Can a South Carolina county use transportation sales-tax money to build a highway noise barrier?

Plain-English summary

The Mayor of North Charleston asked whether revenue from a county transportation sales-and-use tax can pay to build an engineered highway noise barrier. The barrier is meant to cut the noise from a county transportation project and, by the mayor's description, has no use other than that. The request asked the AG to assume the tax was properly approved by voters in a referendum, so the only live question was whether a noise barrier is an allowable thing to spend the money on.

The statute, S.C. Code § 4-37-30(A)(1)(a)(i), lets counties impose the tax to pay for "highways, roads, streets, bridges, mass transit systems, greenbelts, and other transportation-related projects facilities." A noise barrier is obviously not a highway, road, street, bridge, transit system, or greenbelt. The question was whether it fits the catch-all phrase "other transportation-related projects facilities."

The Attorney General acknowledged that the phrase is awkwardly worded and genuinely ambiguous. The Court of Appeals said as much in S.C. Public Interest Foundation v. Richland County, noting it could not tell what "projects facilities" was supposed to mean and suggesting a drafting error. But the AG concluded that under any reasonable reading of that phrase, an engineered highway noise barrier qualifies: the barrier is clearly transportation-related, it serves no purpose other than mitigating the transportation project's noise, and it can fairly be called either a "project" or a "facility." So whether the statute covers projects, facilities, or both, the barrier fits.

The AG noted that the Richland case's actual holding (about spending transit funds on operating costs rather than capital) does not drive the answer here, because a noise barrier, unlike a mass transit system, is not separately listed in the statute. The AG also distinguished its own April 9, 2026 opinion on the Charleston Battery Extension, which turned on the separate word "drainage" rather than on the "other transportation-related projects facilities" language.

The bottom line, in the AG's words: "we think an engineered highway noise barrier is likely an 'other transportation-related projects facility[y]' and may be funded under Section 4-37-30(A)(1)(a)(i)."

What this means for you

County and municipal officials planning transportation projects

Based on this opinion, a noise barrier that is part of, and serves only, a voter-approved county transportation project is treated as a fundable "transportation-related" facility under § 4-37-30. The opinion's reasoning leans on two facts the mayor supplied: the barrier mitigates the transportation project's noise, and it has no standalone utility. If your project shares those features, the opinion's analysis points the same way. Note the AG's framing is "likely," not a guarantee; AG opinions are advisory, and a court could read the ambiguous statute differently.

Public works directors and transportation planners

The opinion confirms the AG reads the "other transportation-related projects facilities" catch-all broadly enough to reach items that are not themselves roadways but that exist to serve a roadway project. The opinion does not lay out a general test for what else qualifies; it decides this barrier on its specific facts (transportation-related, no other purpose).

Local government attorneys

The opinion rests on the referendum being valid, an assumption the mayor asked the AG to make. It does not opine on referendum sufficiency, project approval, or any procedural question. It also flags that the governing phrase is ambiguous and that the controlling appellate case (Richland) does not resolve this particular use. Treat the conclusion as persuasive AG guidance on the spending-authority question only.

Common questions

Does this mean any wall or structure near a road can be paid for with transportation tax money?
No. The opinion is narrow. It addresses an engineered highway noise barrier that mitigates the noise of a county transportation project and has no other use. The AG's reasoning depends on the barrier being transportation-related and serving only the project.

Did the AG decide whether the referendum or the project itself was proper?
No. The mayor asked the AG to assume a proper referendum had occurred, so the AG addressed only whether a noise barrier is an allowable use of the funds.

Is this binding on the county?
No. South Carolina AG opinions are persuasive authority, not binding law. A court interpreting § 4-37-30 could reach a different result, especially given the AG's own observation that the statutory phrase is ambiguous.

Background and statutory framework

Chapter 37 of Title 4 of the South Carolina Code provides optional methods for financing transportation facilities. Section 4-37-30 lets a county impose a sales-and-use tax, after enacting an ordinance and holding a referendum, to finance "highways, roads, streets, bridges, mass transit systems, greenbelts, and other transportation-related projects facilities." S.C. Code § 4-37-30(A)(1)(a)(i).

The interpretive question is the meaning of the catch-all "other transportation-related projects facilities." In S.C. Public Interest Foundation v. Richland County, 436 S.C. 271, 871 S.E.2d 599 (Ct. App. 2021), the Court of Appeals called the "projects facilities" wording confusing and possibly a drafting error, but held the statute authorizes spending on operating transportation-related projects, not just facilities. The AG applied the ordinary rules of statutory construction (give effect to legislative intent; plain text where unambiguous; construe where ambiguous) and concluded the barrier qualifies under any of the readings the court considered.

Citations

• S.C. Code Ann. § 4-37-30(A)(1)(a)(i) (county transportation sales-and-use tax; permitted uses)
• S.C. Code Ann. § 4-37-10 et seq. (optional methods for financing transportation facilities)
• S.C. Code Ann. § 4-37-30(A)(1) (ordinance and referendum requirement)
• S.C. Public Interest Foundation v. Richland County, 436 S.C. 271, 871 S.E.2d 599 (Ct. App. 2021) (ambiguity of "other transportation-related projects facilities")
• Mid-State Auto Auction of Lexington, Inc. v. Altman, 324 S.C. 65, 476 S.E.2d 690 (1996); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 533 S.E.2d 578 (2000); Wade v. Berkeley Cnty., 348 S.C. 224, 559 S.E.2d 586 (2002); State v. Henkel, 413 S.C. 9, 774 S.E.2d 458 (2015) (statutory-construction principles)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/opinion-regarding-the-use-of-transportation-tax-revenues-to-build-a-highway-barrier/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/media/lvchyzdx/burgess-6-5.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

ALAN WILSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

June 5, 2026

Mayor Reginald L. Burgess
City of North Charleston
PO Box 190016
North Charleston, SC 29419

Dear Mayor Burgess:

Attorney General Alan Wilson referred your letter to the Opinions section for a response. You seek an opinion regarding the permissible use of revenues generated by a county transportation sales and use tax. Specifically, you seek guidance on whether the construction of an engineered highway noise barrier qualifies as a "transportation-related projects facilities" under Section 4-37-30(A)(1)(a)(i). You explain that the barrier is designed to mitigate the environmental acoustic impact of a county transportation project and that the barrier has no utility outside of the transportation project. In your request, you ask us to assume that the barrier was properly approved by voters via referendum.

Law/Analysis

As we have previously discussed, Chapter 37 of Title 4 of the South Carolina Code of Laws provides optional methods for financing transportation facilities. Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 2007 WL 655622 (Feb. 16, 2007) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 4-37-10 et seq. (Supp. 2005)). Section 4-37-30 affords counties the ability to impose a sales and use tax to finance the cost of highways, roads, streets, bridges, and "other transportation-related projects facilities." S.C. Code Ann. § 4-37-30(A)(1)(a)(i) (2021). Section 4-37-30(A)(1) requires counties to enact an ordinance and hold a referendum in order to impose the tax. S.C. Code Ann. § 4-37-30(A)(1) (2021). Your request assumes that a proper referendum has occurred, so your question is purely whether an engineered highway noise barrier is an allowable use under Section 4-37-30(A)(1)(a)(i).

The primary goal of statutory interpretation "is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature." Mid-State Auto Auction of Lexington, Inc. v. Altman, 324 S.C. 65, 69, 476 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1996). Where a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, "the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will." Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). "[W]here a statute is ambiguous, [courts] must construe the terms of the statute." Wade v. Berkeley Cnty., 348 S.C. 224, 229, 559 S.E.2d 586, 588 (2002). "A statute as a whole must receive a practical, reasonable and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers." State v. Henkel, 413 S.C. 9, 14, 774 S.E.2d 458, 461 (2015), reh'g denied (Aug. 5, 2015).

Section 4-37-30 allows counties to use transportation tax funds on "highways, roads, streets, bridges, mass transit systems, greenbelts, and other transportation-related projects facilities." S.C. Code Ann. § 4-37-30(A)(1)(a)(i) (2021). An engineered highway noise barrier is not "highways, roads, streets, bridges, mass transit systems, [or] greenbelts." However, an engineered highway noise barrier may be "other transportation-related projects facilities." The phrase "other transportation-related projects facilities" is ambiguous. The Court of Appeals observed as much in S.C. Public Interest Foundation v. Richland County, 436 S.C. 271, 871 S.E.2d 599 (2021). There, the Court of Appeals stated:

We do not know what to make of the word sequence "projects facilities." Perhaps either "projects" or "facilities" was included by mistake. Another explanation may be that there was supposed to be an "and" or "or" between them. The title of the statute says the statute is about "transportation facilities," but the Act's legislative findings refer to "transportation-related projects," and a later provision of the very same statute repeatedly uses the same term —"transportation-related projects." See § 4-37-30(B)(1)(a).

436 S.C. 271, 276-277, 871 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2021). The Court of Appeals then held that, despite the ambiguity, "the statute authorizes spending funds on operating transportation-related projects, not just transportation-related facilities." Id.

Under any of the readings considered by the Court of Appeals in Richland, the engineered highway noise barrier is permitted. The barrier is clearly transportation related. As you explain in your letter, the barrier serves no utility other than mitigating the noise created by the transportation project. The engineered highway noise barrier could fairly be considered either a project or a facility. Thus, regardless of whether the statute permits facilities, projects, or both, the engineered highway noise barrier qualifies as "other transportation-related projects facilities" and may be funded under Section 4-37-30(A)(1)(a)(i).

While the discussion of the phrase "other transportation-related projects facilities" in Richland is notable, the ultimate holding in the case does not aid in the analysis of your question. The Court in Richland considered whether using transportation tax funds on the operation of the mass transit system, as opposed to expending the funds on facilities or capital expenditures, was permissible. 436 S.C. at 275, 871 S.E.2d at 601. Mass transit systems, unlike engineered highway noise barriers, are explicitly permitted in the statute. S.C. Code Ann. § 4-37-30(A)(1)(a)(i) (2021). The Court held that operating the mass transit system was permitted because mass transit systems are enumerated and including the phrase "other transportation-related projects facilities" means that expenditures within the enumerated categories are not strictly limited to capital expenses. 436 S.C. at 277, 871 S.E.2d at 602. Unlike in Richland, there is not an analogous hook, e.g., "mass transit systems," for the engineered highway noise barrier. Thus, the only question is whether it is an "other transportation-related projects facilities."

In your request, you reference the Office's April 9, 2026 Opinion, 2026 WL 1022620, regarding the Charleston Battery Extension Project. The April 9 Opinion discusses the Charleston Battery Extension and largely grounds its analysis in the term "drainage" and flood control. The April 9 Opinion discusses the ambiguity of "other transportation-related projects facilities," but, similar to Richland, drainage is a specifically enumerated category in the statute. As a result, the analysis of the April 9 Opinion does not ultimately hinge on the interpretation of "other transportation-related projects facilities" and instead centers on whether the Charleston Battery Extension qualifies as drainage.

Conclusion

Section 4-37-30 affords counties the ability to impose a sales and use tax to finance the cost of highways, roads, streets, bridges, "other transportation-related projects facilities." S.C. Code Ann. § 4-37-30(A)(1)(a)(i) (2021). The engineered highway noise barrier is clearly transportation related. As you explain in your letter, the engineered highway noise barrier serves no utility other than mitigating the noise created by the county transportation project. Despite the statute's lack of clarity, we think an engineered highway noise barrier is likely an "other transportation-related projects facilit[y]" and may be funded under Section 4-37-30(A)(1)(a)(i).

Sincerely,

REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

Robert D. Cook
Solicitor General Emeritus