Can a Tennessee county school board move its administrative offices to a federally controlled building like the TVA East Tower without violating the statutes that put 'public schools' and 'school property' in the board's custody?

Plain-English summary

Knox County wanted to relocate the Knox County Board of Education's administrative offices from the county-owned Andrew Johnson Building to TVA East Tower, a federally controlled building, under a long-term term-easement arrangement between Knox County and TVA. Sen. Becky Massey asked the AG whether two key Tennessee statutes blocked the move.

The first statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-203(a)(2), gives the county school board the duty to "manage and control all public schools" under its jurisdiction. The second, § 49-6-2004(a), gives the board "the custody of all county school property." The question was whether moving the board's offices to a building owned and operated by a federal agency would conflict with either of those duties.

AG Slatery answered no, but framed the conclusion as a conditional yes: the move was permissible as long as the lease itself did not strip away the board's statutory authority. The reasoning had three pieces.

First, separation between county legislative bodies and county school boards. Tennessee Supreme Court precedent (Weaver, Bobo, Boles, Bandy) treats the two as performing separate functions. The county legislative body funds; the school board manages. So Knox County could not unilaterally relocate the board's offices. The board had to consent, and the AG assumed it would.

Second, the meaning of "public schools" in § 49-2-203(a)(2). The AG read "public schools" against its natural meaning and against the State Board of Education's own regulatory definition (a school with grades, teachers, and a principal, Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0520-01-02-.01). Administrative offices do not fit that definition. The General Assembly knew how to write "buildings and property" when it wanted to (it did so in § 49-2-203(b)(10) authorizing the board to lease or sell unused buildings). When a different subsection uses the narrower phrase "public schools," that choice is presumed deliberate. So the manage-and-control duty does not reach administrative offices.

Third, the meaning of "custody" in § 49-6-2004(a). Drawing on a 1950 Tennessee case (Monroe County Motor Co.), the AG explained that "custody" means having property "in charge," not exclusive dominion or total possession. The board can have custody of county school property while operating from a building owned by someone else, as long as the lease arrangement does not let the lessor (TVA) control the school property itself or override the board's authority.

The condition the opinion places on this conclusion comes straight from the statutes: the lease must not impinge on the board's duty to manage and control the public schools under its jurisdiction, and it must not impinge on the board's authority to keep the county's school property in its charge. Within those limits, the relocation is permissible.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2020. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Is a county school board's administrative office considered a "public school"?
A: Not under § 49-2-203(a)(2) as construed by this opinion. The AG reasoned from the natural meaning of "public schools" and from the State Board of Education's regulatory definition (a basic administrative unit consisting of grades, teachers, and a principal). Administrative offices fall outside that definition, so they are not subject to the manage-and-control duty in the same way an actual school building is.

Q: Does the board have to approve the lease?
A: Yes. Tennessee precedent treats county legislative bodies and county school boards as separate authorities. The county commission cannot unilaterally relocate the board's offices. The board's consent is required. With consent, the lease can proceed cooperatively (Bandy).

Q: What does "custody of all county school property" actually mean?
A: The AG drew on Monroe County Motor Co. for a working definition: "custody" means having property "in charge," not absolute dominion. The board can keep school property in its charge from any office location, including a leased one, so long as the lease terms do not give the lessor (TVA) effective control over the property.

A: Per the opinion, a lease that impinged on the board's duty to manage and control the public schools under its jurisdiction, or that gave TVA effective control over the county's separately owned school property (overriding the board's authority to keep it "in its charge"), would run into § 49-2-203(a)(2) or § 49-6-2004(a). Short of that, the opinion treats the relocation as permissible.

Q: Does the federal nature of TVA matter?
A: Not for purposes of the two state statutes the AG analyzed. The AG treated the lessor as a landlord whose ownership of the building does not by itself displace the board's statutory duties. The opinion does not analyze federal preemption issues that might arise inside a TVA-owned building (for instance, security or access rules that TVA imposes), and any practical operational issues would be a matter for the lease negotiation rather than the threshold legal question.

Q: Why was Knox County, rather than the school board, the contracting party with TVA?
A: The opinion describes the lease as a long-term agreement to be entered into between Knox County and TVA. Because county legislative bodies and county school boards perform separate functions, Knox County could not unilaterally relocate the board's offices; the AG explained that the contemplated contract had to have the board's approval (Bandy).

Background and statutory framework

Tennessee's public-education system is the product of Article XI, § 12 of the Tennessee Constitution and Title 49 of the Tennessee Code. The General Assembly built a partnership between the State and its political subdivisions, with the State Board of Education at the top, and county boards of education and county legislative bodies at the local level. The Tennessee Supreme Court (Weaver, Bobo, Boles, Bandy) has long held that county legislative bodies and county school boards perform separate functions: county commissions appropriate funds, county boards manage and control schools.

That separation rules out unilateral action by either body in the other's domain. Knox County could not on its own move the board's offices. The board had to agree. With cooperation between the two, no constitutional or statutory conflict arises (Bandy).

The two statutes the question targeted are § 49-2-203(a)(2) (manage and control all public schools) and § 49-6-2004(a) (custody of all county school property). The AG read both narrowly. "Public schools" means the schools themselves, not administrative buildings. "Custody" means in charge, not exclusive dominion. With those narrow readings, an off-site administrative office, even one in a federally owned building, does not interfere with either duty.

The opinion's one stated limit is that the lease cannot impinge on the board's duty to manage and control the schools under its jurisdiction or on its authority to keep county school property in its charge. Within those boundaries, the relocation is permissible.

Citations

• Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 12
• Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 49-1-103(1); 49-2-203(a), (a)(2), (b)(10); 49-6-2004(a)
• Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0520-01-02-.01 (public school defined)
• State ex rel. Weaver v. Ayers, 756 S.W.2d 217 (Tenn. 1988)
• State ex rel. Boles v. Groce, 152 Tenn. 566, 280 S.W. 27 (1926)
• State ex rel. Bobo v. Moore Cnty., 207 Tenn. 622, 341 S.W.2d 746 (1960)
• Benson v. Harding Cnty., 173 Tenn. 246, 116 S.W.2d 1025 (1938)
• Bandy v. State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. of Sullivan Cnty., 186 Tenn. 11, 207 S.W.2d 1011 (1948)
• Rollins v. Wilson Cnty. Gov't, 154 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 1998)
• Putnam Cnty. Educ. Ass'n v. Putnam Cnty. Comm'n, 2005 WL 1812624 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)
• State v. Strode, 232 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2007)
• Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515 (Tenn. 2010)
• Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503 (Tenn. 2004)
• State v. Casper, 297 S.W.3d 676 (Tenn. 2009)
• Monroe Cnty. Motor Co. v. Tennessee Odin Ins. Co., 33 Tenn. App. 223, 231 S.W.2d 386 (1950)

Subject

Relocation of County School Board Administrative Offices to Federally-Controlled Building

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2020/op20-03.pdf

Original opinion text

Relocation of County School Board Administrative Offices to Federally-Controlled Building

Question
Would the relocation of the Knox County Board of Education's administrative offices to the Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") East Tower, a federally-controlled building, pursuant to a Term Easement between Knox County and TVA violate any applicable provision of state law, including Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-2004(a), Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-203(a)(2), or any other Tennessee law requiring that a county board of education have custody and control of all public school property?

Opinion
A county school board's duty to "[m]anage and control all public schools" under Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-203(a)(2) does not categorically prevent the Knox County Board of Education ("Board") from relocating its administrative offices to the TVA East Tower. Similarly, the requirement that the Board have the custody of all county school property under Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-2004(a) does not foreclose the Board from relocating its administrative offices to the TVA East Tower. As long as the lease agreement for the office space does not impinge on the Board's duty to manage and control the public schools under its jurisdiction and does not impinge on the Board's authority to have the county's school property in its charge, locating the Board's administrative offices in the TVA East Tower would not be prohibited by these statutory provisions.

ANALYSIS

The administrative offices of the Knox County Board of Education are currently located in Knoxville in the Andrew Johnson Building, which is owned by Knox County. There is a plan to relocate those offices to the TVA East Tower, which is a federally-controlled building, pursuant to a long-term lease agreement to be entered into between Knox County and TVA.

Article XI, section 12 of the Tennessee Constitution requires the General Assembly to "provide for the maintenance, support and eligibility standards of a system of free public schools." Consistent with this mandate, the General Assembly has enacted a comprehensive and detailed statutory scheme concerning education in this State. This statutory scheme, found in Title 49 of the Tennessee Code, establishes a partnership between the State and its political subdivisions to provide educational opportunities in Tennessee. State ex rel. Weaver v. Ayers, 756 S.W.2d 217, 221 (Tenn. 1988). "At the county level, the State has divided the responsibilities allocated to the counties [regarding education] between the county board of education and the county legislative body." Id.

As observed by the courts, the two entities perform separate functions. Rollins v. Wilson Cnty. Gov't, 154 F.3d 626, 627 (6th Cir. 1998). See State ex rel. Boles v. Groce, 152 Tenn. 566, 568-570, 280 S.W. 27, 28 (1926). The county board of education has exclusive management and control of the county schools, subject to the rules and regulations of the State Department of Education, while the county legislative body has the authority to appropriate the funds necessary to carry out the county education program. See Weaver, 756 S.W.2d at 221-222; State ex rel. Bobo v. Moore Cnty., 207 Tenn. 622, 630, 341 S.W.2d 746, 749-750 (1960); Benson v. Harding Cnty., 173 Tenn. 246, 247-248, 116 S.W.2d 1025, 1025-1026 (1938); Boles, 152 Tenn. at 570, 280 S.W. at 28.

Due to the separate functions assigned to these two entities, the Tennessee Supreme Court has found that county legislative bodies have no supervisory authority over county boards of education. See Weaver, 756 S.W.2d at 225; Bobo, 207 Tenn. at 631, 341 S.W.2d at 750; Boles, 152 Tenn. at 570-571, 280 S.W. at 28. Thus, county legislative bodies have no authority to select school sites, to erect school buildings, or otherwise manage or control county schools. See Weaver, 756 S.W.2d at 224; Bandy v. State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. of Sullivan Cnty., 186 Tenn. 11, 15-17, 207 S.W.2d 1011, 1012-1013 (1948). See also Putnam Cnty. Educ. Ass'n v. Putnam Cnty. Comm'n, M2003-03031-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1812624, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Therefore, Knox County does not have the authority to unilaterally relocate the Board's administrative offices to the TVA East Tower. Hence, as an initial consideration, the contemplated contract between Knox County and TVA must have the Board's approval. See Bandy, 186 Tenn. at 17, 207 S.W.2d at 1013.

Assuming the Board does approve, the next consideration is whether the Board is authorized to locate its administrative offices in a federally-controlled building. County school boards are creatures of statute and have only authority that is express or necessarily implied. 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 142 (2020).

The General Assembly has provided for local boards of education to manage and control their respective school systems. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 49-1-103(1); 49-2-203(a). Pertinent here, a county school board has the duty to "[m]anage and control all public schools established or that may be established under its jurisdiction." Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-203(a)(2). And Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-2004(a) provides that "[t]he custody of all county school property shall be with the county board of education."

In considering the meaning of these provisions, a court's role is to "ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope." State v. Strode, 232 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tenn. 2007). Thus, initial focus must be on the statute's words, giving these words their natural and ordinary meaning in light of their statutory context. Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 526 (Tenn. 2010). Any forced or subtle construction that would limit or extend the meaning the language in the statute is to be avoided. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004).

The county school board has a statutory duty to "[m]anage and control all public schools established or that may be established under its jurisdiction." Construing that language to categorically prevent the Board from relocating its administrative offices to the TVA East Tower would unduly expand the meaning of the statutory language. Construing "public schools" to include the Board's administrative offices is not warranted by the natural and ordinary meaning of this phrase. First, an administrative office is not a "public school." Under the regulations of the Tennessee State Board of Education, "[a] public school is the basic administrative unit of a state, county, city or special district school system, consisting of one or more grade groups, one or more teachers to give instruction, and one principal . . . ." Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0520-01-02-.01.

Second, the phrase "public schools" in Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-203(a)(2) stands in contrast to a later provision in Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-203 that permits a local school board to "lease or sell buildings and property or portions of buildings or property it determines are not being used or are not needed at present by the public school system." See Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-203(b)(10). This latter provision clearly covers buildings and property beyond the schools themselves. State v. Casper, 297 S.W.3d 676, 693 (Tenn. 2009). Thus, unless the terms of the contemplated agreement would impinge on the Board's duty to manage and control the public schools under its jurisdiction, the relocation of the Board's administrative offices to the TVA East Tower would not be prohibited by Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2-203(a)(2).

Nor does Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-2004(a) preclude the contemplated office relocation. It provides that "[t]he custody of all county school property shall be with the county board of education." "Custody of a thing means to have it in charge." Monroe Cnty. Motor Co. v. Tennessee Odin Ins. Co., 33 Tenn. App. 223, 244, 231 S.W.2d 386, 395 (1950). "In charge of" means "in the care or custody of, or entrusted to the management or direction of." Id. at 244, 231 S.W.2d at 395-396. Custody "does not have to constitute dominion of supremacy of authority as does possession in its full significance." Id. at 244, 231 S.W.2d at 395. Thus, the requirement that the Board have the "custody" of all county school property does not foreclose the Board from relocating its administrative offices to the TVA East Tower because the Board does not have to have "dominion of supremacy of authority" over the county's school property. As long as the terms of the contemplated lease agreement do not impinge on the Board's authority to have the county's school property "in its charge," the relocation of the Board's administrative offices would not be proscribed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-2004(a).

HERBERT H. SLATERY III
Attorney General and Reporter

ANDRÉE SOPHIA BLUMSTEIN
Solicitor General

LAURA T. KIDWELL
Senior Assistant Attorney General

Requested by:
The Honorable Becky Massey
State Senator
Cordell Hull Building, Suite 776
425 5th Avenue North
Nashville, Tennessee 37243