Can a Tennessee general sessions judge fill in for a circuit court judge or chancellor without a private act?

Subject

Authority of General Sessions Judges to Interchange for Circuit Judges or Chancellors

Plain-English summary

Tennessee divides its trial bench into state-level judges (circuit court judges, chancellors, criminal court judges) and county-level judges (general sessions judges, juvenile court judges, municipal court judges). State trial judges can interchange with each other freely under Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-2-202, sitting in any judicial district as needed. County-level judges have far more limited interchange authority.

The AG addressed two questions about this divide. First, can a general sessions judge sit by interchange for a circuit judge or chancellor under existing general law? The answer is essentially no, with one carve-out: in counties over 700,000 population (which functionally means Davidson, Shelby, and Knox), Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-2-209 lets a general sessions judge sit "for the exclusive purpose of hearing and deciding uncontested and irreconcilable differences in divorce cases." Outside that narrow exception, general law gives general sessions judges no authority to fill in for circuit judges or chancellors.

Second, can the legislature authorize broader interchange in a particular county by private act? Yes, but with a constitutional limit: the legislature must articulate a rational basis for granting that authority in that specific county. The AG drew on prior opinions and on Article VI, Section 11 of the Tennessee Constitution, which gives the legislature authority to provide for special, temporary judges. A private act creating county-specific interchange falls within that constitutional power so long as the act is rational and provides for temporary, not permanent, interchange.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2019. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

What's the basic difference between state and county judges in Tennessee?

The opinion noted that circuit court judges and chancellors are "judges and chancellors for the state at large" who can sit anywhere in Tennessee under Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-1-203. General sessions judges are county officials, see State ex rel. Winstead v. Moody. State trial judges interchange with each other under § 17-2-202. The general law does not extend that interchange to general sessions judges except in the limited circumstance set out in § 17-2-209.

What does § 17-2-209 actually allow?

In counties with populations over 700,000 (the threshold tracked the 1980 census), a general sessions judge can sit by interchange as a circuit judge or chancellor solely to hear uncontested divorces and irreconcilable-differences divorces. The opinion characterized this as the "exclusive" general-law exception.

What about hearings on conflicts, contempt, or interlocutory matters?

The general statute is narrow. Outside of the divorce carve-out and outside any private act for the relevant county, a general sessions judge has no authority to act for a circuit judge or chancellor. For ordinary substitute-judge needs (illness, disqualification, scheduling), the legislature has separate special- or substitute-judge statutes (§§ 17-2-109, 17-2-116, 17-2-118, 17-2-121, 17-2-122) that operate independently.

How does a county actually get broader interchange authority?

By asking the General Assembly for a private act. The opinion confirmed that private acts authorizing this kind of interchange have been used (citing the Crawford v. Gilpatrick example involving Clay County's court of common pleas). For the act to survive challenge, the legislature has to articulate a rational basis showing why interchange is necessary or convenient to the operation of the judicial system in that specific county. A purely arbitrary distinction would not survive.

Could a private act make the interchange permanent?

The AG advised against permanence. Article VI, Section 11 authorizes the legislature to provide for "special Judges" to hold court "the Judge of which shall be unable or fail to attend or sit." That language supports temporary, gap-filling judicial service, not a permanent reassignment. A private act mimicking that structure (temporary interchange when a circuit judge or chancellor is unable to sit) fits the constitutional category; a permanent transfer of authority would not.

Background and statutory framework

Tennessee's judicial structure has multiple layers, and the rules about who can sit for whom are scattered across Chapter 2 of Title 17 and various private acts. The opinion lays out the chain of authority cleanly: § 17-2-202 covers state-level interchange, § 17-2-208 covers county-level cross-interchange between general sessions and juvenile court judges, § 16-18-312(b) covers municipal court judges sitting for other municipal judges, and § 17-2-209 contains the only general-law exception that crosses the state/county line.

The constitutional backdrop is Article VI, Section 11, which the AG had construed in earlier opinions (notably Op. 09-133 and Op. 18-14) as authority for temporary special-judge service rather than long-term reassignments. That distinction matters because the Tennessee Constitution generally requires judges to be elected. Special-judge authority is the legislature's safety valve for unavoidable absence or disqualification, and any private act using it must respect that the assignment is temporary.

The rational-basis floor for population-based or county-specific legislation comes from the Civil Service Merit Bd. line of cases, which the AG has cited repeatedly. Some justification connecting the special treatment to actual differences in the affected county is required; pure arbitrariness fails. Op. 02-74, the prior AG opinion approving a Haywood County interchange private act, demonstrated the kind of case-specific articulation the legislature should provide.

Citations

• Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-18-312(b), 17-1-203, 17-2-109, 17-2-116, 17-2-118, 17-2-121, 17-2-122, 17-2-202, 17-2-208, 17-2-209
• Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 11
• Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 02-74 (June 12, 2002)
• Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 09-133 (July 28, 2009)
• Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 18-14 (Mar. 23, 2018)
• Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 96-114 (Sept. 5, 1996)
• State ex rel. Winstead v. Moody, 596 S.W.2d 811 (Tenn. 1980)
• Jackson v. Lanphere, 2011 WL 3566978 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2011)
• Crawford v. Gilpatrick, 646 S.W.2d 433 (Tenn. 1983)
• Ferrell v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 731 (Tenn. 2000)
• In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539 (Tenn. 2002)
• State ex rel. Witcher v. Bilbrey, 878 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2019/op19-14.pdf

Original opinion text

STATE OF TENNESSEE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
September 9, 2019

Opinion No. 19-14

Authority of General Sessions Judges To Interchange for Circuit Judges or Chancellors

Question 1
May general sessions court judges sit by interchange for circuit court judges or chancellors in the absence of a private act specifically granting such interchange authority?

Opinion 1
No, except "for the exclusive purpose of hearing and deciding uncontested and irreconcilable differences in divorce cases" in counties with a population over 700,000 pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-2-209.

Question 2
May the General Assembly, by private act, authorize general sessions judges to interchange with circuit court judges and chancellors in a particular county?

Opinion 2
Yes, as long as the General Assembly has a rational basis for granting interchange authority in that county.

ANALYSIS

Under the statutory provisions governing interchange, judges of the general sessions court may interchange with circuit court judges and chancellors only in the limited circumstances authorized by Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-2-209. In general, the legislature has authorized general sessions court judges and juvenile court judges to interchange only with "each other." Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-2-208. And it has authorized "[m]unicipal court judges and general sessions court judges . . . to sit by interchange for other municipal court judges." Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-18-312(b). But "the general laws do not authorize [circuit court judges and chancellors] to interchange with general sessions judges[.]" Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 02-74 (June 12, 2002).

Circuit court judges and chancellors are state officials; they are "judges and chancellors for the state at large, and, as such, may, upon interchange and upon other lawful ground, exercise the duties of office in any other judicial district in the state." Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-1-203. By contrast, general sessions court judges are county, not state, officials. See State ex rel. Winstead v. Moody, 596 S.W.2d 811 (Tenn. 1980). Whereas state trial court judges are authorized, and in some circumstances required, to interchange with other state trial court judges, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-2-202; Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 96-114 (Sept. 5, 1996), "no general statute allow[s] a general sessions judge to sit by interchange for a circuit judge or chancellor[,]" Jackson v. Lanphere, No. M2010-01401-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 3566978, at *5 (Aug. 12, 2011).

Tennessee Code Annotated § 17-2-209(a) provides the "exclusive" instance in which general sessions judges may sit by interchange for circuit court judges and chancellors:

In counties with a population of over seven hundred thousand (700,000), according to the 1980 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the general sessions judges may sit by interchange as a circuit court judge or chancellor for the exclusive purpose of hearing and deciding uncontested and irreconcilable differences in divorce cases.

Absent a private act providing additional authority within a particular county, interchange between general sessions court judges and circuit court judges and chancellors is not allowed in any other circumstance. See Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 02-74.

The legislature has, by private act, authorized county judges in certain counties to sit by interchange with the circuit court judges or chancellors in that county. See Jackson, 2011 WL 3566978, at *5 n.5 (recognizing this practice); Crawford v. Gilpatrick, 646 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tenn. 1983) (discussing a private act that allowed the judge of the court of common pleas in Clay County to sit by interchange with the circuit court judges and the chancellor).

In a previous opinion, this office concluded that such private acts are constitutional so long as they have a rational basis. In response to the question whether the legislature could, by private act, authorize the general sessions court judge for Haywood County to interchange with the chancellor for Haywood County, the opinion concluded that the legislature could do so as long as it "articulate[d] the reasons why such authority [was] necessary or convenient to the operation of the judicial system in the affected county." Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 02-74.

A private act that allowed general sessions court judges to interchange with circuit court judges or chancellors within a particular county would also be consistent with the legislature's constitutional authority to provide for temporary "special judges." Article VI, section 11 of the Tennessee Constitution gives the legislature the authority to "make provisions that special Judges may be appointed, to hold any Court the Judge of which shall be unable or fail to attend or sit; or to hear any cause in which the Judge may be incompetent." As this office has explained:

Article VI, section 11 does not "enable the General Assembly to provide for filling a vacancy in an office, but only for supplying a temporary judge in the case of the absence or disqualification of the regular judge." Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 09-133 (July 28, 2009). Pursuant to this authority, "the General Assembly has enacted several statutes relating to the appointment of special/substitute judges[.]" Ferrell v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Tenn. 2000); see, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 17-2-109, 17-2-116; 17-2-118, 17-2-121, 17-2-122. And the Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized that there is no conflict between the general requirement that judges be elected and the specific grant of authority to the General Assembly to provide for the appointment of special judges. See In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 545 (Tenn. 2002); State ex rel. Witcher v. Bilbrey, 878 S.W.2d 567, 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 18-14 (Mar. 23, 2018). Accordingly, a private act that allowed the general sessions judges and state trial court judges in a particular county to interchange in certain circumstances would not violate any of the constitutional requirements applicable to state trial court judges. It would be an exercise of the legislature's constitutional authority to provide for special, temporary judges when necessary.

In sum, the legislature may, by private act, provide for the interchange of general sessions court judges and state trial court judges within a particular county as long as the private act has a rational basis and provides only for temporary, not permanent, interchange.

HERBERT H. SLATERY III
Attorney General and Reporter

ANDRÉE SOPHIA BLUMSTEIN
Solicitor General

JONATHAN DAVID SHAUB
Assistant Solicitor General

Requested by:
The Honorable Clark Boyd
425 5th Avenue North
Suite 528, Cordell Hull Bldg.
Nashville, TN 37243