Can a Tennessee city impose a fine over $50 for driving a large vehicle in a residential area without a jury trial?

Plain-English summary

Article VI, Section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution says: "No fine shall be laid on any citizen of this State that shall exceed fifty dollars, unless it shall be assessed by a jury of his peers." The opinion applies this limit to the proposed ordinance fine.

Municipal ordinance proceedings had traditionally been considered civil. In City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that Article VI, Section 14 applies when an ordinance's monetary sanction is punitive rather than remedial. The opinion explains the two-part Davis test: a sanction is punitive if the legislature primarily intended punishment, or if clear proof shows punitive purpose or effect despite remedial intent.

Representative Ben West asked whether a municipal court or general sessions judge can enforce a city ordinance that imposes a fine greater than $50 on people who drive large motor vehicles through residential areas. The stated purpose of the ordinance is to protect children and older residents. The AG assumed (in favor of the city) that the council did not "primarily intend to punish" but instead intended a remedial public-safety regulation. Even so, the AG concluded the fine still fails the second prong of Davis. A fixed dollar amount imposed every time a large vehicle goes through a neighborhood does not compensate any specific person for harm, does not reimburse enforcement costs in any particular case, does not disgorge ill-gotten gains, and does not coerce compliance with any particular court order. It just punishes the driving behavior. Under Davis and Dickson v. State, 116 S.W.3d 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), that is a punitive fine, which means it falls inside the $50 cap.

The practical upshot for municipal and general sessions judges: imposing a fine over $50 for this ordinance would violate Article VI, Section 14 unless the defendant knowingly waives the jury right. The opinion cites Town of Nolensville v. King, 151 S.W.3d 427, 433 (Tenn. 2004), for the waiver exception.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2010. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

The opinion describes the constitutional provision and the City of Chattanooga v. Davis test as they were applied in 2010. Check later authority before using that analysis for a different ordinance.

Common questions

Q: What is the Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause?
A: Article VI, Section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution. It says: "No fine shall be laid on any citizen of this State that shall exceed fifty dollars, unless it shall be assessed by a jury of his peers."

Q: Why is $50 so low?
A: The opinion quotes the constitutional limit but does not discuss its history or whether the amount has changed.

Q: Doesn't the cap only apply to criminal cases?
A: Not anymore. Before 2001, Tennessee treated municipal ordinance violations as civil cases that fell outside Article VI, Section 14. The Tennessee Supreme Court overruled that approach in City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001), and brought "punitive" ordinance fines inside the cap.

Q: How does a court tell whether an ordinance fine is "punitive"?
A: Two-part Davis test. First, if the legislative body primarily intended to punish, the fine is punitive and the analysis ends. Second, even if the legislative body intended a remedial measure, the fine is still punitive if it has no real connection to (i) compensating for loss, (ii) reimbursing for expenses, (iii) disgorging ill-gotten gains, (iv) providing restitution for harm, or (v) coercing compliance with an order, and instead serves only deterrence and future compliance.

Q: Why does a fixed-amount fine usually fail the second prong?
A: The opinion says a fixed fine is predominantly punitive, though it may be remedial if it bears a relationship to the harm, compensates enforcement costs, or disgorges ill-gotten gains. The proposed large-vehicle fine did not appear to fit those categories.

Q: Can a defendant waive the jury right and let a judge impose the higher fine?
A: Yes. Citing Town of Nolensville v. King, 151 S.W.3d 427, 433 (Tenn. 2004), the opinion says a judge may impose the greater fine if the defendant knowingly waives the Article VI, Section 14 jury right.

Q: Could a judge impose this ordinance's fine above $50 without a jury?
A: The opinion says yes only if the defendant knowingly waives the Article VI, Section 14 jury right. It does not address other ways to enforce the ordinance.

Q: Does this opinion decide whether parking penalties exceed the constitutional limit?
A: No. It addresses a proposed fine for driving large vehicles in residential areas. It describes the Davis test for deciding whether a monetary sanction is punitive, but does not apply that test to parking penalties.

Background and statutory framework

Article VI, Section 14 requires a jury to assess a fine above $50, subject to a defendant's knowing waiver as described in this opinion.

The pre-Davis baseline. The opinion says municipal ordinance proceedings were traditionally considered civil. It cites City of Chattanooga v. Davis as overruling O'Dell v. City of Knoxville, 388 S.W.2d 150 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964), on whether Article VI, Section 14 applies to those proceedings.

The 2001 Davis reset. City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001), overruled O'Dell and held that the Article VI, Section 14 cap applies to ordinance fines that are "punitive" rather than "remedial." The Court adopted the two-part test described above. The 2003 Court of Appeals decision in Dickson v. State, 116 S.W.3d 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), summarized the test crisply: "if the legislative body creating the sanction primarily intended that the sanction punish the offender the inquiry ends. The assessment is punitive. On the other hand, if the legislative body primarily intended the sanction to be remedial, the sanction may still be punitive if it serves no remedial purpose."

What counts as remedial? Davis gave specific examples: stop-work orders, revocation of a permit, an order to show proof of compliance at the owner's expense. For monetary penalties specifically, Davis listed five truly remedial purposes: compensation for loss, reimbursement for expenses, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, restitution for harm, and prospective coercion (such as a bond or a coercive fine to enforce a specific order). 54 S.W.3d at 270. Penalties that do not fit those categories are likely punitive, regardless of legislative intent.

Why fixed-amount fines fail. The Davis Court emphasized that a fixed and determinate fine is "predominantly punitive in nature." 54 S.W.3d at 272. The reason is structural: a fixed amount cannot be calibrated to actual harm, actual enforcement cost, or actual gain. It just enforces deterrence. Dickson confirmed this analysis in the context of the Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Act: a fixed monetary fine that did not relate to the harm, enforcement cost, or disgorgement was punitive even though the underlying statute had a remedial environmental-protection purpose.

Application to the large-vehicle ordinance. The opinion assumes (favorably to the city) that the ordinance's purpose is genuinely public safety, not punishment. Even so, a flat fine "greater than $50.00" imposed on every offending driver fails Davis prong two: it does not compensate any specific person for harm, does not reimburse the city's enforcement costs in any particular case, does not disgorge any gain, does not provide restitution, and does not coerce compliance with a particular court order. It just deters big-vehicle traffic through residential streets by punishing those who drive there. That is punitive under the Davis framework, so the $50 cap applies.

The waiver exception. The opinion says a judge may impose a fine greater than $50 for this ordinance if the defendant knowingly waives the Article VI, Section 14 jury right, citing Town of Nolensville v. King, 151 S.W.3d 427, 433 (Tenn. 2004).

Citations and references

Constitutional provisions:

• Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 14 (Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause)

Cases:

• City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001)
• Town of Nolensville v. King, 151 S.W.3d 427 (Tenn. 2004)
• Dickson v. State, 116 S.W.3d 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)
• O'Dell v. City of Knoxville, 388 S.W.2d 150 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) (overruled by Davis)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2010/op10-053.pdf

Original opinion text

April 19, 2010

Opinion No. 10-53

Ordinance Imposing Fine Greater Than $50.00 on Large Motor Vehicles in Residential Areas

QUESTION

Whether a municipal court judge or general sessions court judge would violate Article VI, § 14 of the Tennessee Constitution if such a judge were to enforce an ordinance that imposes a fine greater than $50.00 on those persons operating large motor vehicles in residential areas.

OPINION

Yes, absent a valid waiver of the defendant's Article VI, § 14 right to a jury.

ANALYSIS

Article VI, § 14 of the Tennessee Constitution provides: "No fine shall be laid on any citizen of this State that shall exceed fifty dollars, unless it shall be assessed by a jury of his peers[.]" In City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001), the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Article VI, § 14 of the Tennessee Constitution applied to a proceeding for the violation of a municipal ordinance. The Court initially found that Article VI, § 14 applied to such proceedings even though they have been traditionally considered to be civil in nature. Davis, 54 S.W.3d at 261 (overruling O'Dell v. City of Knoxville, 388 S.W.2d 150 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964)). The Court held that Article VI, § 14 applied to such proceedings when a monetary sanction imposed for an ordinance violation was punitive and therefore a "fine" for purposes of Article VI, § 14, rather than a remedial measure. Id. at 261-62, 281; Town of Nolensville v. King, 151 S.W.3d 427, 430 (Tenn. 2004) (discussing Davis). Specifically, the Court held that a monetary sanction falls within the scope of Article VI, § 14 when: (1) the legislative body creating the sanction primarily intended that the sanction punish the offender; or (2) despite evidence of remedial intent, the monetary sanction is shown by the "clearest proof" to be so punitive in its actual purpose or effect that it cannot be legitimately viewed as remedial in nature. Davis, 54 S.W.3d at 264, 281; King, 151 S.W.3d at 430 (discussing Davis). "The 'clearest proof' of punitive purpose or effect is more properly established by considering whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the statutory scheme truly envisions the pecuniary sanction as serving to remedy or to correct a violation." Davis, 54 S.W.3d at 265.

The Court of Appeals has succinctly summarized the two-part test set forth in Davis.

[I]f the legislative body creating the sanction primarily intended that the sanction punish the offender the inquiry ends. The assessment is punitive. On the other hand, if the legislative body primarily intended the sanction to be remedial, the sanction may still be punitive if it serves no remedial purpose.

Dickson v. State, 116 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

You have asked us whether the enforcement of an ordinance that imposes a fine greater than $50.00 on those persons operating large motor vehicles in residential areas would violate Article VI, § 14 of the Tennessee Constitution. While the text of the ordinance is not included in your opinion request, you indicate that the purpose of the ordinance is to provide protection to children and older persons. Thus, for the purposes of applying the two-part test of Davis, we will assume that there is nothing in the text of the ordinance that indicates the legislative body creating the sanction primarily intends that the sanction punish the offender. By making this assumption, the first part of the Davis test would be satisfied. See Davis, 54 S.W.3d at 267-69; Dickson, 116 S.W.3d at 742-43. Nevertheless, even making this assumption, we do not believe that an ordinance imposing a fine greater than $50.00 on those persons operating large motor vehicles in residential areas would satisfy the second part of the test set forth in Davis, for the reasons stated below.

In explaining the second part of the test set forth in Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court initially stated: "[T]he mere fact that the intended purpose of the statute itself is remedial is not also determinative of whether the actual purpose and effect of the statute's penalties are likewise remedial in nature." Davis, 54 S.W.3d at 269. In giving guidance on determining whether a penalty is a remedial measure, the Court stated: "[R]emedial measures are any 'means by which a right is enforced or the violation of a right is prevented, redressed or compensated.'" Id. Examples fitting the definition of a remedial measure are stop-work orders, the revocation of a permit, and an order to show proof of compliance at the owner's expense. Id. at 269-70. The Court stressed that a monetary penalty often stands in sharp contrast to these types of remedial measures, because a monetary penalty can serve but a few remedial purposes.

Some examples of truly remedial purposes served by monetary penalties include those that (1) compensate for loss; (2) reimburse for expenses; (3) disgorge "ill-gotten" gains; (4) provide restitution for harm; and (5) ensure compliance with an order or directive, either through the execution of a bond, or as discussed below, through a prospectively coercive fine. Importantly, however, to the extent that a monetary penalty is not designed to serve these or similar goals, it will appear more likely to predominantly serve the purpose of general and specific deterrence. Although we agree that some level of deterrence is present in all remedial measures, when the predominant purposes served by the penalty are to provide general and specific deterrence and to ensure overall future compliance with the law, then the monetary penalty should be deemed as serving punitive purposes for analysis under Article VI, section 14.

Id. at 270 (emphasis original). In a footnote, the Court said: "[I]f the predominant 'remedial' purpose served by a monetary sanction is ensuring deterrence against future wrongdoing, then the sanction more properly appears to be punitive in its actual purpose or effect." Id. at 270 n. 22.

Accordingly, a fine that is fixed and determinant is predominantly punitive in nature. Dickson, 116 S.W.3d at 744 (citing Davis, 54 S.W.3d at 272). Under the Davis Court's analysis, the only way a fixed, determinate fine can be considered remedial is when it bears some relationship to the harm caused by the violation, compensates for the costs of enforcement, or requires the wrongdoer to disgorge ill-gotten gains. Dickson, 116 S.W.3d at 744. An ordinance imposing a fine greater than $50.00 on those persons operating large motor vehicles in residential areas does not seem to fall into any of these three categories. See, e.g., Davis, 54 S.W.3d at 270-71 (Court found fixed monetary penalty for failure to obtain building permit for past completed violations not to be remedial in nature because penalty was imposed without regard to correcting or rectifying any harm); Dickson, 116 S.W.3d at 744 (Court found fixed monetary fine for violation of Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Act to be punitive, rather than remedial, because it did not bear relationship to the harm caused by the violation, compensate the State for the costs of enforcement, or require the wrongdoer to disgorge ill-gotten gains). Thus, we think that a municipal court judge or general sessions court judge would violate Article VI, § 14 of the Tennessee Constitution if such a judge were to enforce an ordinance that imposes a fine greater than $50.00 on those persons operating large motor vehicles in residential areas. The imposition of a fine greater than $50.00 by such a judge would be constitutionally permissible only if the defendant knowingly waives his or her Article VI, § 14 right to a jury. See King, 151 S.W.3d at 433.

ROBERT E. COOPER, JR.
Attorney General and Reporter

MICHAEL E. MOORE
Solicitor General

LAURA T. KIDWELL
Senior Counsel

Requested by:

Honorable Ben West, Jr.
State Representative
108 War Memorial Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0160