffic citation fee imposed pursuant to an ordinance or resolution under this subdivision (e)(4) shall terminate five (5) years from the date on which the ordinance or resolution is adopted," Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-207(e)(4), precludes a local government from adopting another resolution or ordinance imposing such a fee after the initial five-year period for which the fee was imposed by the original resolution or ordinance has elapsed.

HERBERT H. SLATERY III
Attorney General and Reporter

ANDRÉE SOPHIA BLUMSTEIN
Solicitor General

LAURA T. KIDWELL
Assistant Solicitor General

Requested by:

The Honorable Chris Todd
State Representative
Cordell Hull Bldg., Suite 608
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, Tennessee 37243