When did a South Carolina DUI license suspension begin: at conviction or after written notice?

Plain-English summary

A municipal judge asked whether a driver's license suspension for driving under the influence began on conviction or only when the driver received written notice. The Attorney General read Section 56-5-2990 to start the suspension on the date of conviction, sentencing after a plea, or bail forfeiture, subject to exceptions stated in the statute. Notice from the motor vehicle department did not postpone that start date. For the described driver, who had surrendered his license when posting bond, the office said a driving-under-suspension charge could begin on the day bail was forfeited.

The opinion distinguished a case about suspension for failure to provide proof of financial responsibility. That case concerned a different statutory ground and did not control the DUI timing question.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2004. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the driver have to receive mailed notice before the DUI suspension started?
A: The AG said no under the statute then in force. It treated notice as required but separate from the date the suspension began.

Q: What if the driver forfeited bail rather than appearing for a DUI conviction?
A: The office said the suspension began when bail was forfeited in the situation described.

Q: When could driving under suspension be charged in that situation?
A: The opinion said from the forfeiture date, especially where the driver had surrendered his license and was told the consequence of failing to appear.

Background and statutory framework

Section 56-5-2990 governed suspension after a DUI violation under Section 56-5-2930. The opinion separated the statutory start date from subsequent notice procedures and distinguished State v. Smith, which involved proof-of-insurance suspension rather than a DUI conviction or bail forfeiture.

Citations

• Section 56-5-2990
• Section 56-5-2930
• State v. Smith

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/september-8-2004/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/04sept-8-Miller.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
HENRY McMAsn:R
ATI'ORNEY GENERAL

September 8, 2004

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The Honorable B. Lee Miller
Municipal Court Judge
Post Office Box 40
Greenwood, South Carolina 29648

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Dear Judge Miller:

In a letter to this office you questioned at what point oftime is an individual's driver's license suspended for driving under the influence, the date of conviction or the date he receives written notice of the suspension. You also asked at what point can an individual be charged for driving under suspension in such circumstances. S.C. Code Ann. Section 56-5-2990 (Supp. 2003) provides for the suspension of the driver's license of a person who is convicted, pleads guilty or forfeits bond for a violation of S.C. Code Ann. Section 56-5-2930 (Supp. 2003), driving under the influence. Pursuant to Subsection (F) of Section 56-5-2990, I

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Except as provided for in Section 56-1-365(0) ... (an individual already under suspension) ... and (E) ...(where the defendant fails to surrender his license) .. ., the driver's license suspension periods under this section begin on the date the person is convicted. receives sentence upon a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere. or forfeits bail posted for the violation of Section 56-5-2930.... (emphasis added) Therefore, consistent with such provision, the driver's license of an individual who, in the situation you cited forfeits bail, is suspended on the date the bail is forfeited. Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. Sections 56-1-350 et seq. (Supp. 2003) notice is provided by the Department of Motor Vehicles of the suspension. However, none of those provisions detract from the conclusion of Section 56-5-2990 that the date of suspension begins on the date of conviction or forfeiture of bail. ln fact, Section 56-5-2990(F) while providing that the license is suspended on the day of conviction, also requires in subsection (B) that notification of the suspension be provided. I do not read such requirement of notification as detracting from the date of the suspension however. Therefore, as to your question of at what point can an individual be charged with driving under suspension, an individual can be charged as of the date of conviction or forfeiture of bail for driving under the influence. This is especially true as to the situation you addressed where the defendant
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The Honorable B. Lee Miller
Page2
September 8, 2004

surrendered his driver's license when he posted bond. You indicated that in such circumstances, the defendant was advised that if he did not appear back in court, his license would be suspended on the day of court, he could not drive, and his bond would be forfeited. Moreover, such conclusion is supported by the realization that an individual should not be driving if in fact he has surrendered his driver's license.

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The case you cited, State v. Smith, 330 S.C. 237, 498 S.E.2d 648 (1998), does not deal with an individual cited for driving under the influence. Instead, it deals with the suspension of a driver's license for failure to provide SR-22 insurance. Suspension of a license is provided pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. Section 56-9-610 (1991) for failure to provide proof of financial responsibility, not for a conviction, such as in Section 56-5-2990. In such circumstances, notice of suspension would be provided as set forth in S.C. Code Ann. Sections 56-1-350 and 56-1-360 (Supp. 2003). Sincerely,

Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General
REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General