What recording fee applied to a South Carolina certificate of trust that did not affect real estate?

Plain-English summary

In 2010, Horry County's register of deeds asked which recording fee applied to a certificate or memorandum of trust that named trustees and described their powers. Some counties used the fee for papers affecting title or possession of real or personal property; Horry County used the fee for a trustee qualification or other appointment. The South Carolina AG said Horry County's approach appeared correct if the document only identified trustees and powers and “has nothing to do with real estate.”

The opinion did not classify every trust document alike. Its answer turned on whether the particular filing affected property rights or merely documented an appointment.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2010. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later
AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current
legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy
mentioned here.

Common questions

Which fee did the AG favor for a trustee-only document?
A: It favored the appointment or trustee-qualification fee Horry County used when the document did not concern real estate.

Would the same answer govern a trust filing affecting property title? A: The AG did not decide that. Its conclusion expressly depended on the document having nothing to do with real estate.

Why were counties charging differently?
A: The request contrasted a fee for recording property-affecting papers with a fee for filing a power of attorney, trustee qualification, or other appointment. The AG chose the latter for the limited facts described.

Background and statutory framework

The register of deeds described certificates and memoranda that identify trustees and their powers without necessarily affecting real estate. The AG compared the two statutory fee categories and applied ordinary statutory meaning. It concluded that the appointment category fit a trustee-only filing.

Citations and references

The opinion discussed South Carolina Code sections 8-21-310(9) and 8-21-210(10), using those section numbers as printed in the source opinion.

Official title

Questioning the appropriate recording fee for a “certificate of trust” or a “memorandum of trust” pursuant to S.C. Code § 8-21-310.

Requester

Ballery V. Skipper, Director, Horry County Register of Deeds

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/october-7-2010/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/skipper-b-v-os-9145-10-7-10-recording-fee-certificate-of-trust-or-memorandum-of-trust.pdf

Original opinion text

H ENRY McMASTER
ATIORNEY G ENERAL

October 7, 2010

Ballery V. Skipper, Director
Horry County Register of Deeds
P. 0. Box470
Conway, South Carolina 29528
Dear Ms. Skipper:
In a letter to this office you questioned the appropriate recording fee for a "certificate oftrust" or a "memorandum of trust" pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 8-21-310. You indicated that such documents " ...refer to who are being appointed as trustees and their power and does not necessarily have to do with title to real estate."

You referenced that some counties charge pursuant to Section 8-21-310(9) which states that "for recording any other paper affecting title or possession of real estate or personal property and required by law to be recorded, except judicial records, ten dollars, and an additional one dollar a p age for a document containing more than four pages." You also indicated that Horry County charges to record such documents pursuant to Section 8-21-210(10) which states that "for filing power of attorney, trustee qualification, or other appointment, fifteen dollars, and an additional one dollar a page for a document containing more than four pages." When interpreting the meaning of a statute, certain basic principles must be observed. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. State v. Martin, 293 S.C. 46, 358 S.E.2d 697 (1987). Typically, legislative intent is determined by applying the words used by the General Assembly in their usual and ordinary significance. Martin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 256 S.C. 577, 183 S.E.2d 451 (1971). Resort to subtle or forced construction for the purpose oflimiting or expanding the operation of a statute should not be undertaken. Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165, 318 S.E.2d 14 (1984). Courts must apply the clear and unambiguous terms of a statute according to their literal meaning and statutes should be given a reasonable and practical construction which is consistent with the policy and purpose expressed therein. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991); Jones v. South Carolina State Highway Department, 247 S.C. 132, 146 S.E.2d 166 (1966).

REMBERT c. D ENNIS Bull.DING

• POST O FPICB Box Ll549 • COLUMBlA, SC 29211-1549 • T ELBPHONE 803-734-3970 • FACS!M:lLE 803-253-6283

Ms. Skipper
Page2
October 7, 2010

Consistent with such, in the opinion of this office, it appears that Horry County is correct in charging its assessment pursuant to Section 8-21-210(10) if the "certificate of trust" or "memorandum of trust" makes reference only to individuals being appointed as trustees and their power and has nothing to do with real estate. With kind regards, I am, Very truly yours, Henry McMaster Attoqiey General

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REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

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Deputy Attorney General

Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General