Can a Tennessee local government enforce zoning against a sport shooting range that's no longer meeting the state's setback requirements?

Plain-English summary

Representative Richard Floyd asked whether a sport shooting range becomes subject to local land use planning and zoning when it fails, or stops meeting, the conditions for protection under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(c). The AG said yes. That provision protects a range open to the public and in continuous operation for the required 30-year period before December 16, 2008, only if its shooting positions meet specified distances from property lines and roads and the vegetation in the specified boundary areas remains undisturbed.

When a range fails those conditions, the AG concluded that local government may apply the land use and zoning rules governing its location and may amend, restrict, or terminate operations under those rules. The AG treated § 39-17-316(b)(2) as a separate protection against nuisance, abatement, or similar actions based on noise pollution. That protection requires the range to be in compliance now with the local noise-control requirements that applied when it began operations. Past compliance at opening is not enough by itself.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2010. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: What happens when a long-running range stops meeting the setback or vegetation conditions?
A: The AG concluded that the range becomes subject to the land use and zoning restrictions applicable to its location. Under those local rules, the government may amend, restrict, or terminate its operations.

Q: Which distances did the statute require for shooting positions?
A: The quoted 2010 statute required 150 feet from the specified south-side boundary or county road and 180 feet from the specified west, north, and east boundaries or roads. It also required 180 feet from any adjoining residential property boundary line. Those distances are described in detail in the original text below.

Q: What was the vegetation condition?
A: The statute required vegetation between the applicable shooting-position distance and the adjoining boundary line or county road to remain undisturbed. The AG did not assign a separate purpose to that requirement.

Q: Does losing zoning protection also end the protection against noise-based nuisance claims?
A: No. The AG said § 39-17-316(b)(2) applies separately. A range remains protected from nuisance, abatement, or similar actions based on noise if it is in compliance with the local noise rules that applied when the range began operating.

Q: Is it enough that a range complied with noise rules when it opened?
A: No. The statutory condition quoted by the AG says the range "is in compliance" with the rules that applied at the time it began operating. The opinion describes an ongoing compliance requirement measured against those earlier rules.

Q: Did the AG decide how local officials should determine compliance?
A: No. The opinion gives the legal consequences of failing the statutory conditions but does not prescribe an inspection, hearing, or appeal procedure.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion distinguished two parts of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316. Subsection (c) restricts local zoning control over certain shooting ranges that meet the statute's age, public-access, setback, and vegetation conditions. When those conditions are not met, the AG said the statute does not otherwise limit local land use and zoning authority over the range.

Subsection (b)(2) concerns nuisance, abatement, and similar actions that would limit or end use of a sport shooting range. For noise-based actions, the AG read the provision as barring local government action so long as the range is in compliance with the local noise-control laws, resolutions, ordinances, or regulations that applied when it began operations. The date identifies which rules serve as the benchmark; it does not turn compliance into a one-time event.

The opinion also mentioned subsection (b)(1), which provides protection from civil or criminal liability for range operators and users if the range complies with the local noise provisions that were in effect when it began operating. The AG did not decide any specific range's compliance or the validity of a particular zoning restriction.

Citations and references

Statutes (as of 2010):

• Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316 (sport shooting range protection)

Cases (Tennessee Supreme Court unless noted):

• 421 Corp. v. Metro Gov. of Nashville, 36 S.W.3d 469 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (Tennessee Court of Appeals): zoning authority delegation
• City of Norris v. Bradford, 321 S.W.2d 543 (Tenn. 1958): local police power scope
• Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn. 1995): statutory construction
• State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195 (Tenn. 2000): statutory construction
• State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2001): avoiding absurd results

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2010/op10-050.pdf

Original opinion text

Application of Zoning to Sport Shooting Ranges under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(c)

QUESTION

If a sport shooting range fails to comply, or discontinues compliance with, one or more of the requirements set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(c)(1) and (c)(2), does the sport shooting range become subject to land use planning or zoning applicable to the shooting range's location?

OPINION

In accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(c)(1) and (c)(2), a sport shooting range that fails to meet the specific requirements of the statute becomes subject to the land use and zoning restrictions that apply to its location, except that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(b)(2) would still guarantee the right of such a shooting range to operate if it is in compliance with all noise control requirements of local government that applied to the shooting range at the time it began operations.

ANALYSIS

The General Assembly has delegated to local governments certain express authority to enact zoning ordinances and general police power regulations. 421 Corp. v. Metro Gov. of Nashville, 36 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). The Tennessee Supreme Court has noted that the local government's authority to exercise the police power of the sovereign is necessarily broad so as to meet the needs of our "complex civilization." City of Norris v. Bradford, 321 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tenn. 1958). This broad authority notwithstanding, there are also several significant limitations to local government regulatory power, the most basic of which is that a local government may not exceed the power expressly granted to it by the General Assembly. Id. Thus, while granted "considerable discretion" in the exercise of its delegated regulatory authority, a local government's actions must not conflict with state law. Id.

In enacting Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(c), the General Assembly has limited the power of local government to amend, restrict or terminate the operations of a sport shooting range under certain conditions. The statute provides, in pertinent part:

> [W]ith respect to any sport shooting range that is open to the public and was in continuous operation for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding December 16, 2008, the right to operate as a shooting range shall not be amended, restricted or terminated due to any land use planning or zoning applicable to the shooting range's location if:
> (1) The shooting positions operate no closer than:
> (A) One hundred fifty feet (150') from any adjoining boundary line or county road that extends from the southeast corner to the southwest corner;
> (B) One hundred eighty feet (180') from any adjoining boundary line that extends from the southwest corner to the northwest corner;
> (C) One hundred eighty feet (180') from any adjoining boundary line that extends from the northwest corner to the northeast corner;
> (D) One hundred eighty feet (180') from any adjoining boundary line or county road that extends from the northeast corner to the southeast corner; and
> (E) One hundred eighty feet (180') from any adjoining residential property boundary line, notwithstanding subdivisions (c)(1)(A)-(D).
> (2) Any vegetation between the appropriate distance requirement described in subdivision (c)(1) and the adjoining boundary line or county road remains undisturbed.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(c).

The Tennessee Supreme Court has stated that in interpreting statutes, courts are to "give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope." Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995). Moreover, intent is to be derived "from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that would extend or limit the statute's meaning." State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 197 (Tenn. 2000). The rules of statutory construction prevent the assignment of "a particular interpretation to a statute if that interpretation would yield an absurd result." State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tenn. 2001).

There can be little doubt from the plain language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(c) that the intent of the General Assembly was specifically to restrict local government's regulatory authority to amend, restrict or terminate the operation of any sport shooting range which meets the specific statutory requirements regarding the placement of shooting positions and the maintenance of boundary vegetation. In so doing, the General Assembly did not otherwise limit a local government's regulatory authority. A local government's delegated authority includes the enforcement of land use planning and zoning regulations applicable to a specific shooting range's location. In such cases, local government has the authority to amend, restrict, or terminate the operations of a sport shooting range that does not comply, or ceases to comply, with these above-mentioned statutory requirements.

Nevertheless, the General Assembly has provided some protections for sport shooting ranges that fall outside Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(c), thereby further limiting the authority of local governments. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(b)(2) provides:

> A person or entity that operates or uses a sport shooting range is not subject to an action for nuisance, abatement, or any other type of action or proceeding which would have the effect of limiting, reducing, eliminating or enjoining the use or operation of the sport shooting range as a sport shooting range if the sport shooting range is in compliance with any applicable noise control laws, resolutions, ordinances or regulations issued by a unit of local government, that applied to the range and its operation at the time that the range began operation.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(b)(2). Under this statute, local government would be barred from bringing a nuisance, abatement, or similar action to terminate a shooting range's operations because of noise pollution so long as the shooting range is in compliance with the noise control laws and regulations that applied to the shooting range's location at the time the shooting range began operations. In addition, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-316(b)(1) provides considerable protection from civil or criminal liability for operators and users of a sport shooting range if the range complies with the local noise control provisions that were in effect when it began operation.

ROBERT E. COOPER, JR.
Attorney General and Reporter

MICHAEL E. MOORE
Solicitor General

BRIAN J. RAMMING
Assistant Attorney General

Requested by:
The Honorable Richard Floyd
State Representative, 27th Legislative District
Suite G-24, War Memorial Building
Nashville, Tennessee 37243