Can Tennessee's General Assembly strip a city court's criminal jurisdiction in the middle of an elected city judge's term?

Plain-English summary

Article VI of the Tennessee Constitution puts the judicial power in the Tennessee Supreme Court "and in such Circuit, Chancery and other inferior Courts as the Legislature shall from time to time, ordain and establish." The same article (§ 8) lets the Legislature change the jurisdiction of those inferior courts. The AG applied that rule to Dickson City Court on the express assumption that the General Assembly had established it.

District Attorney General Ray Crouch, Jr. asked AG Slatery whether the Legislature could strip the Dickson City Court of its concurrent criminal jurisdiction with the Dickson County General Sessions Court, and whether it could do so during a sitting elected city judge's term. The AG answered yes to both.

The reasoning is well-trodden in Tennessee case law. The Legislature can create inferior courts, abolish them, transfer their jurisdiction to other courts, and define what those courts can hear (Duncan v. Rhea County; Gouge v. McInturff; Spurgeon v. Worley; Moore v. Love; Hodge v. State). When a court is abolished, the office of its judge is extinguished. Reducing jurisdiction is a lesser action than abolition; the Legislature retains it.

On the opinion's assumption that the General Assembly established Dickson City Court, the elected judge's ongoing term did not prevent the legislature from reducing the court's jurisdiction.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2017. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

The Tennessee Code's specific provisions on city-court concurrent jurisdiction with general sessions courts (Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-17-101, 16-17-301 through 302) may have been amended after this opinion. Anyone evaluating the current jurisdictional reach of any specific city court should pull the present version of those provisions and any local private acts.

Common questions

Q: What is an "inferior court"?
A: In the Tennessee constitutional sense, "inferior courts" are courts inferior to the Tennessee Supreme Court (Hodge v. State). Article VI, § 1 puts the judicial power in the Supreme Court and in such circuit, chancery, and other inferior courts as the Legislature may establish. City courts and county courts created by statute are within that "other inferior courts" category.

Q: Does the Legislature need a specific reason to reduce a court's jurisdiction?
A: The cases describe this power broadly: to create new courts, transfer jurisdiction between existing courts, decide how many courts of which kinds are needed, and fix the limits of their jurisdiction (Gouge v. McInturff; State ex rel. Ward v. Murrell; Spurgeon v. Worley). Tennessee courts speak of efficiency, economy, and meeting changed conditions of population and business as legitimate reasons, but the constitutional power exists regardless.

Q: Doesn't the city judge's elected status protect the office?
A: Not from changes to the underlying court. Duncan v. Rhea County held that when a court is abolished by a valid legislative enactment, the office of the judge presiding is extinguished and the salary ceases. The same analytical principle applies to lesser changes like jurisdictional reductions: those changes do not violate any constitutional right of the elected judge to keep the office in its prior form.

Q: What happens to pending cases if jurisdiction is moved?
A: The opinion does not address the docket-transition question, only the legislative authority question. Practical legislation usually includes a savings clause and a docket-transfer provision, but the AG opinion stops short of saying anything specific about that.

Q: Could the Legislature do this for any city court, or only for Dickson?
A: The reasoning applies to courts established by the General Assembly. For Dickson City Court, the opinion expressly assumed that premise; it did not determine the court's origin as a fact.

Q: Is the elected city judge entitled to a hearing or some kind of procedural process before the change?
A: The opinion does not say there is one. The constitutional power runs to the Legislature directly. Any procedural claim by an affected judge would have to find its source somewhere other than article VI.

Background and statutory framework

Tennessee's allocation of judicial power starts with article VI, § 1. The Supreme Court is constitutional. The other inferior courts (circuit, chancery, and "such other inferior courts as the Legislature shall from time to time, ordain and establish") are statutory. Article VI, § 8 reinforces the Legislature's authority to define their jurisdiction.

The case law worked out from those two sections has been remarkably consistent. Hodge v. State (1916) confirmed the Legislature's power to alter inferior-court jurisdiction. Ramsey v. Temple (1879) held that inferior-court jurisdiction may be increased or diminished by statute. Gouge v. McInturff (1935) confirmed that the establishment power necessarily includes the power to define jurisdiction and to transfer jurisdiction between courts. Spurgeon v. Worley (1936) said the same about transferring jurisdiction from existing courts to a newly created one. Moore v. Love (1937) held the General Assembly is permitted to alter inferior-court jurisdiction. Duncan v. Rhea County (1955) added the consequence rule: when a court is abolished, the office of the presiding judge is extinguished. Ely v. Deroyal Indus. (2005) restated all of this in a worker's compensation context.

Statutorily, Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-17-101 governs the establishment of city courts. Sections 16-17-301 and -302 describe their concurrent jurisdiction with general sessions courts. The Legislature's power under article VI to alter that statutory jurisdiction is the legal premise of the opinion.

Citations

• Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 1 (judicial power)
• Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 8 (jurisdiction of inferior courts)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-17-101 (city courts)
• Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-17-301, -302 (concurrent jurisdiction with general sessions)
• Duncan v. Rhea County, 287 S.W.2d 26 (Tenn. 1955)
• Ely v. Deroyal Indus., 2005 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 414 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005)
• Moore v. Love, 107 S.W.2d 982 (Tenn. 1937)
• Gouge v. McInturff, 90 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1935)
• Spurgeon v. Worley, 90 S.W.2d 948 (Tenn. 1936)
• State ex rel. Ward v. Murrell, 90 S.W.2d 945 (Tenn. 1935)
• Rains v. Rains, 428 S.W.2d 650 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968)
• Hodge v. State, 188 S.W. 203 (Tenn. 1916)
• Ramsey v. Temple, 71 Tenn. 252 (1879)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2017/op17-008.pdf

Original opinion text

Authority of the General Assembly to Reduce the Jurisdiction of the Dickson City Court

Question 1
Does the General Assembly have the authority to limit or reduce the jurisdiction of the Dickson City Court by eliminating its concurrent jurisdiction with the General Sessions Court of Dickson County in criminal cases?

Opinion 1
Yes.

Question 2
If the General Assembly has the authority to limit or reduce the jurisdiction of the Dickson City Court by eliminating its concurrent jurisdiction with the General Sessions Court of Dickson County in criminal cases, does it have authority to do so during the term of office of the duly elected City Judge?

Opinion 2
Yes.

ANALYSIS

The Tennessee Constitution vests the judicial power of Tennessee in one Supreme Court "and in such Circuit, Chancery and other inferior Courts as the Legislature shall from time to time, ordain and establish." Tenn. Const. art VI, § 1. The Tennessee Constitution also authorizes the Legislature to change the jurisdiction of such "other Inferior Courts." Tenn. Const. art VI, § 8.

Thus, "[i]t is well-settled that the Legislature has the power not only to create inferior Courts under the constitutional provision but to diminish or to enlarge or to transfer their jurisdiction in the interest of efficiency and economy, art. 6, section 1." Duncan v. Rhea County, 287 S.W.2d 26, 28 (1955). "Article VI of the Tennessee Constitution gives the Tennessee Legislature the exclusive authority to establish and change the jurisdiction of the inferior courts in Tennessee." Ely v. Deroyal Indus., 2005 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 414, *17 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2005) (citing Moore v. Love, 107 S.W.2d 982, 986 (Tenn. 1937); Gouge v. McInturff, 90 S.W.2d 753 (1935); and Spurgeon v. Worley, 90 S.W.2d 948, 949 (1936) ("The broad power conferred by article 6, section 1, upon the Legislature to establish courts necessarily conveys power to define their jurisdiction and to transfer jurisdiction from existing courts . . . to the newly created court" and "[i]t has been common practice in the legislative history of the state to transfer jurisdiction from existing courts to special courts established to meet changed conditions produced by concentration of population and of business.")). The Tennessee Constitution gives the General Assembly the authority to allocate judicial powers and jurisdiction with regard to inferior courts. Rains v. Rains, 428 S.W.2d 650, 655 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968). The Legislature has discretion to create new courts, to transfer to one court jurisdiction formerly exercised by another court, to determine how many and what kind of courts are required for the administration of justice, and to fix the limit of their jurisdiction. Gouge v. McInturff, 90 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1935) (article VI, section 1, of the Constitution confers on the Legislature the power to establish inferior courts and to prescribe and define the jurisdiction of those courts); State ex rel. Ward v. Murrell, 90 S.W.2d 945 (Tenn. 1935).

In particular, article VI, § 8 of the Tennessee Constitution reserves to the Legislature power to alter the jurisdiction of the courts that the Legislature establishes and as a matter of course to enlarge or diminish that jurisdiction. Hodge v. State, 188 S.W. 203 (Tenn. 1916). The jurisdiction of the inferior courts may be increased or diminished by statute. Ramsey v. Temple, 71 Tenn. 252 (1879). The General Assembly is permitted to alter the jurisdiction of inferior courts. Moore v. Love, 107 S.W.2d 982 (Tenn. 1936).

"Inferior courts" are courts that are inferior to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Hodge v. State, 188 S.W. 203 (Tenn. 1916). A city (municipal) court and a county court that are established by the Legislature are "inferior courts" within the scope of article VI, § 1. See Ely v. Deroyal Indus., 2005 Tenn. Lexis 383 at *17 (Tenn. 2005); Duncan v. Rhea County, 287 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Tenn. 1955); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-17-101 and §§ 16-17-301 through 302.

When the court over which a judge presides is abolished by a valid legislative enactment, his office is abolished and extinguished and his salary ceases. Unless a court is protected by the constitution, the Legislature may redistribute the business of that court or abolish it, which operates to vacate the office of the judge who presided over it. Duncan v. Rhea County, 287 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Tenn. 1955).

Accordingly, assuming the Dickson City Court is a court established by the General Assembly, the General Assembly has the authority to reduce the jurisdiction of the Dickson City Court by eliminating its concurrent jurisdiction with the General Sessions Court of Dickson County in criminal cases. The General Assembly has the discretion to do so during the term of office of the duly elected Dickson City Judge.

HERBERT H. SLATERY III
Attorney General and Reporter

ANDRÉE SOPHIA BLUMSTEIN
Solicitor General

Requested by:
The Honorable Ray Crouch, Jr.
District Attorney General
P.O. Box 690
Ashland City, TN 37015