Does Tennessee's 2004 Anti-Rabies Law override Wilson County's 1980 private act that taxes domestic animals to fund the local humane association?

Subject

Opinion No. 13-40, Wilson County Domestic Animal Tax and Tennessee Anti-Rabies Law, May 23, 2013

Plain-English summary

Wilson County has a 1980 private act, Chapter 242, that authorizes a $2 tax on domestic animals (collected when the animal is vaccinated) with the proceeds going to The Humane Association of Wilson County, Inc., "for its use in animal control." The state's 2004 Anti-Rabies Law (Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-8-101 to -113) requires rabies vaccinations for dogs and cats, lets local governments register pets and collect registration fees, and directs those fees into a rabies control fund for specific listed uses.

Representative Pody asked ten interrelated questions about how the 1980 private act interacts with the 2004 state law. The AG's bottom-line answers:

1. Does the Anti-Rabies Law repeal Chapter 242? No. Tennessee disfavors repeal by implication. Cronin v. Howe; In re Akins. Repeal by implication requires irreconcilable conflict. Chapter 242 (a tax for the humane association) and the Anti-Rabies Law (a registration fee for rabies control) serve different purposes and can coexist.

2. Does the Anti-Rabies Law supersede Chapter 242's tax? No. The tax and the registration fee are different things. Wilson County can collect both.

3. Does Chapter 242 meet the minimum requirements of the Anti-Rabies Law so as to exempt Wilson County? No. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-8-105(b) exempts counties with private rabies-control laws that meet the law's minimum requirements. Chapter 242 only authorizes a tax; it doesn't require vaccinations or set rabies-control standards. So Wilson County is not exempt and is subject to the Anti-Rabies Law.

4. Must the Wilson County Commission take steps to nullify Chapter 242? No (pretermitted; no conflict).

5. Can Wilson County pay the Chapter 242 tax proceeds to anyone other than the named association? No. The statute specifically names "The Humane Association of Wilson County, Inc." If that entity still legally exists and is engaged in animal control (even under a different operating name), the clerk pays to that organization. The clerk cannot pay to a different legal entity.

6. Must the humane association use the funds for "animal control"? Yes. Chapter 242 specifies "for its use in animal control." The term isn't defined, so the question of whether current activities fit depends on factual analysis.

7. How is Chapter 242 amended? By the General Assembly. Tenn. Const. art. II, § 17. Under art. XI, § 9, amendments to local acts must include local approval (local body or referendum).

8. Can the County Commission stop collecting the Chapter 242 tax? Yes, by resolution. Chapter 242 authorizes but doesn't mandate the tax. The Commission can cease collecting.

9. Can Wilson County also establish an Anti-Rabies Law registration program? Yes. The two laws don't conflict; the county can run both.

10. Can Wilson County increase the Chapter 242 tax or redirect proceeds to a county-run animal control program? Increasing the tax: no, the $2 cap is in the statute and requires General Assembly amendment. Redirecting: no, the proceeds must go to The Humane Association of Wilson County, Inc. But the county can run a separate animal control program under the Anti-Rabies Law's registration-fee authority.

Reconsideration of 1981 Opinion 81-46. The AG also formally walked back Op. 81-46, which had concluded Chapter 242 was constitutionally suspect as special legislation under Article XI, Section 8. Three reasons: (1) the Tennessee Supreme Court has since clarified that where there is no general law, a private act doesn't implicate Article XI, Section 8 (First Utility District of Carter County v. Clark; Civil Service Merit Board v. Burson); (2) the general laws Op. 81-46 relied on (§§ 5-8-102, -103) have been largely replaced by the business tax codified at § 67-4-701 et seq., and Chapter 242 doesn't conflict with those provisions because it taxes vaccination, not a business; (3) even if rational basis review applied, there may be many conceivable reasons that would support a Wilson County-specific animal control tax. Op. 81-46 was withdrawn.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2013. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

The Tennessee Anti-Rabies Law has been amended since 2013. The 1980 Wilson County Private Act 242 is local and may still be on the books in essentially the same form. Anyone advising on a current Wilson County animal control or rabies question should check the current state statute and verify the current status of the private act.

Background and statutory framework

Wilson County Private Act 242 (1980). 1980 Tenn. Private Acts, ch. 242. Authorizes a $2 per head annual tax on domestic animals, collected when the animal is vaccinated, with proceeds paid to the county clerk and then to "The Humane Association of Wilson County, Inc., for its use in animal control."

Tennessee Anti-Rabies Law (2004). Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-8-101 to -113. Key provisions:

• § 68-8-103: Dogs and cats six months or older must be vaccinated against rabies.
• § 68-8-104(a): Local governments may adopt registration requirements for cats/dogs. "[I]n addition to, but not as a substitute for or in any way detracting from" the vaccination requirements.
• § 68-8-104(b): Local registration laws must include collection methods and require fee revenue to be used for a rabies control program (a/k/a animal control program). Must ensure vaccination, biting animal observation/confinement, etc.
• § 68-8-104(d): Registration fees go into the county/municipality rabies control fund. Allowable uses: salaries, animal shelter, animal control program, other expenses incidental to enforcement of the chapter.
• § 68-8-105(a): Counties or municipalities maintaining a rabies control program are exempt if the program meets the chapter's minimum requirements.
• § 68-8-105(b): The chapter doesn't apply to any county that has or may enact private rabies-control laws meeting the chapter's minimum requirements.
• §§ 68-8-106 to -109: Vaccination tags, stray animal release, observation/confinement of suspected rabid animals.
• § 68-8-112: Commissioner of Health's rulemaking authority.

General authority for county animal regulation. § 5-1-120: counties can license/regulate cats and dogs by resolution.

Statutory construction principles.

• Statutes on the same subject should be construed together (In re Akins, 87 S.W.3d 488 (Tenn. 2002)).
• Legislature is presumed aware of existing statutes when enacting new ones (Shorts v. Bartholomew, 278 S.W.3d 268 (Tenn. 2009)).
• Repeal by implication isn't favored; requires that "no fair and reasonable construction will permit the statutes to stand together" (Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn. 1995); Hayes v. Gibson County, 288 S.W.3d 334 (Tenn. 2009)).

Article XI, section 8 framework for private acts. Harwell v. Leech, 672 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. 1984), and Sanford v. Pearson, 190 Tenn. 652 (1950), set out the two-step analysis:

1. Private acts that confer special benefits/burdens where there's no general statute (only common law) are generally upheld.
2. Private acts that amend or abrogate a prior general statute as applied to a particular county are struck down unless there's a reasonable basis for the classification.

Smith County v. Enoch, 2003 WL 535914 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), adds: an Article XI, § 8 challenge requires showing more than that the private act differs from the general law; the private act must "flatly contravene a generally applicable statewide statute."

Walking back Op. 81-46. That 1981 AG opinion had concluded Chapter 242 conflicted with §§ 5-8-102 and -103 (general county taxation provisions). The 2013 opinion reversed for three reasons:

• First Utility District of Carter County v. Clark, 834 S.W.2d 283 (Tenn. 1992), and Civil Service Merit Board v. Burson, 816 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1991), confirm that where there's no general law on the subject, a private act doesn't implicate Article XI, § 8.
• §§ 5-8-102 and -103 have been largely supplanted by the business tax at § 67-4-701 et seq. Chapter 242 doesn't tax a business; it taxes the vaccination of an animal. The systems don't conflict.
• Many local-tax private acts have grown up around hotel/motel taxes, wheel taxes, etc., without facing constitutional challenge under §§ 5-8-103. The taxation/non-taxation distinction is not the same as exemption.
• Even under rational-basis review, many conceivable bases might support a Wilson County-specific animal control tax. Because the act names Wilson County by name (not by population bracket), the rational-basis analysis can draw on any feature of Wilson County, not just population.

No repeal by implication. Chapter 242 (a domestic animal tax for a specific named humane association) doesn't conflict with the Anti-Rabies Law (registration fees and statewide vaccination requirements). They serve different purposes. Cronin v. Howe; Hayes v. Gibson County. Both can stand together.

No minimum-requirements exemption. Chapter 242 doesn't require vaccinations or impose other rabies-control requirements. It only authorizes a tax. So it doesn't meet the minimum requirements of the Anti-Rabies Law, and Wilson County isn't exempt under § 68-8-105(b).

Distribution restrictions. Chapter 242 specifies the named recipient and the use. Statutory construction requires giving effect to the plain language. Knox County v. Arrow Exterminators, 350 S.W.3d 511 (Tenn. 2011); Chapman v. DaVita, 380 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2012); Rich v. Tennessee Bd. of Medical Examiners, 350 S.W.3d 919 (Tenn. 2011). The county clerk pays to the named association.

Amending a private act. Generally requires General Assembly action. Tenn. Const. art. II, § 17. Local approval (legislative body or referendum) is required under art. XI, § 9.

Common questions

What was Chapter 242 originally for?

Wilson County's 1980 private act authorized a $2 tax on domestic animals, collected at vaccination, to fund the local humane association's animal control activities. It's a small dedicated revenue stream for animal welfare.

Doesn't the state's Anti-Rabies Law preempt the local tax?

No. The two laws address different things. Chapter 242 is a tax for the local humane association. The Anti-Rabies Law is a statewide vaccination requirement with optional local registration fees for a rabies-control fund. Both can operate in Wilson County simultaneously.

Can Wilson County stop the Chapter 242 tax?

Yes, by resolution of the County Commission. Chapter 242 authorizes the tax; it doesn't require it. The Commission can cease collecting.

Can Wilson County increase the Chapter 242 tax?

No, not unilaterally. The $2 cap is in the statute. The General Assembly would have to amend the private act, which requires local approval under art. XI, § 9.

Can the humane association use the funds for things other than animal control?

The statute requires "use in animal control." That term isn't defined. Whether current activities fit is a factual question. Sheltering animals, adopting animals, spay/neuter programs, and education about responsible pet ownership are arguably all animal control. Funding general humane society overhead unrelated to animals would be harder.

What if The Humane Association of Wilson County, Inc. is now operating under a different name?

If the legal entity still exists and is engaged in animal control (even under a different operating name), the clerk pays to that entity. The clerk cannot pay to a different legal entity, even one that is "successor" in some informal sense.

Was the 1981 AG opinion wrong?

The 2013 opinion concluded that Op. 81-46's analysis of Chapter 242 as unconstitutional special legislation was wrong. The Tennessee Supreme Court's later case law on Article XI, § 8, and the gradual replacement of §§ 5-8-102, -103 by the modern business tax, have shifted the legal landscape. The AG formally withdrew Op. 81-46 in this opinion.

Citations

Statutes: Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-8-101 to -113 (Anti-Rabies Law); §§ 5-1-120, 5-8-102, 5-8-103. 1980 Tenn. Private Acts, ch. 242. Tenn. Const. art. II, § 17; art. XI, § 8; art. XI, § 9. Cases: In re Akins, 87 S.W.3d 488 (Tenn. 2002); Shorts v. Bartholomew, 278 S.W.3d 268 (Tenn. 2009); Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn. 1995); Hayes v. Gibson County, 288 S.W.3d 334 (Tenn. 2009); Harwell v. Leech, 672 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. 1984); Sanford v. Pearson, 190 Tenn. 652, 231 S.W.2d 336 (1950); Smith County v. Enoch, 2003 WL 535914 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); First Utility District of Carter County v. Clark, 834 S.W.2d 283 (Tenn. 1992); Civil Service Merit Board v. Burson, 816 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1991); Knox County v. Arrow Exterminators, 350 S.W.3d 511 (Tenn. 2011); Chapman v. DaVita, 380 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2012); Rich v. Tennessee Bd. of Medical Examiners, 350 S.W.3d 919 (Tenn. 2011); Rector v. Griffith, 563 S.W.2d 899 (Tenn. 1978). Prior AG opinions: Op. 81-46 (Jan. 22, 1981) (withdrawn by this opinion).

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2013/op13-040.pdf

Original opinion text

S T A T E O F T E N N E S S E E
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
PO BOX 20207
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37202

May 23, 2013

Opinion No. 13-40

Wilson County Domestic Animal Tax and Tennessee Anti-Rabies Law

QUESTIONS

1. Does Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-8-101 to -113 (hereinafter the "Tennessee Anti-Rabies Law" or "the Anti-Rabies Law"), adopted in 2004, repeal Chapter 242 of the 1980 Tennessee Private Acts (hereinafter "Private Act 242")?

2. Does the Tennessee Anti-Rabies Law, which authorizes counties to charge a fee for the registration of cats and dogs that becomes part of the county or municipality rabies control fund for the purposes listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-8-104(d), supersede the collection of the tax allowed by Chapter 242?

3. Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-8-105(b), the Anti-Rabies Law does not apply to any county "that has or hereafter may enact private laws governing the control of rabies in that county, that meet the minimum requirements of this chapter." Does Chapter 242 meet the minimum requirements of the Law so that the Law would not apply in Wilson County?

4. If the Anti-Rabies Law supersedes Chapter 242, must the Wilson County Commission take any steps to nullify Chapter 242?

5. Assuming Chapter 242 remains valid, may Wilson County pay the proceeds of the tax collected under Chapter 242 to any organization other than "The Humane Association of Wilson County, Inc."?

6. If The Humane Association of Wilson County, Inc., no longer uses the funds it receives under Chapter 242 for "animal control," is the Association using the funds as required by Chapter 242?

7. Assuming Chapter 242 is still valid, how may it be amended?

8. Could the Wilson County Commission, by resolution, cease to collect the tax levied under Chapter 242?

9. Assuming Chapter 242 is still valid, may the Wilson County Commission establish a registration program and levy a fee under Tennessee Anti-Rabies Law?

10. Assuming Chapter 242 is still valid, may the Wilson County Commission increase the fee for animal control imposed by the Tennessee Anti-Rabies Law and assign the funds to a rabies or animal control program operated directly by the County?

OPINIONS

1. No. Chapter 242 authorizes Wilson County to levy a tax on cats and dogs and distribute the proceeds to The Humane Association of Wilson County, Inc., "for its use in animal control." The Tennessee Anti-Rabies Law does not irreconcilably conflict with Chapter 242 and thus did not repeal the Chapter 242.

2. No.

3. No. Because Chapter 242 does not meet the minimum requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-8-101 to -113, within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-8-105(b), the Anti-Rabies Law applies to Wilson County.

4. This question is pretermitted because there is no conflict between the Tennessee Anti-Rabies Law and Chapter 242.

5. The proceeds of the tax collected under Chapter 242 must be distributed to The Humane Association of Wilson County, Inc. for its use in animal control. If The Humane Association of Wilson County, Inc. still legally exists and is engaged in animal control in the county but is operating under a different name, then the clerk must still pay the tax proceeds to The Humane Association of Wilson County, Inc. or its successor.

6. Chapter 242 specifies that tax distributed must be used by the Humane Association of Wilson County, Inc. for "animal control."

7. Generally, a private act must be amended by the Tennessee General Assembly. Under Article XI, Section 9, of the Tennessee Constitution, such an amendment, being of local application, must provide for local approval either by the local governing body or by local referendum.

8. Yes. The County Commission may, by resolution, cease collecting the tax authorized under Chapter 242.

9. Given no conflict exists between the Tennessee Anti-Rabies Law and Chapter 242, Wilson County may establish a registration program and levy a fee as authorized under Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-8-104.

10. Yes. Wilson County may impose and distribute the fees authorized by the Anti-Rabies Law for a rabies or animal control program given there is no conflict between the Anti-Rabies Law and Chapter 242.

ANALYSIS

Chapter 242 authorizes the Wilson County Commission to impose an annual tax on cats and dogs, providing in relevant part:

That whoever vaccinates domestic animals shall collect the Two Dollar ($2) domestic animal tax, and pay the same over to the County Clerk, who shall in turn pay the same over to The Humane Association of Wilson County, Inc., for its use in animal control.

1980 Tenn. Private Acts, ch. 242, § 5. Chapter 242 collects these funds for the general use of "animal control," which is an undefined term. Id.

Initially, in 1981, this Office opined that Chapter 242, in authorizing Wilson County to impose a $2 per head tax on the vaccination of domestic animals, was constitutionally suspect as special legislation under Article XI, Section 8, of the Tennessee Constitution. Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 81-46 (Jan. 22, 1981). That opinion concluded that Chapter 242 conflicted with the general law, specifically Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-8-102(a) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-8-103. The provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-8-102(a) provide that "[e]ach county is empowered to levy privilege taxes upon merchants and such other vocations, occupations or businesses as are declared to be privileges, not exceeding in amount that levied by the state for state purposes," and Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-8-103 states that "[t]he property and privileges that are taxable or exempt from taxation, for county purposes, are the same that are taxable or exempt from taxation for state revenue." Opinion 81-46 concluded Chapter 242 conflicted with these general laws and, given that conflict, Tennessee law required there must be a special reason justifying the creation of this special classification for Wilson County.

Upon further review, this Office now concludes the more persuasive position is that Chapter 242 is defensible from a constitutional challenge under Article XI, Section 8. Under the law of Tennessee, private acts designating a county by name are not per se unconstitutional. See Harwell v. Leech, 672 S.W.2d 761, 762 (Tenn. 1984).

The review of the validity of a private act such as Chapter 242 under Article XI, Section 8 is necessarily a two-step process. As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained:

Our cases make a clear distinction between (1) Private Acts which confer special benefits and impose special burdens on the citizens of one county, when there is no general statute, and when before the Private Act, there was only the common law, and (2) those Private Acts which undertake to amend or abrogate a prior general statute in its application to a particular county or class of counties. Private Acts of the former class have been upheld, and those of the latter class struck down [unless there is at least a reasonable basis to justify the Private Act's classification].

Harwell v. Leech, 672 S.W.2d at 762-63 (quoting Sanford v. Pearson, 190 Tenn. 652, 657-58, 231 S.W.2d 336, 338 (1950)).

Applying this test to Chapter 242, the more persuasive position is that no Tennessee general law conflicts with Chapter 242 and, even if such a general law existed, a reasonable basis likely exists to support the classification created by Chapter 242 from a constitutional challenge under Article XI, Section 8. First, because there is no general law governing the taxation of the vaccination of domestic animals, Article XI, Section 8, does not prevent the General Assembly from authorizing this special tax in Wilson or any other county. See First Utility District of Carter County v. Clark, 834 S.W.2d 283 (Tenn. 1992); Civil Service Merit Board v. Burson, 816 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1991). The general laws relied upon by Opinion 81-46, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 5-8-102(a) and 5-8-103, have been essentially replaced by the business tax codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-701 to -730. But the tax authorized by Chapter 242 is not a tax on a merchant, vocation, occupation, or business, but on the vaccination of a domestic animal. It would be unreasonable to continue to assume that the taxation system in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 5-8-102 and -103, which had been largely supplanted by the business tax when Chapter 242 was enacted, renders it impermissible for a county to address its animal control problem in part through a local tax on vaccinations, unrelated to any business endeavor.

For the reasons stated above, this Office concludes Chapter 242 is constitutionally defensible. Thus Opinion 81-46 no longer represents the view of this Office.

Turning to the Tennessee Anti-Rabies Law, this Law is codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-8-101 to -113. Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-8-103, dogs and cats six months of age or older must be vaccinated against rabies. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-8-104(a) authorizes local governments to adopt local laws or ordinances to require the registration of cats or dogs. This authority is, "[i]n addition to, but not as a substitute for or in any way detracting from the vaccination requirements of this chapter." Local animal registration laws or ordinances must include methods for collecting a registration fee to establish and maintain a rabies control program. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-8-104(b). All fees collected for registration become part of the county or municipality rabies control fund. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-8-104(d).

The Anti-Rabies Law exempts certain counties from its provisions, stating:

(a) Any county or municipality maintaining a program for the control of rabies shall be exempt from the operation of this chapter so long as such rabies program meets the minimum requirements of this chapter.

(b) This chapter shall not apply to any county that now has or hereafter may enact private laws governing the control of rabies in that county, that meet the minimum requirements of this chapter.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-8-105.

1. The Tennessee Anti-Rabies Law does not explicitly or implicitly repeal Chapter 242. Courts require as a rule of statutory construction that statutes on the same subject should be construed together so they do not conflict. In re Akins, 87 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tenn. 2002). Repeals by implication are not favored in Tennessee and will be recognized "only when no fair and reasonable construction will permit the statutes to stand together." Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tenn. 1995). A court will hold a later statute to have repealed an earlier statute by implication only when the conflict between the statutes is irreconcilable.

The Tennessee Anti-Rabies Law does not conflict with Chapter 242. Chapter 242 authorizes the Wilson County Commission to levy a tax on domestic animals, to be paid when the animal is vaccinated. By contrast, the Anti-Rabies Law requires animals to be vaccinated against rabies and authorizes local governments to adopt local laws or ordinances requiring registration of dogs and cats. These provisions do not irreconcilably conflict with the county's authority under Chapter 242 to levy the tax referenced in Chapter 242 and use the proceeds to support the local humane association.

2. Specifically, Chapter 242 does not conflict with Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-8-104(d) of the Tennessee Anti-Rabies Law. Chapter 242 authorizes Wilson County to levy a tax for a specified amount with the proceeds to be used to sustain an animal control program. By contrast, Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-8-104(d) addresses the collection and use of registration fees set by the local government as part of a rabies control fund. While these laws both address matters related to animal control, they are not in irreconcilable conflict given they serve different and distinct purposes.

3. The enactment of Chapter 242 does not preclude Wilson County from coverage under the Tennessee Anti-Rabies Law. The Anti-Rabies Law does not apply to "any county that now has or hereafter may enact private laws governing the control of rabies in that county, that meet the minimum requirements of this chapter." Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-8-105(b). Chapter 242 authorizes the Wilson County Commission to levy an annual tax of $2 on domestic animals in the county. While Chapter 242 provides that the tax is collected by whoever vaccinates the animal, Chapter 242 does not require that the animals be vaccinated or impose any other regulatory requirements regarding rabies vaccination in the county. For these reasons, Chapter 242 does not meet the minimum requirements of the Tennessee Anti-Rabies Law, within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-8-105(b), and thus Wilson County is not excluded from compliance with the Anti-Rabies Law.

4. Because Chapter 242 and the Anti-Rabies Law do not conflict, question four regarding steps the Wilson County Commission could take in the event of such a conflict is pretermitted.

5. Chapter 242 only authorizes Wilson County to pay the proceeds of the tax collected to "The Humane Association of Wilson County, Inc." When a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, courts need not look beyond the statute itself and must simply enforce the statute as written. Knox County ex rel. Environmental Termite & Pest Control, Inc. v. Arrow Exterminators, Inc., 350 S.W.3d 511, 524 (Tenn. 2011). Chapter 242 authorizes the county clerk to pay the proceeds of the tax only to The Humane Association of Wilson County, Inc. for its use in animal control. The statute does not specify any alternate or successor organization.

6. The Humane Association of Wilson County, Inc., must use any funds distributed under Chapter 242 for "animal control." Chapter 242 expressly states that the tax authorized is to be paid to this organization "for its use in animal control." The opinion request does not specify the activities the organization currently funds with the tax proceeds. Since Chapter 242 contains no definition of the term "animal control," it is possible that the organization's current activities may fall within the term. Any such determination would require an analysis of the facts surrounding the current use to which the funds are being put.

7. Generally, a private act such as Chapter 242 must be amended by the General Assembly. See Tenn. Const. art. II, § 17. Under article XI, section 9, of the Tennessee Constitution, an act of local application must provide for local approval either by the local legislative body or by local referendum before the act becomes effective.

8. The Wilson County Commission may, by resolution, cease to impose the domestic animal tax authorized by Chapter 242. Chapter 242 authorizes but does not require Wilson County to impose the tax.

9. Chapter 242 does not preclude Wilson County from establishing a registration program and levying a fee as authorized under Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-8-104. As discussed above, Chapter 242 does not conflict with Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-8-104.

10. Wilson County is prohibited from increasing the fee for animal control under Chapter 242 and may not assign the funds derived from the Act to a rabies or animal control program operated directly by the county. The Act limits this tax to $2 per domestic animal. Therefore the Wilson County Commission may not increase the tax to more than $2 unless the General Assembly amends Chapter 242. However, per the above analysis, Chapter 242 does not preclude Wilson County from establishing a registration program and fee for a rabies or animal control program as authorized by the Tennessee Anti-Rabies Law.

ROBERT E. COOPER, JR.
Attorney General and Reporter

WILLIAM E. YOUNG
Solicitor General

ANN LOUISE VIX
Senior Counsel

Requested by:
The Honorable Mark A. Pody
State Representative
203 War Memorial Building
Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0146