Can a Tennessee arrest warrant list more than one criminal charge on the same piece of paper?

Subject

Opinion No. 15-20, Multiple Crimes in Single Warrant, March 13, 2015

Plain-English summary

A district attorney asked the AG whether a single arrest warrant from a judicial commissioner can list more than one criminal charge. The AG said no, ideally. Tennessee's warrant statutes (Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-6-203 through -208) and Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure consistently use singular language: "the offense," "the charge," "it." The form warrant set out in the statute itself directs the magistrate to identify "the offense" by name or so it can be clearly inferred. The Tennessee Supreme Court reinforced that reading in State v. Tait, 114 S.W.3d 518 (Tenn. 2003), interpreting the same statutes in the singular. The AG also flagged a practical concern: court clerks' record-keeping systems often tie a single warrant number to a single conviction, so stacking multiple charges on one warrant can break the chain for later enhancements or mandatory minimum sentencing tied to prior convictions.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2015. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

In Tennessee, an arrest warrant commences a criminal prosecution. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-104. The warrant is "an order, in writing, stating the substance of the complaint, directed to a proper officer, signed by a magistrate, and commanding the arrest of the defendant." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-201. Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure adds that an arrest warrant "shall describe the offense charged in the affidavit of complaint."

The statute also supplies a model form: "Information on oath having been made to me . . . that the offense of (designating or describing it) has been committed . . . You . . . are, therefore, commanded to arrest C.D., and bring C.D. before me to answer the charge." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-207. The form uses "offense" and "charge" in the singular, just like the surrounding statutes and rules.

Standard Tennessee statutory-construction principles instruct courts to give words their natural and ordinary meaning within the context of the statute, without forced construction (Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995); Chapman v. DaVita, Inc., 380 S.W.3d 710, 714 (Tenn. 2012)). Applied here, the consistent singular text was unambiguous.

Common questions

What about Tait? What did the Tennessee Supreme Court say?
In State v. Tait, the Tennessee Supreme Court said the warrant statute "mandates that the warrant state the offense either by name, or so that it can be clearly inferred, and . . . the contents of a warrant for arrest must inform the accused of the nature of the charge." Singular again.

Was the AG saying multi-charge warrants are void or invalid?
The opinion stopped short of a categorical "every multi-charge warrant is void" rule. It said the statute "plainly contemplates that an arrest warrant will contain only one criminal charge." The word "ideally" appeared in the Opinion section. Whether a specific multi-charge warrant would survive a later challenge is a question of how courts have applied the rule in practice, which a defense attorney evaluating a particular case in current time would need to research.

Why did the AG mention clerk record-keeping?
Because some Tennessee criminal statutes ramp up penalties based on prior convictions, and the prior convictions are usually tied to specific warrant numbers. If one warrant produces two convictions but the clerk's system can only record one, the second conviction may not show up for enhancement purposes. For example, animal cruelty is a Class A misdemeanor on first conviction and a Class E felony on subsequent ones (Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-202(f)). Domestic assault has graduated mandatory minimum incarceration tied to prior convictions (Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111(c)).

Does this apply to indictments or other charging documents?
No. The opinion addressed arrest warrants specifically. Indictments, presentments, and information are governed by different statutes and rules and routinely include multiple counts.

Citations

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-6-201 through -208; Tenn. R. Crim. P. 4; Jones v. State, 332 S.W.2d 662 (Tenn. 1960); State v. Tait, 114 S.W.3d 518 (Tenn. 2003); Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn. 1995).

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2015/op15-20.pdf

Original opinion text

March 13, 2015
Opinion No. 15-20

Multiple Crimes in Single Warrant

Question

Can an individual arrest warrant issued by a judicial commissioner contain more than one criminal charge?

Opinion

No. Ideally, an arrest warrant should contain a single criminal charge.

ANALYSIS

The issuance of an arrest warrant is one way to commence a criminal prosecution. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-2-104. The process for issuing an arrest warrant and the requirements for the form and contents of an arrest warrant are controlled by statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-6-201 through -217. An arrest warrant is defined as "an order, in writing, stating the substance of the complaint, directed to a proper officer, signed by a magistrate, and commanding the arrest of the defendant." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-201. An arrest warrant "gives notice of the charge which must be answered." Tenn. R. Crim. P. 4 (emphasis added), Advisory Comm'n Cmts; Jones v. State, 206 Tenn. 245, 332 S.W.2d 662, 667 (Tenn. 1960) ("The purpose of a warrant is to give an accused person notice that he is charged with some offense.").

Before an arrest warrant may be issued, a magistrate must examine the affidavit of complaint and be satisfied that there is probable cause to believe "an offense" has been committed and that the defendant committed "the offense." Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-6-203 through -205 (emphasis added); see also Tenn. R. Crim. P. 4(a). The warrant is required to "state the offense either by name, or so that it can be clearly inferred." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-208(b) (emphasis added); see also Tenn. R. Crim. P. 4(c)(1)(D) ("The arrest warrant shall describe the offense charged in the affidavit of complaint.").

In fact, the suggested form of an arrest warrant is set out in the statute itself as follows:

Information on oath having been made to me [the issuing magistrate] that the offense of (designating or describing it) has been committed . . . You [any lawful officer of the state] are, therefore, commanded to arrest C.D., and bring C.D. before me to answer the charge.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-207 (emphasis added).

Since the process, the form, and the contents of an arrest warrant are set by statute, whether a single arrest warrant may be issued for more than one criminal charge is a question of statutory construction. "The most basic principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope." Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995); see also Carter v. Bell, 279 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn. 2009). Legislative intent is to be discerned from the precise wording of the statute, giving those words their natural and ordinary meaning within the context of the legislation as a whole and not utilizing any forced construction that would extend the statute's meaning. Chapman v. DaVita, Inc., 380 S.W.3d 710, 714 (Tenn. 2012); Lee Medical, Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 526 (Tenn. 2010).

Here, the legislature's precise language is unambiguous. All references to "offense" and "charge" in the statutes that govern the warrant process, contents, and form are singular, as shown by the terms emphasized in the statutory language quoted above. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-6-203 through -208 (referencing "the offense," "the offense charged," "it," "the charge."). Likewise, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 4(a) and 4(c)(1)(D) are couched in the singular, mirroring that statutory language. See also State v. Tait, 114 S.W.3d 518, 523 (Tenn. 2003) ("The statute mandates that the warrant state the offense either by name, or so that it can be clearly inferred, and . . . the contents of a warrant for arrest must inform the accused of the nature of the charge.") (emphasis added).

Moreover, as a practical matter, including multiple offenses in a single warrant may create procedural difficulties relating to the resolution of those charges at the general sessions level. For instance, a clerk's record-keeping system may tie a conviction to an individual warrant number such that it cannot reflect a second/separate conviction based on the same number. In such a circumstance, the court clerk would be unable to enter multiple convictions based on a single warrant for future use by the prosecution to enhance charges or impose mandatory incarceration in appropriate cases. See e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-202(f)(1) and (2) (A first conviction for animal cruelty is a Class A misdemeanor; a second or subsequent conviction is a Class E felony); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-111(c)(1)-(3) (providing for mandatory incarceration of 30, 60 or 90 days depending on the number of prior domestic assault convictions).

The consistent use of the singular when referring to the offense or charge to be included in a warrant leaves no ambiguity. Since there is no ambiguity, there is no need to look to rules of statutory construction. When the statutory language is plain, as it is here, the words must be given their natural and ordinary meaning and the scope of the governing provisions should not be extended. The statutory language, given its natural and ordinary meaning, plainly contemplates that an arrest warrant will contain only one criminal charge.

HERBERT H. SLATERY III
Attorney General and Reporter

ANDRÉE SOPHIA BLUMSTEIN
Solicitor General

SHANNON E. POINDEXTER
Assistant Attorney General

Requested by:
The Honorable Jennings H. Jones
District Attorney General
320 West Main Street, Suite 100
Murfreesboro, Tennessee 37130