Can South Carolina's Hartsville Community Center Building Commission issue general obligation bonds, and what does the constitutional ban on taxation without representation mean for appointed special purpose districts?

Plain-English summary

Representative Cody Mitchell asked whether the Hartsville Community Center Building Commission, a five-member appointed body governing a special purpose district in Darlington County, can issue general obligation bonds to fund building improvements. The Commission was created in 1934, reconstituted in 1961, and most recently restructured in 2024 to expand from three members to five.

The Attorney General concluded the Commission cannot issue GO bonds on its own. The reason: a general obligation bond is secured by the issuer's "full faith, credit and taxing power." South Carolina Constitution art. X, § 5 forbids the General Assembly from "delegating the unrestricted power of taxation to an appointive body" (Crow v. McAlpine, 1981). Because the Commission is appointed, not elected, it cannot exercise the taxing power directly, and therefore cannot pledge that taxing power through GO bonds.

But the AG flagged the work-around the legislature already built. Under § 6-11-490, the elected Darlington County Council can authorize the Commission to issue GO bonds. That keeps an elected body in the chain of approval, which satisfies Weaver v. Recreation District (2020) and the constitutional rule. The Commission's path forward: get county council's authorization, then issue.

What this means for you

If you are a member of the Hartsville Commission (or any similarly appointed SC special purpose district)

Two practical tracks:

1. Don't bond on your own. Skipping county council approval and trying to issue GO bonds will draw a constitutional challenge. Crow v. McAlpine and the Weaver line dispose of the question. The bond market will also flag this, and your bond counsel will refuse to opine.
2. Engage county council early. The § 6-11-490 process requires the county board to authorize the bond issuance and may, at the council's election, condition the authorization on a special election in the district. Build a clean financial case (cost of improvements, revenue projections, millage impact) and present it to council. Time the request for a council session with enough lead time for council to deliberate, vote, and (if it chooses) call a referendum.

If you sit on a county council and a special purpose district asks you to authorize GO bonds

Section 6-11-490 puts the decision squarely on you. You are the elected body whose vote satisfies the constitutional rule. Practically:

1. Treat it like any other GO bond authorization. Get written analyses of the impact on county-wide debt service, the millage required, and the consequences if the bonds default.
2. Decide whether to require a referendum. The statute lets you condition the authorization on a special election in the district. That is a political call: a referendum gives political cover but adds time and cost. If the project is widely supported in the district, the referendum is usually a low risk; if it is contested, the referendum either resolves the question or kills the project.
3. Document the authorization. Bond counsel will need a clean record showing council approval and the specific GO bond authority being delegated.

If you live in a special purpose district funded by an appointive commission

Two protections you have under SC law:

1. No taxation without elected representation. If your appointed commission tries to raise your millage on its own (without elected county council approval), they are likely violating Article X, § 5. You can sue or ask the AG to weigh in.
2. No GO bonds without elected approval. Same rule. If the commission borrows on the strength of your tax bill without county council having authorized it, that bond issue is constitutionally vulnerable.

If you are bond counsel for a special purpose district

Make the elected-body authorization step explicit in your transcript. Both the millage chain (§ 6-11-271 if applicable) and the GO bond authorization chain (§ 6-11-490) need to show, on the record, an elected body's approval at the controlling step. That is what Weaver II (2020) demands and what the AG opinion endorses.

If you are a state legislator

The 2024 Act 235 expanded the Hartsville Commission from three to five members but kept the appointment structure (Governor on recommendation of the legislative delegation). If the General Assembly wants special purpose districts to have direct GO bond authority, the constitutional fix is to make the governing commission elected. Short of that, § 6-11-490's county council pass-through is the constitutional structure.

Common questions

Q: What is a "general obligation bond"?
A: A bond backed by "the full faith, credit and taxing power" of the issuer (S.C. Const. art. X, § 14(3)). If the project doesn't generate enough revenue to repay the bond, the issuer must raise taxes to cover the shortfall. That is what makes GO bonds different from revenue bonds, which are repaid only from project revenues and don't bind the issuer's taxing power.

Q: Why does the constitution treat appointed bodies differently?
A: Article X, § 5 says: "No tax, subsidy or charge shall be established, fixed, laid or levied, under any pretext whatsoever, without the consent of the people or their representatives lawfully assembled." The Supreme Court reads "their representatives" to mean elected representatives, the elected county council, the General Assembly, or other elected bodies. Appointed boards aren't "their representatives" in that constitutional sense.

Q: Why isn't this a problem for elected special purpose districts?
A: Because the rule is satisfied: the people elected the governing board, so the board is "their representatives." Elected districts can issue GO bonds and levy taxes directly under their enabling legislation, subject only to the procedural requirements (notice, hearing, sometimes referendum) the legislature imposed.

Q: Can the Commission issue revenue bonds on its own?
A: The opinion does not address revenue bonds, only GO bonds. Revenue bonds are paid only from project revenues and don't pledge the taxing power, so they don't trigger Article X, § 5 in the same way. Whether the Commission has revenue-bond authority depends on its enabling act (Act 259 of 1961 as amended). If you are pursuing a revenue bond, get a separate legal opinion focused on that authority.

Q: What was the Weaver litigation about?
A: A two-act sequence. Weaver I (1997) struck down a recreation district's authority to set its own millage limits because the district was appointed. The legislature responded by enacting § 6-11-271, which kept appointed districts but inserted county council approval at the actual rate-change step. Weaver II (2020) upheld § 6-11-271's structure: as long as no millage change occurs without an elected body's approval, the constitutional rule is satisfied. The AG opinion uses Weaver II as the template for analyzing § 6-11-490.

Q: How long has the Commission existed?
A: Created by Act 1046 of 1934, reconstituted by Act 259 of 1961, clarified as a special purpose district by Act 211 of 1992, and restructured to five members with a weighted-vote chair selection in Act 235 of 2024. Throughout, members have been "appointed and commissioned by the Governor upon the recommendation of a weighted majority of the Darlington County Legislative Delegation."

Background and statutory framework

South Carolina has hundreds of special purpose districts, many created in the early-to-mid 20th century when "elected" governance for sub-county units was uncommon. The constitutional taxation-without-representation issue was largely dormant until the 1981 Crow v. McAlpine decision, which struck down a delegation of unrestricted taxing power to an appointive board. Weaver I (1997) reinforced that rule for recreation districts.

The legislative response was § 6-11-271 (millage) and § 6-11-490 (GO bonds): keep the appointed structure, but require elected-body approval at the action step. Weaver II (2020) blessed that structure. The Hartsville opinion applies that template to the GO bond question and answers it the same way: the Commission can act, but only after the elected county council authorizes the action.

The 1992 amendment clarifying that the Commission is a "special purpose district" was important because it brought the Commission within § 6-11-490's reach. Without that clarification, the Commission would have had to find some other constitutional path for GO bond authority.

Citations and references

Constitution:
- S.C. Const. art. X, § 5 (no taxation without representation)
- S.C. Const. art. X, § 14 (political subdivision bonded indebtedness)

Statutes:
- S.C. Code § 6-11-271 (special purpose district millage levies)
- S.C. Code § 6-11-490 (general obligation bonds with county council authorization)

Cases:
- Crow v. McAlpine, 277 S.C. 240, 285 S.E.2d 355 (1981) (no delegation of unrestricted taxing power to appointive body)
- Weaver v. Recreation Dist., 328 S.C. 83, 492 S.E.2d 79 (1997) (Weaver I; appointed recreation district could not set millage)
- Weaver v. Recreation District, 431 S.C. 357, 848 S.E.2d 760 (2020) (Weaver II; § 6-11-271 satisfies Article X, § 5 because elected body controls actual rate change)
- City of Beaufort v. Griffin, 275 S.C. 603, 274 S.E.2d 301 (1981) (GO debt is "indebtedness lawfully contracted for governmental purposes and ultimately secured by taxes")

Local acts:
- 1934 Act No. 1046 (creation of Hartsville Township Community Center Building Commission)
- 1961 Act No. 259 (reconstitution of Commission)
- 1992 Act No. 211 (clarifying special purpose district status)
- 2024 Act No. 235 (expansion to five members)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/opinion-addressing-the-hartsville-community-center-building-commission-s-authority-to-issue-general-obligation-bonds/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/media/fkrfbeij/mitchellc-os-11043-final-opinion-7-21-2025.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

ALAN WILSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

July 21, 2025

The Honorable Cody T. Mitchell
Member
South Carolina House of Representatives
Post Office Drawer 1408
Hartsville, SC 29550

Dear Representative Mitchell:

Attorney General Alan Wilson has referred your letter to the Opinions section. Your letter requests an opinion addressing the following:

The special purpose district in question is the Commission for Hartsville Township, Darlington County, to be known as the Hartsville Township Community Center Building Commission (Commission). The Commission was created by the General Assembly in Act 1046 of 1934 following a favorable referendum vote of the qualified electors of Hartsville Township simultaneously authorizing the Board of County Directors of Darlington County to issue general obligation bonds in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars for the Commission to acquire a site in the town of Hartsville, proceed to construct and equip a community center on that site, and manage the facility thereafter. Commission members were appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of the Darlington County Legislative Delegation.

Act 1046 of 1934 noted above was repealed by the General Assembly in 1961 in Act 259 of 1961. The 1961 Act, codified as Article 21, Chapter 4, Title 51 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina 1962, reconstitutes the Commission providing its membership, powers and duties with respect to the facility constructed and operated pursuant to Act 1046 of 1934. Commission members pursuant to this new 1961 enactment are appointed in the same manner as the Commission appointed in the repealed Act 1046 of 1934. In addition, the Act 259 Commission is given the power to direct the Darlington County Auditor to impose millage on the taxable property in Hartsville Township.

The most recent legislative change to the Commission occurred in Act 235 of 2024, increasing the membership of the Commission from three to five members and provided that a weighted vote of the Darlington County Legislative Delegation shall designate the Commission Chairman.

The question I have regarding the Commission discussed above is as follows: Does the Hartsville Township Community Center Building Commission, as currently constituted, have the power to authorize and have issued general obligation bonds to raise funds for the building or buildings under its management?

Law/Analysis

It is this Office's opinion that the Hartsville Community Center Building Commission (the "Commission") does not have the authority to issue general obligation bonds on its own because it is an appointive body. As noted in your letter, the Commission is composed of five individuals who are "appointed and commissioned by the Governor upon the recommendation of a weighted majority of the Darlington County Legislative Delegation." 2024 Act No. 235, § 2. The concern is that the Commission, as a purely appointive body, could not issue general obligation bonds to raise funds without offending Article X, § 5 of the South Carolina Constitution which prohibits taxation without representation. See S.C. Const. art. X, § 5 ("No tax, subsidy or charge shall be established, fixed, laid or levied, under any pretext whatsoever, without the consent of the people or their representatives lawfully assembled."). In Crow v. McAlpine, 277 S.C. 240, 245, 285 S.E.2d 355, 358 (1981), the South Carolina Supreme Court held this provision prohibits the General Assembly from "delegating the unrestricted power of taxation to an appointive body."

Article X, Section 5 recognizes that the power to levy taxes rests with the people. As such, we believe it constitutes an implied limitation upon the power of the General Assembly to delegate the taxing power. Where the power is delegated to a body composed of persons not assented to by the people nor subject to the supervisory control of a body chosen by the people, this constitutional restriction is violated.

Id. at 244, 285 S.E.2d at 358; see also Weaver v. Recreation Dist., 328 S.C. 83, 87, 492 S.E.2d 79, 81-82 (1997) (holding delegating "complete discretion to determine its annual budget, and to levy anywhere from one to five mills taxes to meet its budget" to an appointed recreation commission was impermissible under Article X, § 5).

This prohibition on delegating taxing authority is applicable to the authority to issue general obligation debt as well. Article X, § 14 of the South Carolina Constitution grants political subdivisions the power to incur bonded indebtedness, including by issuing general obligation debt. "General obligation debt" is defined to mean "any indebtedness of the political subdivision which shall be secured in whole or in part by a pledge of its full faith, credit and taxing power." S.C. Const. art. X, § 14(3); see also City of Beaufort v. Griffin, 275 S.C. 603, 605, 274 S.E.2d 301, 303 (1981) ("The general obligation debt aspect of bonded indebtedness, as illustrated by the emphasized language in Article X, Section 14, may thus be understood as indebtedness lawfully contracted for governmental purposes and ultimately secured by taxes on the property within the political entity."). Because general obligation debt is secured by an entity's taxing power, an appointive body lacking the authority to tax would likewise lack the authority to issue this type of debt on its own.

However, the General Assembly subsequently established mechanisms for setting and increasing a special purpose district's millage levy and issuing general obligation bonds even where the district is governed by an appointed body. Following the first Weaver decision cited above, the General Assembly adopted S.C. Code § 6-11-271. In a second decision also captioned Weaver v. Recreation District, 431 S.C. 357, 848 S.E.2d 760 (2020), Chief Justice Beatty summarized the statute's structure as follows:

Subsection (A) defines the term "special purpose district" to mean any special purpose district or public service authority, however named, created by the General Assembly prior to March 7, 1973. Id. § 6-11-271(A).

Subsections (B) and (C) apply only to special purpose districts whose "governing bodies ... are not elected but are presently authorized by law to levy [millage] for operations and maintenance." Id. § 6-11-271(B)(1), (C)(1). Subsection (B) concerns districts that were then authorized to levy millage up to a certain limit, and (C) concerns districts then having no limit as to the millage amount. Id. The General Assembly instructed that, beginning in fiscal year 1999, "[t]here must be levied annually in each special purpose district described" (i.e., those described in (B)(1) and (C)(1)), tax millage equal to the amount imposed in fiscal year 1998. Id. § 6-11-271(B)(2), (C)(2).

The General Assembly outlined several methods for a special purpose district to attempt to alter this tax millage. Subsection (D) provides a special purpose district may request that the county election commission conduct a referendum proposing a modification of the millage. Id. § 6-11-271(D). If the voters approve, the "modification in tax millage shall remain effective until changed in a manner provided by law." Id.

Subsection (E) authorizes all special purpose districts located wholly in one county to modify their millage limits, "provided the same is first approved by the governing body of the district and by the governing body of the county in which the district is located by resolutions duly adopted." Id. § 6-11-271(E)(1) (emphasis added). However, any modification is only temporary, as the General Assembly stipulated that "[a]ny increase in millage effectuated pursuant to this subsection is effective for only one year." Id. (emphasis added).

Id. at 361-62, 848 S.E.2d at 762. With the General Assembly approving the millage rates in subsections (B) and (C), the voters approving the millage increases in subsection (D), and the county governing body approving the one year millage increase in subsection (E), each approval would result from either an elected representative body or direct consent of the people. In analyzing subsection (E), the court found the General Assembly's intent was to require a special purpose district to gain "the approval of the elected governing body of the county ... before any modification in millage may occur." Id. at 367, 848 S.E.2d at 765.

Because no change may actually occur without the express approval of county council, an elected body, the prohibition against taxation without representation is not implicated here, as any rate change is, in fact, subject to the supervision of an elected body, and no modification may be made without the approval of that elected body.

Id. (emphasis added). Said differently, the Court held that, by requiring the approval of an elected body before a change in taxation is authorized, the General Assembly crafted a solution that permitted a change to an unelected public service district's millage level consistent with Article X, § 5 of the South Carolina Constitution.

The General Assembly established a similar procedure whereby special purpose districts can issue general obligation debt after gaining approval of governing body of the county.

If, in order to provide for the cost of any improvements, it is necessary that general obligation bonds be issued the county board shall be empowered at any time to authorize the applicable commission to issue general obligation bonds of the special purpose district. Any county board may, but shall not be required to, condition the issuance of general obligation bonds upon the result of a special election held in the special purpose district as reconstituted and such election shall be conducted in the manner and under the procedure made applicable to the issuance of general obligation bonds of the counties of the State by the provisions of Chapter 15, Title 4.

S.C. Code § 6-11-490 (emphasis added). Like the approval requirement for millage increases in section 6-11-271(E), the county council's approval is a necessary condition for the special purpose district to issue general obligation bonds. If the Commission were to obtain county council's approval, a court would likely hold it could use this procedure to raise funds for improvements without violating Article X, § 5 of the South Carolina Constitution.

Conclusion

It is this Office's opinion that the Hartsville Community Center Building Commission (the "Commission") does not have the authority to issue general obligation bonds on its own because it is an appointive body. As noted in your letter, the Commission is composed of five individuals who are "appointed and commissioned by the Governor upon the recommendation of a weighted majority of the Darlington County Legislative Delegation." 2024 Act No. 235, § 2. The concern is that the Commission, as a purely appointive body, could not issue general obligation bonds to raise funds without offending Article X, § 5 of the South Carolina Constitution which prohibits taxation without representation. However, if the Commission were to obtain county council's authorization to issue general obligation bonds of the special purpose district under S.C. Code § 6-11-490, a court would likely hold this procedure would allow it to raise funds for improvements without violating Article X, § 5 of the South Carolina Constitution.

Sincerely,

Matthew Houck
Assistant Attorney General

REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

Robert D. Cook
Solicitor General