Did South Carolina municipal judges receive magistrates' statutory arrest powers?

Plain-English summary

In 1999, the South Carolina Attorney General's office said the statute giving municipal courts certain criminal-case powers and jurisdiction of magistrates did not appear to carry over two separate statutes granting magistrates arrest powers over disorderly or dangerous persons. The office observed that cases and prior AG opinions applying § 14-25-45 had addressed a municipal court's subject-matter jurisdiction, trial authority, or bond setting. It found no South Carolina case specifically extending the two magistrate arrest statutes to municipal courts.

The conclusion was expressly “not free from doubt.” The office said legislation could expressly grant those powers if they were desired. The letter was informal and did not resolve an arrest in a particular case.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1999. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did shared criminal jurisdiction automatically confer magistrates' arrest powers? A: The AG said it did not appear to. The office distinguished jurisdiction to hear criminal cases from the separate arrest authority in the two magistrate statutes.

Was there a South Carolina case directly deciding the point? A: The opinion said it knew of none specifically applying §§ 22-5-140 and 22-5-150 to municipal courts.

Was the AG certain of its reading?
A: No. It called the conclusion “not free from doubt” and suggested express legislation if municipal courts were to have those powers.

Background and statutory framework

An Orangeburg municipal judge asked whether § 14-25-45 conferred the same arrest authority magistrates had under §§ 22-5-140 and 22-5-150. The office compared the statutes with decisions discussing municipal-court jurisdiction and bond-setting authority.

Citations and references

The opinion quoted § 14-25-45 and the two magistrate arrest statutes, §§ 22-5-140 and 22-5-150.

Official title

Questioning whether S.C. Code Ann. § 14-25-45 grants municipal judges the same arrest powers as are granted magistrates pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. §§ 22-5-140 and 22-5-150.

Requester

Mr. Ronald M. Salley, Orangeburg Municipal Judge

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/september-29-1999/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/99sept-29-salley.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CH A RLI E CONDO N
A TIO RN EY GENERAL

September 29, 1999
Mr. Ronald M. Salley
Orangeburg Municipal Judge
Post Off ice Box 1425
Orangeburg, South Carolina

29116-1425

Dear Judge Salley:
In a letter to this office you questioned whether S.C. Code Ann. § 14-25-45 (1998) grants municipal judges the same arrest powers as are granted magistrates pursuant to S.C . Code Ann. §§ 225-140 and 22-5-150 (1998). Section 14-25-45 states: Each municipal court shall have jurisdiction to try all cases arising under the ordinances of the municipality for which established. The court shall also have all such powers, duties and jurisdiction in criminal cases made under state law and conferred uoon magistrates. The court shall have the power to punish for contempt of court by imposition of sentences up to the limits imposed on municipal courts. The court shall have no jurisdiction in civil matters. (emphasis added) . Section 22 - 5-140 states: Any magistrate shall command all persons who, in his view, may be engaged in riotous or disorderly conduct to the disturbance of the peace, to desist therefrom and shall arrest any such person who shall refuse obedience to his command and commit to jail any such person who shall fail to enter into sufficient recognizance either to keep the peace or to answer to an indictment, as the magistrate may determine.

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Mr. Ronald M. Salley
Page 2
September 29, 1999

Section 22-5-150 provides:

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Magistrates may cause to be arrested (a) all affrayers, rioters, disturbers and breakers of the peace, (b) all who go armed offensively, to the terror of the people, (c) such as utter menaces or threatening speeches and (d) otherwise dangerous and disorderly persons. Persons arrested for any of such offenses shall be examined by the magistrate before whom they are brought and may be tried before him .... I am unaware of any cases in this State which have specifically construed §§ 22-5-140 and 22-5-150 as being applicable to municipal courts. Prior opinions of this off ice and prior decisions of the appellate courts in this State which have referenced § 14-25-45 have referred to such provision as referring to subject matter jurisdiction. City of Camden v. Brassell, 326 S.C. 556, 486 S.E.2d 492 (Ct. App. 1997); City of Pickens v. Schmitz, 297 S.C. 253, 376 S.E.2d 271 (1988). In particular in City of Camden, the court referenced §14-25-45 in determining that municipal courts and magistrate courts have the same subject matter jurisdiction over first offense driving under the influence cases. In that same decision, the Court of Appeals stated that subject matter jurisdiction " ... is the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong." 326 S.C. at 562. In Wrenn Bail Bond Service v. City of Hanahan, 335 S.C. 26, 515 S.E.2d 521 (1999) the court recognized that consistent with § 14-25-45, a municipal court has concurrent jurisdiction with a magistrate's court to set bond in criminal cases. Similarly, opinions of this office which have construed § 1425-45 have done so in the terms of the jurisdiction of a municipal court to hear and determine certain cases. See, ~, Ops. of the Attorney General dated October 10, 1984 (municipal courts have no civil jurisdiction); October 12, 1987 {municipal courts have the same subject matter jurisdiction as magistrate courts as to DUS cases); September 29, 1988 {sentencing authority of the municipal court); September 27, 1989, December 5, 1989, April 2, 1997 (municipal courts have same trial jurisdiction as magistrates as to specified criminal cases) .

Mr. Ronald M. Salley
Page 3
September 29, 1999

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While not free from doubt, it does not appear that § 14-25-45 should be considered as granting municipal courts the same authority possessed by magistrates pursuant to § 22-5-140 and 22-5150. Of course, if such authority is desired, consideration could be given to requesting legislation specifically granting municipal courts such authority.

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This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Senior Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific question asked. It has not, however, been personally reviewed by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I am,

Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General
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