Would raising Tennessee's $50 civil penalty for violating an order of protection to $500 violate the state constitution's Fifty-Dollar Fines Clause?

Plain-English summary

State Senator Beverly Marrero asked whether Senate Bill 3100, which would have raised the civil penalty under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-610(b) from $50 to $500, would violate Article VI, § 14 of the Tennessee Constitution. That clause says no fine over $50 may be laid on a citizen unless assessed by a jury of peers who decide the fine at the time of the verdict. The AG said yes, the bill would be unconstitutional.

The reasoning relied on the framework from City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001). The Davis test asks whether the monetary sanction is punitive in nature. A sanction falls within Article VI, § 14 when either (1) the legislature primarily intended it to punish, or (2) the "clearest proof" shows the sanction is so punitive in actual purpose or effect that it cannot be remedial. Remedial purposes include compensating for loss, reimbursing expenses, restitution for harm, or coercing compliance through a prospective fine. Punitive purposes are general and specific deterrence and ensuring overall future compliance.

The AG read the order-of-protection civil penalty as predominantly punitive. The collected money flowed to the state treasury for the domestic violence community education fund, but the AG concluded the spending channel did not transform the sanction's nature: the dollars were not used to compensate the specific victim or reimburse a specific loss. The penalty existed to deter violations of orders of protection and ensure future compliance. That made it punitive under Davis.

A punitive fine over $50 imposed without a jury runs into the Fifty-Dollar Fines Clause. Senate Bill 3100 would have given a judge the power to impose a $500 penalty without a jury, so the increase would have crossed the constitutional line.

The opinion did not strike down the $50 penalty itself. A $50 punitive fine sits right at the constitutional ceiling and can be imposed without a jury. The constitutional problem arose only when the legislature tried to push the fine above $50 without adding a jury safeguard.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2010. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

The Fifty-Dollar Fines Clause in Article VI, § 14 of the Tennessee Constitution is one of the state's distinctive constitutional features. Tennessee has kept it on the books since the 1796 constitution, and the courts have applied it broadly. The rule's effect is to require jury participation for any meaningful punitive fine. Without it, judges can assess only modest punitive amounts. The clause does not apply to remedial sanctions, which is where the Davis line of cases does the analytical work.

City of Chattanooga v. Davis gave the modern test for whether a monetary sanction is punitive or remedial. The legislature's stated purpose is one input; actual purpose and effect can override the stated label by clearest proof. Davis itself involved a municipal ordinance violation, but the framework has been used across statutes and ordinances throughout Tennessee.

Section 36-3-610(b) sits inside the domestic-relations chapter and is one of the contempt-and-penalty tools available when a respondent violates an order of protection. The judge may hold the defendant in civil or criminal contempt, and the $50 civil penalty is in addition to whatever contempt remedy the judge imposes. SB 3100 was the 2010 legislative proposal to scale that penalty up.

Common questions

Q: Did the AG mean orders of protection could not be enforced at all?
A: No. Contempt remedies remained available, and criminal-statute prosecution for violations remained available. The opinion addressed only the civil-penalty piece and only the proposed $500 amount.

Q: Could the legislature have raised the penalty above $50 if a jury assessed it?
A: Yes. The constitution's text expressly contemplates fines over $50 when assessed by a jury at the time of the fact-finding. SB 3100 did not include a jury mechanism, which is why the opinion said it was unconstitutional as drafted.

Q: Why didn't the AG treat the penalty as remedial because it funded victim education?
A: The Davis framework focuses on whether the dollars compensate a loss, reimburse expenses, provide restitution, or coerce prospective compliance. Funding a generalized education program does not match those categories. The AG read the penalty's predominant purpose as deterrence, which is punitive.

Q: What if a future legislature wanted a stronger penalty?
A: The opinion suggests two paths: keep the judge-imposed penalty at $50 or less, or add a jury-assessment mechanism for any higher amount. A third path would be to redesign the sanction to be genuinely remedial (for example, restitution tied to documented victim losses), which could escape Article VI, § 14 entirely.

Q: Does Article VI, § 14 apply to criminal contempt?
A: That is a separate doctrinal question and not addressed here. The opinion focuses on the civil-penalty piece, which is what SB 3100 changed.

Citations and references

Statutes and pending legislation:

• Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-610 (order of protection enforcement)
• Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-610(b) (civil penalty)
• Senate Bill 3100, 106th General Assembly

Constitution:

• Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 14 (Fifty-Dollar Fines Clause)

Cases:

• City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001) (punitive-versus-remedial framework)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2010/op10-044.pdf

Original opinion text

April 6, 2010

Opinion No. 10-44

Assessment of Civil Penalty for Violation of Order of Protection

QUESTION

Would increasing the civil penalty allowed under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-610(b) for violating an order of protection or court-approved agreement from fifty dollars to five hundred dollars violate Article VI, Section 14, of the Tennessee Constitution?

OPINION

Yes. The proposed amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-610(b) increasing the civil penalty a judge may assess for violation of an order of protection or court-approved consent agreement from fifty dollars to five hundred dollars would violate Article VI, Section 14, of the Tennessee Constitution.

ANALYSIS

As provided in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-610, upon violation of an order of protection or a court-approved consent agreement, the court may hold the defendant in civil or criminal contempt. In addition to the authorized punishments for contempt of court, the judge may assess a civil penalty of fifty dollars. Under Senate Bill 3100, the amount of the civil penalty would be increased to five hundred dollars. The stated purpose for this increase would be to encourage compliance by increasing the available sanction.

Article VI, Section 14, of the Tennessee Constitution provides:

No fine shall be laid on any citizen of this State that shall exceed fifty dollars, unless it shall be assessed by a jury of his peers, who shall assess the fine at the time they find the fact, if they think the fine should be more than fifty dollars.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that Article VI, Section 14, applies to any fine that is punitive, as opposed to remedial, in nature. City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001). A monetary sanction falls within the scope of Article VI, Section 14, when:

(1) the legislative body creating the sanction primarily intended that the sanction punish the offender; or (2) despite evidence of remedial intent, the monetary sanction is shown by the "clearest proof" to be so punitive in its actual purpose or effect that it cannot legitimately be viewed as remedial in nature.

Id. at 264.

Remedial purposes have been recognized to include those intended to compensate for loss; reimburse for expenses; provide restitution for harm; or ensure compliance with an order or directive through a prospectively coercive fine. 54 S.W.3d at 270. On the other hand, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that when the predominant purposes served by the penalty are "to provide general and specific deterrence and to ensure overall future compliance," then the monetary penalty is deemed to be punitive. Id.

In our view, the predominant purpose of the civil penalty assessed under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-610(b) is to deter violations of orders of protection or court-approved consent agreements and ensure future compliance. While the civil penalties collected are sent to the state treasury for deposit in the domestic violence community education fund, these monetary penalties do not seem to be intended to compensate for loss or reimburse expenses so as to have a predominantly remedial purpose. Thus, since the proposed Bill would authorize a judge to assess a punitive fine which exceeds fifty dollars without the intervention of a jury, it is in violation of Article VI, Section 14, of the Tennessee Constitution.

ROBERT E. COOPER, JR.
Attorney General and Reporter

MICHAEL E. MOORE
Solicitor General

DIANNE STAMEY DYCUS
Deputy Attorney General

Requested by:
Honorable Beverly Marrero
State Senator
War Memorial Building, Suite 312
Nashville, TN 37243-0189