Could a South Carolina public transit authority spend public money on a table at an appreciation dinner?

Plain-English summary

A state representative asked whether the Pee Dee Regional Transportation Authority had properly reserved a table at a dinner honoring a transportation advocate. The 2000 informal opinion said the event program's acknowledgment did not establish that the authority spent public money. Individuals might have paid personally, or the reservation might not have involved a donation. The AG assumed a contribution of authority funds solely to analyze the legal question.

On that assumption, the payment would need to serve a public purpose. Recognition of transportation service might benefit the broader community, the letter said, but the record was too thin to determine who primarily benefited and whether the public gain was sufficient. The AG left that fact-dependent judgment to a court. It did not conclude that the authority's table reservation was lawful or unlawful.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2000. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later
AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current
legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy
mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the printed dinner program prove the authority donated public money?
A: No. The AG said the acknowledgment of a reserved table did not show who paid, or even whether money was contributed.

Q: If public funds were used, what test did the opinion apply?
A: The AG applied a public-purpose inquiry looking at intended public benefit, primary beneficiaries, speculation and the likelihood and degree of public gain.

Q: Did the AG approve or prohibit this dinner expenditure?
A: Neither. It said the relevant facts were insufficient and only a court could make the final public-purpose determination.

Background and statutory framework

The letter started with the rule that government money must be spent for a public rather than private purpose. It applied Anderson's general definition and Nichols's four-part guidance to the assumed monetary contribution. The existence and terms of any actual payment remained unresolved.

Citations and references

• Anderson v. Baehr, the general public-purpose definition.
• Nichols v. South Carolina Research Authority, the four-part public-purpose analysis.

Official title

On the propriety of the Pee Dee Regional Transportation Authority reserving a table at an appreciation dinner for a State Representative.

Requester

The Honorable Herb Kirsh, Member, House of Representatives

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/september-1-2000/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/00sept1kirsh.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

September 1, 2000

L.

The Honorable Herb Kirsh
Member, House of Representatives
Box 31
Clover, South Carolina 29710
RE: Informal Opinion
Dear Representative Kirsh:
By your letter of August 21, 2000, you have requested an opinion of the Attorney General's Office on the propriety of the Pee Dee Regional Transportation Authority reserving a table at an appreciation dinner for a State Representative .

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You have provided our Office with a copy of the program for the dinner given by The South Carolina Transportation Policy and Research Council recognizing Senator John Drummond as "Transportation Advocate of the Year." The program contains a section labeled "Our Appreciation" and states that the Council "would like to thank the following for reserving Tables." Among the ten organizations listed is the Pee Dee Transportation Authority. It is this acknowledgment that forms the basis of your question. As a preliminary matter, the program alone provides very little factual information about the nature of the Pee Dee Transportation Authority's reservation of the table. For example, the reservation could have been made in the name of the Authority with individual members cont0buting personally to the dinner. Alternatively, the reservation of a table may not necessarily mean the Authority contributed an actual monetary donation to the dinner. However, for the purposes of the opinion only we will assume that the Authority made a monetary contribution of Authority funds to the dinner. It is well settled that the expenditure of state funds must be for a public, not a private purpose. While each case must be decided on its own merits, the notion of what constitutes a public purpose has been described in Anderson v. Baehr, 256 S.C. 153, 217 S.E.2d 43 (1975): " [a]s a general rule a public purpose has for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals,

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P'OST OFFICE Box 11549

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COLUMOIA, S.C. 29211-1549

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TELEPHONE:

803-734-3970

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FACSIMILE : 803-253-6283

Representative Kirsh
September I, 2000
Page 2 of2

general welfare, security, prosperity, and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents, or at least a substantial part thereof." The following four prong test has also provided guidelines for determining a public purpose:
... first determine the ultimate goal or benefit to the public intended by the project. Second,
... analyze whether public or private parties will be the primary beneficiaries. Third, the speculative nature of the project must be considered. Fourth ... analyze and balance the probability that the public interest will be ultimately served and to what degree. Nichols v. South Carolina Research Authority, 290 S.C. 415, 351 S.E.2d 155 (1986). Accordingly, to be permissible, the donation made for the reservation of the table would need to demonstrate a sufficient public purpose under such a test. The dinner appears to be for the recognition of an advocate for transportation. The promotion of service to transportation arguably benefits the community at large. However, this Office is without sufficient information to definitively draw any conclusion. Indeed, the determination of whether the donation is for a public purpose involves numerous questions of fact which are beyond the scope of an opinion ofthis Office to resolve. Only a court could make such a determination.

I

This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Senior Assistant Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific question asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General not officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I remain

Assistant Deputy Attorney General