Could a South Carolina school superintendent conduct student discipline hearings for the school board?
Apply this to your situation
This page answers the general question as of 1994. Ask about yours and see what current South Carolina law means for your facts, with citations you can check.
Plain-English summary
A school board chairman described a policy allowing the district superintendent to hear student discipline cases as the board's designee, with parents and students able to appeal to the board. The AG concluded that the student-discipline statutes allowed the board to designate an administrator or other person for specified decisions, and that the superintendent was not excluded.
The office had not reviewed the actual policy. It therefore said only that the policy, as described in the request, appeared to comply with the statutes. The letter distinguished an administrator's authority to suspend from a designated person's role in expulsion hearings and the reserved right to appeal to the board when someone else heard the matter first. It also corrected the requester's mistaken code reference in a footnote.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 1994. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Common questions
Could the school board designate its superintendent to hear a discipline case?
The AG said the statutes did not prohibit that designation. He read the suspension and expulsion provisions as allowing a board designee for the specified disciplinary steps.
Was an appeal to the board part of the arrangement reviewed?
Yes. The requester said the policy gave parents and students a board appeal, and the opinion noted that the statute reserved appeal to the board when a different authority heard an expulsion matter.
Did the AG approve the district's written policy itself?
No. The office had not received the actual policy and said only that the process as described appeared to comply.
Did the cited suspension and expulsion provisions use the same type of designee?
No. The letter described the suspension provision's “any administrator” language and the expulsion hearing provision's broader “person or committee” language.
Background and statutory framework
The letter read § 59-63-220 as allowing a district board to delegate suspension authority to an administrator. It read § 59-63-240 as allowing an expulsion hearing before the board or a person or committee the board designated, with appeal to the board when another authority conducted the hearing. A footnote explained that the request cited a nonexistent section and that the office assumed the intended reference was the expulsion provision.
Citations and references
- § 59-63-220: delegation of suspension authority discussed in the letter.
- § 59-63-240: designee and appeal terms for expulsion hearings discussed in the letter.
Official title
Regarding the legality of the appointment of the superintendent as the Board’s designee to conduct hearings pursuant to the appropriate statute.
Requester
Carnell Hampton, Chairman, Clarendon School District No. 3
Source
- Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/september-9-1994/
- Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/1994sept9hampton.pdf
Original opinion text
T. TRAVIS MEDLOCK
REMBERT C. DENNIS BUUDING
POST OFACE BOX 11549
COLUMBIA. S.C. 292 11
TEI£PHONE, 803-734-3970
FACSIMILE, 803-253-6283
ATTO RNE Y GENERAL
September 9, 1994
Carnell Hampton, Chairman
Clarendon School District No. 3
Post Office Drawer 270
Turbeville, South Carolina 29162
Dear Mr. Hampton:
By your letter of August 23, 1994, you have advised that the Board of Trustees of Clarendon School District No. 3 passed a policy which authorizes the superintendent of the school district to conduct disciplinary hearings as the Board's designee. Under the policy, parents and students have the right and are advised of the right to appeal the superintendent's decision to the Board of Trustees. You further advised that the right of appeal has been exercised on at least one occasion. You cited S.C. Code Ann. § 59-62-40 as authority for this procedure. 1 It has been suggested that the above procedure is violative of state law. You have asked about the legality of the appointment of the superintendent as the Board's designee to conduct hearings pursuant to the appropriate statute. Discipline of students in the public schools is provided for in Article 3, Chapter 63 of Title 59. Suspension of pupils is authorized in § 59-63-220, which provides as to an administrator as the board's designee: Any district board may confer upon any administrator the authority to suspend a pupil from a teacher's class or from the school ....
1
There is no § 59-62-40 in our Code of Laws. It is assumed for purposes of this opinion that the reference should be to S.C. Code Ann. § 59-63-240.
Mr. Hampton
Page 2
September 9, 1994
A conference with the parent or legal guardian of the suspended pupil is provided in § 5963-230, with the right to appeal the suspension to the board of trustees or to its authorized agent. Then, expulsion is provided for in § 59-63-240, which states in relevant part: The board may expel for the remainder of the school year a pupil for any of the reasons listed in§ 59-63-210. If procedures for expulsion are initiated, the parents or legal guardian of the pupil shall be notified in writing of the time and the place of a hearing either before the board or a person or committee designated by the board .... If the hearing is held by any authority other than the board of trustees, the right to appeal the decision to the board is reserved to either party....
[Emphasis added.]
Rules of Statutory Construction
The primary objective of both the courts and this Office is to determine and effectuate the legislature's intent if at all possible to do so. Bankers Trust of South Carolina v. Bruce, 275 S.C. 35, 267 S.E.2d 424 (1980). Words should be given their plain and ordinary meanings unless there is some reason within the statute requiring a different meaning to be applied. Field v. Gregory, 230 S.C. 39, 94 S.E.2d 15 (1955). In the absence of ambiguity, words must be applied literally. State v. Goolsby, 278 S.C. 52, 292 S.E.2d 180 (1982). Discussion The plain and unambiguous language of§§ 59-63-220 and 59-63-240 authorizes a school district board of trustees to hear a disciplinary matter and also authorizes the board of trustees to designate "any administrator" (§59-63-220) or "a person or committee" (§ 59-63-240) to make certain decisions in disciplinary matters, with an appeal to the board of trustees if the board did not hear the matter originally. The statutes do not limit the person or persons who may be designated by the board acting pursuant to § 59-63240, though the designee under § 59-63-220 must be an administrator. The statutes do not prohibit the superintendent's appointment as the board's designee. Conclusion While the specific policy of the Board of Trustees of Clarendon School District No. 3 has not been presented to this Office for review, this Office is of the opinion that the
Mr. Hampton
Page 3
September 9, 1994
policy as described above appears to be in compliance with the statutes on student discipline. With kindest regards, I am Sincerely,
~~.~
Patricia D. Petway
Assistant Attorney General
PDP/an
REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:
Robert D. Cook
Executive Assistant for Opinions
,,
What does South Carolina law say today, for your facts?
This opinion is from 1994. Ezel checks the current South Carolina statutes and case law, applies them to your situation, and cites what it relies on.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace