In South Carolina, is it a crime to publish the name of an alleged sexual assault victim even if the assault was never reported to police?

Plain-English summary

Sixteenth Circuit Solicitor Kevin Brackett asked the South Carolina Attorney General how broadly to read § 16-3-730, the statute that makes it a misdemeanor to publish the name of any "person upon whom the crime of criminal sexual conduct has been committed or alleged to have been committed." Specifically, he wanted to know whether the protection only kicks in when the alleged assault has been reported to law enforcement or when criminal charges have been filed.

The Attorney General's answer: the statute's plain language sweeps broadly. It applies to "any person" alleged to have been a victim, with no textual requirement that the allegation be a formal complaint to police, that charges be filed, or that an investigation be underway. The AG cites the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Dorman v. Aiken Communications upholding the statute as facially constitutional, and the Fourth Circuit's Nappier decision applying it broadly. The opinion does flag two important limitations: § 16-3-730 has no private cause of action (it is a criminal statute), and its constitutional application has to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. So the statute on its face protects all alleged victims, but a particular prosecution could still founder on First Amendment grounds depending on the facts.

What this means for you

If you are a South Carolina journalist or newspaper editor

Treat § 16-3-730 as a hard-edged rule: do not publish the name of someone who is described as the victim of sexual assault, completed or alleged, regardless of whether police are involved or charges have been filed. The misdemeanor exposure is up to $1,000 and up to three years in prison. Even partial identification, "the broadcast, as pleaded, sufficiently identified the victims other than by name," can violate the statute under the Fourth Circuit's reading in Nappier.

Three practical points:
1. The exception in the statute is for publications made by court order. Court records of an assault that name the victim, where you can confirm the court ordered them unsealed and named, are at lower risk. But "available in a public file" is not the same as "made by order of the court."
2. The Supreme Court's Florida Star and Cox Broadcasting line says the First Amendment may protect publishing truthful information about a matter of public interest that was lawfully obtained from a public record. South Carolina's Supreme Court applied that principle in Doe v. Berkeley Publishers to hold that publishing the name of an inmate raped by another inmate at a county jail was constitutionally protected because the underlying crime was a matter of public significance. Berkeley Publishers was a tort case, not a criminal prosecution, and its First Amendment analysis would still need to be applied to a § 16-3-730 prosecution on the specific facts.
3. The AG's opinion explicitly says the constitutional validity of the statute "must be determined on its own discrete facts." Translation: even if you believe you have a First Amendment defense, you may have to litigate it after you are charged.

If you are a sexual-assault survivor

If a publication identifies you (by name or by enough detail to identify you) as the victim of criminal sexual conduct in South Carolina, § 16-3-730 has been violated regardless of whether you reported the assault to police. The criminal statute does not give you a private lawsuit (per Dorman), but you can:

1. Report the violation to your local law enforcement and the solicitor's office.
2. Consult a tort lawyer about a separate invasion-of-privacy claim, which is independent of § 16-3-730. Doe v. Berkeley Publishers shows those tort claims can be hard to win when the underlying event is a "matter of public significance," but they remain available.
3. Ask the publication to retract and remove the identifying detail. Most outlets will, especially once they understand the criminal exposure.

If you are a prosecutor in South Carolina

The AG's reading gives you a textual hook to charge under § 16-3-730 without needing to prove that the assault was previously reported to police. Build your case on the publication's identification of the alleged victim and the underlying allegation, then expect a First Amendment defense at the constitutional-as-applied level. Florida Star, Cox Broadcasting, Berkeley Publishers, and State v. German's as-applied analysis all guide that defense; have your response ready.

If you are a defense attorney representing a publisher

Your strongest arguments are case-by-case First Amendment ones, not facial. Dorman forecloses facial unconstitutionality. Your moves are: (1) lawfully obtained from a public record, (2) matter of public significance, (3) victim identity already in the public domain. Each is a Florida Star hook. You can also press State v. German's "discrete factual context" framework: courts must evaluate the specific facts before sustaining a § 16-3-730 conviction.

Common questions

Q: Does § 16-3-730 violate the First Amendment?
A: Not on its face, according to the South Carolina Supreme Court in Dorman v. Aiken Communications. Whether it violates the First Amendment as applied to a particular publication is a separate question that turns on the specific facts. The U.S. Supreme Court in Florida Star v. B.J.F. and Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn declined to invalidate similar statutes facially but recognized constitutional limits on their application.

Q: Is there a private right to sue under § 16-3-730?
A: No. The South Carolina Supreme Court in Dorman held the statute "is primarily for protection of the public as an entity, and this Court does not construe it to establish a private right of action." Victims have to rely on prosecutorial enforcement plus separate tort claims (defamation, invasion of privacy).

Q: What if the victim's name is already in a public arrest report?
A: Risky. Florida Star protected publishing a name lawfully obtained from a public police report under specific facts. But South Carolina's Doe v. Berkeley Publishers found a public-significance protection only because of the inmate-on-inmate assault context. The text of § 16-3-730 has only one exception: "publications made by order of the court." Anything else is a constitutional argument you would have to win on the specific facts.

Q: Does the statute apply to social media posts?
A: The statute's language ("newspaper, magazine or other publication") is broad. The Fourth Circuit in Nappier read "publication" expansively and the AG opinion endorses that reading. A South Carolina court applying § 16-3-730 today would likely treat a public social media post or a podcast as "other publication." A private message would be a closer question.

Q: Does the statute apply if the victim has spoken publicly about being assaulted?
A: The statute does not contain a waiver or consent exception. A First Amendment defense based on the victim's own public disclosure would have to be made on the specific facts. As a practical matter, prosecutors are unlikely to charge a publication that simply repeats the victim's own self-identification, but the textual statute does not automatically excuse it.

Q: What about identifying a victim without using their name (for example, by calling them "the daughter of [named person]")?
A: Likely covered. The Fourth Circuit in Nappier held that "[t]he meaning of the term 'name' cannot be given the narrow import" because doing so would "[impair] the purpose of the statute." A broadcast that "sufficiently identified the victims other than by name" violated the statute as pleaded. The AG opinion approves this reading.

Background and statutory framework

Section 16-3-730 has been on the books for decades. The legislature's purpose was twofold: protect the personal privacy of sexual-assault victims, and encourage reporting by removing the threat of public identification. Both purposes are recognized in Dorman v. Aiken Communications and the Fourth Circuit's Nappier decision. The statute reads:

Whoever publishes or causes to be published the name of any person upon whom the crime of criminal sexual conduct has been committed or alleged to have been committed in this State in any newspaper, magazine or other publication shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or imprisonment of not more than three years. The provisions of this section shall not apply to publications made by order of the court.

The statutory construction question Solicitor Brackett raised, whether the protection is limited to police-reported allegations, is answered by the standard rule from Hodges v. Rainey: where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the court does not impose another meaning. The AG opinion applies that rule to § 16-3-730: nothing in the words "any person" or "alleged to have been committed" requires a police report or charging document, so neither does the statute.

The opinion's caveat, citing Greenville Baseball v. Bearden, is that courts can occasionally depart from the ordinary meaning to preserve clear legislative intent. But the legislative intent here points the same way as the text: protect alleged victims regardless of whether they reported. So the AG's reading and the underlying purpose of the statute reinforce each other.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-730 (publication of name of victim of criminal sexual conduct)

South Carolina cases:
- Dorman v. Aiken Communications, Inc., 303 S.C. 63, 398 S.E.2d 687 (1990) (statute facially constitutional; no private right of action)
- Doe v. Berkeley Publishers, 329 S.E.2d 636 (1998) (publishing name of inmate sexual-assault victim a matter of public significance, no invasion-of-privacy tort claim)
- Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956) (involvement in event of public interest waives privacy claim)
- State v. German, 439 S.C. 449, 887 S.E.2d 912 (2024) (constitutional validity in "discrete factual context")
- Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 533 S.E.2d 578 (2000) (plain meaning rule)
- Greenville Baseball v. Bearden, 200 S.C. 363, 20 S.E.2d 813 (1942) (courts may depart from plain meaning to honor legislative intent)

Federal cases:
- The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (truthful publication of lawfully obtained information about matter of public significance)
- Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (publication of victim's name from public records)
- Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1963) (reading "name" broadly to cover identifying details)

Out-of-state authority cited:
- Doe v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Georgia, 452 S.E.2d 776 (Ga. 1994) (state interest in protecting privacy of sexual-assault victims)
- State v. Evjue, 253 Wis. 146, 33 N.W.2d 305 (1948) (purpose of victim-name statutes)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/opinion-on-s-c-code-section-16-3-730/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/media/cacaahie/brackettk-os-11044-final-opinion-8-12-2025.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

ALAN WILSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

August 12, 2025

The Honorable Kevin Brackett, Solicitor
16th Circuit
Moss Justice Center
1675-1A York Highway
York, SC 29745-7422

Dear Solicitor Brackett:

You seek our opinion regarding S.C. Code Section 16-3-730. Your letter states the following:

[t]his section criminalizes the publishing of a person's name who is an alleged victim of criminal sexual conduct. The statute does not outline where the allegation must have been made or who must have made the allegation. Furthermore, the statute does not delineate whether the alleged criminal sexual conduct must be the subject of a criminal investigation or criminal charges. Section 16-3-730 reads:

Whoever publishes or causes to be published the name of any person upon whom the crime of criminal sexual conduct has been committed or alleged to have been committed in this State in any newspaper, magazine or other publication shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or imprisonment of not more than three years. The provisions of this section shall not apply to publications made by order of the court.

I am concerned that the statute may be overbroad because the context of the allegation is not defined. I am requesting your opinion as to how or where allegations must have been made, to wit, whether the allegations must be formal complaints to law enforcement and whether criminal charges against a perpetrator must have been filed for an alleged victim to be afforded the protection under this statute. I understand the purpose of the statute is to encourage victims to report crimes without fear of the embarrassment that attends such a crime and to protect them from potential smear campaigns.

Law/Analysis

Section 16-3-730 has been on the books for decades. Statutes, such as this, which protect the identity of victims of sexual assault, are designed to "encourage[ ] reporting of rape and other sexual assaults, so that they may be investigated and the perpetrators prosecuted." Certainly, the State "has a legitimate interest 'in protecting the privacy of a sexual assault victim.'" Doe v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Georgia, 452 S.E.2d 776, 780 (Ga. 1994).

The South Carolina decision upholding the statute is Dorman v. Aiken Communications, Inc., 303 S.C. 63, 398 S.E.2d 687 (1990). In Dorman, the Court found § 16-3-730 to be facially constitutional. There, the victim was sexually assaulted at gunpoint. The Aiken Standard obtained a statement given to the police. However, the victim's identity was not contained in that statement. The newspaper learned the identity of the victim "through various private sources." 303 S.C. at 65. Following publication, the victim sued the newspaper, alleging various causes of action, including a claim pursuant to § 16-3-730. The Aiken Standard argued that the statute violated the First Amendment.

However, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the First Amendment claim, stating as follows:

... the United States Supreme Court has declined to rule similar statutes unconstitutional on their face. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 109 S.Ct. 2603, 105 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975). Instead, it has addressed the First Amendment issue "only as it arose in a discrete factual context." Florida Star, supra at ___, 109 S.Ct. 2607, 105 L.Ed.2d at 453 (footnote omitted)... Accordingly, we too decline to hold the statute unconstitutional on its face... .

303 S.C. at 66, 398 S.E.2d at 688-89.

The Dorman Court went on to conclude that § 16-3-730 is a criminal statute and thus provides no private cause of action under that statute. According to the Court,

[w]e find that the language and form of the statute do not purport to establish civil liability for violations. Although Dorman may benefit from its enforcement, the statutory provision is primarily for protection of the public as an entity, and this Court does not construe it to establish a private right of action. Hence, we reverse the ruling of the Circuit Court as to the cause of action based on § 16-3-730.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that § 16-3-730 provides no private right of action, the Court clearly found § 16-3-730 to be facially valid. In other words, the Court deemed the statute not unconstitutional "in toto" and its application must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. See State v. German, 439 S.C. 449, 466, 887 S.E.2d 912, 920-21 (2024). The Court also suggested that the statute could be applied lawfully in certain circumstances. The Dorman Court, however, did not elaborate upon those instances where the statute could be validly applied, choosing instead to leave the law's constitutionality to a "discrete factual context."

Following Dorman, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided Doe v. Berkeley Publishers, 329 S.E.2d 636 (1998). There, "Respondent's claim [was] based upon the petitioner's [Berkeley Independent] truthful reporting that respondent was the victim of a sexual assault by an inmate... ." The issue in Doe was "whether publishing Doe's name as the victim of sexual assault was a matter of public significance" was an issue for the jury. The Court of Appeals had held that it was a jury question. The Supreme Court reversed. According to our Supreme Court,

[t]he Court of Appeals erred in separating the plaintiff's identity from the event. Under state law, if a person, whether willingly or not, becomes an actor in an event of public or general interest, "then the publication of his connection with such occurrence is not an invasion of his right to privacy." [citing Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 337, 95 S.E.2d 606, 609 (1956)]. Accordingly, Doe's invasion of privacy claim fails as a matter of law. ...

329 S.C. at 414, 496 S.E.2d at 637. The Court held that "the commission of a violent crime between inmates of a county jail is a matter of public significance as a matter of law" and thus the victim possessed no action for invasion of privacy. Section 16-3-730 was not addressed.

The Fourth Circuit considered § 16-3-730 in Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502 (1963). In that case, Plaintiffs brought an action for invasion of privacy through defendant's televising the fact of plaintiffs' rape. Plaintiffs asserted that both § 16-3-730 and the common law had been violated through such publication. In Nappier, the actual name of neither Plaintiff was published by the television station and that the television report "was a matter of public interest and record... ."

According to the Court, the statute was violated since "the broadcast, as pleaded, sufficiently identified the victims other than by name... ." In the view of the Fourth Circuit,

[t]he meaning of the term 'name' cannot be given the narrow import ascribed it by [defendant] without impairing the purpose of the statute. Aside from the personal protection of the woman involved, the object of this law, concededly, is to encourage a free report of the crime by the victim. Cf. State v. Evjue, 253 Wis. 146, 33 N.W.2d 305, 13 A.L.R.2d 1201 (1948). Fear of publicity might deter her from notifying the police. Thus, the public interest is advanced by the statute; the crime is investigated promptly and the injured person is shielded.

322 F.2d at 504. The Court went on to say that

[i]n South Carolina the penal aspect of the statute does not require an interpretation so rigid as to strip its wording of its plain connotation. [citations omitted].... This is certainly sound construction when, as here, the statute is only employed to provide civil redress.

Thus, while the constitutionality of the statute was not challenged, the Fourth Circuit held that "[n]o matter the news value, South Carolina has unequivocally declared the identity of the injured person shall not be made known in press or broadcast." Id. at 505. Based upon Nappier, as well as Dorman, § 16-3-730 remains valid and enforceable.

With respect to your question regarding whether the statute's protection of a victim's identity can be limited to those situations where a criminal sexual conduct is reported to law enforcement, we see no such limitation in the statute's plain language. Instead, the language of § 16-3-730 appears to encompass the name of any victim of criminal sexual conduct. ["any person upon whom the crime of sexual conduct has been committed or alleged to have been committed"]. As our Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized,

[t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. ... Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute. ... Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory construction are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.... "What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will... ."

Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). Thus, as to us, at least, there appears no room for interpretation of the statute beyond its express language.

However, the primary purpose of the statute is to encourage victims of sexual assault to report these crimes against them to the police. Therefore, while our interpretation is limited to § 16-3-730's plain wording, we do point out that our Supreme Court has, on occasion, held that "... Courts will reject the ordinary meaning of the words used in a statute however plain it may be, when to accept such meaning would defeat the plain legislative intent." Greenville Baseball v. Bearden, 200 S.C. 363, 20 S.E.2d 813, 815 (1942). We are not saying here that a court will depart from the plain wording of § 16-3-730, encompassing all victims of criminal sexual conduct, but only that a court would undoubtedly recognize that the statute's overriding purpose is to encourage victims to come forward and report these heinous crimes against them.

Conclusion

Section 16-3-730 is valid and enforceable. Our Supreme Court in Dorman held that the statute is constitutional on its face and that the constitutional validity of each situation must be determined on its own "discrete" facts.

According to the Fourth Circuit, in Nappier, "[a]side from the personal protection of the woman involved, the object of [§ 16-3-730] ... is to encourage a free report of the crime by the victim. ..." In the words of the Fourth Circuit, "[f]ear of publicity might deter her from notifying the police. Thus, the public interest is advanced by the statute; the crime is investigated promptly and the injured person is shielded."

With respect to your principal question of whether § 16-3-730 may be interpreted to limit the statute's protection to those situations where the criminal sexual conduct is reported to the police, we cannot do so. No such limitation appears in the statute's plain language. On its face, the statute literally applies to "any person" upon whom "the crime of criminal sexual conduct has been committed or alleged to have been committed in this State... ."

We emphasize, however, that if a court determines that this literal language defeats the Legislature's intent, the court is free to interpret the statute consistent with such intent. Greenville Baseball, supra. Thus, while we are not saying that a court will depart from the plain language of § 16-3-730, encompassing all victims of criminal sexual conduct, we stress that the court, in its interpretation, would undoubtedly recognize that the statute's overriding purpose is to encourage victims of criminal sexual conduct to come forward and report these heinous crimes against them.

Robert D. Cook
Solicitor General