If an official court reporter lived in one South Dakota city but had to travel to a different city where the presiding judge held court, did the reporter qualify for mileage and meal reimbursement under the 1965 court reporter expense statute, or did 'residence' in the statute mean the residence of the court rather than the reporter?
Plain-English summary
The presiding judge of a South Dakota judicial circuit asked the AG to resolve a reimbursement dispute. Judge Sigurd Anderson lived in Webster, South Dakota. His official court reporter lived in Milbank. The reporter had to travel from Milbank to Webster to perform his court duties (court proceedings, drafting memorandum opinions, ruling on motions, correspondence, general office functions). The reporter sought reimbursement for mileage and meals; presumably someone (the county auditor) was questioning whether the 1965 statute authorized the payment.
The relevant statute was the last paragraph of Chapter 157 of the 1965 Session Laws:
"Where a shorthand reporter is required in the discharge of his official duties, to leave the county of his residence, or leave the city or town of his residence, to perform such duties, he shall be paid his actual and necessary hotel and living expenses, and transportation expenses as shall be incurred, which account shall be itemized and approved by the Presiding Judge of the Circuit Court, and certified to the County Auditor of the county in which such expenses are incurred, and shall be paid out of the treasury of the county for which such services are performed."
The legal question was whether "his residence" referred to the reporter's personal residence (Milbank) or to the residence of the court (Webster). If it meant the reporter's personal residence, he was entitled to reimbursement when he traveled to Webster to serve the court. If it meant the residence of the court, the reporter could never collect for his ordinary trips because Webster was the court's seat.
The AG concluded the statute meant the reporter's personal residence. The reasoning had two strands. First, SDC 65.0202(8) provided that statutory definitions apply uniformly to the same word or phrase wherever it occurs unless a contrary intent plainly appears. Second, the South Dakota Supreme Court had defined "residence" in Appeal of Lawrence County, 21 N.W.2d 57, 58, as "personal presence in a fixed and permanent abode, with the intent of remaining there"; Nelson v. Nelson, 24 N.W.2d 327, confirmed that definition. Applying that definition, the reporter's residence was Milbank, where he actually lived. Travel from Milbank to Webster was therefore travel away from his residence in the discharge of official duties.
The opinion ended with the AG flagging a policy concern. The AG noted that "as a matter of policy," it would be more sensible for "residence" in this context to mean the residence of the court rather than of the reporter, because the statute as written produced "unnatural or unhealthy situations" (presumably, reporters living far from court and accumulating large mileage bills). But the AG read the legislature's words literally and observed that any different reading would have to come from the legislature.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 1967 (approximate, based on the underlying 1965 statute and Judge Anderson's tenure). Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. South Dakota's modern court reporter statutes are in SDCL Title 16, and the specific travel-reimbursement provisions have been recodified multiple times since 1965.
What the opinion meant at the time
For the reporter in question, the opinion meant he could file an itemized expense account for mileage, hotel, and meals from Milbank to Webster, get it approved by Judge Anderson, certified to the county auditor of the county where the expenses were incurred, and paid out of the treasury of the county for which his services were performed.
For other South Dakota court reporters whose home counties differed from their judges' counties, the opinion was a clean precedent. As long as the duties required travel away from the reporter's actual personal residence, the statute kicked in. The reporter did not have to prove inconvenience or extraordinary travel; ordinary commuting from a residence in one county to a court in another county qualified.
For counties paying the bill, the opinion was a small budget exposure. The opinion does not detail the typical amount, but ongoing mileage at 1960s rates plus meals over a court year would have added up to a real line item.
For presiding judges, the opinion gave them clear discretion: they were the gatekeepers for approving the itemized expense accounts, and the statute did not require them to second-guess the underlying residence determination. If the reporter lived in Milbank and traveled to Webster, the judge could approve the expenses.
For the South Dakota Legislature, the opinion essentially flagged a possible drafting flaw and invited a corrective amendment if the policy outcome was not what the legislature wanted. The AG was upfront that he thought the statute, read literally, produced odd incentives.
Common questions
Q: Is this opinion still good law?
A: Not directly. Chapter 157 of the 1965 Session Laws has been recodified and significantly amended. South Dakota's modern court reporter compensation framework is in SDCL Title 16 chapter 16-5 (or equivalent). Any current question about reporter travel reimbursement should be checked against the current SDCL provisions, current judicial branch policies, and current Supreme Court administrative orders, not the 1965 statute interpreted here.
Q: Why did the AG flag the policy concern?
A: The literal reading meant a reporter could live anywhere and bill the county for travel to the court's seat. The AG noted it would be natural for a reporter to live where the court sits, and the statute as written incentivized the opposite (live elsewhere, collect mileage). The AG was unwilling to rewrite the statute to fix the incentive, but he did not want the legislature to think the literal reading was intended.
Q: What was the SDC 65.0202(8) rule the AG relied on?
A: It was a general statutory-construction rule: when a word or phrase has a defined meaning in a statute, that definition applies uniformly to the same word everywhere unless a contrary intent plainly appears. Here, "residence" had been defined by the Supreme Court as personal presence in a fixed and permanent abode, and the AG applied that uniform definition.
Q: Who paid the bill, the reporter's home county or the county where the court was held?
A: The county where the court was held ("the county for which such services are performed"), per the statute's own text. The itemized expense account was approved by the presiding judge, then certified to the auditor of the county where the expenses were incurred. The opinion does not separately address how counties allocated the cost when a reporter served multiple counties in a circuit.
Q: What if the reporter and judge lived in different counties from the court seat?
A: The opinion does not address that specifically. Logically, the same literal reading would apply: the reporter would still be leaving his personal residence to perform duties, regardless of where the judge lived. The county where the court was held would still pay.
Background and statutory framework
In the 1960s, South Dakota's official court reporters were assigned to circuit court judges, not to courts as institutions. A reporter served the judge and traveled with the judge through the counties of the circuit. The 1965 statute (Chapter 157) was apparently the legislature's way of providing for the reporter's travel when the reporter's home county did not coincide with the counties of court business.
The statute had two parts:
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Substantive entitlement: reporters were paid actual and necessary hotel, living, and transportation expenses when official duties required them to leave the county or city of their residence.
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Procedure: itemized expense account, approved by the presiding judge of the circuit, certified to the county auditor of the county where expenses were incurred, paid from the treasury of the county for which services were performed.
The AG's opinion did not address the procedure (which seems straightforward) but only the substantive trigger: was the reporter actually leaving his residence to perform official duties? Answer: yes, because residence meant personal residence under the Supreme Court's definition.
Citations and references
Statutes and laws (as cited in the opinion):
- Chapter 157, Session Laws of South Dakota 1965
- SDC 65.0202(8)
Cases (as cited in the opinion):
- Appeal of Lawrence County, 21 N.W.2d 57, 58 (South Dakota Supreme Court)
- Nelson v. Nelson, 24 N.W.2d 327 (South Dakota Supreme Court)
Source
Original opinion text
Courts. Payment of Official Court Reporter's meals, transportation, and mileage.
You have requested my official opinion based on the following facts:
"Judge Sigurd Anderson's official court reporter's residence is in Milbank, South Dakota. Judge Anderson's residence is in Webster, South Dakota. It is required that the court reporter travel to Webster, South Dakota for the discharge of the Court's duties, i.e., court proceedings, preparation of memorandum opinions, ruling on motions, etc., correspondence, general office functions, etc."
You have called my attention to Chapter 157 of the Session Laws of South Dakota for 1965 and more particularly to the last paragraph thereof which states:
"Where a shorthand reporter is required in the discharge of his official duties, to leave the county of his residence, or leave the city or town of his residence, to perform such duties, he shall be paid his actual and necessary hotel and living expenses, and transportation expenses as shall be incurred, which account shall be itemized and approved by the Presiding Judge of the Circuit Court, and certified to the County Auditor of the county in which such expenses are incurred, and shall be paid out of the treasury of the county for which such services are performed."
You then ask the specific question:
"We request your opinion as to whether or not the official court reporter is entitled to receive his actual and necessary living expenses (meals) and transportation expenses (mileage) for travel to and from Webster, South Dakota."
It is my opinion that your question will have to be answered in the affirmative.
SDC 65.0202 (8) states:
"Whenever the meaning of a work or phrase is defined in any statute such definition is applicable to the same word or phrase wherever it occurs except where a contrary intention plainly occurs." (emphasis added)
While I am unable to find any statute which clearly defines residence in the context which we have under consideration here, our Supreme Court has considered to question of residence. In the Appeal of Lawrence County, 21 N.W.2d 57, 58 the court stated:
"A residence is established by personal presence in a fixed and permanent abode, with the intent of remaining there."
This decision was quoted and supported in Nelson v. Nelson, 24 N.W.2d 327.
In my opinion, the wording of Chapter 157 of the Session Laws of 1965 is clear and not ambiguous. Simply stated, it says that any time a reporter has to leave the place of his residence in the discharge of his official duties, he shall be reimbursed for such of his expenses as are approved by the Presiding Judge of the Circuit Court. In the facts you have given me, the court reporter, to perform his official duties, is forced to leave his residence in Milbank and travel to the residence of the Court in Webster. This plainly comes within the wording of the statute as it is now written and it is my opinion that the court reporter is entitled to the expenses he incurs making these trips.
I may add that as a matter of policy, it would appear to me that the term "residence" as used in this statute, should mean the "residence" of the court and not the residence of the reporter. It would appear that the statute, as it is now written, opens Pandora's Box to all types of unnatural or unhealthy situations. It seems only natural that the court reporter would have his personal residence in the same place as the Court for reasons too obvious to go into here, but the Legislature has given us no hint as to its intention in this statute and we are bound by the words of the statute and the interpretation of the word "residence" as defined by our Supreme Court. It is my opinion that any different interpretation to be given this statute will have to come from the Legislature.