SD Official Opinion (id=1722) 1968-05-15

If a State Hospital inmate at Yankton is hurt while taking a Vocational Rehabilitation training course using dangerous equipment, can the State, the State Department of Public Instruction, the individual official who approved the course, or the teacher running it be held liable?

Short answer: Not the State, not the Department of Public Instruction, and not the official who approved the course or funding. All three were protected by governmental immunity because the Vocational Rehabilitation program was a constitutionally recognized governmental activity. The teacher, however, did not have immunity and could be personally liable if found negligent.
Currency note: this opinion is from 1968
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: This is an official South Dakota Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority in South Dakota but are not binding precedent like a court ruling. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed South Dakota attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked at the bottom of this page) is the authoritative source for any reliance.

Plain-English summary

The State Department of Public Instruction's Vocational Rehabilitation Division ran training courses for selected inmates of the State Hospital at Yankton. Some courses used equipment that could cause injury if used carelessly. Enrollment was voluntary, and each applicant's medical eligibility was reviewed by the VR counselor and a consulting physician. The Department asked the AG who could be held liable if an enrollee was hurt.

The AG answered each question through the lens of governmental immunity, the doctrine that protected the state and its officers from negligence liability unless the state had voluntarily assumed liability.

Question 1: Could the State of South Dakota be liable? The AG said no. The state had not waived sovereign immunity for this activity. Citing 1929-30 AGR 123 and authorities including Riddock v. State (Wash.), Medical College of Georgia v. Rushing, and Robinson v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge (Mich.), the AG reiterated the accepted principle that states are not liable for the negligence of their officers, agents, or employees absent a voluntary assumption of liability.

Question 2: Could the State Department of Public Instruction be liable? Same answer, same reasoning. State institutions, as agencies of the state, were also immune from tort liability for the acts of their officers, agents, or servants. The AG cited 25 R.C.L. § 42 page 407 and 59 CJS 340, § 196, plus the 1929-30 AGR 123 opinion, with a note that numerous predecessor opinions had adhered to the same principle.

Question 3: Could an individual Department official who authorized the course and approved its funding be liable? Again no. The authorization and funding decisions were governmental acts within the scope of the official's duties, and the same immunity protected the official from personal liability for those decisions. Article VIII of the South Dakota Constitution recognized education as a governmental concern, making the VR program a governmental activity.

Question 4: Could the teacher running the course be personally liable for negligence? The AG said yes. The teacher did not have the benefit of governmental immunity for personally negligent acts. If the teacher was found to be negligent in the performance of teaching duties or participated in a wrongful act causing injury to a student, the teacher could be personally liable. The AG explicitly distinguished the teacher's position from that of the higher-level officials: members of a school board (and by analogy higher-level decisional officials) could be liable for their own personal participation in a wrongful act, but the teacher was the front-line actor whose direct conduct was the most likely source of liability.

The opinion's bottom line: governmental immunity protected the state, the agency, and the approving officials, but did not protect the teacher whose personal conduct in operating the equipment or supervising the student was the proximate cause of the injury.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1968. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. South Dakota's sovereign immunity doctrine has been substantially restructured since 1968, with the modern framework in SDCL chapter 21-32 (waivers of sovereign immunity), the SD Public Entity Pool for Liability (PEPL) Fund (SDCL 3-22), and the constitutional and statutory developments that followed Conway v. Humbert and other modern immunity cases. The federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act framework has also evolved. Modern questions about state, agency, and individual employee liability for educational program injuries should be analyzed under current SDCL and case law.

What the opinion meant at the time

For the State Department of Public Instruction in 1968, the opinion was reassuring at the institutional level. The Department's authorization of the VR program, its funding decisions, and its choice of equipment did not expose the Department or its leadership to negligence liability. The Department could plan and approve programs with confidence that institutional liability was not at stake.

For individual administrative officials within the Department, the opinion was protective. The official who signed off on a course, allocated the funds, and chose the equipment could not be personally sued for negligence arising from a later student injury. Their decisions were governmental acts within the immunity envelope.

For teachers running the VR courses, the opinion was the opposite. The teacher had personal liability exposure for negligent conduct. A teacher who failed to provide adequate safety instructions, failed to supervise properly, allowed an obviously dangerous condition to persist, or otherwise breached a duty of care to the student could be sued personally. The teacher's salary, savings, and any personal liability insurance would be on the line.

For State Hospital inmates considering enrolling in the VR program, the opinion meant that their recovery options after an injury were narrower than they might have expected. They could not sue the State, the agency, or the supervising officials. Their realistic remedy was a personal-injury suit against the individual teacher (or whoever directly handled the equipment), and the teacher's collectibility was the practical limit on recovery.

For school districts watching the immunity analysis, the AG's reference to school district immunity (with the caveat about personal participation by board members) was a reminder that the same doctrinal framework applied across South Dakota's public-education institutions. School districts were immune; school boards' individual members could be liable for personal participation in wrongful acts.

Common questions

Q: Why didn't the State Hospital inmate's voluntary enrollment matter?
A: The immunity doctrine the AG applied did not turn on the plaintiff's consent. The doctrine protected the state from negligence liability regardless of whether the plaintiff was a willing or unwilling participant. Voluntary enrollment might have affected damages or contributory-negligence defenses if a suit had been brought, but it did not affect the immunity threshold.

Q: What if the equipment was defective at the time the State acquired it?
A: The opinion did not address that scenario. A products-liability claim against the equipment manufacturer (a private party) might have been available to the injured student, separate from any state-liability claim. The State's role in selecting and approving the equipment would not have created state liability under this opinion.

Q: Could the teacher's liability insurance cover the personal exposure?
A: The opinion did not address insurance. Teachers in 1968 typically did not have personal professional liability policies (although these became more common later, often through teacher unions). A teacher exposed to personal liability would have had to defend with personal assets unless covered by some other policy.

Q: Was the consulting physician's eligibility review relevant to the analysis?
A: The opinion described the physician's review as part of the program's structure but did not assign legal significance to it. The review presumably reduced the practical risk of injuries by screening out medically unsuitable enrollees, but it did not change the immunity analysis.

Q: What if the teacher had a state employment contract that said the state would indemnify the teacher?
A: The opinion did not address indemnity. State employment contracts in 1968 typically did not have broad indemnification provisions. Modern state employment terms often include indemnification for acts within the scope of employment, but the 1968 opinion's analysis would have been the same regardless.

Q: Could the State have been liable if it had bought liability insurance?
A: The AG's principle was that the state was immune "unless it has voluntarily assumed such liability." Buying liability insurance to cover certain risks could be read as a voluntary assumption to the extent of the insurance. The opinion did not address whether the state had any such insurance.

Background and statutory framework

Sovereign immunity in 1968 South Dakota was largely a common-law doctrine, inherited from English law and applied across most U.S. states. The doctrine protected the state and its agencies from tort liability unless the state legislature had expressly waived immunity for a particular kind of claim. South Dakota had limited statutory waivers (e.g., for workers' compensation claims by state employees) but no broad tort claims act of the kind the federal government adopted in 1946 (the Federal Tort Claims Act).

The doctrine extended to state agencies (like the Department of Public Instruction) and to state institutions (like the State Hospital at Yankton). It also extended to local governmental units (counties, municipalities, school districts) to varying degrees, with school districts typically receiving the broadest immunity protection.

The personal liability of individual public employees was a separate question. Senior officials making policy decisions were generally protected by the same governmental immunity that protected the agency. But front-line workers (teachers, nurses, mechanics, drivers) were generally personally liable for negligent acts in the course of their employment, with the line drawn between "discretionary functions" (immune) and "ministerial functions" (liable).

The AG's opinion was a faithful application of those doctrines to the VR-at-the-State-Hospital fact pattern. The state's choice to run a VR program at the State Hospital was a high-level policy decision, immune. The Department's choice of curriculum and funding was an agency decision, immune. The approving official's signature was an administrative act, immune. But the teacher's actual handling of the equipment and the student in the classroom was a ministerial function, exposed to personal liability for negligence.

The opinion did not address: workers' compensation availability for the inmate (whether the inmate was an "employee" for workers' comp purposes was unlikely but worth analysis), federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act provisions that might have shifted liability rules, or any contractual indemnification arrangements.

Citations and references

Cases:
- Riddock v. State, 123 Pac. 450 (Wash.)
- Medical College of Georgia v. Rushing, 57 S.E. 1083
- Robinson v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 199 N.W. 618 (Mich.)

Constitutional provisions:
- South Dakota Constitution, Article VIII, Paragraph I (legislative duty to provide public schools; education as governmental concern)

Prior AG opinions:
- 1929-30 AGR 123 (state immune from torts of officers, agents, employees)
- 1929-30 AGR 131 (school district immunity; personal liability of board members for wrongful acts)

Treatises:
- 25 R.C.L. § 42, page 407 (state institutions immune from tort liability)
- 59 CJS 340, § 196 (same)

Source

Original opinion text

Department of Public Instruction. Liability for injury of state hospital inmates selected for vocational rehabilitation.

You have requested an opinion on the following factual situation:

"The State Department of Public Instruction, through its Vocational Rehabilitation Division provides funds for and offers courses of instruction of a vocational nature for clients of Vocational Rehabilitation who are selected inmates of the State Hospital at Yankton, South Dakota. Some of these courses of instruction involve the use of equipment which when carelessly

used can result in bodily injury. Such enrollees of the State Hospital takes these courses on a voluntary basis. In each case, all medical information is reviewed by the Vocational Rehabilitation counselor and a consulting physician and on the basis of the interpretations given by the medical consultant, the Vocational Rehabilitation counselor then determines the applicant's eligibility for the services provided in the various training programs." You have asked the following specific questions:

"1. Could the State of South Dakota be held liable for injury under such circumstances?

"2. Could the State Department of Public Instruction be held liable?

"3. Could an individual employed in the State Department of Public Instruction be held liable for authorizing the course to be offered and allocating funds for the expense of such course?

"4. Could the teacher employed to teach such course be held liable for negligence?"

It is an accepted principle of law that a state is not liable for the negligence of its officers, agents or employees, unless it has voluntarily assumed such liability. See 1929-30 AGR 123 citing Riddock v. State (Wash.) 123 Pac. 450, Medical College of Georgia v. Rushing, 57 S. E. 1083. Robinson v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge (Mich.) 199 N. W. 618.

The same rule is applicable to school districts although members of a school board are liable for their own participation in a wrongful act or they may be held personally liable by negligence in the performance of duties imposed by law. 1929-30 AGR 131.

Our South Dakota Constitution, Article VIII, recognizes "education" as a subject of governmental concern and activity. Paragraph I of said Article VIII provides:

"The stability of a republican form of government depending on the morality and intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature to establish and maintain a general and uniform system of public schools wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equality open to all; and to adopt all suitable means to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of education."

With such provisions in our Constitution, it is clear that the general supervision, direction and control of the program of Vocational Rehabilitation, carried on by the State Department of Public Instruction through its Vocational Rehabilitation Division at our State Hospital at Yankton, South Dakota, is a governmental activity.

"State institutions as agencies of the state are exempt from liability for torts of officers, agents or servants of such institutions." 25 R. C. L. Section 42, page 407. See also 59 CJS 340 196, and 1929-30 AGR 123, supra. Numerous opinions of my predecessors issued since that time all adhere to this principle of law of governmental immunity.

Your questions 1, 2 and 3 will therefore have to be answered in the NEGATIVE.

Question No. 4 requires an affirmative answer and the teacher involved would not have the benefit of governmental immunity should it be found that he or she were negligent in the performance of his or her duties or participated in a wrongful act causing injury to others.