If a citation for a state crime tells the defendant to appear in a Tennessee municipal court, can the city prosecutor or city attorney handle the case, or does only the district attorney general have authority?

Subject

Opinion No. 13-85, Authority of District Attorneys General in Municipal Courts, November 6, 2013

Plain-English summary

District Attorney General James G. Woodall asked whether the issuance of a citation that requires a defendant to appear in municipal court for a state criminal offense divests the district attorney general of authority to prosecute. The AG said no, in clear terms.

Tennessee municipal courts ordinarily handle only municipal ordinance violations. But the General Assembly can extend municipal court jurisdiction to state criminal offenses, and Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-1-107 does so for "city judges of certain towns and cities." These municipal courts then have concurrent jurisdiction with general sessions courts for state crimes within the city limits.

When a state crime ends up in such a municipal court, the question is who prosecutes. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103 makes clear that the district attorney general "[s]hall prosecute in the courts of the district all violations of the state criminal statutes and perform all prosecutorial functions attendant thereto, including prosecuting cases in a municipal court where the municipality provides sufficient personnel to the district attorney general for that purpose." The Tennessee Supreme Court in Ramsey v. Town of Oliver Springs, 998 S.W.2d 207, 209 (Tenn. 1999), confirmed: "The District Attorney General and only the District Attorney General can make the decision whether to proceed with a prosecution for an offense committed within his or her district."

Practical effect: the DA may elect to prosecute the state offense in municipal court, dismiss it there, or take another action allowed by Tennessee law. The opinion does not decide who may prosecute a municipal ordinance violation. A 2001 AG opinion (Op. 01-120) had previously reached the same conclusion about state criminal actions.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2013. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

For a current case, check the present statutes governing the court's jurisdiction and the district attorney general's authority.

Background and statutory framework

Municipal court jurisdiction over state offenses. City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248, 276-77 (Tenn. 2001); Hill v. State ex rel. Phillips, 216 Tenn. 503, 507, 392 S.W.2d 950, 952 (1965); Moore v. State, 159 Tenn. 468, 19 S.W.2d 233, 233 (1929), confirmed that the General Assembly may extend municipal court jurisdiction beyond ordinance violations. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-1-107 vested original criminal jurisdiction in city judges of certain towns and cities. City of White House v. Whitley, 979 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tenn. 1998), recognized concurrent jurisdiction for the White House Municipal Court with general sessions.

District attorney's exclusive prosecutorial authority. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103: "[e]ach district attorney general: (1) [s]hall prosecute in the courts of the district all violations of the state criminal statutes and perform all prosecutorial functions attendant thereto, including prosecuting cases in a municipal court where the municipality provides sufficient personnel to the district attorney general for that purpose."

Prosecutorial discretion. Quillen v. Crockett, 928 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995): no Tennessee statute specifically governs the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to institute proceedings. Ramsey v. Town of Oliver Springs, 998 S.W.2d 207, 209 (Tenn. 1999): "The District Attorney General and only the District Attorney General can make the decision whether to proceed with a prosecution for an offense committed within his or her district."

Prior AG opinion. Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 01-120 at 2 (July 31, 2001): "no other entity or individual [other than the District Attorney General] may prosecute state criminal actions in a municipal court vested with concurrent general sessions jurisdiction."

Common questions

Can a city handle DUIs in municipal court without involving the DA?

The opinion does not address DUI specifically. Its rule is that only the district attorney general has authority to prosecute a state criminal offense in a municipal court, even if the citation directs the defendant to appear there. It does not describe an arrangement under which a city attorney prosecutes the charge.

What if a city has no DA personnel assigned to its municipal court?

Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103, as quoted in the opinion, includes municipal-court cases where the municipality provides sufficient personnel to the district attorney general. The opinion does not discuss staffing arrangements or delegation. Its conclusion remains that the DA alone has authority to prosecute a state offense in municipal court.

Can a defendant force the case into general sessions to get away from a municipal court?

The opinion does not address a defendant's transfer rights or the mechanics of moving a case between courts. It answers who has authority to prosecute when the citation directs appearance in municipal court.

What about a "city prosecutor" who has historically handled state cases in municipal court?

The opinion does not describe a historical local practice. It says the district attorney general is the only person with authority to prosecute a state criminal offense in municipal court.

Could the city ordinances mirror state offenses?

The opinion distinguishes municipal ordinance cases from state criminal offenses but does not analyze overlapping ordinances or parallel charges. For a state criminal charge in municipal court, it assigns prosecution authority to the district attorney general.

Citations

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 8-7-103, 40-1-107. Cases: City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001); Hill v. State ex rel. Phillips, 216 Tenn. 503, 392 S.W.2d 950 (1965); Moore v. State, 159 Tenn. 468, 19 S.W.2d 233 (1929); City of White House v. Whitley, 979 S.W.2d 262 (Tenn. 1998); Quillen v. Crockett, 928 S.W.2d 47 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); Ramsey v. Town of Oliver Springs, 998 S.W.2d 207 (Tenn. 1999). Prior AG opinion: Op. 01-120 (July 31, 2001).

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2013/op13-085.pdf

Original opinion text

November 6, 2013

Opinion No. 13-85

Authority of District Attorneys General in Municipal Courts

QUESTION

If a citation issued for a state criminal offense requires the defendant's appearance in a municipal court, is the district attorney general divested of authority to prosecute the offense?

OPINION

No. The district attorney general is the only person with authority to prosecute a State of Tennessee criminal offense in a municipal court.

ANALYSIS

While ordinarily the jurisdiction of municipal courts is limited to cases involving violations of municipal ordinances, it may be extended by the General Assembly to include other cases arising under Tennessee law. See, e.g., City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248, 276-77 (Tenn. 2001); Hill v. State ex rel. Phillips, 216 Tenn. 503, 507, 392 S.W.2d 950, 952 (1965); Moore v. State, 159 Tenn. 468, 19 S.W.2d 233, 233 (1929). Accordingly, the General Assembly has provided that certain municipal courts have original jurisdiction of Tennessee criminal offenses. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-1-107 (providing that "[o]riginal jurisdiction of criminal actions is committed to the city judges of certain towns and cities"). Those municipal courts that exercise jurisdiction over criminal offenses are usually accorded concurrent jurisdiction with general sessions courts for offenses committed within the city limits. See, e.g., City of White House v. Whitley, 979 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tenn. 1998) (noting authority of White House Municipal Court "to exercise jurisdiction concurrent with courts of general sessions in all cases involving the violation of the criminal law of the State within the corporate limits of the city").

The General Assembly has also specified the duties of a district attorney general to include that "[e]ach district attorney general: (1) [s]hall prosecute in the courts of the district all violations of the state criminal statutes and perform all prosecutorial functions attendant thereto, including prosecuting cases in a municipal court where the municipality provides sufficient personnel to the district attorney general for that purpose." Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103. There are no Tennessee statutes that specifically govern the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in determining whether, if at all, criminal proceedings are to be instituted. Quillen v. Crockett, 928 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). However, the Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he District Attorney General and only the District Attorney General can make the decision whether to proceed with a prosecution for an offense committed within his or her district." Ramsey v. Town of Oliver Springs, 998 S.W.2d 207, 209 (Tenn. 1999). This Office has previously opined in reviewing these authorities that, "[t]herefore, no other entity or individual [other than the District Attorney General] may prosecute state criminal actions in a municipal court vested with concurrent general sessions jurisdiction." Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 01-120, at 2 (July 31, 2001).

Thus, if a citation issued for a state criminal offense commands the defendant's appearance in municipal court, the district attorney general is the only person with authority to prosecute the offense. The district attorney general may elect to prosecute the case in that court, dismiss the case there, or take any other appropriate action regarding the case as allowed by the law of Tennessee.

ROBERT E. COOPER, JR.
Attorney General and Reporter

WILLIAM E. YOUNG
Solicitor General

BENJAMIN A. BALL
Senior Counsel

Requested by:

The Honorable James G. Woodall
District Attorney General
P.O. Box 2825
Jackson, Tennessee 38302