Were South Carolina parents automatically liable for a 17-year-old child’s car accident or contract?

Plain-English summary

Two state senators asked about parents' liability for the actions of a 17-year-old. The 2000 informal opinion said no single rule answered every type of liability. South Carolina still treated a 17-year-old as a minor for general age-of-majority purposes, while some statutes made age-specific exceptions. Whether the child was emancipated depended on the circumstances, including the parents' control, and could affect legal rights and liabilities.

For a car accident, the AG explained the family purpose doctrine: a head of household who provided a car for the family's general use could be liable for a family member's negligent driving with authority to use it. Car title alone did not decide the question; the opinion compared cases with different facts about ownership and use. It also described a minor's contract as voidable at the minor's option before ratification and said the parents could not be bound merely because the minor entered it. The letter did not decide any particular family's liability.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2000. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later
AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current
legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy
mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did turning 17 automatically free a child from parental control?
A: No. The AG said a 17-year-old remained a minor under the general age-of-majority statute, although some laws treated that age differently. Emancipation required a fact-specific inquiry.

Q: Would a parent be liable whenever a 17-year-old crashed a car titled to the parent?
A: Not automatically. The opinion described one case where title was in the father's name but the son had bought the car for his own use, and the father was not liable under the family purpose doctrine.

Q: Did a minor's contract automatically bind the parents?
A: No. The opinion said a minor's contract was generally voidable before ratification and that the parents could not be bound simply by that contract.

Background and statutory framework

The letter distinguished statutory support and neglect rules from liability under emancipation, the family purpose doctrine and contract law. It said emancipation and family car use were questions of fact. The cited cases supplied examples, not a finding about the senators' unspecified families.

Citations and references

• § 15-1-320, the general age-of-majority provision; § 20-7-95, the parental immunity provision discussed for an incorrigible 17-year-old.
• Parker v. Parker, on emancipation; Porter v. Hardee and Reid v. Swindler, on family car use and parental liability.

Official title

Having concerns about the liability of parents for the actions of a seventeen-year-old child.

Requester

The Honorable Joe Wilson and The Honorable Andre Bauer, Members, South Carolina Senate

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/september-15-2000-1/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/00sept15bauer.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLIE CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

September 15, 2000
The Honorable Joe Wilson and The Honorable Andre Bauer
Members, South Carolina Senate
Post Office Box 142
Columbia, South Carolina 29202
RE: Informal Opinion

Dear Senator Wilson and Senator Bauer,
Thank you for your letter of September 11, 2000, requesting an opinion of the Attorney General's Office. You have concerns about the liability of parents for the actions of a seventeenyear-old child.

I

Your questions implicate many aspects of South Carolina jurisprudence, both statutory and common law. The age of majority in South Carolina is provided for by statute: "all references to minors in the laws of this State shall ... be deemed to mean persons under the age of eighteen years ... " S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-320. Generally, a parent's duty of support runs until the child reaches eighteen. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420. However, for some purposes, a seventeen-yearold minor enjoys more freedoms, or depending on your perspective, more responsibilities, than minors sixteen and younger. For example, South Carolina law requires parents to maintain their child's emollment in a suitable school from the age of five until the "ward attains his seventeenth birthday... " See S.C. CODE ANN.§ 59-65-10. Also, parents are granted immunity from charges of neglect or failure to provide reasonable support for a seventeen-year-old child "where there is a demonstrable record that the child is incorrigible (beyond the control of parents)." S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-7-95. Thus, the law makes several exceptions for children at the age of seventeen, still minors but not entirely a protected class, which often creates confusion for parents coping with difficult teenagers.

b1

lflJ

I

The parents' liability for the actions of their seventeen-year-old child is a fact specific issue. One very important question for parental liability is whether the child is emancipated, or released from the parents' control. If the emancipation of the child is complete, it "severs the parental

i

/1

REMBERT

c. DE'1NlS BctLDl:--IG

JJ I /Af;',;;.i, kl~

•

POST OrncE Box

11549

•

CoLL:~fB[A,

s c. 29211-1549

•

TELEPHONE: 803- 734-3970

•

FACSIMILE: 803-253-6283

J
Senator Wilson and Senator Bauer
September 15, 2000
Page 2of3

L

I

I

relationship so far as legal rights and liabilities are concerned." Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C. 28, 94 S.E.2d 12 ( 1956). However, the determination of emancipation depends on the particular circumstances of each case, and ultimately, would be a question of fact for a jury to decide. See id. In Parker, the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld a jury determination of emancipation even though the minor lived in his parent's home. The case turned largely on upon parental supervision and authority. The testimony showed that the minor was gainfully employed, owned his own automobile, was a member of the national guard, and listed his aged father as a dependent on his income tax return. See. id. In another case, Timmerman v. Bro'-Vn, 268 S.C. 303, 233 S.E.2d 106 ( 1977), a minor left the home of her father with his consent. She remained away from home for a period of months without any contact with or supervision from her father when she incurred certain medical expenses. The Court held that the father's voluntary renunciation of his parental rights and the daughter's subsequent conduct were such that her emancipation was completely effected. The father, therefore, was found not to be responsible for the child's medical expenses. Although the determination of a minor's emancipation is certainly one instance in which parents are no longer responsible for either the support or the liabilities of a minor child, there are other circumstances in which parents are not per se liable for the minor's actions. You referred in your letter to concerns about the parent's responsibility to pay damages when their seventeen-yearold is involved in an accident. Under the family purpose doctrine, when the head of the family provides an automobile for the general use and convenience of the family, that person is liable for damages caused by the negligence of any family member having the authority to use the vehicle. See Porter v. Hardee, 241 S.C. 474, 129 S.E.2d 131 (1963). Again, the liability of the parents under the family use doctrine involves numerous questions of fact. In Porter v. Hardee, the father was actually held not liable for the personal injuries of a plaintiff when his son was driving an automobile titled in the father's name. Although the son lived with the parents, received income from the father's farm, and the car was titled in the father's name because the son was a minor, the son purchased the car with his O\VTI money and intended to use the car exclusively for his O\VTI purposes. Under these facts, the court held that liability could not be imposed under the family purpose doctrine. In another case, however, the Court held that evidence that a mother purchased the car for her minor son, signed an application as O\VTier of the car for the highway department to have title in her name, received insurance in her name as the o\VTier, and obtained a loan using the car as collateral was sufficient to go to the jury as a question of fact of o\VTiership of the vehicle for liability under the family purpose doctrine. See Reid v. Swindler, 249 S.C. 483, 154 S.E.2d 910 (1967). As with the determination of emancipation, liability under the family purpose doctrine depends on the particulars surrounding each case. Finally, as for liability in contract, generally a contract entered into by a minor has been held to be voidable, not void at its inception. The contract may be voided at the option of the minor at any time prior to ratification. Ihley v. Padgett 27 S.C.30, 3 S.E. 468 (l 887); Salinas v. Bennett, 33 S.C. 285, 11 S.E. 968 (1890). Because the minor, himself, may not be bound in contract when it is made in infancy, the parents can neither be bound. The minor may ratify the contract upon reaching the

Senator Wilson and Senator Bauer
September 15, 2000
Page 3of3
age of majority, but at that age the child is emancipated by operation of law. In sum, the laws relating to seventeen-year-old minors may cause some confusion because they address the realization that a seventeen-year-old is no longer a child in practicality, but is not yet legally an adult. Fortunately for the parents, both the legislature and the common law have provided protections when the minor is no longer under parental control. Statutes such as S.C. CODE ANN.§ 20-7-95 (granting parental immunity when the minor is incorrigible) and the doctrines of emancipation and family purpose (neither of which is age-specific) may provide adequate safeguards against your concerns. Of course, every theory of liability is unique, and we have only addressed those most relevant to your inquiry, but these issues are probably among the most important to those parents troubled by the actions of their seventeen-year-old child. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Senior Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific question asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I remain Very truly yours,

Zeb C. Williams, III
Deputy Attorney General