In South Carolina, is it a crime to publish the name of an alleged sexual assault victim even if the assault was never reported to police?

Plain-English summary

Solicitor Kevin Brackett asked whether South Carolina's ban on publishing the name of a person alleged to be a victim of criminal sexual conduct applies only after a report to law enforcement or the filing of charges. The AG reads § 16-3-730's plain text as containing no such requirement. The statute refers to "any person" upon whom the crime has been committed or alleged to have been committed.

The answer has two limits. First, the South Carolina Supreme Court held in Dorman v. Aiken Communications, Inc. that the statute is constitutional on its face, but left its constitutional application to particular facts. Second, the AG notes that a court may depart from literal wording if it finds the wording defeats legislative intent. The opinion says the statute's overriding purpose is to encourage victims to report sexual assaults, and it does not predict whether a court would use that purpose to narrow the text.

The opinion also discusses Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., where the Fourth Circuit read "name" broadly enough to cover a broadcast that sufficiently identified victims without naming them. That decision concerned civil redress. The AG does not decide how § 16-3-730 applies to social media, podcasts, or a particular proposed publication.

What this means for you

If you edit or publish news in South Carolina

The AG's reading gives no safe harbor merely because an allegation was never reported to police. The statute carries a fine of up to one thousand dollars or imprisonment of up to three years upon conviction and excepts publications made by court order. A specific publication can still raise constitutional and statutory interpretation questions that this opinion leaves for a court.

If your identity was published

The AG says a police report is not required by the statute's plain words. Dorman also held that § 16-3-730 does not itself give a victim a private cause of action. Whether a separate claim or a criminal charge could succeed depends on facts and law not resolved here.

If you assess a potential prosecution

The opinion supports reading the statute without a police-report or filed-charge condition. It also requires attention to the particular facts of any constitutional challenge. The AG expressly leaves open whether a court might read the statute's reporting purpose as a reason to depart from its literal wording.

Common questions

Must the assault allegation have been reported to police?
The AG says the statute's plain text contains no police-report requirement. It cautions that a court may consider the law's purpose of encouraging reports when interpreting that text.

Did the South Carolina Supreme Court uphold every application of the statute?
No. Dorman declined to find the statute unconstitutional on its face and left constitutional validity in each "discrete factual context" for later decision.

Did Doe v. Berkeley Publishers decide a case under this statute?
No. As the AG notes, Doe resolved an invasion-of-privacy claim under state law concerning publication of an inmate assault victim's identity. "Section 16-3-730 was not addressed."

Does identifying detail count if the victim's name is omitted?
The AG cites Nappier, where the Fourth Circuit said a broadcast, as pleaded, sufficiently identified victims without their names and read "name" beyond a narrow literal sense. The case used the statute in a civil redress context; this opinion does not decide every form of indirect identification.

Does the AG opinion decide whether a social media post is a publication?
No. It quotes the statute's phrase "newspaper, magazine or other publication" but does not analyze specific media formats.

Background and statutory framework

Section 16-3-730 criminalizes publication of the name of a person upon whom criminal sexual conduct has been committed or alleged to have been committed in South Carolina, with an exception for publications made by court order. The AG applies the plain meaning rule from Hodges v. Rainey and finds no textual reporting condition. It cites Greenville Baseball v. Bearden for the possibility of departing from plain wording where that would defeat legislative intent. Because the statute aims to encourage reports, the opinion flags this as a possible tension without resolving it for a court.

Citations and references

• S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-730: publication of an alleged victim's name.
• Dorman v. Aiken Communications, Inc., 303 S.C. 63, 398 S.E.2d 687 (1990): facial validity and no private cause of action.
• Doe v. Berkeley Publishers: state invasion-of-privacy decision; the AG says § 16-3-730 was not addressed.
• Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1963): discussed for its reading of "name" in a civil case.
• Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 533 S.E.2d 578 (2000): plain meaning rule.
• Greenville Baseball v. Bearden, 200 S.C. 363, 20 S.E.2d 813 (1942): legislative intent caveat.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/opinion-on-s-c-code-section-16-3-730/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/media/cacaahie/brackettk-os-11044-final-opinion-8-12-2025.pdf

Original opinion text

ALAN WILSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

August 12, 2025

The Honorable Kevin Brackett, Solicitor
16th Circuit
Moss Justice Center
1675-1A York Highway
York, SC 29745-7422

Dear Solicitor Brackett:

You seek our opinion regarding S.C. Code Section 16-3-730. Your letter states the following:

> [t]his section criminalizes the publishing of a person's name who is an alleged victim of criminal sexual conduct. The statute does not outline where the allegation must have been made or who must have made the allegation. Furthermore, the statute does not delineate whether the alleged criminal sexual conduct must be the subject of a criminal investigation or criminal charges. Section 16-3-730 reads:
>
> Whoever publishes or causes to be published the name of any person upon whom the crime of criminal sexual conduct has been committed or alleged to have been committed in this State in any newspaper, magazine or other publication shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or imprisonment of not more than three years. The provisions of this section shall not apply to publications made by order of the court.
>
> I am concerned that the statute may be overbroad because the context of the allegation is not defined. I am requesting your opinion as to how or where allegations must have been made, to wit, whether the allegations must be formal complaints to law enforcement and whether criminal charges against a perpetrator must have been filed for an alleged victim to be afforded the protection under this statute. I understand the purpose of the statute is to encourage victims to report crimes without fear of the embarrassment that attends such a crime and to protect them from potential smear campaigns.

Law/Analysis

Section 16-3-730 has been on the books for decades. Statutes, such as this, which protect the identity of victims of sexual assault, are designed to "encourage[ ] reporting of rape and other sexual assaults, so that they may be investigated and the perpetrators prosecuted." Certainly, the State "has a legitimate interest 'in protecting the privacy of a sexual assault victim.'" Doe v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Georgia, 452 S.E.2d 776, 780 (Ga. 1994).

The South Carolina decision upholding the statute is Dorman v. Aiken Communications, Inc., 303 S.C. 63, 398 S.E.2d 687 (1990). In Dorman, the Court found § 16-3-730 to be facially constitutional. There, the victim was sexually assaulted at gunpoint. The Aiken Standard obtained a statement given to the police. However, the victim's identity was not contained in that statement. The newspaper learned the identity of the victim "through various private sources." 303 S.C. at 65. Following publication, the victim sued the newspaper, alleging various causes of action, including a claim pursuant to § 16-3-730. The Aiken Standard argued that the statute violated the First Amendment.

However, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the First Amendment claim, stating as follows:

> ... the United States Supreme Court has declined to rule similar statutes unconstitutional on their face. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 109 S.Ct. 2603, 105 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975). Instead, it has addressed the First Amendment issue "only as it arose in a discrete factual context." Florida Star, supra at ___, 109 S.Ct. 2607, 105 L.Ed.2d at 453 (footnote omitted)... Accordingly, we too decline to hold the statute unconstitutional on its face... .

303 S.C. at 66, 398 S.E.2d at 688-89.

The Dorman Court went on to conclude that § 16-3-730 is a criminal statute and thus provides no private cause of action under that statute. According to the Court,

> [w]e find that the language and form of the statute do not purport to establish civil liability for violations. Although Dorman may benefit from its enforcement, the statutory provision is primarily for protection of the public as an entity, and this Court does not construe it to establish a private right of action. Hence, we reverse the ruling of the Circuit Court as to the cause of action based on § 16-3-730.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that § 16-3-730 provides no private right of action, the Court clearly found § 16-3-730 to be facially valid. In other words, the Court deemed the statute not unconstitutional "in toto" and its application must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. See State v. German, 439 S.C. 449, 466, 887 S.E.2d 912, 920-21 (2024). The Court also suggested that the statute could be applied lawfully in certain circumstances. The Dorman Court, however, did not elaborate upon those instances where the statute could be validly applied, choosing instead to leave the law's constitutionality to a "discrete factual context."

Following Dorman, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided Doe v. Berkeley Publishers, 329 S.E.2d 636 (1998). There, "Respondent's claim [was] based upon the petitioner's [Berkeley Independent] truthful reporting that respondent was the victim of a sexual assault by an inmate... ." The issue in Doe was "whether publishing Doe's name as the victim of sexual assault was a matter of public significance" was an issue for the jury. The Court of Appeals had held that it was a jury question. The Supreme Court reversed. According to our Supreme Court,

> [t]he Court of Appeals erred in separating the plaintiff's identity from the event. Under state law, if a person, whether willingly or not, becomes an actor in an event of public or general interest, "then the publication of his connection with such occurrence is not an invasion of his right to privacy." [citing Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 337, 95 S.E.2d 606, 609 (1956)]. Accordingly, Doe's invasion of privacy claim fails as a matter of law. ...

329 S.C. at 414, 496 S.E.2d at 637. The Court held that "the commission of a violent crime between inmates of a county jail is a matter of public significance as a matter of law" and thus the victim possessed no action for invasion of privacy. Section 16-3-730 was not addressed.

The Fourth Circuit considered § 16-3-730 in Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502 (1963). In that case, Plaintiffs brought an action for invasion of privacy through defendant's televising the fact of plaintiffs' rape. Plaintiffs asserted that both § 16-3-730 and the common law had been violated through such publication. In Nappier, the actual name of neither Plaintiff was published by the television station and that the television report "was a matter of public interest and record... ."

According to the Court, the statute was violated since "the broadcast, as pleaded, sufficiently identified the victims other than by name... ." In the view of the Fourth Circuit,

> [t]he meaning of the term 'name' cannot be given the narrow import ascribed it by [defendant] without impairing the purpose of the statute. Aside from the personal protection of the woman involved, the object of this law, concededly, is to encourage a free report of the crime by the victim. Cf. State v. Evjue, 253 Wis. 146, 33 N.W.2d 305, 13 A.L.R.2d 1201 (1948). Fear of publicity might deter her from notifying the police. Thus, the public interest is advanced by the statute; the crime is investigated promptly and the injured person is shielded.

322 F.2d at 504. The Court went on to say that

> [i]n South Carolina the penal aspect of the statute does not require an interpretation so rigid as to strip its wording of its plain connotation. [citations omitted].... This is certainly sound construction when, as here, the statute is only employed to provide civil redress.

Thus, while the constitutionality of the statute was not challenged, the Fourth Circuit held that "[n]o matter the news value, South Carolina has unequivocally declared the identity of the injured person shall not be made known in press or broadcast." Id. at 505. Based upon Nappier, as well as Dorman, § 16-3-730 remains valid and enforceable.

With respect to your question regarding whether the statute's protection of a victim's identity can be limited to those situations where a criminal sexual conduct is reported to law enforcement, we see no such limitation in the statute's plain language. Instead, the language of § 16-3-730 appears to encompass the name of any victim of criminal sexual conduct. ["any person upon whom the crime of sexual conduct has been committed or alleged to have been committed"]. As our Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized,

> [t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. ... Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute. ... Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory construction are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.... "What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will... ."

Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). Thus, as to us, at least, there appears no room for interpretation of the statute beyond its express language.

However, the primary purpose of the statute is to encourage victims of sexual assault to report these crimes against them to the police. Therefore, while our interpretation is limited to § 16-3-730's plain wording, we do point out that our Supreme Court has, on occasion, held that "... Courts will reject the ordinary meaning of the words used in a statute however plain it may be, when to accept such meaning would defeat the plain legislative intent." Greenville Baseball v. Bearden, 200 S.C. 363, 20 S.E.2d 813, 815 (1942). We are not saying here that a court will depart from the plain wording of § 16-3-730, encompassing all victims of criminal sexual conduct, but only that a court would undoubtedly recognize that the statute's overriding purpose is to encourage victims to come forward and report these heinous crimes against them.

Conclusion

Section 16-3-730 is valid and enforceable. Our Supreme Court in Dorman held that the statute is constitutional on its face and that the constitutional validity of each situation must be determined on its own "discrete" facts.

According to the Fourth Circuit, in Nappier, "[a]side from the personal protection of the woman involved, the object of [§ 16-3-730] ... is to encourage a free report of the crime by the victim. ..." In the words of the Fourth Circuit, "[f]ear of publicity might deter her from notifying the police. Thus, the public interest is advanced by the statute; the crime is investigated promptly and the injured person is shielded."

With respect to your principal question of whether § 16-3-730 may be interpreted to limit the statute's protection to those situations where the criminal sexual conduct is reported to the police, we cannot do so. No such limitation appears in the statute's plain language. On its face, the statute literally applies to "any person" upon whom "the crime of criminal sexual conduct has been committed or alleged to have been committed in this State... ."

We emphasize, however, that if a court determines that this literal language defeats the Legislature's intent, the court is free to interpret the statute consistent with such intent. Greenville Baseball, supra. Thus, while we are not saying that a court will depart from the plain language of § 16-3-730, encompassing all victims of criminal sexual conduct, we stress that the court, in its interpretation, would undoubtedly recognize that the statute's overriding purpose is to encourage victims of criminal sexual conduct to come forward and report these heinous crimes against them.

Robert D. Cook
Solicitor General