Did South Carolina require a second owner and lienholder search before selling an abandoned vehicle?

Plain-English summary

The South Carolina Sheriffs' Association asked whether a 2004 amendment to the abandoned-vehicle law required an additional search for an owner's and lienholder's names and addresses before a sale. The Attorney General concluded that it did not. Section 56-5-5630 said registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the last known registered owner and lienholders of record constituted notice for that section.

The office acknowledged that the statute's reference to Section 29-15-10 was ambiguous. A person familiar with the legislation told the office the reference concerned storage costs, including a notice deadline affecting which costs could be charged. The AG used that understanding to reject a mandatory second search and recommended legislative clarification.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2004. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Was a second owner search required before an abandoned vehicle sale?
A: The AG said no under the 2004 amendment it interpreted. The letter treated the abandoned-vehicle provision's mailed notice as sufficient for that section.

Q: Why did the law mention the separate storage statute?
A: The office reported that the cross-reference was intended to address storage costs, not to import the separate statute's second-search requirement. It called the wording ambiguous.

Q: Did the AG consider the wording settled?
A: No. It recommended legislative clarification of the cross-reference.

Background and statutory framework

Section 56-5-5630 described notice to the last known registered owner and lienholders of record after an abandoned vehicle was taken into custody. It referred to Section 29-15-10, which the opinion discussed for storage costs and timing of notice. The question was whether that reference added a second search before sale; the office concluded it did not.

Citations

• Section 56-5-5630
• Section 29-15-10

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/september-13-2004-1/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/04sept-13-Moore1.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
HENRY McMAsrER

September 13, 2004

ATfORNEY GENERAL

Jeffrey B. Moore, Executive Director
South Carolina Sheriffs' Association
P. 0. Box 21428
Columbia, South Carolina 29221-1428
Dear Jeff:
In a letter to this office you referenced the provisions of newly-amended S.C. Code Ann. Section 56-5-5630. Such provision was amended by Act No. 269 of2004. This statute provides for the sale of abandoned vehicle stating that

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When an abandoned vehicle has been taken into custody, the towing company and storage facility having towed and received the vehicle shall notify by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, the last known registered owner ofthe vehicle and all lienholders of record that the vehicle has been taken into custody. Notification of the owner and all lienholders by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, constitutes notification for purposes of this section. This notification must satisfy the notification requirements contained in Section 29-15-10. The notice must: (a) give a description of the year, make, model, and identification number of the vehicle; (b) set forth the location where the vehicle is being held; (c) inform the owner and all lienholders of the right to reclaim the vehicle within thirty days beginning the day after the notice is mailed, return receipt requested, upon payment of all towing, preservation, storage charges, notification, publication, and court costs resulting from placing the vehicle in custody; and (d) state that the failure of the owner and all lienholders to exercise their right to reclaim the vehicle within the time provided is considered a waiver by the owner and lienholders of all rights, title, and interest in the vehicle and is considered as their consent to the sale of the vehicle at a public auction.

(j.LW~ ~~~ BUILDING • POST 0FFJCE Box 11549 • COWMBIA. S.C. 292 11 - 1549 • TELEPHONE: 803-734-3970 •

FACSlMILE: 803-253-6283

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Mr. Moore
Page2
September 13, 2004
As noted, Section 56-5-5630 requires that the "notification must satisfy the notification requirements contained in Section 29-15-10." You have asked whether such provision requires an additional search for the name and address of any owner or lienholder as set forth in Section 29-15-10 before an article is sold for purposes of that provision.

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The provisions of Section 56-5-5630 emphasized above, "(t)his notification must satisfy the notification requirements contained in Section 29-15-1 O" are ambiguous. However, I have been informed by an individual familiar with this legislation that the reference to Section 29-15-10 is meant to provide for the assessment of storage costs as set forth in Section 29-15-10 (B) which provides that Storage costs may be charged that have accrued before the notification of the owner and lienholder, by certified or registered mail, of the location of the article. Notification to the owner and lienholder by the proprietor, owner, or operator of the towing company, storage facility, garage or repair shop must occur within five days, after receiving the owner's and lienholder's identities. If the notice is not mailed within this period, storage costs after the five-day period must not be charged until the notice is mailed. Therefore, in light of such response as to the intended meaning, the provisions requiring a mandatory second search for the owner and lienholder information as provided in Section 29-15-10 are not applicable to a situation arising under Section 56-5-5630. As set forth in Section 56-5-5630, "(n)otification of the owner and all lienholders by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, constitutes notification for purposes of this section." However, in light of the ambiguity, it would be desirable to seek legislative clarification. Sincerely,

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Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General

REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

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Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General