Ezel / AG Opinions / SC
SC 2026-djj-per-diem-post-adjudication February 26, 2026

Can the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice charge counties a $50 per-day fee for keeping juveniles in custody after they have been adjudicated and committed?

Short answer: No. The AG concluded that DJJ's per-diem authority under Section 63-19-360(4) is limited to pre-adjudication detention. Once a juvenile has been adjudicated and committed, the State must bear the costs. DJJ has no statutory basis to bill the originating law enforcement agency for that period.
Disclaimer: This is an official South Carolina Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed South Carolina attorney for advice on your specific situation.

Plain-English summary

Marion County's detention director asked the AG: South Carolina law clearly lets the Department of Juvenile Justice charge a per-diem to the originating law enforcement agency while a juvenile is being held before adjudication. But what about after a juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent and committed to DJJ's care? Can DJJ keep billing the county?

The AG said no. Section 63-19-360(4), the per-diem statute, is wall-to-wall about pre-adjudication detention. The cost-sharing scheme it lays out (one-third DJJ, two-thirds the originating law enforcement agency), the reporting requirements about "preadjudicatory detention facilities," the rules for closing such facilities, the dedicated account for funds received under the section, all of it is framed around pre-adjudication. Reading the per-diem authority to extend past adjudication "strains credulity."

Section 63-19-1610 is the other place per-diem is mentioned. It caps the charge at $50 per day per child and ties it to "juvenile detention services," a term Section 63-19-360 reserves for pre-adjudication services. Read the two statutes together (which South Carolina's in pari materia canon requires), and the per-diem is a pre-adjudication-only mechanism.

After adjudication, Section 63-19-1610 says all expenses must be borne by the State. The AG flagged pending legislation (Senate Bill 374 and a budget proviso in House Bill 5126) that would adjust the rate or add charges, but neither would extend the per-diem beyond adjudication. Counties currently being billed for post-adjudication detention have a textual basis to push back.

What this means for you

If you are a county sheriff or detention director

Audit your DJJ invoices. If DJJ is billing a per-diem for any day a juvenile was in their custody after adjudication and commitment, the AG's reading is that DJJ has no statutory authority to do so. The right move is to send the AG opinion to your county attorney and decide whether to dispute the billing. Past payments may be recoverable depending on how the dispute goes; that question turns on facts the AG explicitly declined to adjudicate.

If you are a county attorney or finance officer

The AG's reasoning is a clean in pari materia argument: Section 63-19-360(4) and Section 63-19-1610 must be read together as one harmonious system. That system limits per-diem to pre-adjudication. The AG also notes Section 63-19-1610's "[a]ll expenses must be borne by the State" clause as the affirmative provision for post-adjudication funding. If you challenge a DJJ invoice, lead with that statutory architecture.

If you are at DJJ

Continuing to bill counties for post-adjudication days creates litigation exposure once this opinion becomes widely circulated. Either revise billing practice to stop at adjudication, or work with the General Assembly on a statutory amendment that explicitly extends per-diem authority. The AG noted: "[i]n the event the General Assembly meant the Department's per diem authority to extend past adjudication, this Office believes statutory amendment would clarify and remedy this situation."

If you are a state legislator

Two pending bills are already touching DJJ per-diem (Senate Bill 374 adjusts the rate; the House Bill 5126 budget proviso adds a $125 capital expenditure charge). Neither, on the AG's read, extends the per-diem beyond adjudication. If extending it is the policy goal, that has to be done expressly. If keeping post-adjudication costs on the State is the policy goal, the current statutory architecture already does that.

If you advocate for juvenile justice reform

This opinion may shift the cost burden of post-adjudication detention back onto DJJ (and the State general fund). Counties that have been quietly absorbing those costs may now contest them. Expect knock-on effects on DJJ's operating budget and possibly on the duration or location of post-adjudication placements.

Common questions

Why is the line drawn at adjudication?

The statute uses different phrases for different phases. Section 63-19-360(1) requires DJJ to provide "correctional institutional services for juveniles committed under this chapter" (post-adjudication). Section 63-19-360(4) requires DJJ to provide "juvenile detention services for juveniles charged with having committed a criminal offense who are found, after a detention screening or detention hearing, to require detention or placement outside the home pending an adjudication of delinquency or dispositional hearing" (pre-adjudication). The per-diem authority is in subsection (4), not (1).

What does Section 63-19-360(4) say about how the cost is split?

DJJ assumes one-third of the per-diem cost; the law enforcement agency having original jurisdiction where the offense occurred assumes two-thirds. Transportation between facilities is on DJJ; transportation to and from is on the law enforcement agency. Per-diem funds received "must be placed in a separate account by the department for operation of all preadjudicatory state facilities." Note the "preadjudicatory" qualifier in the dedicated-account language, which the AG treats as another piece of evidence the per-diem is pre-adjudication-only.

What does Section 63-19-1610 add?

It caps the per-diem at $50 per day per child for "the juvenile detention services provided by the Department." It also says: "All expenses must be borne by the State except local governments utilizing the juvenile detention services provided by the Department of Juvenile Justice must pay the department a per diem of fifty dollars a day per child."

The AG read "juvenile detention services" as a defined term that Section 63-19-360 ties to pre-adjudication. So Section 63-19-1610's $50 cap is a cap on pre-adjudication per-diem.

What is "in pari materia"?

It's the canon that statutes addressing the same subject are construed together "to produce a single, harmonious result." Penman v. City of Columbia (2010), quoted in the opinion. Both Section 63-19-360 and Section 63-19-1610 sit in Title 63, Chapter 19, both deal with DJJ services, and both use the same "juvenile detention services" term. So they get read as one system.

What about the pending bills the AG mentioned?

Senate Bill 374 would change the per-diem rate. House Bill 5126's Part 1B § 67.16 would authorize an additional $125 per day for capital expenditures, on top of the existing $50. The AG noted neither bill changes when DJJ may charge a per-diem; they only change the amount. So the pre-adjudication-only limit holds even if those bills pass.

Can a county recover past payments?

The AG explicitly declined to address this. The opinion says factual questions are "beyond the authority of the Office," so anyone seeking refund of past per-diem charges paid for post-adjudication detention will have to bring the question through normal county-vs-state channels (administrative dispute, declaratory judgment action, or legislative remedy).

Background and statutory framework

South Carolina's juvenile justice system splits responsibility for housing juveniles into two phases:

Pre-adjudication detention (Section 63-19-360(4)): A juvenile has been charged but not yet adjudicated delinquent. After a detention screening or hearing, the juvenile may be detained pending adjudication. DJJ must provide these services, but counties and municipalities can run their own detention facilities under DJJ oversight if they choose.

Post-adjudication custody (Section 63-19-360(1)): A juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent and committed to DJJ. DJJ provides "correctional institutional services."

The per-diem authority sits in the pre-adjudication subsection. Section 63-19-360(4) says:

In Department of Juvenile Justice operated facilities, the department shall determine an amount of per diem for each child detained in a center, which must be paid by the governing body of the law enforcement agency having original jurisdiction where the offense occurred.

Surrounding language reinforces the pre-adjudication framing:

  • The cost-sharing scheme references "preadjudicatory state facilities."
  • The required reports cover "preadjudicatory detention of juveniles in this State."
  • Approvals to close detention centers reference "preadjudicatory" centers.
  • Per-diem funds received "must be placed in a separate account by the department for operation of all preadjudicatory state facilities."

Section 63-19-1610 adds:

From the time of lawful reception of a child by the Department of Juvenile Justice and during the child's stay in custody in a correctional institution, facility, or program operated by the department, the child shall be under the exclusive care, custody, and control of the department. All expenses must be borne by the State except local governments utilizing the juvenile detention services provided by the Department of Juvenile Justice must pay the department a per diem of fifty dollars a day per child.

The AG's reading: "juvenile detention services" is the same defined term used in Section 63-19-360(4) for pre-adjudication. Read in pari materia, the $50 per-diem in Section 63-19-1610 is a pre-adjudication cap. Section 63-19-1610's main rule (all expenses borne by the State) governs post-adjudication.

The AG's two interpretive moves:

  1. Internal consistency. Section 63-19-360(4) is wall-to-wall pre-adjudication. Reading the per-diem subsection to apply post-adjudication would be inconsistent with everything else in the subsection.
  2. Cross-statutory coherence. Section 63-19-1610 caps the per-diem and ties it to "juvenile detention services," a term Section 63-19-360 reserves for pre-adjudication. The two statutes have to mean the same thing or the system breaks.

Pending legislation (as of February 2026):

  • Senate Bill 374, 126th Session, adjusts the per-diem rate
  • House Bill 5126, 126th Session, Part 1B § 67.16 (Capital Expenditure Charge): adds a $125-per-day capital charge

Neither extends DJJ's per-diem authority beyond adjudication.

Citations

Cases:

  • Mid-State Auto Auction of Lexington, Inc. v. Altman, 324 S.C. 65, 69, 476 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1996)
  • Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000)
  • Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam'rs, 370 S.C. 452, 468-69, 636 S.E.2d 598, 606-07 (2006)
  • Penman v. City of Columbia, 387 S.C. 131, 138, 691 S.E.2d 465, 468 (2010)
  • Joiner ex rel. Rivas v. Rivas, 342 S.C. 102, 109, 536 S.E.2d 372, 375 (2000)
  • Fishburne v. Fishburne, 171 S.C. 408, 172 S.E. 426 (1932)
  • Gilstrap v. South Carolina Budget and Control Board, 310 S.C. 210, 423 S.E.2d 101 (1992)
  • Bryant v. City of Charleston, 295 S.C. 408, 368 S.E.2d 899 (1988)
  • State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 273, 403 S.E.2d 660, 662 (1991)

Statutes and pending bills:

  • S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-360, DJJ correctional and detention services
  • S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-1610, exclusive custody, expense allocation
  • Senate Bill 374, 126th Session, pending per-diem rate adjustment
  • House Bill 5126, 126th Session, Part 1B § 67.16, pending capital expenditure charge

Source

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

ALAN WILSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

February 26, 2026

Mr. James Floyd, Jr.
Director of Detention
Marion County Sheriff's Office

Dear Director Floyd:

Attorney General Alan Wilson referred your letter to the Opinions section for a response. You seek an opinion regarding the per diem charged by the Department of Juvenile Justice to "the governing body of the law enforcement agency having original jurisdiction where the offense occurred" for juveniles who are in the Department's custody. Specifically, you explain that the Department is authorized to charge a per diem for each child in its custody prior to adjudication and ask if the Department may charge a per diem to the governing body of the relevant law enforcement agency for children in its custody after they have been adjudicated and committed.

Law/Analysis

South Carolina Code Section 63-19-360(1) requires the Department of Juvenile Justice to "provid[e] correctional institutional services for juveniles committed under this chapter." S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-360(1) (Supp. 2025). Section 63-19-360(4) instructs the Department to "provid[e] juvenile detention services for juveniles charged with having committed a criminal offense who are found, after a detention screening or detention hearing, to require detention or placement outside the home pending an adjudication of delinquency or dispositional hearing." Id. § 63-19-360(4). Section 63-19-360(4) goes on to state the following regarding the costs incurred while detaining juveniles prior to adjudication:

In Department of Juvenile Justice operated facilities, the department shall determine an amount of per diem for each child detained in a center, which must be paid by the governing body of the law enforcement agency having original jurisdiction where the offense occurred.

Id. As you state in your letter, prior to adjudication Section 63-19-360(4) explicitly authorizes the Department to charge the governing body of the law enforcement agency having original jurisdiction where the offense occurred an amount of per diem for each day a child is detained by the Department. Your question regards whether the authority to charge a per diem continues after a child has been adjudicated and committed to the care and custody of the Department. In short, it is the opinion of this Office that Section 63-19-360 does not authorize the Department of Juvenile Justice to charge a per diem for children in its care after the children have been adjudicated and committed to the care and custody of the Department.

The primary aim of statutory interpretation "is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature." Mid-State Auto Auction of Lexington, Inc. v. Altman, 324 S.C. 65, 69, 476 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1996) (citing Gilstrap v. South Carolina Budget and Control Board, 310 S.C. 210, 423 S.E.2d 101 (1992)). Where a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, "the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will." Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (quoting Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.03 at 94 (5th ed. 1992)). "A statute as a whole must receive a practical, reasonable and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers." Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam'rs, 370 S.C. 452, 468, 636 S.E.2d 598, 606-07 (2006). "Words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation." Id. at 469, 636 S.E.2d at 607. (citing Bryant v. City of Charleston, 295 S.C. 408, 368 S.E.2d 899 (1988); State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 273, 403 S.E.2d 660, 662 (1991)).

To understand the extent of the per diem authority in Section 63-19-360(4), it is helpful to begin with the larger context of the juvenile detention system. Section 63-19-360 lays out various institutional services which the Department must provide. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-360. Subsection (4) requires the Department to provide juvenile detention services for "juveniles charged with having committed a criminal offense who are found, after a detention screening or detention hearing, to require detention or placement outside the home pending an adjudication of delinquency or dispositional hearing." Id. § 63-19-360(4). Subsection (4) requires the Department to house these juveniles prior to adjudication, but it allows counties or municipalities to maintain their own juvenile detention facilities to house juveniles prior to adjudication, subject to the Department's oversight, if they so choose. Id. In essence, Subsection (4) gives counties and municipalities a choice between using the juvenile detention services of the Department or maintaining local juvenile detention facilities.

Subsection (4) then grants the Department the authority to charge a per diem to the "the governing body of the law enforcement agency having original jurisdiction where the offense occurred." Id. The subsection continues by specifying the method of cost sharing regarding pre-adjudication juveniles. Specifically, the Department assumes one-third of the per diem cost and the governing body of the law enforcement agency having original jurisdiction where the offense occurred assumes two-thirds of the cost. Id. In addition, Subsection (4) states that the cost of transportation to and from the facility is the responsibility of the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction where the offense was committed, while the cost of transportation of juveniles between department facilities is the responsibility of the Department. Id. Notably, "[p]er diem funds received by the department must be placed in a separate account by the department for operation of all preadjudicatory state facilities." Id. Subsections (5) and (6) create requirements for county and municipal operated facilities in which pre-adjudication juveniles are detained.

Further, Subsection (4) specifically mentions preadjudicatory detention throughout. Subsection (4) requires the Department to provide pre-adjudication juvenile detention services, in contrast to the post-adjudication correctional institutional services described in Subsection (1). After laying out some of the requirements of juvenile detention centers, Subsection (4) specifies that the Department must prepare an initial report regarding the facilities needed for "preadjudicatory detention of juveniles in this State" and annual reports regarding "the status of all preadjudicatory juvenile detention facilities" in the State. Next, the subsection addresses the approvals necessary to close a "preadjudicatory" detention center. Finally, Subsection (4) creates a cost sharing scheme, which in part is based on "the average operating cost among all preadjudicatory state facilities" and requires funds received under Subsection (4) to be "be placed in a separate account by the department for operation of all preadjudicatory state facilities." In short, Subsection (4) throughout its text addresses the detention of juveniles prior to adjudication.

Thus, the per diem authority in Subsection (4) appears by its context to be limited to pre-adjudication juveniles. While the Department's authority to charge and collect a per diem created in Subsection (4) is not explicitly limited to the pre-adjudication detention of juveniles, it strains credulity to suggest that the authority created in Subsection (4), which wholly focuses on pre-adjudication detention, was meant to extend after adjudication.

The question then becomes whether the Department has additional authority, located elsewhere, which would allow it to continue charging a per diem after adjudication. Section 63-19-1610 provides that:

From the time of lawful reception of a child by the Department of Juvenile Justice and during the child's stay in custody in a correctional institution, facility, or program operated by the department, the child shall be under the exclusive care, custody, and control of the department. All expenses must be borne by the State except local governments utilizing the juvenile detention services provided by the Department of Juvenile Justice must pay the department a per diem of fifty dollars a day per child.

S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-1610 (2010). Section 63-19-1610 requires the Department to charge local governments utilizing "the juvenile detention services provided by" the Department a per diem of $50.00 a day per child. This both caps the per diem at $50.00 per day per child and ties it to use of the Department's "juvenile detention services."

Section 63-19-360 requires the Department to provide "correctional institutional services for juveniles committed under [Title 63, Chapter 19]," see § 63-19-360(1), and "juvenile detention services" for "juveniles charged with having committed a criminal offense who are found, after a detention screening or detention hearing, to require detention or placement outside the home pending an adjudication of delinquency or dispositional hearing," see § 63-19-360(4). Thus, Section 63-19-360 uses the term "juvenile detention services" to refer to pre-adjudication detention. Where statutes deal with the same subject matter, it is well established that they "are in pari materia and must be construed together, if possible, to produce a single, harmonious result." Penman v. City of Columbia, 387 S.C. 131, 138, 691 S.E.2d 465, 468 (2010) (quoting Joiner ex rel. Rivas v. Rivas, 342 S.C. 102, 109, 536 S.E.2d 372, 375 (2000)); see also Op. S.C. Atty. Gen., 2000 WL 1347162 at *1 (Aug. 25, 2000) (The meaning of related statutes and their effect must be determined with reference to each other so as to "construe them together into one integrated system of law.") (quoting Fishburne v. Fishburne, 171 S.C. 408, 172 S.E. 426 (1932)). Section 63-19-1610 uses the term "juvenile detention services" and is found in the same Title and Chapter as Section 63-19-360. Moreover, both sections deal with the services which the Department is required to provide. Thus, reading the statutes together, the per diem mandate of Section 63-19-1610 also appears to be limited to the juvenile detention services provided prior to a juvenile's adjudication and commitment. This accords with cost sharing laid out in Section 63-19-360 and with Section 63-19-1610's mandate that "[a]ll expenses must be borne by the State."

The Office is aware of pending legislation which would adjust the per diem rate which the Department is able to charge. See Senate Bill 374, 126th Session of the South Carolina General Assembly. However, based on our review of the legislation, it would alter the amount of the per diem not when the Department is authorized to charge it. Additionally, the Office is aware of a pending budgetary proviso which would authorize the Department to charge an additional $125 per day to local governments, in addition to the $50 per diem from Section 63-19-360(4). See Part 1B Section 67 - N120 § 67.16 (Capital Expenditure Charge) House Bill 5126, 126th Session of the South Carolina General Assembly. Similarly, passage of this proviso would allow for an additional charge and would not alter when the Department is authorized to charge the $50 per diem created in Section 63-19-360(4).

In the event the General Assembly meant the Department's per diem authority to extend past adjudication, this Office believes statutory amendment would clarify and remedy this situation.

Conclusion

It is the opinion of this Office that the Department of Juvenile Justice while authorized, and required, to charge a per diem to the governing body of the law enforcement agency having original jurisdiction where an offense occurred for children in its care prior to adjudication, the Department is not authorized to charge a per diem after the child has been adjudicated and committed to its custody and care.

Sincerely,

Assistant Attorney General

Robert D. Cook
Solicitor General Emeritus