When South Dakota police arrest a suspect outside their own city limits because another department asked them to or because they had probable cause from a different jurisdiction, is that arrest legal? And does the host department have to step in if it isn't?

Plain-English summary

The Spearfish police chief wrote to the AG about two real situations that kept coming up. In the first, a neighboring department put out an "attempt to locate" (ATL) bulletin for a domestic violence suspect and asked Spearfish to arrest the suspect if found. In the second, a different neighboring department put out a "be on the lookout" (BOLO) for a fleeing simple assault suspect; a Lawrence County deputy spotted the vehicle inside Spearfish; the neighboring department drove in, arrested the suspect, and drove him back across the line, all without coordinating with the Spearfish officers on scene. The neighboring department argued it had "collective knowledge" probable cause and a mandatory arrest obligation, so its extra-jurisdictional arrest was lawful.

AG Marty Jackley parsed it into three answers.

1. Collective knowledge doctrine: yes, probable cause can be borrowed. South Dakota recognizes the collective knowledge doctrine. State v. Richards (1998), State v. Mohr (2013), and a line of older cases say officers can rely on another officer's probable cause determination to stop, frisk, search, or arrest. ATL and BOLO bulletins generally provide enough information to justify a stop. The communication between agencies matters: case law expects the underlying facts to be relayed before the stop, not just a label.

2. Jurisdictional arrest authority: no, it does not extend across city lines. SDCL 9-29-19 gives municipal officers the powers of constables, including state-wide pursuit power and authority to arrest fleeing suspects. But SDCL 9-29-1 explicitly limits municipal jurisdiction to the corporate limits plus a one-mile buffer, and forbids exercising that authority "within the corporate limits of another municipality." State v. Hirsch (1981) and State v. MacDonald (1977) confirm the rule: in the absence of specific statutory authority, a municipal officer has no official power to arrest beyond the territorial jurisdiction. A mandatory arrest obligation under SDCL 23A-3-2.1 does not override that. The mandatory-arrest statute speaks to when an officer must arrest if otherwise authorized, not where an officer can act.

3. Citizen's arrest is the fallback. What an officer outside their jurisdiction can do is what any citizen can do under SDCL 23A-3-3. The arrest must meet citizen-arrest requirements (the offense occurred in the arresting person's presence or there is probable cause for a felony) and SDCL 23A-4-1 requires the arrested person to be delivered immediately to the nearest committing magistrate or law enforcement officer. MacDonald makes the point: an out-of-jurisdiction officer making an arrest has the same power as a private citizen and can still later act in official capacity once the suspect is properly handed over.

4. Duty to intervene in another agency's bad arrest: not as a categorical rule. Bystanding officers can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failing to intervene in clearly unconstitutional conduct (excessive force, for example), but only when a reasonable officer would have understood the conduct violated clearly established rights. There is no broad SD duty for one department to police another department's procedural compliance.

What this means for you

For SD municipal police officers

You can make a Terry stop or a felony arrest based on another department's transmitted probable cause, anywhere your jurisdictional authority extends (within your municipality and the one-mile buffer). You cannot drive into another municipality to arrest someone using your official authority, even if you have a mandatory arrest situation. If you find yourself in another city and witness an offense or have probable cause to believe a felony was committed, you can make a citizen's arrest under SDCL 23A-3-3, then deliver the suspect to a local officer or magistrate per SDCL 23A-4-1.

For police chiefs and departments writing mutual-aid protocols

The collective knowledge doctrine works only when the communication is concrete. ATL and BOLO bulletins should state the underlying facts (what happened, when, where, suspect description) and an explicit statement about whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists. A bare "arrest this person" request without facts is too thin under the case law. Build a template that requires the requesting agency to state the basis.

For departments asked to make an out-of-jurisdiction arrest as a favor

Decline the official arrest. Offer one of three alternatives: (1) the requesting agency dispatches its own officer and makes the arrest itself; (2) if facts support citizen's arrest, your officer makes a citizen's arrest under SDCL 23A-3-3 and delivers the suspect to the local jurisdiction or to the requesting agency; (3) get a warrant. A statewide warrant is the cleanest fix and removes the territorial-authority problem entirely.

For sheriffs

County sheriffs have broader territorial authority than municipal police. SDCL Chapter 7-12 gives sheriffs county-wide arrest authority. The Spearfish opinion specifically addresses municipal officers; a sheriff making the same arrest on the same facts may be on firmer ground because their jurisdiction includes the location of the arrest.

For criminal defense attorneys

If your client was arrested by an out-of-jurisdiction municipal officer with no warrant and no citizen-arrest procedure properly observed (no immediate delivery to magistrate, no facts establishing presence-or-felony probable cause), there is a legal defect to litigate. Motion to suppress or motion to dismiss may be appropriate depending on what evidence flowed from the arrest. The exclusionary rule and fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree analysis still apply.

For prosecutors

A successful arrest that doesn't sort out the jurisdictional question can sink a case at the suppression stage. When charging, confirm where the arrest happened, who made it, what authority they used, and whether the procedural requirements for citizen's arrest were met if jurisdictional authority is questionable.

For the host jurisdiction's officers on scene

You generally have no affirmative duty to intervene in the outside agency's arrest if you disagree with its lawfulness, unless the conduct rises to clearly unconstitutional excess (force, for example). But you also do not have to actively assist or stand back politely. Documenting what happened is your safest move: who arrived, what they said about their authority, who they took, where they went.

For SD law enforcement training staff

This opinion deserves a training session. The collective knowledge doctrine plus jurisdictional limits plus citizen's arrest fallback is not intuitive. Officers in the field need a flowchart they can recall in 30 seconds, not a treatise.

Common questions

Q: What's the collective knowledge doctrine in plain English?
A: If one officer or department has probable cause, another officer or department can act on it, as long as the underlying facts were communicated, not just the conclusion. It lets law enforcement work as a network rather than as 100 isolated little forces.

Q: Can a Spearfish officer arrest someone in Sturgis?
A: Not under their official municipal authority. They could potentially make a citizen's arrest under SDCL 23A-3-3, but they then have to deliver the suspect to a Sturgis officer or magistrate, not just drive them back to Spearfish.

Q: What about hot pursuit?
A: The AG noted in a footnote that hot pursuit doctrine didn't apply to Chief Smith's specific facts. Hot pursuit is a Fourth Amendment doctrine about entering private property without a warrant while chasing a fleeing suspect, not a doctrine about crossing municipal lines. If an officer is actively chasing a fleeing suspect across a city line, the statewide pursuit power in SDCL 9-29-19 may help, but it's a narrower carveout than people sometimes assume.

Q: What about a mandatory arrest situation, like domestic violence?
A: SDCL 23A-3-2.1 requires an arrest in certain circumstances if the officer has probable cause. The AG opinion says the mandatory-arrest statute doesn't override the territorial limit in SDCL 9-29-1. If the officer is outside their jurisdiction, the mandatory-arrest obligation doesn't unlock extra authority.

Q: Can a municipal officer in another city make a citizen's arrest?
A: Yes, but it has to satisfy citizen-arrest requirements. The offense must have occurred in the arresting person's presence, or there must be probable cause to believe a felony was committed. The suspect has to be delivered to the nearest available magistrate or law enforcement officer.

Q: If the other department's officers come into our city and do a bad arrest, are we liable for not stopping it?
A: Generally no, unless the conduct is clearly unconstitutional (excessive force is the typical example). There is no general duty to enforce another agency's compliance with jurisdictional rules. But if you witness conduct that any reasonable officer would know violates the Constitution, you may have a duty under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case law to intervene.

Q: Is an ATL or BOLO enough basis for our department to arrest someone?
A: For a Terry stop, usually yes if the bulletin contains specific facts. For a full custodial arrest, it depends. United States v. Hensley upheld a stop based on a bulletin. State v. Krebs in SD recognized similar use. The bulletin should include the facts giving rise to probable cause, not just the request. Stops are a lower bar than arrests, and you should be more careful as the intrusiveness escalates.

Q: Does this change with mutual aid agreements?
A: A formal mutual aid agreement under specific statutory authority can extend jurisdictional powers. The AG opinion doesn't address mutual aid agreements specifically. If your departments have one in place, it should be reviewed against this opinion's framework to confirm it provides the statutory basis the opinion says is otherwise lacking.

Q: Does this apply to tribal police?
A: The opinion addresses municipal police. Tribal law enforcement has its own statutory framework and federal/tribal jurisdiction issues that the opinion does not analyze.

Background and statutory framework

South Dakota's law enforcement jurisdictional structure has roots in older common-law constable doctrine. Constables were creatures of local jurisdiction. Modern police inherit much of that limitation. SDCL 9-29-19 grants police "the powers of constables" but the basic territorial constraint of SDCL 9-29-1 still applies. The Legislature has carved out specific extensions (hot pursuit, sheriff authority, statewide officers like Highway Patrol or DCI agents) but has not generally given municipal officers cross-municipal arrest power.

The collective knowledge doctrine developed in federal Fourth Amendment cases (Hensley, Erwin) and was adopted in SD through State v. Czmowski (1986), State v. Krebs (1993), State v. Richards (1998), and State v. Mohr (2013). The doctrine is a search-and-seizure rule about probable cause, not a jurisdictional rule about where an officer can act. The AG opinion is careful to keep those concepts separate, which is the analytical move that lets the doctrine apply within a jurisdiction without simultaneously extending arrest authority across city lines.

The citizen's arrest fallback in SDCL 23A-3-3 has the same elements that have existed for over a century in SD common law. MacDonald (1977) directly addressed an officer making an out-of-jurisdiction arrest and treated it as a citizen's arrest situation. Hirsch (1981) reinforced the rule. The 1976 amendment in Kierstead and later cases left the territorial limit intact.

The duty-to-intervene analysis comes from federal § 1983 doctrine. Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982) set the objective-reasonableness test. Anderson v. Creighton (1987) refined it. Hart v. Miller (2000 SD) applied it in South Dakota. None of these create a general affirmative duty for one department to police another department's procedural compliance.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- SDCL 9-29-1 (municipal jurisdiction)
- SDCL 9-29-19 (police powers)
- SDCL 22-1-2(22) (law enforcement officer definition)
- SDCL 23A-3-2.1 (mandatory arrest)
- SDCL 23A-3-3 (citizen's arrest)
- SDCL 23A-4-1 (post-citizen-arrest delivery)
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Cases:
- State v. Hodges, 2001 S.D. 93, 631 N.W.2d 206
- State v. Vento, 1999 S.D. 158, 604 N.W.2d 468
- State v. Kenyon, 2002 S.D. 111, 651 N.W.2d 269
- State v. Krebs, 504 N.W.2d 580 (S.D. 1993)
- State v. Mohr, 2013 S.D. 94, 841 N.W.2d 440
- State v. Richards, 1998 S.D. 128, 588 N.W.2d 594
- State v. Baysinger, 470 N.W.2d 840 (S.D. 1991)
- State v. Czmowski, 393 N.W.2d 72 (S.D. 1986)
- Commonwealth v. Privette, 491 Mass. 501, 204 N.E.3d 967 (2023)
- United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985)
- United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1989)
- Maltby v. Winston, 36 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1994)
- State v. Hirsch, 309 N.W.2d 832 (S.D. 1981)
- State v. MacDonald, 260 N.W.2d 626 (S.D. 1977)
- Olson v. Butte County Comm'n, 2019 S.D. 13, 925 N.W.2d 463
- Goetz v. State, 2001 S.D. 138, 636 N.W.2d 675
- In re Implicated Individual, 2021 S.D. 61, 966 N.W.2d 578
- Long v. State, 2017 S.D. 78, 904 N.W.2d 358
- Faircloth v. Raven Industries, Inc., 2000 S.D. 158, 620 N.W.2d 198
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)
- Hart v. Miller, 2000 S.D. 53, 609 N.W.2d 138
- Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987)

Source

• Landing page: https://atg.sd.gov/OurOffice/OfficialOpinions/opinionhtml.aspx?id=1769
• Original PDF: https://atg.sd.gov/OfficialOpinions/AG%20Opinion%2025-03.pdf

Original opinion text

OFFICIAL OPINION 25-03

Re: Official Opinion Concerning Law Enforcement Jurisdictional Arrest Authority

Dear Chief Smith,

In your capacity as Chief of Police for the City of Spearfish Police Department, you have requested an official opinion from the Attorney General's Office on the following questions:

QUESTION(S):

• Does the collective knowledge doctrine apply to provide a law enforcement agency authority to make an arrest when probable cause for the arrest was established in another jurisdiction?
• Is there an extension of jurisdictional arrest authority when a mandatory arrest offense is committed in a separate jurisdiction?
• If arrest authority does not exist for a law enforcement agency to make an arrest outside its jurisdiction, do law enforcement officers of the jurisdiction where the arrest is attempted have a duty to intervene to prevent an unlawful arrest?

ANSWER(S):

• Yes, the collective knowledge doctrine allows municipal law enforcement officers to rely on the probable cause determinations of other officers, whether from the same agency or different jurisdictions, to make arrests or conduct investigatory stops.
• No, a municipal law enforcement agency's jurisdictional arrest authority does not generally extend outside its territorial limits, even in circumstances permitting warrantless arrests, except for citizens arrests.
• No, municipal law enforcement officers generally do not have a duty to intervene to prevent an arrest made in its jurisdiction by an outside law enforcement agency because of the exception noted above, although the facts of every circumstance will differ.

FACTS:

Recently, two incidents occurred in Spearfish involving neighboring law enforcement agencies requesting and conducting custodial arrests in Spearfish, outside their jurisdictions or the jurisdiction where probable cause for arrest originated.

In the first example a police department sent out an "attempt to locate" (ATL) bulletin for a simple assault-domestic violence suspect. In the call they directed law enforcement agencies to arrest the suspect on their behalf if contact was made. You informed this police department that your department could not take a suspect into custody without a warrant. Their Chief of Police indicated his belief that you could effectuate such an arrest without a warrant because of the ATL issued by the original jurisdiction.

The second example you provided involved a situation where a neighboring municipality's police department, in a separate county, put out a vehicle "be on the lookout" (BOLO) notice after a simple assault suspect had fled their county. A Lawrence County Sheriff's deputy identified the vehicle at a location within the City of Spearfish. The neighboring police department was notified and, after arriving on the scene, arrested the suspect and transported him back to their jurisdiction without consulting your officers who were also already on the scene. The neighboring police department claimed the collective knowledge doctrine gave them authority to effect the arrest outside their jurisdiction. They also asserted they had probable cause for a mandatory arrest.

IN RE QUESTION 1:

You have asked whether the collective knowledge doctrine applies to the first fact scenario to provide local law enforcement officers the authority to make an arrest when probable cause was established in an outside jurisdiction.

"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and is implicated when a vehicle is stopped." State v. Hodges, 2001 S.D. 93, ¶ 11, 631 N.W.2d 206, 209 (quoting State v. Vento, 1999 S.D. 158, ¶ 18, 604 N.W.2d 468, 470). To stop a vehicle, law enforcement must have reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that its occupants are involved in criminal activity. State v. Kenyon, 2002 S.D. 111, ¶ 14, 651 N.W.2d 269, 273. A stop of a vehicle is a seizure of all its occupants so even a passenger has standing to challenge the stop. State v. Krebs, 504 N.W.2d 580, 584 (S.D. 1993) (citing United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir. 1989)).

In South Dakota, "[l]aw enforcement personnel are allowed to rely upon information conveyed by one officer to another for determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion through the collective knowledge doctrine." State v. Mohr, 2013 S.D. 94, ¶ 18, 841 N.W.2d 440, 445 (citing State v. Richards, 1998 S.D. 128, ¶ 15, 588 N.W.2d 594, 597). "The collective knowledge doctrine is designed to allow law enforcement personnel from the same agency, or from different jurisdictions, to rely on the probable cause determinations of one another in order to apprehend specific suspects." Richards, 1998 S.D. 128, ¶ 15, 588 N.W.2d at 597 (citing Maltby v. Winston, 36 F.3d 548, 564 n.26 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1141, 115 S.Ct. 2576, 132 L.Ed.2d 827 (1995)). Thus, the collective knowledge doctrine allows local law enforcement officers to arrest an individual if probable cause was established in an outside jurisdiction.

Like many other states, "South Dakota has recognized the necessity of law enforcement relying upon each other for determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause through the collective knowledge doctrine." Richards, 1998 S.D. 128, ¶ 15, 588 N.W.2d at 597 (citing Krebs, 504 N.W.2d at 586; State v. Baysinger, 470 N.W.2d 840, 845 (1991); and State v. Czmowski, 393 N.W.2d 72, 73 (1986)). In these circumstances, "whether or not probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists is determined by considering the information possessed by the requesting officer." Richards, 1998 S.D. 128, ¶ 18, 588 N.W.2d at 597. Of particular concern is the communication between agencies. Case law in South Dakota suggests the actual facts underlying the analysis of reasonable suspicion or probable cause be communicated to the acting officer prior to the stop, frisk, search, or arrest. See Mohr, 2013 S.D. 94, ¶ 18, 841 N.W.2d at 445; Richards, 1998 S.D. 128, ¶ 18, 588 N.W.2d at 597; and Commonwealth v. Privette, 491 Mass. 501, 509, 204 N.E.3d 967, 976 (2023) (comparing various requirements for inter-agency communication).

Police bulletins such as ATLs or BOLOs are likely sufficient to justify reasonable suspicion for minimally intrusive stops. Krebs, 504 N.W.2d at 585. See also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (upholding a Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion where officers relied on police-issued bulletins describing the suspect). But each situation is different. In fact, the South Dakota Supreme Court has found no authority specifying any "specific quantum of information justifying a stop" that "must be relayed to the stopping officer before the stop is upheld." Richards, 1998 S.D. 128, ¶ 18, 588 N.W.2d at 597. "'In assessing police justifications for arrests or intrusions of a type less offensive than full arrests, we take an objective view of all the facts and may evaluate the knowledge of all the officers collectively.'" Richards, 1998 S.D. 128, ¶ 16, 588 N.W.2d at 597 (quoting Czmowski, 393 N.W.2d at 73) (other citations omitted).

The facts and knowledge of all the officers, from the requesting and arresting jurisdictions, is viewed collectively. Id. Each request for apprehension from an outside agency should state the facts underlying the request and whether or not probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists based on the information possessed by the requesting officer.

IN RE QUESTION 2:

You have also asked, relevant to the second fact scenario, whether there is an extension of a municipal law enforcement agency's jurisdictional authority when a mandatory arrest offense is committed in a separate jurisdiction. This question contemplates SDCL 9-29-1, SDCL 9-29-19, and SDCL 23A-3-2.1.

When interpreting statutes, "'the language expressed in the statute is the paramount consideration.'" Olson v. Butte County Comm'n, 2019 S.D. 13, ¶ 5, 925 N.W.2d 463, 464 (quoting Goetz v. State, 2001 S.D. 138, ¶ 15, 636 N.W.2d 675, 681). "When the language in a statute is clear, certain, and unambiguous, there is no reason for construction[.]" In re Implicated Individual, 2021 S.D. 61, ¶ 16, 966 N.W.2d 578, 583 (quoting Long v. State, 2017 S.D. 78, ¶ 13, 904 N.W2d 358, 364). The intent of a statute "must be determined from the statute as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject." In re Taliaferro, 2014 S.D. 82, ¶ 6, 856 N.W.2d 805, 807 (citations omitted). "Where two statutes appear to conflict, it is [the court's] duty to reasonably interpret both, giving effect, if possible, to all provisions under consideration, construing them together to make them harmonious and workable." Faircloth v. Raven Industries, Inc., 2000 S.D. 158, ¶ 7, 620 N.W.2d 198, 201 (cleaned up).

Under South Dakota law, municipal law enforcement officers generally lack the authority to make arrests outside their jurisdiction unless explicitly authorized by statute. Broadly, SDCL 9-29-19 grants police officers the following powers:

All policemen of any municipality shall possess the powers of constables. They may pursue and arrest any person fleeing from justice in any part of the state, and when performing the duties aforesaid may arrest and detain any person guilty of any breach of the peace or any violation of the laws of the state or ordinance of the municipality.

But that statute must be read in conjunction with SDCL 9-29-1, which defines a municipal officer's jurisdictional territory as within one mile of the city limits:

Every municipality shall have power to exercise jurisdiction for all authorized purposes over all territory within the corporate limits and over any public ground or park belonging to the municipality, whether within or without the corporate limits, and in and over all places, except within the corporate limits of another municipality, within one mile of the corporate limits or of any public ground or park belonging to the municipality outside the corporate limits, for the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community, and of enforcing its ordinances and resolutions relating thereto.

Giving effect to both provisions and reading the language of the statutes explicitly, a municipal police officer's power to exercise his or her authority forbids doing so "within the corporate limits of another municipality. . ." SDCL 9-29-1. The South Dakota Supreme Court has interpreted these statutes in the same way. If a municipal police officer enters another municipality to arrest a person, it could be an unlawful exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction explicitly prohibited by SDCL 9-29-1. State v. Hirsch, 309 N.W.2d 832, 834 (S.D. 1981). "In the absence of specific statutory authority, it is a well established general principle, in most jurisdictions, that a public police officer for a particular municipality has no official power to arrest offenders beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the municipality for which he serves." Hirsch, 309 N.W.2d at 834 (quoting State v. MacDonald, 260 N.W.2d 626, 627 (S.D. 1977) (footnote omitted).

In contrast, SDCL 23A-3-2.1 does not relate to territorial jurisdiction; it enumerates circumstances requiring a law enforcement officer to make a warrantless arrest. It says, "a law enforcement officer shall arrest and take into custody. . . any person, without a warrant, at any time that the opportunity presents itself, if the officer has probable cause to believe that" certain circumstances have been met. SDCL 23A-3-2.1.

SDCL 23A-3-2.1 confirms an officer making a valid legal arrest must have probable cause and be aware of certain criteria to make the mandatory arrest. But I find no legal authority suggesting that a mandatory arrest circumstance supersedes the jurisdictional authority explicit in SDCL 9-29-1.

Even so, it is possible that an officer from another jurisdiction could make a citizen's arrest under the conditions set forth in SDCL 23A-3-3, as any citizen can do. See MacDonald, 260 N.W.2d at 627 (holding that when a municipal police officer made an arrest outside of his jurisdiction, "he does have the same power of arrest as that conferred on a private citizen"). Such an arrest must adhere to relevant laws for a citizen's arrest, including that the offense either occur in the arresting person's presence or that he has probable cause (see SDCL 23A-3-3), and that the arresting person immediately "take the arrested person before the nearest available committing magistrate or deliver him to the nearest available law enforcement officer." SDCL 23A-4-1. A law enforcement officer is defined as "any officer . . . of the state or any of its political subdivisions . . . who is responsible for the prevention, detection, or prosecution of crimes, for the enforcement of the criminal or highway traffic laws of the state..." SDCL 22-1-2(22). Thus, it is likely the arresting officer qualifies as an officer legally entitled to take possession of the suspect. See MacDonald, 260 N.W.2d at 628 ("[t]he arrest had to meet the requirements of a private citizen arrest; but, once it met those requirements, the Police Chief was qualified and legally entitled to give him the implied consent warning.")

IN RE QUESTION 3:

Finally, you ask whether local enforcement officers in the jurisdiction where an arrest is attempted have a duty to intervene if an outside law enforcement agency attempts to make an arrest in your jurisdiction.

The answer to your question depends on the facts of each circumstance. All law enforcement officers are generally required to act within the bounds of the law. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, either arresting or bystanding law enforcement officers may be held liable for depriving individuals of constitutional rights while acting under color of law. For example, an arresting officer may be liable for using excessive force, and a bystanding officer may be liable for the failure to intervene when the other officer uses excessive force. The test for whether an officer's conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights is not one's subjective beliefs, but what a reasonable officer should have known at the time and under those specific circumstances. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "This objective legal reasonableness standard means the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Hart v. Miller, 2000 S.D. 53, ¶ 13, 609 N.W.2d 138, 143 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (cleaned up).

I find no express duty applicable in all situations requiring you to intervene in these circumstances, particularly considering that any person can make a citizen's arrest as discussed above.

CONCLUSION

The collective knowledge doctrine provides a law enforcement agency authority to arrest an individual when probable cause was established and communicated by law enforcement in another jurisdiction. A municipal law enforcement agency's jurisdictional arrest authority does not generally extend outside its territorial limits, even in circumstances permitting warrantless arrests, except for citizens arrests. Furthermore, there is no express duty to intervene if an outside law enforcement agency attempts an arrest within your jurisdiction, unless it is sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer in that specific situation must intervene to protect a person's constitutional rights. In the event there is a desire to extend jurisdictional authority, the legislature has the power to change statutes regarding jurisdictional authority for mandatory arrest offenses or arrests outside of a jurisdiction.

Sincerely,

Marty J. Jackley

ATTORNEY GENERAL