Can Tennessee suspend a doctor, nurse, or insurance agent's professional license because they fell behind on their student loans?

Subject

Opinion No. 12-22, Revocation of Professional Licenses Due to Student Loan Arrears, February 22, 2012

Plain-English summary

Representative Brown asked the AG whether HB 0740 was constitutional. The bill would have amended Titles 3, 49, and 56 of the Tennessee Code to let the Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation (TSAC) or its guarantee agency move to suspend a person's professional license if the person was delinquent or in default on student loans.

The AG ran a standard two-step due-process review.

The right at stake. A professional license is a property interest and a liberty interest protected by both the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and Tenn. Const. art. I, § 8. Martin v. Sizemore (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). It is not a fundamental right. Conn v. Gabbert (1999); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners (1957); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia (1976). So legislation affecting it draws rational-basis review, not strict scrutiny.

Procedural due process. Did HB 0740 give debtors fair notice and a meaningful hearing? Yes. The bill required TSAC or the guarantee agency to serve notice of intent to file a suspension order, either personally or by certified mail with return receipt requested. The notice had to specify that the license would be suspended in 90 days unless the debtor paid, entered or complied with a payment plan, requested or qualified for deferment or forbearance, or requested a hearing. Hearings would be governed by the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that the UAPA satisfies procedural due process by providing chancery-court review of agency decisions. Threadgill v. Board of Professional Responsibility (Tenn. 2009).

Substantive due process. Was the bill rationally related to a legitimate state interest? Yes. The state has a substantial interest in collecting student loans guaranteed by TSAC. License suspension is rationally related to that interest. Several jurisdictions had upheld similar license-suspension statutes for nonpayment of child support against substantive due process challenges, applying the same rational-basis framework. Amunrud v. Board of Appeals (Wash. 2006) (commercial driver's license suspension for child-support arrears: rationally related to the state's interest in encouraging legally responsible persons to support their children); Thompson v. Ellenbecker (D.S.D. 1995); State v. Beans (Alaska 1998); Tolces v. Trask (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). The AG noted that nonpayment of student loans is similarly unrelated to one's ability to practice a profession, but rational-basis review does not require a tight nexus between the conduct sanctioned and the license at stake.

Bottom line. HB 0740, if enacted as drafted, would be constitutionally defensible.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2012. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Many states have rolled back license-suspension regimes for student-loan default in the years since 2012, in response to evidence that suspending a borrower's source of income makes repayment less likely. Tennessee's current statutory regime may differ from HB 0740 as drafted. Anyone facing a license-suspension threat tied to student loans should consult current law and counsel.

Background and statutory framework

Constitutional starting points.

• Federal: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
• State: Tenn. Const. art. I, § 8 (analogous due-process protection).
• The right to work in a chosen profession is a protected property and liberty interest under both, but not a fundamental right. Martin v. Sizemore.

Rational-basis test. A non-fundamental right legislation survives if it bears a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. Riggs v. Burson (Tenn. 1997); Newton v. Cox (Tenn. 1994). The court must identify a legitimate governmental interest that the legislative body could rationally conclude was served by the act. Parks Properties (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

Procedural due process baseline. Individuals must be given an opportunity to have their legal claims heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Lynch v. City of Jellico (Tenn. 2006); Logan (1982). Tennessee's UAPA satisfies this baseline. Threadgill (Tenn. 2009); Bobbitt (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Watts v. Burkhart (6th Cir. 1988).

Comparable cases. Multiple jurisdictions have upheld license-suspension statutes for child-support arrears on the same rational-basis framework: Amunrud (Wash. 2006); Thompson (D.S.D. 1995); State v. Beans (Alaska 1998); Tolces (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).

Common questions

Q: Can my professional license be suspended right now because I am behind on my student loans?
A: This opinion was about a 2012 bill, not current law. Many states have repealed similar regimes since 2012. Pull current Tennessee statute before assuming any specific consequence.

Q: What does "rational basis" mean here?
A: The lowest level of constitutional scrutiny. A law passes rational basis if any conceivable legitimate state interest could be advanced by the law, even modestly. Courts give the Legislature wide latitude.

Q: Could the state suspend a license without giving me a hearing?
A: Per this opinion, no. Procedural due process requires notice and a meaningful hearing before a license is suspended. HB 0740 provided both, and the UAPA framework is the constitutional standard for agency adjudication in Tennessee.

Q: Is a professional license a fundamental right?
A: No. Courts have repeatedly held the right to practice a particular profession is not fundamental. That is why rational-basis review applies rather than strict scrutiny.

Q: Are there limits on how big the loan delinquency must be before suspension?
A: HB 0740 as proposed used the categories "delinquent" or "in default" without a dollar threshold. Comparable child-support statutes in other states often use dollar thresholds (e.g., $1,000 in Ohio). Check the final enacted text and TSAC's implementing rules for actual practice.

Citations and references

Constitutional provisions and statutes:

• U.S. Const. amend. XIV
• Tenn. Const. art. I, § 8
• HB 0740 (107th General Assembly)

Cases:

• Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997)
• Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)
• Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286 (1999)
• Martin v. Sizemore, 78 S.W.3d 249 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)
• Threadgill v. Bd. of Professional Responsibility, 299 S.W.3d 792 (Tenn. 2009)
• Lynch v. City of Jellico, 205 S.W.3d 384 (Tenn. 2006)
• Amunrud v. Board of Appeals, 143 P.3d 571 (Wash. 2006)
• Riggs v. Burson, 941 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. 1997)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2012/op12-022.pdf

Original opinion text

Revocation of Professional Licenses Due to Student Loan Arrears
QUESTION
Is House Bill 0740 of the 107th General Assembly (hereinafter "HB0740")
constitutionally suspect?
OPINION
No. HB0740 is constitutionally defensible as it is rationally related to the legitimate state
interest of compelling the repayment of student loans and provides sufficient due process to
protect the rights of debtors.
ANALYSIS
HB0740 would amend Title 3, Title 49, and Title 56 of the Tennessee Code to provide for
the revocation of a professional license when a debtor is delinquent or in default on student loan
obligations.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the significance of a person's interest in
remaining employed. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932 (1997); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985). The right to work in a chosen profession without
unreasonable government interference is a property and liberty interest "protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Tenn. Const. art. I § 8." Martin v. Sizemore,
78 S.W.3d 249, 262 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959).
See also State v. AAA Aaron's Action Agency Bail Bonds, Inc., 993 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1998).
The level of scrutiny for legislative acts that invoke due process concerns is determined
by whether the right in question is fundamental. The United States Supreme Court recently held
that "[t]he liberty component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause includes some
generalized due process right to choose one's field of private employment, but a right which is
nevertheless subject to reasonable government regulation." Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291-
92 (1999) (emphasis added). Various federal courts have also concluded that there is no
fundamental right to employment in a specific field. See Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353
U.S. 232, 238 (1957) (no fundamental right to practice law); Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
Page 2
427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (no fundamental right to government employment). See also
Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 29 n.3 (1st
Cir. 2005) (no fundamental right to pursue an
occupation and legislation infringing upon such a right is subject to a rational basis review).
Procedural Due Process
As a professional license is a property right and liberty interest protected by Article I,
Section 8, of the Tennessee Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, revocation of a license must comport with the requirements of procedural due
process. The Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized in this context that the “most basic
principle underpinning procedural due process is that individuals be given an opportunity to have
their legal claims heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Lynch v. City of
Jellico, 205 S.W.3d 384, 391 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S.
422, 429-30 (1982)).
HB0740 meets the requirements of procedural due process. HB0740 requires the
Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation (“TSAC”) or the guarantee agency to serve upon a
debtor notice of intent to file an order with a licensing agency to revoke the debtor‟s license.
HB0740 mandates that TSAC or the guarantee agency either personally serve the notice upon the
debtor or mail it by certified mail with return receipt requested. HB0740 also requires that the
notice state with specificity that the debtor‟s license shall be suspended within ninety days unless
the debtor pays the debt, enters into or complies with a payment plan, requests or qualifies for
deferment or forbearance, or requests a hearing.
Should the debtor request a hearing, HB0740 specifies that the hearing shall be governed
by the rules and regulations of the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act
(“UAPA”). It is well settled that the “UAPA satisfies procedural due process standards by
providing chancery court review of agency decisions.” Threadgill v. Bd. of Professional
Responsibility of Supreme Court, 299 S.W.3d 792, 814 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Bobbitt v. Shell, 115
S.W.3d 506, 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)). See also Watts v. Burkhart, 854 F.2d 839, 841 (6th
Cir.
1988). Accordingly, because HB0740 provides debtors the opportunity for a hearing to have their
legal claims heard pursuant to the UAPA, HB0740 comports with the requirements of procedural
due process.
Substantive Due Process
The Due Process clause guarantees more than just a fair procedural process. Parks
Properties v. Maury County, 70 S.W.3d 735, 743 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997)). The clause also bars “certain governmental actions
regardless of the procedures used to implement them.” Id. at 744 (citing County of Sacramento
v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 830 (1998) and Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). Thus,
substantive due process protects against “acts of government officials that are so far beyond the
outer limits of legitimate government that no amount of process could cure the deficiency.” Id.
(citing Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 262-63 (2d. Cir. 1999) and Front Royal and
Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 288 (4th
Cir. 1998)).
427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (no fundamental right to government employment). See also
Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 29 n.3 (1ˢᵗ Cir. 2005) (no fundamental right to pursue an
As a professional license is a property right and liberty interest protected by Article I,
Section 8, of the Tennessee Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, revocation of a license must comport with the requirements of procedural due
process. The Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized in this context that the "most basic
principle underpinning procedural due process is that individuals be given an opportunity to have
their legal claims heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Lynch v. City of
Jellico, 205 S.W.3d 384, 391 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S.
HB0740 meets the requirements of procedural due process. HB0740 requires the
Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation ("TSAC") or the guarantee agency to serve upon a
debtor notice of intent to file an order with a licensing agency to revoke the debtor's license.
HB0740 mandates that TSAC or the guarantee agency either personally serve the notice upon the
debtor or mail it by certified mail with return receipt requested. HB0740 also requires that the
notice state with specificity that the debtor's license shall be suspended within ninety days unless
the debtor pays the debt, enters into or complies with a payment plan, requests or qualifies for
Should the debtor request a hearing, HB0740 specifies that the hearing shall be governed
by the rules and regulations of the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act
("UAPA"). It is well settled that the "UAPA satisfies procedural due process standards by
providing chancery court review of agency decisions." Threadgill v. Bd. of Professional
Responsibility of Supreme Court, 299 S.W.3d 792, 814 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Bobbitt v. Shell, 115
S.W.3d 506, 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)). See also Watts V. Burkhart, 854 F.2d 839, 841 (6th Cir.
1988). Accordingly, because HB0740 provides debtors the opportunity for a hearing to have their
legal claims heard pursuant to the UAPA, HB0740 comports with the requirements of procedural
The Due Process clause guarantees more than just a fair procedural process. Parks
Properties v. Maury County, 70 S.W.3d 735, 743 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997)). The clause also bars "certain governmental actions
regardless of the procedures used to implement them." Id. at 744 (citing County of Sacramento
v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 830 (1998) and Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). Thus,
substantive due process protects against "acts of government officials that are so far beyond the
outer limits of legitimate government that no amount of process could cure the deficiency." Id.
(citing Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258, 262-63 (2d. Cir. 1999) and Front Royal and
Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 288 (4th Cir. 1998)).
Page 3
Where the right involved is not a fundamental one, “a statute comports with substantive due
process if it bears „a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose‟ and is „neither arbitrary
nor discriminatory.‟” Riggs v. Burson, 941 S.W.2d 44, 51 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Newton v. Cox,
878 S.W.2d 105, 110 (Tenn. 1994)). Accordingly, for HB0740 to survive a substantive due
process analysis, a court must “identify a legitimate governmental interest that the legislative
body could rationally conclude was served by the legislative act.” Parks Properties v. Maury
County, 70 S.W.3d, 735, 744 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
While statutes providing for revocation of licenses as a consequence of defaulting on
student loans are relatively new legal developments, similar statutes involving license revocation
for non-payment of child support have been ruled upon in multiple jurisdictions. The State of
Washington has enacted a statute, that permits the revocation of a professional license of a
person who has failed to pay child support. Wash. Rev. Code § 74.20A.320 (2009). In Amunrud
v. Board of Appeals, the State of Washington, Department of Social and Health Services,
suspended Mr. Amunrud‟s commercial driver‟s license for failure to pay child support pursuant
to this statute. Amunrud v. Board of Appeals, 143 P.3d 571 (Wash. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
1282 (2007). Mr. Amunrud filed suit, claiming the statute was unconstitutional and violated his
substantive due process rights. Id. Performing a rational basis analysis, the Washington Supreme
Court determined that, while non-payment of child support is unrelated to one‟s driving abilities,
Section 74.20A.320 promotes the State‟s interest in “encouraging legally responsible persons to
financially support their children.” Id. at 578-79. Accordingly, the Washington Supreme Court
determined that Section 74.20A 320 was rationally related to a legitimate state interest and was
consistent with substantive due process. Id. at 579. Other courts considering this question have
reached similar conclusions. See Thompson v. Ellenbecker, 935 F.Supp. 1037 (D. S.D. 1995)
and State v. Beans, 965 P.2d 725 (Alaska 1998) (license suspension is effective at promoting
payment of child support); Tolces v. Trask, 76 Cal.App. 4th
285 (1999) (license suspension is a
rational means of enforcing child support orders); State v. Leuvoy, No. 03CA66, 2004 WL
944387 (Ohio Ct. App. April 29, 2004), appeal denied, 814 N.E.2d 491 (Ohio 2004) (upheld
statute prohibiting renewal or issuance of driver‟s license to those owing more than $1000 in
child support arrears).
Given the above, it is our opinion there exists a rational basis for HB0740. Specifically,
we believe a court would find that the State of Tennessee has a substantial interest in ensuring
the payment of student loans guaranteed by TSAC and that HB0740 is tailored to advance such
an interest. Accordingly, HB0740 does not offend the substantive due process rights of debtors
whose licenses would be subject to revocation.
As HB0740 does not offend either procedural or substantive due process, it is
constitutionally defensible.
ROBERT E. COOPER, JR.
Attorney General and Reporter
Where the right involved is not a fundamental one, "a statute comports with substantive due
process if it bears ,,a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose' and is neither arbitrary
nor discriminatory.' Riggs v. Burson, 941 S.W.2d 44, 51 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Newton v. Cox,
878 S.W.2d 105, 110 (Tenn. 1994)). Accordingly, for HB0740 to survive a substantive due
process analysis, a court must "identify a legitimate governmental interest that the legislative
body could rationally conclude was served by the legislative act." Parks Properties v. Maury
County, 70 S.W.3d, 735, 744 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
While statutes providing for revocation of licenses as a consequence of defaulting on
student loans are relatively new legal developments, similar statutes involving license revocation
for non-payment of child support have been ruled upon in multiple jurisdictions. The State of
Washington has enacted a statute, that permits the revocation of a professional license of a
person who has failed to pay child support. Wash. Rev. Code § 74.20A.320 (2009). In Amunrud
v. Board of Appeals, the State of Washington, Department of Social and Health Services,
suspended Mr. Amunrud's commercial driver's license for failure to pay child support pursuant
to this statute. Amunrud v. Board of Appeals, 143 P.3d 571 (Wash. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S.
1282 (2007). Mr. Amunrud filed suit, claiming the statute was unconstitutional and violated his
substantive due process rights. Id. Performing a rational basis analysis, the Washington Supreme
Court determined that, while non-payment of child support is unrelated to one's driving abilities,
Section 74.20A.320 promotes the State's interest in "encouraging legally responsible persons to
financially support their children." Id. at 578-79. Accordingly, the Washington Supreme Court
determined that Section 74.20A 320 was rationally related to a legitimate state interest and was
consistent with substantive due process. Id. at 579. Other courts considering this question have
reached similar conclusions. See Thompson v. Ellenbecker, 935 F.Supp. 1037 (D. S.D. 1995)
and State v. Beans, 965 P.2d 725 (Alaska 1998) (license suspension is effective at promoting
payment of child support); Tolces v. Trask, 76 Cal.App. 4th 285 (1999) (license suspension is a
rational means of enforcing child support orders); State v. Leuvoy, No. 03CA66, 2004 WL
944387 (Ohio Ct. App. April 29, 2004), appeal denied, 814 N.E.2d 491 (Ohio 2004) (upheld
statute prohibiting renewal or issuance of driver's license to those owing more than $1000 in
Given the above, it is our opinion there exists a rational basis for HB0740. Specifically,
we believe a court would find that the State of Tennessee has a substantial interest in ensuring
the payment of student loans guaranteed by TSAC and that HB0740 is tailored to advance such
an interest. Accordingly, HB0740 does not offend the substantive due process rights of debtors
As HB0740 does not offend either procedural or substantive due process, it is
Page 4
WILLIAM E. YOUNG
Solicitor General
ALEXANDER S. RIEGER
Assistant Attorney General
Requested by:
The Honorable Tommie F. Brown, Ph. D.
State Representative
36 Legislative Plaza
Nashville, TN 37243-0128