Can a Tennessee city impose a fine over $50 for driving a large vehicle in a residential area without a jury trial?

Plain-English summary

Tennessee's Constitution has an unusual clause that limits how much money a judge can fine a citizen without a jury. Article VI, Section 14 says: "No fine shall be laid on any citizen of this State that shall exceed fifty dollars, unless it shall be assessed by a jury of his peers." This is sometimes called the Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause, and it is one of the surviving relics of the original 1796 Tennessee Constitution. The $50 cap has never been adjusted for inflation, so today it functions as a very low ceiling on what a judge can do alone.

For most of Tennessee history, courts treated municipal ordinance violations as civil cases that fell outside the $50 cap. That changed in 2001 when the Tennessee Supreme Court decided City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001). Davis overruled the old O'Dell line of cases and held that the $50 cap applies to ordinance fines if the fine is "punitive" rather than "remedial." A fine is punitive if (1) the legislative body primarily intended to punish the offender or (2) the fine has no real connection to compensating for harm, reimbursing costs, disgorging gains, providing restitution, or coercing compliance with a specific order, and instead just serves deterrence and future-compliance goals.

Representative Ben West asked whether a municipal court or general sessions judge can enforce a city ordinance that imposes a fine greater than $50 on people who drive large motor vehicles through residential areas. The stated purpose of the ordinance is to protect children and older residents. The AG assumed (in favor of the city) that the council did not "primarily intend to punish" but instead intended a remedial public-safety regulation. Even so, the AG concluded the fine still fails the second prong of Davis. A fixed dollar amount imposed every time a large vehicle goes through a neighborhood does not compensate any specific person for harm, does not reimburse enforcement costs in any particular case, does not disgorge ill-gotten gains, and does not coerce compliance with any particular court order. It just punishes the driving behavior. Under Davis and Dickson v. State, 116 S.W.3d 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), that is a punitive fine, which means it falls inside the $50 cap.

The practical upshot for municipal courts: a municipal judge or general sessions judge cannot impose a fine over $50 on this kind of violation alone. The constitutional fix is either to send the case to a jury or to obtain a knowing waiver of the jury right from the defendant. The opinion cites Town of Nolensville v. King, 151 S.W.3d 427, 433 (Tenn. 2004), for the proposition that a knowing waiver is permitted.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2010. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

The Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause and the City of Chattanooga v. Davis framework remain Tennessee constitutional law as of 2026, but case law continues to develop on what counts as remedial vs. punitive in specific contexts. Anyone advising a Tennessee city on ordinance fine structures should look at the latest Tennessee Supreme Court and Court of Appeals decisions interpreting Davis, not only at this 2010 AG opinion.

Common questions

Q: What is the Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause?
A: Article VI, Section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution. It says: "No fine shall be laid on any citizen of this State that shall exceed fifty dollars, unless it shall be assessed by a jury of his peers." Tennessee is one of the few states with a constitutional cap on judge-imposed fines.

Q: Why is $50 so low?
A: Because the Tennessee Constitution has never been amended on this point. The original 1796 cap was a meaningful amount at the time. It has never been indexed for inflation, so the modern effect is to push almost all serious fines into jury-trial territory.

Q: Doesn't the cap only apply to criminal cases?
A: Not anymore. Before 2001, Tennessee treated municipal ordinance violations as civil cases that fell outside Article VI, Section 14. The Tennessee Supreme Court overruled that approach in City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001), and brought "punitive" ordinance fines inside the cap.

Q: How does a court tell whether an ordinance fine is "punitive"?
A: Two-part Davis test. First, if the legislative body primarily intended to punish, the fine is punitive and the analysis ends. Second, even if the legislative body intended a remedial measure, the fine is still punitive if it has no real connection to (i) compensating for loss, (ii) reimbursing for expenses, (iii) disgorging ill-gotten gains, (iv) providing restitution for harm, or (v) coercing compliance with an order, and instead serves only deterrence and future compliance.

Q: Why does a fixed-amount fine usually fail the second prong?
A: Because a fixed amount, imposed regardless of the actual harm caused or the actual cost of enforcement in a particular case, by definition does not "compensate," "reimburse," "disgorge," or "restitute" anything specific. It just punishes. The Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis and the Court of Appeals in Dickson both treated fixed-dollar penalties as predominantly punitive on this reasoning.

Q: Can a defendant waive the jury right and let a judge impose the higher fine?
A: Yes. Town of Nolensville v. King, 151 S.W.3d 427, 433 (Tenn. 2004), confirmed that a defendant can knowingly waive the Article VI, Section 14 right. In practice, traffic-court defendants often do waive, because the jury process is more expensive and time-consuming than just paying the fine.

Q: So how do Tennessee cities actually enforce ordinances with fines higher than $50?
A: A few options. They can structure the fine as a per-day continuing violation (multiple $50 fines for separate days). They can use injunctive relief or stop-work orders (truly remedial) instead of monetary penalties. They can charge an alleged violation as a criminal misdemeanor under state law (where the trial-by-jury procedure is built in). Or they can rely on routine knowing waivers in traffic court. But a municipal judge cannot simply impose a $500 fine alone, by default, on a non-waiving defendant.

Q: Does this opinion apply to civil parking tickets?
A: It depends on whether the parking penalty is structured as a remedial measure (reimbursement for enforcement, recovery of meter fees) or as a punitive fine. The case-by-case Davis analysis controls. The fact that a city calls something a "civil penalty" does not automatically take it out of the cap.

Background and statutory framework

The Tennessee Constitution's Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause (Article VI, Section 14) is a structural protection of the jury-trial right that survives from the state's founding documents. Its key feature is not the $50 amount itself but the requirement that anything above the $50 line be assessed by a jury rather than a judge alone. The Clause is one of the reasons Tennessee misdemeanor and ordinance-violation practice differs from neighboring states.

The pre-Davis baseline. For decades, Tennessee treated municipal ordinance violations as civil cases outside the Clause. The leading case was O'Dell v. City of Knoxville, 388 S.W.2d 150 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964). Cities relied on O'Dell to impose ordinance fines of any size through municipal courts.

The 2001 Davis reset. City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001), overruled O'Dell and held that the Article VI, Section 14 cap applies to ordinance fines that are "punitive" rather than "remedial." The Court adopted the two-part test described above. The 2003 Court of Appeals decision in Dickson v. State, 116 S.W.3d 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), summarized the test crisply: "if the legislative body creating the sanction primarily intended that the sanction punish the offender the inquiry ends. The assessment is punitive. On the other hand, if the legislative body primarily intended the sanction to be remedial, the sanction may still be punitive if it serves no remedial purpose."

What counts as remedial? Davis gave specific examples: stop-work orders, revocation of a permit, an order to show proof of compliance at the owner's expense. For monetary penalties specifically, Davis listed five truly remedial purposes: compensation for loss, reimbursement for expenses, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, restitution for harm, and prospective coercion (such as a bond or a coercive fine to enforce a specific order). 54 S.W.3d at 270. Penalties that do not fit those categories are likely punitive, regardless of legislative intent.

Why fixed-amount fines fail. The Davis Court emphasized that a fixed and determinate fine is "predominantly punitive in nature." 54 S.W.3d at 272. The reason is structural: a fixed amount cannot be calibrated to actual harm, actual enforcement cost, or actual gain. It just enforces deterrence. Dickson confirmed this analysis in the context of the Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Act: a fixed monetary fine that did not relate to the harm, enforcement cost, or disgorgement was punitive even though the underlying statute had a remedial environmental-protection purpose.

Application to the large-vehicle ordinance. The opinion assumes (favorably to the city) that the ordinance's purpose is genuinely public safety, not punishment. Even so, a flat fine "greater than $50.00" imposed on every offending driver fails Davis prong two: it does not compensate any specific person for harm, does not reimburse the city's enforcement costs in any particular case, does not disgorge any gain, does not provide restitution, and does not coerce compliance with a particular court order. It just deters big-vehicle traffic through residential streets by punishing those who drive there. That is punitive under the Davis framework, so the $50 cap applies.

The waiver escape. Town of Nolensville v. King, 151 S.W.3d 427 (Tenn. 2004), confirms that the Article VI, Section 14 jury right is waivable. A defendant who knowingly and voluntarily agrees to let the judge impose a higher fine, typically through a plea or routine traffic-court colloquy, validly consents to the larger penalty. In practice, most Tennessee municipal-court defendants take this path because the alternative is the cost and time of a jury trial for a traffic offense.

Citations and references

Constitutional provisions:

• Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 14 (Fifty-Dollar Fine Clause)

Cases:

• City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001)
• Town of Nolensville v. King, 151 S.W.3d 427 (Tenn. 2004)
• Dickson v. State, 116 S.W.3d 738 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)
• O'Dell v. City of Knoxville, 388 S.W.2d 150 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) (overruled by Davis)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2010/op10-053.pdf

Original opinion text

April 19, 2010

Opinion No. 10-53

Ordinance Imposing Fine Greater Than $50.00 on Large Motor Vehicles in Residential Areas

QUESTION

Whether a municipal court judge or general sessions court judge would violate Article VI, § 14 of the Tennessee Constitution if such a judge were to enforce an ordinance that imposes a fine greater than $50.00 on those persons operating large motor vehicles in residential areas.

OPINION

Yes, absent a valid waiver of the defendant's Article VI, § 14 right to a jury.

ANALYSIS

Article VI, § 14 of the Tennessee Constitution provides: "No fine shall be laid on any citizen of this State that shall exceed fifty dollars, unless it shall be assessed by a jury of his peers[.]" In City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001), the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Article VI, § 14 of the Tennessee Constitution applied to a proceeding for the violation of a municipal ordinance. The Court initially found that Article VI, § 14 applied to such proceedings even though they have been traditionally considered to be civil in nature. Davis, 54 S.W.3d at 261 (overruling O'Dell v. City of Knoxville, 388 S.W.2d 150 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964)). The Court held that Article VI, § 14 applied to such proceedings when a monetary sanction imposed for an ordinance violation was punitive and therefore a "fine" for purposes of Article VI, § 14, rather than a remedial measure. Id. at 261-62, 281; Town of Nolensville v. King, 151 S.W.3d 427, 430 (Tenn. 2004) (discussing Davis). Specifically, the Court held that a monetary sanction falls within the scope of Article VI, § 14 when: (1) the legislative body creating the sanction primarily intended that the sanction punish the offender; or (2) despite evidence of remedial intent, the monetary sanction is shown by the "clearest proof" to be so punitive in its actual purpose or effect that it cannot be legitimately viewed as remedial in nature. Davis, 54 S.W.3d at 264, 281; King, 151 S.W.3d at 430 (discussing Davis). "The 'clearest proof' of punitive purpose or effect is more properly established by considering whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the statutory scheme truly envisions the pecuniary sanction as serving to remedy or to correct a violation." Davis, 54 S.W.3d at 265.

The Court of Appeals has succinctly summarized the two-part test set forth in Davis.

[I]f the legislative body creating the sanction primarily intended that the sanction punish the offender the inquiry ends. The assessment is punitive. On the other hand, if the legislative body primarily intended the sanction to be remedial, the sanction may still be punitive if it serves no remedial purpose.

Dickson v. State, 116 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

You have asked us whether the enforcement of an ordinance that imposes a fine greater than $50.00 on those persons operating large motor vehicles in residential areas would violate Article VI, § 14 of the Tennessee Constitution. While the text of the ordinance is not included in your opinion request, you indicate that the purpose of the ordinance is to provide protection to children and older persons. Thus, for the purposes of applying the two-part test of Davis, we will assume that there is nothing in the text of the ordinance that indicates the legislative body creating the sanction primarily intends that the sanction punish the offender. By making this assumption, the first part of the Davis test would be satisfied. See Davis, 54 S.W.3d at 267-69; Dickson, 116 S.W.3d at 742-43. Nevertheless, even making this assumption, we do not believe that an ordinance imposing a fine greater than $50.00 on those persons operating large motor vehicles in residential areas would satisfy the second part of the test set forth in Davis, for the reasons stated below.

In explaining the second part of the test set forth in Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court initially stated: "[T]he mere fact that the intended purpose of the statute itself is remedial is not also determinative of whether the actual purpose and effect of the statute's penalties are likewise remedial in nature." Davis, 54 S.W.3d at 269. In giving guidance on determining whether a penalty is a remedial measure, the Court stated: "[R]emedial measures are any 'means by which a right is enforced or the violation of a right is prevented, redressed or compensated.'" Id. Examples fitting the definition of a remedial measure are stop-work orders, the revocation of a permit, and an order to show proof of compliance at the owner's expense. Id. at 269-70. The Court stressed that a monetary penalty often stands in sharp contrast to these types of remedial measures, because a monetary penalty can serve but a few remedial purposes.

Some examples of truly remedial purposes served by monetary penalties include those that (1) compensate for loss; (2) reimburse for expenses; (3) disgorge "ill-gotten" gains; (4) provide restitution for harm; and (5) ensure compliance with an order or directive, either through the execution of a bond, or as discussed below, through a prospectively coercive fine. Importantly, however, to the extent that a monetary penalty is not designed to serve these or similar goals, it will appear more likely to predominantly serve the purpose of general and specific deterrence. Although we agree that some level of deterrence is present in all remedial measures, when the predominant purposes served by the penalty are to provide general and specific deterrence and to ensure overall future compliance with the law, then the monetary penalty should be deemed as serving punitive purposes for analysis under Article VI, section 14.

Id. at 270 (emphasis original). In a footnote, the Court said: "[I]f the predominant 'remedial' purpose served by a monetary sanction is ensuring deterrence against future wrongdoing, then the sanction more properly appears to be punitive in its actual purpose or effect." Id. at 270 n. 22.

Accordingly, a fine that is fixed and determinant is predominantly punitive in nature. Dickson, 116 S.W.3d at 744 (citing Davis, 54 S.W.3d at 272). Under the Davis Court's analysis, the only way a fixed, determinate fine can be considered remedial is when it bears some relationship to the harm caused by the violation, compensates for the costs of enforcement, or requires the wrongdoer to disgorge ill-gotten gains. Dickson, 116 S.W.3d at 744. An ordinance imposing a fine greater than $50.00 on those persons operating large motor vehicles in residential areas does not seem to fall into any of these three categories. See, e.g., Davis, 54 S.W.3d at 270-71 (Court found fixed monetary penalty for failure to obtain building permit for past completed violations not to be remedial in nature because penalty was imposed without regard to correcting or rectifying any harm); Dickson, 116 S.W.3d at 744 (Court found fixed monetary fine for violation of Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Act to be punitive, rather than remedial, because it did not bear relationship to the harm caused by the violation, compensate the State for the costs of enforcement, or require the wrongdoer to disgorge ill-gotten gains). Thus, we think that a municipal court judge or general sessions court judge would violate Article VI, § 14 of the Tennessee Constitution if such a judge were to enforce an ordinance that imposes a fine greater than $50.00 on those persons operating large motor vehicles in residential areas. The imposition of a fine greater than $50.00 by such a judge would be constitutionally permissible only if the defendant knowingly waives his or her Article VI, § 14 right to a jury. See King, 151 S.W.3d at 433.

ROBERT E. COOPER, JR.
Attorney General and Reporter

MICHAEL E. MOORE
Solicitor General

LAURA T. KIDWELL
Senior Counsel

Requested by:

Honorable Ben West, Jr.
State Representative
108 War Memorial Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0160