When an outside police department asks a South Dakota city's officers to arrest someone in that city, or comes into the city and makes the arrest themselves, what authority is actually in play?

Plain-English summary

The Chief of Police in Spearfish saw two bad cross-jurisdictional arrest patterns and asked the AG to clarify. Pattern one: another department puts out an "attempt to locate" bulletin asking Spearfish to make an arrest on their behalf, even though Spearfish has no warrant of its own. Pattern two: an outside department drives into Spearfish, makes a custodial arrest, and leaves without coordinating with the local department, claiming the "collective knowledge doctrine" justifies the cross-jurisdictional grab.

AG Marty Jackley split the answer into three:

1. Yes, the collective knowledge doctrine lets Spearfish officers arrest someone in Spearfish when probable cause was developed by another agency, as long as the facts behind the probable cause are communicated to the arresting officer before the stop or arrest. ATL/BOLO bulletins can carry the underlying facts. So pattern one is generally fine, but it works because Spearfish officers are making the arrest in their own jurisdiction.
2. No, an outside municipal agency cannot drive into Spearfish and make a custodial arrest on its own authority, even if the underlying offense triggers mandatory warrantless arrest under SDCL 23A-3-2.1. The Legislature drew a hard one-mile limit in SDCL 9-29-1 and never created a mandatory-arrest exception. The mandatory-arrest statute tells officers when they must arrest, not where they may arrest.
3. What outside officers can still do is a citizen's arrest under SDCL 23A-3-3, if the offense occurred in their presence or they have probable cause. That requires immediate transfer of the suspect to the local jurisdiction's officer or to a magistrate, per SDCL 23A-4-1. It is not a workaround for the territorial limit, it is a separate legal route with separate rules.

The third question, whether Spearfish officers have a duty to intervene when another agency makes an extraterritorial arrest in Spearfish, gets a fact-specific answer. Generally no, but if a reasonable officer would have understood the outside arrest to be a clear constitutional violation, intervention may be required to avoid Section 1983 liability for the bystanding officer.

The opinion notes that if there is a desire to extend jurisdictional authority, the Legislature has the power to change the statutes governing jurisdictional authority for mandatory-arrest offenses or arrests outside a jurisdiction.

What this means for you

If you are a South Dakota municipal police chief or officer

On the ATL/BOLO scenario, the opinion holds that the collective knowledge doctrine lets a municipal officer arrest someone in the officer's own jurisdiction based on probable cause established by another agency. It adds that South Dakota case law "suggests the actual facts underlying the analysis of reasonable suspicion or probable cause be communicated to the acting officer prior to the stop, frisk, search, or arrest," and states that "[e]ach request for apprehension from an outside agency should state the facts underlying the request and whether or not probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists."

On arresting someone in another municipality, the opinion holds that a municipal officer's authority generally does not extend outside the territorial limits set by SDCL 9-29-1 (the corporate limits plus one mile, but not inside another municipality), and that the mandatory-arrest statute SDCL 23A-3-2.1 does not supersede that limit because it addresses when an officer must arrest, not where. It identifies two routes that remain: fresh pursuit of a person fleeing from justice under SDCL 9-29-19, and a citizen's arrest under SDCL 23A-3-3.

On citizen's arrest, the opinion holds that an out-of-jurisdiction officer has the same arrest power as a private citizen (MacDonald): the offense must occur in the person's presence or there must be probable cause for a felony, and the arrested person must be taken "immediately" before the nearest magistrate or delivered to the nearest available law enforcement officer under SDCL 23A-4-1. It reads SDCL 22-1-2(22) as meaning the local arresting officer qualifies to take possession of the suspect.

If you are a county sheriff

The opinion addresses municipal officers specifically; its territorial-limit analysis is grounded in SDCL 9-29-1, which governs municipalities. The collective knowledge doctrine it describes applies across agencies generally, including a sheriff's deputy relaying or relying on probable cause from another jurisdiction. (In the second fact scenario, a Lawrence County deputy identified the suspect's vehicle and notified the neighboring department.)

If you are a defense attorney

The opinion sets out the framework a cross-jurisdictional arrest is measured against: whether the arresting officer was within the territorial limit of SDCL 9-29-1; whether, if outside, the arrest met the citizen's-arrest conditions of SDCL 23A-3-3 with immediate transfer under SDCL 23A-4-1; and whether, for a collective-knowledge arrest, the underlying probable-cause facts were communicated to the acting officer (State v. Richards, State v. Mohr). It quotes State v. Hirsch that an officer entering another municipality to arrest "could be an unlawful exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction explicitly prohibited by SDCL 9-29-1."

If you are a prosecutor

The opinion holds that a mandatory-arrest circumstance does not cure a lack of territorial authority, and that an extraterritorial municipal arrest is valid only if it satisfies the citizen's-arrest requirements. It does not address charging decisions or suppression practice; it resolves only the three jurisdictional questions posed.

If you are a city attorney

The opinion holds that the territorial limits of SDCL 9-29-1 are not displaced by a neighboring agency's ATL/BOLO or by a mandatory-arrest situation, and that the route for changing the allocation of cross-jurisdictional arrest authority lies with the Legislature, which "has the power to change statutes regarding jurisdictional authority." It does not opine on mutual-aid agreements between departments.

If you are a federal civil rights attorney

On the duty-to-intervene question, the opinion holds there is "no express duty applicable in all situations" requiring local officers to intervene in an outside agency's arrest, and that the answer "depends on the facts of each circumstance." It notes that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 both arresting and bystanding officers may be liable for constitutional violations, measured by the objective-reasonableness standard of Harlow v. Fitzgerald and Anderson v. Creighton (as applied in Hart v. Miller): the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand the conduct violates it. The opinion does not say a cross-jurisdictional arrest, by itself, creates liability.

Common questions

Q: What is the "collective knowledge doctrine"?
A: It is the rule that one officer can act on probable cause established by another officer, as long as the underlying facts are communicated. State v. Mohr, 2013 S.D. 94, and State v. Richards, 1998 S.D. 128, lay it out. The doctrine is about who can rely on what facts, not about who can cross what borders.

Q: Does a "mandatory arrest" statute create extra authority to arrest across jurisdictions?
A: No. SDCL 23A-3-2.1 lists offenses for which an officer "shall arrest" (mandatory-arrest domestic violence cases are the central example). The AG reads that statute as instructing officers on when to arrest, not where. A Yankton officer with a mandatory-arrest situation in Spearfish still cannot make the arrest unless the citizen's-arrest framework applies.

Q: Can a Spearfish officer pursue a suspect into another jurisdiction?
A: Yes, in fresh pursuit. SDCL 9-29-19 lets municipal police "pursue and arrest any person fleeing from justice in any part of the state." The opinion does not address fresh-pursuit details, but the statute carves it out from the general one-mile limit.

Q: What about within one mile of city limits?
A: SDCL 9-29-1 extends municipal jurisdiction to "within one mile of the corporate limits," except into another municipality. So a Spearfish officer can arrest outside Spearfish proper as long as they are within one mile and not inside another city's limits.

Q: What's the difference between a custodial arrest and a citizen's arrest?
A: A custodial arrest is a law enforcement action under color of authority, processed through the law enforcement chain. A citizen's arrest under SDCL 23A-3-3 is something any private person can do, with strict rules: offense in your presence or probable cause for a felony, and immediate transfer to a magistrate or local officer under SDCL 23A-4-1. MacDonald says an out-of-jurisdiction officer is at most a citizen, with the same authority a private person would have.

Q: When does an outside arrest become a civil rights problem?
A: If the arrest involves use of excessive force, illegal entry, or seizure without probable cause, Section 1983 exposure applies to the arresting officer. The opinion does not say cross-jurisdictional alone creates liability. It says bystanding officers may be liable if a clearly-established constitutional right is violated and a reasonable officer should have intervened.

Q: Do local officers have a duty to stop an out-of-jurisdiction arrest in their city?
A: Per the opinion, generally no. The AG found "no express duty applicable in all situations" and said the answer depends on the facts. Intervention may be required only where it is sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer must step in to protect a person's constitutional rights, the standard that also governs § 1983 bystander liability.

Background and statutory framework

South Dakota's municipal-police authority statute is unusually explicit about the territorial limit. SDCL 9-29-1 confines municipal authority to the corporate limits plus one mile, expressly excluding any part of another municipality. The South Dakota Supreme Court has read that statute strictly in State v. Hirsch (1981) and State v. MacDonald (1977), holding that an out-of-jurisdiction municipal arrest is invalid as such, leaving the officer at most a citizen.

The collective knowledge doctrine is a separate body of law about probable cause. It comes from the federal Fourth Amendment line of cases (United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985)) and was adopted in South Dakota in State v. Czmowski (1986), State v. Baysinger (1991), and State v. Richards (1998). The doctrine answers the question "can officer A rely on officer B's probable cause?" The answer is yes, with communication. It does not answer the question "can officer A cross into officer C's jurisdiction?" The answer to that question is no.

The mandatory-arrest framework in SDCL 23A-3-2.1 was enacted in part as a domestic-violence response. It creates a "you must arrest" rule for officers who already have arrest authority over the situation. The AG's reading harmonizes the statutes: an officer with arrest authority (because they're in their jurisdiction, or because of fresh pursuit, or because the facts trigger a citizen's-arrest right) is told they "shall" arrest when the listed criteria are met. The statute does not address the antecedent question of who has arrest authority in the first place.

Citizen's arrest under SDCL 23A-3-3 is the practical safety valve. It permits any person to arrest for an offense committed in their presence, or for a felony for which they have probable cause. SDCL 23A-4-1 requires immediate delivery of the arrested person to a magistrate or "the nearest available law enforcement officer." That second route, transfer to a local officer, is how a cross-jurisdictional citizen's arrest by an out-of-jurisdiction officer should normally resolve.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- SDCL 9-29-1 (municipal one-mile territorial limit)
- SDCL 9-29-19 (police powers including fresh pursuit)
- SDCL 23A-3-2.1 (mandatory warrantless arrest)
- SDCL 23A-3-3 (citizen's arrest)
- SDCL 23A-4-1 (immediate delivery requirement)
- SDCL 22-1-2(22) (law enforcement officer definition)
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (federal civil rights)

Cases on collective knowledge doctrine:
- State v. Richards, 1998 S.D. 128, 588 N.W.2d 594
- State v. Mohr, 2013 S.D. 94, 841 N.W.2d 440
- State v. Czmowski, 393 N.W.2d 72 (S.D. 1986)
- State v. Baysinger, 470 N.W.2d 840 (S.D. 1991)
- State v. Krebs, 504 N.W.2d 580 (S.D. 1993)
- United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985)

Cases on extraterritorial jurisdiction:
- State v. Hirsch, 309 N.W.2d 832 (S.D. 1981)
- State v. MacDonald, 260 N.W.2d 626 (S.D. 1977)

Cases on Section 1983 / duty to intervene:
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)
- Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987)
- Hart v. Miller, 2000 S.D. 53, 609 N.W.2d 138

Source

• Landing page: https://atg.sd.gov/OurOffice/OfficialOpinions/opinionhtml.aspx?id=1769
• Original PDF: https://atg.sd.gov/OfficialOpinions/AG%20Opinion%2025-03.pdf

Original opinion text

OFFICIAL OPINION 25-03

Re: Official Opinion Concerning Law Enforcement Jurisdictional Arrest Authority

Dear Chief Smith,

In your capacity as Chief of Police for the City of Spearfish Police Department, you have requested an official opinion from the Attorney General's Office on the following questions:

QUESTION(S):

• Does the collective knowledge doctrine apply to provide a law enforcement agency authority to make an arrest when probable cause for the arrest was established in another jurisdiction?
• Is there an extension of jurisdictional arrest authority when a mandatory arrest offense is committed in a separate jurisdiction?
• If arrest authority does not exist for a law enforcement agency to make an arrest outside its jurisdiction, do law enforcement officers of the jurisdiction where the arrest is attempted have a duty to intervene to prevent an unlawful arrest?

ANSWER(S):

• Yes, the collective knowledge doctrine allows municipal law enforcement officers to rely on the probable cause determinations of other officers, whether from the same agency or different jurisdictions, to make arrests or conduct investigatory stops.
• No, a municipal law enforcement agency's jurisdictional arrest authority does not generally extend outside its territorial limits, even in circumstances permitting warrantless arrests, except for citizens arrests.
• No, municipal law enforcement officers generally do not have a duty to intervene to prevent an arrest made in its jurisdiction by an outside law enforcement agency because of the exception noted above, although the facts of every circumstance will differ.

FACTS:

Recently, two incidents occurred in Spearfish involving neighboring law enforcement agencies requesting and conducting custodial arrests in Spearfish, outside their jurisdictions or the jurisdiction where probable cause for arrest originated.

In the first example a police department sent out an "attempt to locate" (ATL) bulletin for a simple assault-domestic violence suspect. In the call they directed law enforcement agencies to arrest the suspect on their behalf if contact was made. You informed this police department that your department could not take a suspect into custody without a warrant. Their Chief of Police indicated his belief that you could effectuate such an arrest without a warrant because of the ATL issued by the original jurisdiction.

The second example you provided involved a situation where a neighboring municipality's police department, in a separate county, put out a vehicle "be on the lookout" (BOLO) notice after a simple assault suspect had fled their county. A Lawrence County Sheriff's deputy identified the vehicle at a location within the City of Spearfish. The neighboring police department was notified and, after arriving on the scene, arrested the suspect and transported him back to their jurisdiction without consulting your officers who were also already on the scene. The neighboring police department claimed the collective knowledge doctrine gave them authority to effect the arrest outside their jurisdiction. They also asserted they had probable cause for a mandatory arrest.

IN RE QUESTION 1:

You have asked whether the collective knowledge doctrine applies to the first fact scenario to provide local law enforcement officers the authority to make an arrest when probable cause was established in an outside jurisdiction.

"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and is implicated when a vehicle is stopped." State v. Hodges, 2001 S.D. 93, ¶ 11, 631 N.W.2d 206, 209 (quoting State v. Vento, 1999 S.D. 158, ¶ 18, 604 N.W.2d 468, 470). To stop a vehicle, law enforcement must have reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that its occupants are involved in criminal activity. State v. Kenyon, 2002 S.D. 111, ¶ 14, 651 N.W.2d 269, 273. A stop of a vehicle is a seizure of all its occupants so even a passenger has standing to challenge the stop. State v. Krebs, 504 N.W.2d 580, 584 (S.D. 1993) (citing United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir. 1989)).

In South Dakota, "[l]aw enforcement personnel are allowed to rely upon information conveyed by one officer to another for determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion through the collective knowledge doctrine." State v. Mohr, 2013 S.D. 94, ¶ 18, 841 N.W.2d 440, 445 (citing State v. Richards, 1998 S.D. 128, ¶ 15, 588 N.W.2d 594, 597). "The collective knowledge doctrine is designed to allow law enforcement personnel from the same agency, or from different jurisdictions, to rely on the probable cause determinations of one another in order to apprehend specific suspects." Richards, 1998 S.D. 128, ¶ 15, 588 N.W.2d at 597 (citing Maltby v. Winston, 36 F.3d 548, 564 n.26 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1141, 115 S.Ct. 2576, 132 L.Ed.2d 827 (1995)). Thus, the collective knowledge doctrine allows local law enforcement officers to arrest an individual if probable cause was established in an outside jurisdiction.

Like many other states, "South Dakota has recognized the necessity of law enforcement relying upon each other for determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause through the collective knowledge doctrine." Richards, 1998 S.D. 128, ¶ 15, 588 N.W.2d at 597 (citing Krebs, 504 N.W.2d at 586; State v. Baysinger, 470 N.W.2d 840, 845 (1991); and State v. Czmowski, 393 N.W.2d 72, 73 (1986)). In these circumstances, "whether or not probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists is determined by considering the information possessed by the requesting officer." Richards, 1998 S.D. 128, ¶ 18, 588 N.W.2d at 597. Of particular concern is the communication between agencies. Case law in South Dakota suggests the actual facts underlying the analysis of reasonable suspicion or probable cause be communicated to the acting officer prior to the stop, frisk, search, or arrest. See Mohr, 2013 S.D. 94, ¶ 18, 841 N.W.2d at 445; Richards, 1998 S.D. 128, ¶ 18, 588 N.W.2d at 597; and Commonwealth v. Privette, 491 Mass. 501, 509, 204 N.E.3d 967, 976 (2023) (comparing various requirements for inter-agency communication).

Police bulletins such as ATLs or BOLOs are likely sufficient to justify reasonable suspicion for minimally intrusive stops. Krebs, 504 N.W.2d at 585. See also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (upholding a Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion where officers relied on police-issued bulletins describing the suspect). But each situation is different. In fact, the South Dakota Supreme Court has found no authority specifying any "specific quantum of information justifying a stop" that "must be relayed to the stopping officer before the stop is upheld." Richards, 1998 S.D. 128, ¶ 18, 588 N.W.2d at 597. "'In assessing police justifications for arrests or intrusions of a type less offensive than full arrests, we take an objective view of all the facts and may evaluate the knowledge of all the officers collectively.'" Richards, 1998 S.D. 128, ¶ 16, 588 N.W.2d at 597 (quoting Czmowski, 393 N.W.2d at 73) (other citations omitted).

The facts and knowledge of all the officers, from the requesting and arresting jurisdictions, is viewed collectively. Id. Each request for apprehension from an outside agency should state the facts underlying the request and whether or not probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists based on the information possessed by the requesting officer.

IN RE QUESTION 2:

You have also asked, relevant to the second fact scenario, whether there is an extension of a municipal law enforcement agency's jurisdictional authority when a mandatory arrest offense is committed in a separate jurisdiction. This question contemplates SDCL 9-29-1, SDCL 9-29-19, and SDCL 23A-3-2.1.

When interpreting statutes, "'the language expressed in the statute is the paramount consideration.'" Olson v. Butte County Comm'n, 2019 S.D. 13, ¶ 5, 925 N.W.2d 463, 464 (quoting Goetz v. State, 2001 S.D. 138, ¶ 15, 636 N.W.2d 675, 681). "When the language in a statute is clear, certain, and unambiguous, there is no reason for construction[.]" In re Implicated Individual, 2021 S.D. 61, ¶ 16, 966 N.W.2d 578, 583 (quoting Long v. State, 2017 S.D. 78, ¶ 13, 904 N.W.2d 358, 364). The intent of a statute "must be determined from the statute as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject." In re Taliaferro, 2014 S.D. 82, ¶ 6, 856 N.W.2d 805, 807 (citations omitted). "Where two statutes appear to conflict, it is [the court's] duty to reasonably interpret both, giving effect, if possible, to all provisions under consideration, construing them together to make them harmonious and workable." Faircloth v. Raven Industries, Inc., 2000 S.D. 158, ¶ 7, 620 N.W.2d 198, 201 (cleaned up).

Under South Dakota law, municipal law enforcement officers generally lack the authority to make arrests outside their jurisdiction unless explicitly authorized by statute. Broadly, SDCL 9-29-19 grants police officers the following powers:

All policemen of any municipality shall possess the powers of constables. They may pursue and arrest any person fleeing from justice in any part of the state, and when performing the duties aforesaid may arrest and detain any person guilty of any breach of the peace or any violation of the laws of the state or ordinance of the municipality.

But that statute must be read in conjunction with SDCL 9-29-1, which defines a municipal officer's jurisdictional territory as within one mile of the city limits:

Every municipality shall have power to exercise jurisdiction for all authorized purposes over all territory within the corporate limits and over any public ground or park belonging to the municipality, whether within or without the corporate limits, and in and over all places, except within the corporate limits of another municipality, within one mile of the corporate limits or of any public ground or park belonging to the municipality outside the corporate limits, for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community, and of enforcing its ordinances and resolutions relating thereto.

Giving effect to both provisions and reading the language of the statutes explicitly, a municipal police officer's power to exercise his or her authority forbids doing so "within the corporate limits of another municipality. . ." SDCL 9-29-1. The South Dakota Supreme Court has interpreted these statutes in the same way. If a municipal police officer enters another municipality to arrest a person, it could be an unlawful exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction explicitly prohibited by SDCL 9-29-1. State v. Hirsch, 309 N.W.2d 832, 834 (S.D. 1981). "In the absence of specific statutory authority, it is a well established general principle, in most jurisdictions, that a public police officer for a particular municipality has no official power to arrest offenders beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the municipality for which he serves." Hirsch, 309 N.W.2d at 834 (quoting State v. MacDonald, 260 N.W.2d 626, 627 (S.D. 1977)) (footnote omitted).

In contrast, SDCL 23A-3-2.1 does not relate to territorial jurisdiction — it enumerates circumstances requiring a law enforcement officer to make a warrantless arrest. It says, "a law enforcement officer shall arrest and take into custody. . . any person, without a warrant, at any time that the opportunity presents itself, if the officer has probable cause to believe that" certain circumstances have been met. SDCL 23A-3-2.1.

SDCL 23A-3-2.1 confirms an officer making a valid legal arrest must have probable cause and be aware of certain criteria to make the mandatory arrest. But I find no legal authority suggesting that a mandatory arrest circumstance supersedes the jurisdictional authority explicit in SDCL 9-29-1.

Even so, it is possible that an officer from another jurisdiction could make a citizen's arrest under the conditions set forth in SDCL 23A-3-3, as any citizen can do. See MacDonald, 260 N.W.2d at 627 (holding that when a municipal police officer made an arrest outside of his jurisdiction, "he does have the same power of arrest as that conferred on a private citizen"). Such an arrest must adhere to relevant laws for a citizen's arrest, including that the offense either occur in the arresting person's presence or that he has probable cause (see SDCL 23A-3-3), and that the arresting person immediately "take the arrested person before the nearest available committing magistrate or deliver him to the nearest available law enforcement officer." SDCL 23A-4-1. A law enforcement officer is defined as "any officer . . . of the state or any of its political subdivisions . . . who is responsible for the prevention, detection, or prosecution of crimes, for the enforcement of the criminal or highway traffic laws of the state..." SDCL 22-1-2(22). Thus, it is likely the arresting officer qualifies as an officer legally entitled to take possession of the suspect. See MacDonald, 260 N.W.2d at 628 ("[t]he arrest had to meet the requirements of a private citizen arrest; but, once it met those requirements, the Police Chief was qualified and legally entitled to give him the implied consent warning.")

IN RE QUESTION 3:

Finally, you ask whether local enforcement officers in the jurisdiction where an arrest is attempted have a duty to intervene if an outside law enforcement agency attempts to make an arrest in your jurisdiction.

The answer to your question depends on the facts of each circumstance. All law enforcement officers are generally required to act within the bounds of the law. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, either arresting or bystanding law enforcement officers may be held liable for depriving individuals of constitutional rights while acting under color of law. For example, an arresting officer may be liable for using excessive force, and a bystanding officer may be liable for the failure to intervene when the other officer uses excessive force. The test for whether an officer's conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights is not one's subjective beliefs, but what a reasonable officer should have known at the time and under those specific circumstances. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "This objective legal reasonableness standard means the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Hart v. Miller, 2000 S.D. 53, ¶ 13, 609 N.W.2d 138, 143 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (cleaned up).

I find no express duty applicable in all situations requiring you to intervene in these circumstances, particularly considering that any person can make a citizen's arrest as discussed above.

CONCLUSION

The collective knowledge doctrine provides a law enforcement agency authority to arrest an individual when probable cause was established and communicated by law enforcement in another jurisdiction. A municipal law enforcement agency's jurisdictional arrest authority does not generally extend outside its territorial limits, even in circumstances permitting warrantless arrests, except for citizens arrests. Furthermore, there is no express duty to intervene if an outside law enforcement agency attempts an arrest within your jurisdiction, unless it is sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer in that specific situation must intervene to protect a person's constitutional rights. In the event there is a desire to extend jurisdictional authority, the legislature has the power to change statutes regarding jurisdictional authority for mandatory arrest offenses or arrests outside of a jurisdiction.

Sincerely,

Marty J. Jackley

ATTORNEY GENERAL

MJJ/SLT/dd