Why did the 1994 South Carolina AG doubt the constitutionality of a bill combining three local subjects?

Plain-English summary

The governor's legal counsel asked about an act covering Folly Beach oyster grounds, distribution of a dissolved Florence County organization's assets, and the Goose Creek recreation commission in Berkeley County. The AG described the act as of doubtful constitutionality, while emphasizing that only a court could invalidate an enacted law.

The letter raised several distinct concerns. Its Goose Creek provision appeared to be a law for a specific county, the Florence provision might be impermissible special legislation, and the oyster-ground provision might face a similar question despite its stated local reasons. Most clearly, the office found the three subjects unrelated and therefore thought the act contravened the constitutional requirement that an act address one subject expressed in its title. These were the AG's legal views, not a court ruling.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1994. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

What three subjects did the act combine?
The opinion identified oyster grounds, the assets of a dissolved Florence County nonprofit, and the Goose Creek recreation commission in Berkeley County.

Why did the AG question the Goose Creek provision?
He read it as a law for one county because the commission lay wholly in Berkeley County, and cited the state prohibition on laws for a specific county.

Was the Florence provision definitely unconstitutional?
The AG said it was possible that the provision violated restrictions on local or special laws. He left any definitive ruling to a court.

What was the concern about the entire act?
The office concluded that its subjects were unrelated despite being described in the title, creating a single-subject problem.

Could the AG himself strike down the act?
No. The letter expressly said that only a court had authority to declare a General Assembly act invalid.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion assessed the act against the state constitution's county-specific-law prohibition, special-legislation restrictions, and single-subject rule. It applied the ordinary presumption that enacted laws are constitutional but found substantial problems with this act's structure and local provisions.

Citations and references

• Article VIII, Section 7: county-specific-law restriction discussed.
• Article III, § 34: local or special-law restriction discussed.
• Article III, Section 17: one-subject requirement discussed.

Official title

Concerning the constitutionality of S.1432, R-563, an act embracing relocation of the Folly Beach Public Oyster Ground, an eleemosynary corporation in Florence County, and the Goose Creek Park and Playground Commission.

Requester

Mark R. Elam, Esquire, Senior Legal Counsel to the Governor

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/september-7-1994/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/1994sept7elam.pdf

Original opinion text

T. TRAVIS MEDLOCK
ATTORNEY GENERAL

REMBERT C. DENNIS BUllJ)ING
POST OFACE BOX 11549
COLUMBIA. S.C. 29211
TELEPHONE, 803-734-3970
FACSIMILE, 803-253-6283

September 7, 1994

Mark R. Elam, Esquire
Senior Legal Counsel to the Governor
Office of the Governor
Post Office Box 11369
Columbia, South Carolina 29211
Dear Mr. Elam:
By your letter of August 23, 1994, you have asked for the opinion of this Office as to the constitutionality of S.1432, R-563, an act embracing relocation of the Folly Beach Public Oyster Ground, an eleemosynary corporation in Florence County, and the Goose Creek Park and Playground Commission. For the reasons following, it is the opinion of this Office that the Act is of doubtful constitutionality. In considering the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly, it is presumed that the act is constitutional in all respects. Moreover, such an act will not be considered void unless its unconstitutionality is clear beyond any reasonable doubt. Thomas v. Macklen, 186 S.C. 290, 195 S.E. 539 (1937); Townsend v. Richland County, 190 S.C. 270, 2 S.E.2d 777 (1939). All doubts of constitutionality are generally resolved in favor of constitutionality. While this Office may comment upon potential constitutional problems, it is solely within the province of the courts of this State to declare an act unconstitutional. Section 3 of S.1432, R-563 would amend Act No. 1093 of 1966, as amended, to change the name of the Goose Creek Park and Playground Commission to "Goose Creek Recreation Commission." A review of the relevant acts shows that the Commission is located wholly within Berkeley County. Thus, S.1432, R-563 is clearly an act for a specific county. Article VIII, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of South Carolina provides that "[n]o laws for a specific county shall be enacted." Act similar to section 3 of S.1432, R-563 have been struck down by the South Carolina Supreme Court as

Mr. Elam
Page 2
September 7, 1994
violative of Article VIII, Section 7. See Cooper River Parks and Playground Commission v. City of North Charleston, 273 S.C. 639, 259 S.E.2d 107 (1979); Torgerson v. Craver, 267 S.C. 558, 230 S.E.2d 228 (1976); Knight v. Salisbury, 262 S.C. 565, 206 S.E.2d 875 (1974); Hamm v. Cromer, 305 S.C. 305, 408 S.E.2d 227 (1991); Pickens County v. Pickens County Water and Sewer Authority, Op. No. 23981 filed in the Supreme Court January 10, 1994. Section 2 of S.1432, R-563 would add§ 33-31-155 to the South Carolina Code of Laws so as to authorize the former board of directors of a dissolved nonprofit corporation or eleemosynary organization located in Florence County to distribute the remaining assets of the organization and to set an effective date by which the action is to be taken lest the property escheat to the state. No reason appears within the act (i.e., by legislative findings or otherwise) as to the need for such a law applicable only to Florence County. Article III, § 34 (IX) and (X) of the State Constitution prohibit local or special laws and particularly provide that where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted and further direct the General Assembly to adopt general laws uniform in their operation. It is possible that section 2 of S.1432, R-563 may be violative of these constitutional provisions, though only a court could say so with certainty. The same constitutional concerns presented as to section 2 of the ratified act may exist as to section 1, as well. The act contains a preamble or recitals wherein the need for the act as to public oyster grounds and the location of private docks adjacent to such grounds is fully set forth. It might be argued that sufficient reason has been established for a local or special law to be enacted rather than a general law in this instance. Again, only a court could say so with certainty. A final constitutional concern is presented with respect to the entire ratified act. Article III, Section 17 provides that "[e]very Act or resolution having the force of law shall relate to but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." A review of the title shows that the subjects embraced within the act are adequately described within the title; the subjects embraced within the act are not related and thus the act cannot be said to "relate to but one subject." 1 It thus appears that this constitutional provision is contravened by the act.

1

The subjects of the act relate to public oyster grounds, distribution of assets of a dissolved eleemosynary organizations or nonprofit corporations in Florence County, and a special purpose district in Berkeley County.

Mr. Elam
Page 3
September 7, 1994
Based on the foregoing, we would advise that S.1423, R-563 would be of doubtful constitutionality. Of course, this Office possesses no authority to declare an act of the General Assembly invalid; only a court would have such authority. Sincerely,

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Patricia D. Petway
Assistant Attorney General
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REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

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