If a hunter sends a deer dog onto private land where the hunter has no permission to hunt, can the hunter be charged with criminal trespass under South Carolina Code Section 50-1-90?

Plain-English summary

DNR Director Tom Mullikin laid out a recurring problem for South Carolina law enforcement: hunters (especially deer-dog hunters) release their dogs from a road, right-of-way, or adjacent property, and the dogs run onto private land where the hunter has no hunting rights. The 2010 Renegade Hunter Act (Section 50-11-770) covers some of this conduct but not the specific scenario where the hunter never personally enters the private land but uses the dog as the encroaching agent. DNR asked the AG to read Section 50-1-90 (the older general anti-trespass-for-hunting statute) as treating the dog as an extension or agent of the hunter, so the hunter could be charged with criminal trespass.

The AG sympathized with DNR's position but did not give them what they asked for. Three AG opinions from the 1960s had concluded that releasing a dog onto another person's land in pursuit of game does NOT make the hunter criminally guilty of trespass under Section 50-1-90 (then codified as Section 28-8). Those opinions said it is a civil trespass at most. The 2026 AG acknowledged those opinions are likely outdated, especially given modern dog-tracking technology, but declined to read Section 50-1-90 as treating the dog as an extension of the hunter. The AG's reason: doing so requires reading words into the statute that aren't there, and the General Assembly has had multiple opportunities to amend Section 50-1-90 to address this exact problem and has not done so.

The AG's practical advice: DNR can prosecute a test case under Section 50-1-90 if it disagrees with the AG's reading. Courts can decide. The AG also pointed to Arkansas's 2002 AG opinion (2002 WL 2005935) reaching the opposite conclusion to show this is a question on which states differ.

What this means for you

If you are a DNR officer or wildlife enforcement officer

When you encounter the fact pattern (hunter releases dog from road or boundary, dog crosses onto land where hunter has no rights), the AG opinion confirms that current law is unsettled. You can:

1. Use Section 50-11-770 where it applies. If the hunter is "hunting from any road, right of way, property line, boundary, or property upon which he does not have hunting rights with the aid or use of a dog when the dog has entered upon the land of another," and the hunter does not stop the hunt once the dog crosses, you have a clear violation. That covers a lot of dog-deer hunting scenarios.

2. Consider a test prosecution under Section 50-1-90 for the harder fact pattern where the hunter never personally enters the private land but the dog does. The AG explicitly invited this approach. DNR should coordinate with a willing solicitor and pick a clean fact pattern.

3. Use Section 50-11-770(D) defensively for landowners. That subsection makes it illegal for a landowner to kill, maim, or otherwise harm a hunting dog simply because the dog has entered the property. Landowners cannot self-help with violence.

If you are a deer-dog hunter

The legal landscape is unsettled but moving toward broader liability for what your dogs do.

• Section 50-11-770(B) requires you to stop hunting as soon as a dog enters land where you don't have hunting rights, when you are hunting from a road, right-of-way, property line, boundary, or land where you have no hunting rights. Continuing the hunt after the dog crosses is illegal. Penalty exposure under that statute.
• Even if Section 50-11-770 does not technically reach your scenario, DNR may pursue a test case under Section 50-1-90 treating your dog as your agent. The AG's opinion does not block that. A court could side with DNR.
• Practical takeaways: use GPS tracking and recall on your dogs, stick to land where you have hunting rights or written permission, and stop the hunt immediately if a dog crosses.

If you are a private landowner adjacent to hunting land

You cannot legally harm hunting dogs that come onto your property (Section 50-11-770(D)). What you can do:

• Document carefully (photos, video, dates, times, dog descriptions or collar tags).
• Report incidents to DNR for enforcement under Section 50-11-770 where applicable.
• Pursue a civil trespass action against the hunter who released the dog. The AG repeatedly noted that civil trespass remedies are available even where criminal trespass is uncertain.
• If you suffer property damage, the dog owner may have civil liability for that as well.

If you are a hunting club operator

Brief your members on Section 50-11-770(B). The "stop the hunt" rule is unforgiving. If your club operates near unhunted private land, train members to recall dogs immediately when they cross. Document training. The AG's signal that DNR may pursue test prosecutions under Section 50-1-90 is a warning to clubs whose practices haven't kept pace with the 2010 Act.

If you are a state legislator

The AG's opinion is a near-explicit invitation to amend Section 50-1-90 (or pass a follow-on to the Renegade Hunter Act) to define when a dog's encroachment becomes the hunter's trespass. The AG noted: "The General Assembly could have done so any number of ways and may well choose to do so in the future." Suggested amendments would clarify whether the existing statute already reaches this conduct or whether new language is required.

Common questions

Has anyone ever been convicted of criminal trespass for sending a hunting dog onto another's land?

The AG's opinion does not cite such a case. Three AG opinions from 1962, 1964, and 1968 all said the hunter could not be criminally convicted under what is now Section 50-1-90 just for sending a dog. The 1960s opinions allowed only civil trespass and (in the 1962 opinion) suggested an injunction or arrest of the person who actually released the dog onto the land. The AG noted in 2025 that no court has subsequently ruled on this exact theory in South Carolina.

Has the Renegade Hunter Act helped?

Partly. Section 50-11-770(B) prohibits hunting "from any road, right of way, property line, boundary, or property upon which [the hunter] does not have hunting rights with the aid or use of a dog when the dog has entered upon the land of another without written permission." The 2014 AG opinion (2014 WL 1398595) confirmed DNR's interpretation: when a deer-dog hunter is hunting from one of those locations and a dog crosses onto land where the hunter has no rights, the hunter must stop hunting. Continuing is the violation. But the statute does not reach situations where the hunter is on land they have rights to and a dog crosses onto adjacent land where the hunter has no rights, or where the hunter never personally enters any property and uses the dog purely as agent.

Why didn't the AG just agree with DNR?

Three reasons. First, the words are not there in Section 50-1-90. The statute speaks of a "person" hunting on the lands of another, and dogs have been treated as personal property in South Carolina since State v. Langford (1899). Second, the General Assembly has explicitly addressed dog-related trespass in Section 50-11-770 but did not extend Section 50-1-90 to cover the fact pattern DNR is concerned with. The legislature's targeted action implies it knew it could have gone further and chose not to. Third, AG opinions are advisory, and reading new conduct into a criminal statute is the kind of expansion best left to either the legislature or a court considering an actual prosecution.

What's the Arkansas opinion the AG mentioned?

Op. AR Att'y Gen., 2002 WL 2005935 (Aug. 2, 2002). The Arkansas AG concluded a court would likely find that a person who intentionally releases a dog to hunt is "deemed hunting" on any private property the dog enters. The South Carolina AG cited it as persuasive but ultimately did not adopt that reading.

What is Section 50-1-20 and why does it matter?

Section 50-1-20 defines "hunters" and "hunting" for the state's game laws. The definition excludes persons "without guns, [who] assist others with dogs." The AG flagged this as a wrinkle to think about when DNR picks a test case: someone purely handling dogs without a gun may not even be a "hunter" under this exemption.

Can a landowner kill a hunting dog that comes onto their property?

No. Section 50-11-770(D) makes it illegal to kill, maim, or otherwise harm a dog simply because it has entered the property. Landowners must call DNR or pursue civil remedies.

Background and statutory framework

Section 50-1-90 (general anti-hunting-trespass). The statute provides:

If any person, at any time whatsoever, shall hunt or range on any lands or shall enter thereon, for the purpose of hunting, fishing, or trapping, without the consent of the owner or manager thereof, such person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . .

The statute says "person" and references no dogs. It was previously codified as Section 28-8 of the 1962 and 1952 Codes. The operative "person" language has not changed.

The 1960s AG opinions. All three (1962 WL 9035, 1964 WL 8259, 1968 WL 8954) concluded that releasing a dog to enter another's land in pursuit of game does not constitute criminal trespass by the hunter under Section 50-1-90 (or the parallel Section 16-11-610). The opinions allowed civil trespass.

The 1962 opinion is somewhat different. It addressed an Orangeburg game-warden's complaint that a hunting club was releasing dogs to chase deer through a state game sanctuary into a hunter line on the other side. The AG suggested the sanctuary owner pursue an injunction, or alternatively that the warden charge the dog-releaser with common-law trespass. That opinion did not, however, treat the dog as an agent of any hunter for purposes of Section 50-1-90.

Section 50-11-770 (Renegade Hunter Act, 2010). The 2010 General Assembly addressed part of this problem with Section 50-11-770. Subsection (B):

[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to hunt from any road, right of way, property line, boundary, or property upon which he does not have hunting rights with the aid or use of a dog when the dog has entered upon the land of another without written permission or over which the person does not have hunting rights. The provisions of this section apply whether the person in control of the dog intentionally or unintentionally releases, allows, or otherwise causes the dog to enter upon the land of another without permission of the landowner.

Subsection (D) protects the dogs:

[I]t shall be unlawful for someone to kill, maim or otherwise harm a dog simply because it has entered the property.

Subsections (B) and (D) reflect the legislature's attempt to balance hunter and landowner interests. The 2014 AG opinion (2014 WL 1398595) confirmed DNR's interpretation that the rule applies when a hunter is hunting from one of the listed locations and a dog crosses; the hunter must stop hunting when the dog crosses. The 2014 AG noted: "[t]he dog going on lands where permission is not obtained does not constitute a violation, but the law would be violated where a hunting dog ventures onto another's land where the hunter has no hunting rights and rather than stopping the hunt, he continues to hunt."

Section 50-1-20 (definition exemption). Defines "hunting" for purposes of state game laws to exclude persons "without guns, [who] assist others with dogs." This carve-out matters for any test case: a defendant who handles dogs without a gun may argue they are not a "hunter" subject to Section 50-1-90.

Section 50-11-780 (leash law exemption). State leash laws do not apply to a dog while the dog is both actively hunting game and under supervision. The AG flagged this as evidence the General Assembly recognizes hunter responsibility for hunting dogs.

The 2008 working group. A South Carolina DNR Dog Deer Hunting Stakeholders Working Group reported in November 2008 that the issue is genuinely contentious and that the working group could not reach consensus. The legislative response in 2010 (Section 50-11-770) addressed part but not all of the working group's concerns.

Background dog-as-property rule. State v. Langford (1899) treated dogs as personal property. South Carolina has not adopted any general statute treating a dog as an agent or extension of its owner for tort or criminal liability purposes.

Citations

Cases:

• State v. Langford, 55 S.C. 322, 33 S.E. 370 (1899), dog historically classified as personal property

Statutes:

• S.C. Code Ann. § 50-1-20, definition of hunters and hunting
• S.C. Code Ann. § 50-1-90, general anti-hunting-trespass statute
• S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-610, parallel anti-hunting-trespass statute (general criminal code)
• S.C. Code Ann. § 50-11-770, Renegade Hunter Act
• S.C. Code Ann. § 50-11-780, leash law exemption for actively hunting dogs

Prior AG opinions:

• Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 1962 WL 9035 (Nov. 13, 1962), Orangeburg game warden inquiry
• Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 1964 WL 8259 (Feb. 20, 1964), civil but not criminal trespass for dog
• Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 1968 WL 8954 (Jan. 9, 1968), civil but not criminal trespass for dog
• Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 2014 WL 1398595 (Jan. 2, 2014), DNR's interpretation of Section 50-11-770(B) confirmed
• Op. AR Att'y Gen., 2002 WL 2005935 (Aug. 2, 2002), Arkansas approach treating intentional dog release as hunting on the encroached property

Secondary:

• 35A Am. Jur. 2d Fish, Game, & Wildlife Conservation § 20
• 24 American Jurisprudence, Game & Game Laws, Section 5 (older edition cited in the 1960s opinions)
• South Carolina DNR Dog Deer Hunting Stakeholders Working Group, Final Program Report (November 2008)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/opinion-addressing-whether-a-dog-may-be-viewed-as-an-extension-or-agent-of-a-hunter-when-determining-whether-the-hunter-has-violated-south-carolina-code-section-50-1-90/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/media/b4gb4lvd/t-mullikin-final.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

ALAN WILSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

December 30, 2025

Thomas S. Mullikin, PhD, JD, Director
South Carolina Department of Natural Resources
PO Box 167
Columbia, SC 29202

Dear Director Mullikin:

You have requested an opinion from this office on whether a dog may be considered an extension or agent of a hunter such that the dog's unauthorized entry onto private lands constitutes a violation of South Carolina Code Section 50-1-90 by the hunter. You state the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) "regularly encounters situations in which hunting dogs, particularly deer dogs — are released on adjacent lands or public rights-of-way and subsequently enter private property without permission." Section 50-1-90 makes it unlawful for a person to hunt, fish, or trap on the lands of another without consent. You acknowledge the statute speaks in terms of what a person may not do and "does not explicitly address whether this prohibition extends to dogs used in hunting." However, you contend that a hunting dog serves as an extension or agent of the hunter from both a practical and legal perspective and maintain that treating the dog as such "is both reasonable and consistent with the current statutory framework and modern principles of liability." You have identified three opinions issued by this office in the 1960s that you believe hold a contrary view and thus serve as an obstacle to the interpretation you seek to enforce. You contend that while those opinions may well have fit their time, they "no longer reflect the current state of South Carolina Law." Therefore, you ask that we revisit those opinions and agree with your interpretation.

Although your request is not limited to the topic of deer hunting, our communications with DNR's General Counsel reveal your question is prompted by the challenges DNR faces when dogs are used to drive deer to awaiting hunters and, in the process, the dogs enter property on which the hunters have no right to hunt.

The use of dogs in deer hunting is rooted in tradition, but is not without controversy. A 2008 report from a working group on the topic of dog deer hunting explained:

Opinions vary regarding the extent to which this type of hunting should be regulated, if at all. Increasingly, still hunters and landowners have complained about hunting dogs crossing into private property which can be a significant nuisance even if there is no property damage caused. Aggrieved property owners point to their right to enjoy private property without outside interference. At present, the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources (DNR) does not have regulatory authority to act on these complaints and concerns. If concerns continue to arise, and are not adequately addressed, there will likely be increasing pressure to restrict the tradition of hunting deer with dogs.

South Carolina Department of Natural Resources Dog Deer Hunting Stakeholders Working Group, FINAL PROGRAM REPORT (November 2008), p. 1, located at https://www.dnr.sc.gov/wildlife/deer/pdf/dogreport12122008.pdf (last visited 12/22/2025). Unfortunately, the working group failed to reach a consensus. Id. Despite the efforts of the working group and several subsequent attempts at a legislative solution, DNR's General Counsel reports this is an ongoing issue in need of a solution.

Law/Analysis

Section 50-1-90 of the South Carolina Code provides in relevant part:

If any person, at any time whatsoever, shall hunt or range on any lands or shall enter thereon, for the purpose of hunting, fishing, or trapping, without the consent of the owner or manager thereof, such person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . .

S.C. Code Ann. § 50-1-90 (Supp. 2025). No portion of the statute references dogs. In two of the opinions you ask us to revisit, this office concluded a hunter could not be criminally charged with trespass under previously codified versions of Sections 50-1-90 or 16-11-610 for sending a dog onto the premises of another without permission and in pursuit of game. Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 1964 WL 8259 (February 20, 1964); Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 1968 WL 8954 (January 9, 1968). Both opinions concluded such conduct would, however, constitute a civil trespass. Both opinions relied on the following quote from 24 American Jurisprudence, Game & Game Laws, Section 5:

Trespass of a hunter in pursuit of game on another's premises may be made a crime, but it has been held that such offense is not committed by the sending of a dog on the premises in search or pursuit of game.

Although the first clause of the quoted language appears in the current edition of American Jurisprudence, we have not been able to locate any passage containing the second clause or its equivalent.

In the third opinion you reference, this office was responding to an Orangeburg game warden, who reported that a hunting club was releasing dogs on the edge of a game sanctuary for the purpose of having the dogs run through the sanctuary and chase deer into range of a line of hunters waiting on club property on the other side of the sanctuary. Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 1962 WL 9035 (November 13, 1962). The owner of the sanctuary entrusted the Game Department with control of the sanctuary and wanted the practice to stop. Although the statutes cited in the opinions referenced above were in existence, the 1962 opinion reported no statutes covered the scenario the game warden described. Instead, the opinion suggested having the owner apply for an injunction against the club owners as the best and safest manner of addressing the problem. Alternatively, the opinion suggested an arrest warrant against the person who "turned the dogs loose on the sanctuary" for trespassing, reasoning that "a person trespasses on another's property if he shoots into it, throws things into it, or, as here, deliberately sends dogs into the property." Id. The only citation of authority in this opinion concerns a dog owner's civil liability for intentionally sending a dog onto another's property in pursuit of game. Therefore, we presume the arrest warrant suggestion proposed a prosecution for common law trespass. The opinion did not suggest a dog can be treated as an extension of a hunter.

In 2010, long after our opinions on this topic, the General Assembly passed the Renegade Hunter Act, which added Section 50-11-770 to the South Carolina Code. That statute provides in relevant part:

[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to hunt from any road, right of way, property line, boundary, or property upon which he does not have hunting rights with the aid or use of a dog when the dog has entered upon the land of another without written permission or over which the person does not have hunting rights. The provisions of this section apply whether the person in control of the dog intentionally or unintentionally releases, allows, or otherwise causes the dog to enter upon the land of another without permission of the landowner.

S.C. Code Ann. § 50-11-770(B) (Supp. 2025). In a 2014 opinion addressing whether DNR was correctly interpreting this portion of the statute, we stated:

It is our understanding that DNR has interpreted this statute to mean that when a dog deer hunter is hunting from any road, right of way, property line, boundary, or other property where he does not have hunting rights, the hunter must stop his hunt once a hunting dog gets on property that the hunter does not have rights to hunt. In other words, '[t]he dog going on lands where permission is not obtained does not constitute a violation,' but the law would be violated where a hunting dog ventures onto another's land where the hunter has no hunting rights and rather than stopping the hunt, he continues to hunt.

Op. S.C. Att'y Gen., 2014 WL 1398595 *4 (January 2, 2014). We concluded DNR's interpretation was consistent with the plain meaning of the statute. Id.

In addition to establishing the circumstances when a hunter is required to stop a hunt, Section 50-11-770 also makes it illegal for someone to kill, maim or otherwise harm a dog simply because it has entered the property. § 50-11-770(D).

Together, Subsections (B) and (D) of Section 50-11-770 reflect an effort by our General Assembly to balance the rights and interests of both hunters and adjoining landowners. However, while the protection for hunting dogs appears to apply any time a dog impermissibly enters the land of another, the situations where a hunter is required to stop a hunt because a hunting dog has crossed onto property are more narrowly tailored. Your General Counsel reports that Section 50-11-770 does not apply to the exact factual scenarios DNR is being asked to address and that hunters are essentially attempting to hunt where they are not permitted to do so by sending dogs where the hunters are not allowed to go.

This brings us back to Section 50-1-90, which prohibits a person from hunting on the lands of another without permission. You maintain it is appropriate to treat a dog as an extension or agent of a hunter for the purpose of determining whether the hunter has violated Section 50-1-90. Historically, dogs have been viewed as personal property. State v. Langford, 55 S.C. 322, 33 S.E. 370 (1899). Although many jurisdictions have enacted laws that hold a dog owner liable for a dog's conduct, we have been unable to locate any statute that treats a dog as an extension or agent of its owner, with respect to hunting or any other activity. Our 1960s opinions on this topic may well be outdated, particularly when you consider the level of tracking and control today's hunter can exercise over a hunting dog. In fact, the General Assembly has provided that leash laws do not apply to any dog while it is both actively hunting game and under supervision. See S.C. Code Ann. § 50-11-780 (Rev. 2008). Because the exemption only applies when the dog is actively hunting and supervised, the argument that a hunter should not be able to escape prosecution under Section 50-1-90 by sending the dog where the hunter is not allowed to go is compelling. In a 2002 opinion interpreting a regulation similar to Section 50-1-90, the Arkansas Attorney General determined a court would likely conclude a person who intentionally releases a dog to hunt would be deemed hunting on any private property on which the dog encroached. Op. AR Att'y Gen., 2002 WL 2005935 (August 2, 2002). As the entity charged with enforcing hunting laws in South Carolina, we remind you that our opinions are simply advisory and you should not feel compelled to follow them, especially when they are outdated. Because Section 50-1-90 does not mention the use of dogs at all, we will not go so far as to say a dog is an extension or agent of a hunter for criminal liability under the statute. Our decision is partly driven by the fact that the General Assembly has restricted hunting with dogs in Section 50-11-770 but has not addressed the longstanding issue you are facing. The General Assembly could have done so any number of ways and may well choose to do so in the future. At present, however, if your agency wishes to apply Section 50-1-90 to the conduct you have described, we suggest that you charge and prosecute a test case under the statute. In selecting a case for prosecution, you may wish to keep in mind that Section 50-1-20 defines hunters and hunting for the purposes of all state game laws that provide punishment to exclude persons who "without guns, assist others with dogs." S.C. Code Ann. § 50-1-20 (Rev. 2008).

Conclusion

You seek an opinion that a dog may serve as an extension or agent of a hunter for purposes of charging individuals with violating Section 50-1-90. We agree with you that our opinions from the 1960s that reach a contrary conclusion are likely dated. However, rather than agree with your specific interpretation, which would require we read language into the statute, we suggest you charge and prosecute a test case.

Sincerely,

Sabrina C. Todd
Assistant Attorney General

REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

Robert D. Cook
Solicitor General Emeritus

Footnote: Section 16-11-610 (Rev. 2015). Section 16-11-610 provides it is a misdemeanor for a person to enter the lands of another without consent to hunt, fish, or trap, among other things. It was previously codified as Section 16-387 of the 1962 Code of Laws and Section 16-387 of the 1952 Code of Laws. Section 50-1-90 was previously codified as Section 28-8 of the 1962 Code of Laws as well as Section 28-8 of the 1952 Code of Laws. Although both code sections have been amended over time, the language of what constitutes a violation has remained the same.