Which Shelby County court hears a Tennessee parentage action: only juvenile court, or also circuit and chancery?

Plain-English summary

Statewide, Tennessee parentage actions (paternity establishment, custody, visitation, support, and related issues for children born out of wedlock) can be filed in juvenile court or in any trial court with general jurisdiction (circuit, chancery). Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-307(a)(1). But that statute also carves out an exception: in any county with a population "not less than eight hundred twenty-five thousand (825,000) nor more than eight hundred thirty thousand (830,000)" per the 1990 federal census or later, "only the juvenile court shall have jurisdiction." Shelby County's 1990 census put it in that bracket, so only Shelby County Juvenile Court has parentage jurisdiction.

A state senator asked whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-104(f), enacted later, changes that result. § 37-1-104(f) reads:

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit and chancery court of any proceedings to establish paternity of children born out of lawful wedlock and to determine any custody, visitation, support, education or other issues regarding the care and control of children born out of wedlock.

The AG concluded that § 37-1-104(f) does not give Shelby Circuit and Chancery Courts back their parentage jurisdiction. Both statutes can be read together harmoniously. § 37-1-104(f) speaks only about juvenile-court jurisdiction (giving juvenile courts concurrent jurisdiction with circuit and chancery in counties that do not have the population-bracket carve-out). It does not affirmatively confer parentage jurisdiction on circuit and chancery courts in counties where the legislature has specifically taken that jurisdiction away. Tennessee disfavors repeals by implication, Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tenn. 1995); a later statute repeals an earlier one by implication only when the conflict is irreconcilable, and here it is not.

The opinion notes that the population-bracket exception triggers Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 8 scrutiny (legislative classifications), but a court would uphold it under rational basis review (Stalcup v. City of Gatlinburg, 577 S.W.2d 439 (Tenn. 1978)) given the legitimate justifications for handling parentage cases in large-population counties through a single specialized court.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2010. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: I want to file a parentage action in Shelby County. Where do I file?
A: Per this opinion, Shelby County Juvenile Court. The Shelby County Circuit and Chancery Courts do not have parentage jurisdiction under Title 36, Chapter 2.

Q: What if my parentage case is also tied to a divorce I have pending in Shelby County Circuit Court?
A: The opinion does not directly address joinder of related cases or how the circuit court should handle parentage-related issues that arise in a divorce. Consult a family-law attorney for the specifics. The general rule is that the substantive parentage action under Title 36, Chapter 2 belongs in juvenile court in Shelby County, even if the family has other matters in circuit court.

Q: Is this rule unique to Shelby County?
A: At the time of the opinion, yes. The population bracket (825,000 to 830,000) corresponded only to Shelby County under the 1990 census. The statute is drafted to apply to any county that falls into that bracket under a later census, so the carve-out is in theory mobile, but in practice has applied only to Shelby.

Q: What is "repeal by implication"?
A: When a later statute is so inconsistent with an earlier statute that the only way to read them together is to treat the earlier one as repealed. Tennessee courts disfavor implied repeals (Cronin, 906 S.W.2d at 912) and will recognize one only when no fair, reasonable construction permits both statutes to stand together. Here, both can stand: § 37-1-104(f) addresses juvenile-court jurisdiction; § 36-2-307(a)(1) addresses circuit and chancery jurisdiction. They do not conflict, and the population-bracket carve-out remains in force.

Q: Why would the legislature concentrate parentage jurisdiction in one court in Shelby County?
A: The opinion gestures at "a legitimate justification" without specifying. Consolidating parentage cases in juvenile court keeps related custody, visitation, and support proceedings in one specialized forum; in a county with very high case volume, that consolidation can produce efficiency gains, consistency of judgments, and better tracking of child-support obligations.

Background and statutory framework

Tennessee's parentage statute, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-2-301 et seq., authorizes actions to establish paternity, support, custody, and visitation for children born out of wedlock. § 36-2-307(a)(1) is the jurisdictional anchor: "The juvenile court or any trial court with general jurisdiction shall have jurisdiction of an action brought under this chapter; provided, that, in any county having a population not less than eight hundred twenty-five thousand (825,000) nor more than eight hundred thirty thousand (830,000), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census, only the juvenile court shall have jurisdiction of an action brought under this chapter."

Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-10-101 and § 16-11-102 make circuit and chancery courts courts of general jurisdiction; Stambaugh v. Price, 532 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tenn. 1976), confirms this. So statewide, those courts have parentage jurisdiction concurrent with juvenile court, except where the population-bracket carve-out applies.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-104(f) addresses juvenile-court jurisdiction over parentage and care-and-control of out-of-wedlock children. The "notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary" prefatory clause raises the question whether it overrides § 36-2-307(a)(1)'s carve-out. But the operative text is about juvenile court jurisdiction (giving juvenile courts concurrent jurisdiction with circuit and chancery), not about circuit and chancery court jurisdiction. § 37-1-104(f) also reserves matters in the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court under § 37-1-103. So § 37-1-104(f) does not affirmatively grant or restore parentage jurisdiction to Shelby County Circuit and Chancery Courts.

The construction principles the AG applies all support reading the two statutes together: harmonious construction (In re Akins, 87 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tenn. 2002)); presumption that the legislature is aware of related statutes (Shorts v. Bartholomew, 278 S.W.3d 268, 277 (Tenn. 2009)); preference for honoring both statutes when the conflict is not irreconcilable (Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d at 912; Hayes v. Gibson County, 288 S.W.3d 334, 338 (Tenn. 2009)).

The population-bracket carve-out itself raises Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 8 (Tennessee equal protection / class-legislation) questions. But Stalcup v. City of Gatlinburg, 577 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tenn. 1978), upholds legislative classifications when "any possible reason" can be envisioned, a deferential standard the population-bracket parentage rule easily satisfies.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• Tenn. Const. art. XI, § 8 (Tennessee equal protection / class-legislation)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-10-101 (circuit courts of general jurisdiction)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-11-102 (chancery courts of general jurisdiction)
• Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-2-301 et seq. (parentage actions)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-307(a)(1) (jurisdiction over parentage actions; Shelby County carve-out)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-103 (exclusive jurisdiction of juvenile court)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-104(f) (concurrent juvenile-court jurisdiction with circuit/chancery)

Cases:

• Meighan v. United States Sprint Comm. Co., 924 S.W.2d 632 (Tenn. 1996) (subject matter jurisdiction)
• Landers v. Jones, 872 S.W.2d 674 (Tenn. 1994) (jurisdiction is conferred by sovereign)
• Stambaugh v. Price, 532 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn. 1976) (circuit and chancery are general jurisdiction)
• Stalcup v. City of Gatlinburg, 577 S.W.2d 439 (Tenn. 1978) (legislative classifications uphold rational basis)
• Hayes v. Gibson County, 288 S.W.3d 334 (Tenn. 2009) (statutory construction; repeal by implication)
• State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195 (Tenn. 2000) (plain meaning)
• State v. Sherman, 266 S.W.3d 395 (Tenn. 2008) (ambiguous statute construction)
• In re Akins, 87 S.W.3d 488 (Tenn. 2002) (harmonious construction)
• State v. Turner, 193 S.W.3d 522 (Tenn. 2006) (conflicting statutes; legislative intent)
• Shorts v. Bartholomew, 278 S.W.3d 268 (Tenn. 2009) (legislature aware of related statutes)
• Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn. 1995) (implied repeals disfavored)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2010/op10-091.pdf

Original opinion text

August 9, 2010
Opinion No. 10-91

Jurisdiction Over Parentage Actions in Shelby County

QUESTIONS

1. Do Shelby County Circuit and Chancery Courts have jurisdiction over parentage actions brought under Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 36, Chapter 2?

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-307(a)(1), do Shelby County Circuit and Chancery Courts have jurisdiction under Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-104(f) over proceedings to establish the paternity of children born out of lawful wedlock and to determine any custody, visitation, support, education or other issues regarding the care and control of children born out of wedlock?

OPINIONS

1. No. As provided in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-307(a)(1), in a county that has a population between 825,000 and 830,000 according to the 1990 or subsequent federal census, only the juvenile court shall have jurisdiction of an action brought under Chapter 2, Title 36. As Shelby County fell within this population bracket according to the 1990 federal census, the Shelby County Circuit and Chancery Courts do not have jurisdiction over such actions.

2. No. Proceedings to establish the paternity of children born out of lawful wedlock and to determine any custody, visitation, support, education or other issues regarding the care and control of children born out of wedlock are parentage actions brought under Title 36, Chapter 2. Shelby County Circuit and Chancery Courts are not granted jurisdiction over such actions under Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-104(f).

ANALYSIS

1. In general, subject matter jurisdiction concerns the authority of a particular court to hear a particular controversy. Meighan v. United States Sprint Comm. Co., 924 S.W.2d 632, 639 (Tenn. 1996). A court's subject matter jurisdiction "relates to the nature of the cause of action and the relief sought and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court." Landers v. Jones, 872 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tenn. 1994) (citations omitted). For parentage actions filed under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-2-301, et seq., subject matter jurisdiction is conferred on the appropriate juvenile, circuit, or chancery court, except in counties with populations between 825,000 and 830,000 according to the 1990 or subsequent federal census:

The juvenile court or any trial court with general jurisdiction shall have jurisdiction of an action brought under this chapter; provided, that, in any county having a population not less than eight hundred twenty-five thousand (825,000) nor more than eight hundred thirty thousand (830,000), according to the 1990 federal census or any subsequent federal census, only the juvenile court shall have jurisdiction of an action brought under this chapter.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-307(a)(1).

Circuit and chancery courts are courts of general jurisdiction. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-10-101 and 16-11-102; Stambaugh v. Price, 532 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tenn. 1976). Shelby County, however, had a population between 825,000 and 830,000 according to the 1990 federal census. Thus, under the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-307(a)(1), the Shelby County Circuit and Chancery Courts do not have jurisdiction over parentage actions filed under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-2-301, et seq. [As this legislation creates an exception, through population brackets, to jurisdiction over parentage actions, it triggers scrutiny under Article XI, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. The courts have consistently held that a legislatively-created classification within a statute will be upheld as long as there is any possible reason to justify the classification. Stalcup v. City of Gatlinburg, 577 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tenn. 1978). It is our opinion that a legitimate justification can be envisioned for the different treatment of parentage actions in counties with large populations.]

2. Your second question asks whether Shelby County Circuit and Chancery Courts are conferred jurisdiction over parentage actions under Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-104(f), notwithstanding the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-307(a)(1). This later statute also grants jurisdiction to juvenile courts over parentage proceedings concurrent with circuit and chancery courts:

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit and chancery court of any proceedings to establish paternity of children born out of lawful wedlock and to determine any custody, visitation, support, education or other issues regarding the care and control of children born out of wedlock. The court further has the power to enforce its orders. Nothing in this subsection (f) shall be construed as vesting the circuit and chancery courts with jurisdiction over matters that are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court under § 37-1-103.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-104(f).

In construing a statute, the primary goal of the courts is to give effect to the purpose of the legislature without exceeding its intended scope. Hayes v. Gibson County, 288 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tenn. 2009). When a statute is unambiguous, a court will construe its meaning from the natural and ordinary meaning of the words chosen. State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 197 (Tenn. 2000). On the other hand, when a statute is ambiguous in that it is subject to varied interpretations producing contrary results, a court will construe its meaning by examining "the broader statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources." State v. Sherman, 266 S.W.3d 395, 401 (Tenn. 2008).

As a general rule, statutes on the same subject should be construed together harmoniously, so they do not conflict. In re Akins, 87 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tenn. 2002) (citation omitted). When construing facially conflicting statutes, a court will give effect to the legislative intent "without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's intended coverage." State v. Turner, 193 S.W.3d 522, 526 (Tenn. 2006) (citation omitted). There is a presumption that the legislature is aware of other statutes relating to the same subject matter. Shorts v. Bartholomew, 278 S.W.3d 268, 277 (Tenn. 2009). Accordingly, unless the newer statute expressly repeals or amends the old one, "the new provision is presumed to be in accord with the same policy embodied in the prior statutes." Id. Repeals by implication are disfavored in Tennessee and will be recognized "only when no fair and reasonable construction will permit the statutes to stand together." Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tenn. 1995). A court will hold a later statute to have repealed an earlier statute by implication only when the conflict between the statutes is irreconcilable. Id. See also Hayes v. Gibson County, 288 S.W.3d at 338.

In construing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-104(f) and 36-2-307(a)(1) together, it is possible to have a fair and reasonable construction that permits both of these statutes to stand together. Both of these statutes provide juvenile courts with concurrent jurisdiction with circuit and chancery courts over proceedings to establish paternity of children born out of wedlock. In looking at the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used in § 37-1-104(f), there is no indication of legislative intent to either confer or remove jurisdiction over parentage actions from circuit and chancery courts. Rather, this section addresses only the jurisdiction of juvenile courts. Thus, it is our opinion that the specific exception in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-307(a), depriving circuit and chancery courts in Shelby County of jurisdiction over parentage actions brought under Chapter 2, Title 36, is not irreconcilable with the later enactment of Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-104(f) and was not repealed by implication.

ROBERT E. COOPER, JR.
Attorney General and Reporter

BARRY TURNER
Deputy Attorney General

DIANNE STAMEY DYCUS
Deputy Attorney General

Requested by:

Honorable Jim Kyle
State Senator
309 War Memorial Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0028