When must a Tennessee tow truck driver get the written tow authorization, before hooking up or before pulling away?

Plain-English summary

Senator Joe Haynes asked the AG to settle a dispute between Tennessee tow truck inspectors and tow truck drivers. Tow truck inspectors had been writing citations to drivers who hooked vehicles to their trucks before the written tow authorization was completed. Drivers said the practice was efficient: identify the vehicle, hook it up while the form was being filled out, and roll only after the paperwork was done.

AG Robert E. Cooper, Jr. sided with the drivers. The criminal statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-16-112(a), requires the towing firm to obtain "express written authorization" before it tows the vehicle, and it makes a violation a Class C misdemeanor. The verb "tow" means "to draw or pull along behind." Hooking a vehicle to a tow truck is a preliminary step; it does not draw or pull the vehicle anywhere. So the operative line under the statute is movement, not connection. As long as the truck doesn't pull the vehicle from its original location before the form is fully completed, the statute is satisfied.

The opinion leaned on the rule of lenity for criminal statutes. Where a statute is ambiguous and creates a criminal penalty, the court reads it strictly in favor of the defendant. The Legislature didn't expressly say "before hooking up," and the AG declined to read that requirement in.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2010. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: What does § 55-16-112(a) require?
A: That the towing firm obtain "express written authorization" from one of three sources before it tows or stores the vehicle: (1) a law enforcement officer with appropriate jurisdiction, (2) the owner of the vehicle, or (3) the owner of the private property from which the vehicle is being towed (or that owner's authorized agent). The authorization must include the information specified in § 66-19-103(d). Violation is a Class C misdemeanor.

Q: What's the rule of lenity?
A: A canon of criminal statutory construction. When a criminal statute is ambiguous, the court resolves the ambiguity in favor of the defendant. Rewis v. United States (U.S. 1971) and the line of Tennessee cases the opinion cited (Key v. State, Crowe v. State, State v. Williams) all apply this rule. The rationale is that people should have fair warning of what is criminal, so close cases go to the defendant.

Q: So tow truck inspectors can't ticket a driver for hooking up early?
A: Not under § 55-16-112(a) by itself. If the driver actually moves the vehicle before the form is done, that's a violation. If the driver hooks up while the form is being filled out and waits to start towing, that's not a violation under this opinion's reading.

Q: What if local rules say otherwise?
A: The opinion only addressed the state statute. A local ordinance regulating towing more strictly could add requirements (like a "no hookup before authorization" rule). This opinion doesn't override local regulations that have their own legal basis.

Q: Why does the AG care about how dictionaries define "tow"?
A: Because the statutory text is "to tow," not "to hook up to a tow truck." Where the legislature uses a common-meaning verb without specifying its scope, the AG (and a court) will look to ordinary dictionaries for the natural meaning. Both Merriam-Webster and American Heritage define "tow" as drawing or pulling. Hooking is a preparatory step, not towing itself.

Q: Is the authorization paperwork still required?
A: Yes, fully. The driver still has to obtain the express written authorization, complete with all information § 66-19-103(d) requires, before pulling the vehicle from its location. The opinion only addressed timing, not whether the requirement exists.

Q: What if the form is partly completed when towing begins?
A: The opinion's standard is "until the written authorization has been completed." A partially completed form would not meet the standard. The driver must wait until the form is fully filled out before starting the tow.

Background and statutory framework

Tennessee's regulation of towing operations sits in two related title sections. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-16 governs garagekeepers, towing firms, and abandoned vehicle disposition. Section 55-16-112(a) is the heart of the consent requirement: a towing firm cannot tow or store a vehicle without express written authorization from a law enforcement officer, the vehicle's owner, or the property owner. The authorization must include the items in § 66-19-103(d), the related title that governs vehicle storage liens and disposition procedures.

The legislative purpose is to prevent unauthorized "predatory towing," where towing companies hook up parked cars and drive off with them, demanding storage fees on retrieval. The express-written-authorization requirement creates a documentary record that the tow had a lawful predicate. The criminal penalty backs the requirement with enforcement teeth.

Where the statute is silent (and § 55-16-112(a) is silent on the precise timing of authorization relative to physical hookup), the AG's analysis applies standard construction tools: ordinary meaning of statutory terms (Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. King, Tenn. 1984; Azbill v. Azbill, Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), and, for criminal statutes, the rule of lenity (Key v. State, Tenn. 1978; Crowe v. State, Tenn. 1951; Rewis v. United States, U.S. 1971). The conclusion (no violation if no movement) follows from both: ordinary meaning of "tow" requires movement, and lenity resolves any ambiguity for the defendant.

The opinion is a clean example of statutory restraint. The AG declined to read in a requirement (no hookup before authorization) that the Legislature could have written but did not, noting that if a criminal penalty was to attach to early hookup, "that intent would have to be made clear."

Citations and references

Statutes:
- Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-16-112
- Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-19-103(d) (authorization information requirements)

Cases:
- Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. King, 678 S.W.2d 19 (Tenn. 1984) (Tennessee Supreme Court)
- Azbill v. Azbill, 661 S.W.2d 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (Tennessee Court of Appeals)
- Key v. State, 563 S.W.2d 184 (Tenn. 1978) (Tennessee Supreme Court): rule of lenity
- Crowe v. State, 241 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1951) (Tennessee Supreme Court)
- State v. Williams, 623 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1981) (Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals)
- Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971) (U.S. Supreme Court): federal articulation of rule of lenity
- Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955) (U.S. Supreme Court)
- Knoxville Power & Light Co. v. Thompson, 276 S.W. 1050 (Tenn. 1925) (Tennessee Supreme Court)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/opinions.html
• Original PDF: https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/ops/2010/op10-004.pdf

Original opinion text

Written authorization required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-16-112(a) to tow vehicle

QUESTION

Does a tow truck driver violate Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-16-112(a) by hooking a vehicle to his tow truck after an appropriate person under the statute identifies the vehicle to be towed, but before the required written authorization has been completed?

OPINION

A tow truck driver does not violate Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-16-112(a) if he hooks a vehicle to his tow truck after an appropriate person identifies the vehicle to be towed, but before the written authorization required by the statute is completely filled out, as long as the tow truck driver does not draw or pull the vehicle from its original location until the written authorization has been completed.

ANALYSIS

This opinion addresses the interpretation of Section 55-16-112(a), which is part of a statutory scheme for the disposition of unclaimed or abandoned vehicles. This provision states:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this part or of title 66, chapter 19, part 1, in order for a garagekeeper or a towing firm to tow or to store a vehicle the garagekeeper or towing firm shall obtain an express written authorization for towing and storage of each vehicle from a law enforcement officer with appropriate jurisdiction, or from the owner of the vehicle, or from the owner, or the authorized agent of the owner, of the private property from which the vehicle is to be towed. The authorization shall include all of the information required by § 66-19-103(d). In addition to any other penalty provided by this part or by title 66, chapter 19, part 1, a violation of the provisions of this section is a Class C misdemeanor.

You state that some tow truck inspectors take the position that the written authorization described above must be completed before a tow truck driver may hook a vehicle to his tow truck. You convey, however, that many tow truck drivers take preliminary steps to hook vehicles to their tow trucks after an appropriate person under the statute identifies a vehicle to be towed, but before that person completes the requisite written authorization. Tow truck inspectors who take the position described above are writing citations to tow truck drivers engaging in this practice. You inquire whether a tow truck driver who takes preliminary steps to hook a vehicle to his tow truck after the vehicle has been identified to be towed, but before the requisite written authorization has been completed, is in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-16-112(a).

The guiding principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention or purpose of the legislature as expressed in the statute. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. King, 678 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Tenn. 1984), appeal dismissed, 470 U.S. 1075, 105 S.Ct. 1830, 85 L.Ed.2d 131 (1985). Legislative intent or purpose is to be ascertained primarily from the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used when read in the context of the statute and without any forced or subtle construction to limit the import of the language. Azbill v. Azbill, 661 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (citations omitted). Where the intent of the lawmakers is clear, the court will exercise its ingenuity to give effect thereto. Knoxville Power & Light Co. v. Thompson, 276 S.W. 1050, 1051 (Tenn. 1925). Where this intent is doubtful, the court must be more cautious. Id. This is especially true when a statute is penal in nature. Such a statute must be construed strictly in favor of the defendant. Key v. State, 563 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Tenn. 1978); Crowe v. State, 241 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Tenn. 1951); State v. Williams, 623 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1981). Any ambiguity concerning the ambit of a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971) (citing Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955)).

Examining Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-16-112(a), the General Assembly does not expressly address when the tow truck driver must obtain the written authorization described therein. The statute simply provides that a towing firm must obtain an express written authorization "to tow" a vehicle. The Merriam-Webster on-line dictionary states that the verb "tow" means "to draw or pull along behind." Similarly, the American Heritage Dictionary states that "tow" means "to draw or pull along behind by a chain or line." American Heritage Dictionary, p. 1430 (3d Coll. ed. 1997). These definitions of "tow" embrace movement. Applying the statutory construction principles above, we do not think that a violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-16-112(a) occurs when a tow truck driver takes preliminary steps to hook a vehicle to his tow truck after the vehicle has been identified to be towed, but before the written authorization required by the statute has been completed, assuming that the tow truck driver does not proceed to draw or pull the vehicle from its original location until the written authorization is completely filled out. If a criminal penalty is to result in this instance, we think that intent would have to be made clear.

ROBERT E. COOPER, JR.
Attorney General and Reporter

CHARLES L. LEWIS
Deputy Attorney General

LAURA T. KIDWELL
Senior Counsel

Requested by:
Honorable Joe M. Haynes
State Senator
G-19 War Memorial Building
Nashville, TN 37243-0220