Could a retiring South Carolina university police officer keep the issued service weapon?

Plain-English summary

Lander University Police asked whether its officers counted as state law enforcement officers for a statute allowing retired officers to retain their commissions and issued service weapons. The Attorney General said in 2008 that the term included officers associated with state agencies, including Lander University.

The opinion also read the statute’s word “may” as giving the retiring officer the choice to keep the issued weapon, rather than leaving the choice to the agency. It interpreted “upon retirement” to require the officer to exercise that choice at retirement, not later.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2008. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the 2008 opinion include Lander University Police in the retirement rule? A: Yes. The AG read “state law enforcement officer” to include officers associated with a state agency, including Lander University.

Q: Could the agency decide whether to offer the retiring officer the weapon? A: The AG said the officer had the choice under the statute it analyzed, not the agency.

Q: Could the officer ask for the service weapon long after retirement? A: The AG said no. It read the statute’s timing phrase to require the option to be exercised at retirement.

Background and statutory framework

The assistant chief asked for the meaning of “state law enforcement officer” and for the effect of “may” and “upon retirement” in the service-weapon statute. The AG relied on earlier opinions covering other state agency officers and gave separate answers on eligibility, who chooses, and timing.

Citations and references

Statutes: The opinion analyzed S.C. Code Ann.§ 23-1-225.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/september-4-2008/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/briggs-e-os-8651-9-4-08-definition-state-law-enforcement-officer.pdf

Original opinion text

HE:\RY MCMASTER

ArrnK'.'il:r Gr1'<LRAL

September 4, 2008

Eddie Briggs, Assistant Chief
Lander University Police
320 Stanley Avenue
Greenwood, South Carolina 29649
Dear Assistant Chief Briggs:
In an email to this office you raised questions regarding S.C. Code Ann.§ 23-1-225 which states that"[ u ]pon retirement, state law enforcement officers may retain their commissions in retired status with all rights and privileges, including the right to retain their service weapons issued while serving in active duty status." Referencing such, you have questioned what is the definition of"state law enforcement officer" for purposes of that statute. The term "state law enforcement officer" is not separately defined for purposes of such statute. However, an opinion of this office dated June 6, 2002 construed such provision as being applicable to a State Forestry Commission law enforcement officer. Another opinion of this office dated July 17, 2002 construed such provision as being applicable to an officer associated with the State Department of Public Safety. Consistent with such, in the opinion of this office, the term "state law enforcement officer" should be read as including any law enforcement officer associated with a state agency, including Lander University. You also questioned what is meant by the term "may" as used in Section 23-1-225. You asked whether the use of such term leaves an agency the option of giving a retired officer his or her duty weapon and whether the officer has to ask for the weapon at the time of his or her retirement or can ask at any time thereafter. Generally, when interpreting the meaning of a statute, certain basic principles must be observed. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. State v. Martin, 293 S.C. 46, 358 S.E.2d 697 ( 1987). Typically, legislative intent is determined by applying the words used by the General Assembly in their usual and ordinary significance. Martin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 256 S.C. 577, 183 S.E.2d 451 ( 1971 ). Resort to subtle or forced construction for the purpose oflimiting or expanding the operation of a statute should not be undertaken. Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165, 318 S.E.2d 14 ( 1984). Courts must apply the clear and unambiguous terms of a statute according to their literal meaning and statutes should be given a reasonable and practical construction which is consistent

Rr:.!Bl:RT C DL 'l.'llS BL ILDI'l(;

•

Posr OHKL Box t l5·+9 •

CuLL'>1BIA, SC 292t1-15.+9

•

TLU:l'llU.'ll'. 803- 7..f-_1970

•

E\CC>IMIU- XO.k.'5 l-628.1

Assistant Chief Briggs
Page 2
September 4, 2008

with the policy and purpose expressed therein. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991 ); Jones v. South Carolina State Highway Department, 247 S.C. 132, 146 S.E.2d 166 (1966). As set forth by Section 23-1-225 "[ u]pon retirement, state law enforcement officers may retain their commissions .. .including the right to retain their service weapons .... " In the opinion of this office, it would be a matter within the discretion of the officer as to whether or not he or she wishes to retain his or her service weapon and it would not be a matter within the discretion of the agency as to whether such is offered. Also, inasmuch as the provision states that "upon retirement" such retention may be exercised, in the opinion of this office, the option must be exercised at the time of retirement and not at some later period.

If there are any questions, please advise.
Sincerely,
Henry McMaster
Attorney General

a?Jurt{ flPa_JL_
By:

REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

11/&JSJ, cpg_

lobert D. Cook
Deputy Attorney General

Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General