Did Georgetown County’s administrator control election-board staff and the veterans affairs director?

Plain-English summary

Georgetown County's attorney asked what authority the county administrator had over election and registration board employees and the veterans affairs director or staff. At the attorney's request, the opinion assumed that the county legislative delegation, rather than the county council, appointed the election board and veterans affairs director. On that assumption, the Attorney General concluded that the administrator had no authority over those two offices or departments.

The opinion's reasoning was narrow. In a council-administrator county, the statute made the administrator responsible for departments that the county council had authority to control. Because the requested assumption placed appointment authority outside the council, the AG found no administrator authority over the two identified departments. The letter did not make an independent factual determination about who actually held appointment power.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2005. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did the county administrator supervise the election board under this opinion?
No, on the express assumption that the county legislative delegation appointed that board rather than county council.

Did the answer also cover the veterans affairs office?
Yes. The same assumed appointment arrangement led the AG to the same conclusion for that director and office.

Why did the assumption about appointments matter?
The opinion read the administrator's authority as limited to county departments the council could control.

Background and statutory framework

The letter applied the council-administrator statute's language making the administrator responsible for departments under the council's control. Its conclusion was tied to the question's assumed delegation appointment power.

Citations and references

The opinion quoted Section 4-9-620 on the county administrator's responsibility for departments the council could control.

Official title

Questioning the authority, if any, of the Georgetown County Administrator over the employees of the Georgetown County Board of Elections and Registration and the Georgetown County Veteran’s Affairs Director or the Director’s subordinate.

Requester

John M. Tolar, Esquire

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/september-6-2005-1/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/05sept-6-Tolar.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
HENRY McMt\STER
ATTORNEY GENER.AL

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September 6, 2005

John M. Tolar, Esquire
Georgetown County Attorney
Post Office Box 421270
Georgetown, South Carolina 29442
Dear Mr. Tolar:

In a letter to this office you questioned the authority, if any, of the Georgetown County Administrator over the employees of the Georgetown County Board of Elections and Registration and the Georgetown County Veteran's Affairs Director or the Director's subordinate. In our telephone conversation you requested that, for the purposes of this opinion, it is to be assumed that the appointment authority for the Board of Elections and Registration and the Veteran's Affairs Director is the Georgetown County Legislative Delegation. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 4-9-610 et seq. provide for the council-administrator form ofgovernment. Pursuant to Section 4-9-620 (t)he council shall employ an administrator who shall be the administrative head of the county government and shall be responsible for the administration of all the departments of the county government which the council has the authority to control. (emphasis added). When interpreting the meaning of a statute, certain basic principles must be observed. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. State v. Martin, 293 S.C. 46, 358 S.E.2d 697 (1987). Typically, legislative intent is determined by applying the words used by the General Assembly in their usual and ordinary significance. Martin v. Nationwide Mutual lnsurance Company, 256 S.C. 577, 183 S.E.2d 451 (197 1). Resort to subtle or forced construction for the purpose oflimiting or expanding the operation of a statute should not be undertaken. Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165, 318 S.E.2d 14 (1984). Courts must app1y the clear and unambiguous terms of a statute according to their literal meaning. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991 ). Statutes should be given a reasonable and practical construction which is consistent with the policy and purpose expressed therein. Jones v. South Carolina State Highway Department, 247 S.C. 132, 146 S.E.2d 166 (1966). As set forth, the administrator in a council-administrator form of government is responsible only for the administration of those departments "which the council has the authority to control".

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POST OFFICE Box 11549

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COLUMBIA, S.C. 292 11 -1549

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T EL.£PHONE: 803-734-3970

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FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

Mr. Tolar
Page2
September 6, 2005

Inasmuch as it is to be assumed that for purposes of this opinion the appointment authority for the two offices referenced by you, the Georgetown County Board of Elections and Registration and the Georgetown County Veteran's Affairs Director is the Georgetown County Legislative Delegation and not the county council, in my opinion, the county administrator would have no authority over these two departments or offices. If there is anything further, please advise.

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Sincerely,

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Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General
REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

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Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General