Did moving into and back out of a South Carolina school district end a student's tuition exemption?

Plain-English summary

In 1999, the South Carolina Attorney General's office addressed whether children who owned property in a school district could keep attending without paying nonresident tuition after their family briefly moved into the district and later moved away. The statute exempted nonresident students who had enrolled by September 9, 1996, remained continuously enrolled, and met the other qualifications for attendance. The office said the family's move did not itself end that exemption. The statutory continuity requirement concerned the children's enrollment, not uninterrupted residence outside the district.

The answer assumed the children met the exemption's other requirements. It did not independently verify their property ownership, enrollment history, or eligibility. The letter was expressly informal.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1999. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did the family's temporary move into the district end the exemption? A: The AG said no, assuming the children otherwise met the statutory requirements. The provision did not list a temporary change in residence as an exception.

What had to remain continuous?
A: The opinion read the exemption as requiring continuous student enrollment after the September 9, 1996 cutoff, along with the other qualifications for attending the district.

Did owning property alone establish free attendance?
A: The opinion did not decide that. It described a property-based eligibility provision but applied the separate exemption on the assumption that the children met its other requirements.

Background and statutory framework

A legislator asked about a constituent's children who owned property and attended a district where they no longer lived. The district considered the family's interim residence within its boundaries a reason to deny the nonresident tuition exemption. The office read § 59-63-45(D)'s text as preserving the exemption if continuous enrollment and the other conditions were met.

Citations and references

The opinion discussed § 59-63-30 on attendance qualifications and § 59-63-45 on nonresident tuition and the older-student exemption.

Official title

Responding to a question posed by a constituent as to whether his children may attend school free of charge in a school district in which they own property, but do not reside.

Requester

The Honorable Ronald P. Townsend, Chairman, House Education and Public Works Committee

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/october-6-1999/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/99oct-6-townsend.pdf

Original opinion text

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The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLIE CONDON
AITO RNEY GENERAL

October 6, 1999

The Honorable Ronald P. Townsend
Chairman
House Education and Public Works Committee
Room 420, Blatt Building
Columbia, SC
By Delivery
Dear Chairman Townsend:

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You have requested an informal opinion as to a question posed by a constituent as to whether his children may attend school free of charge in a school district in which they own property, but do not reside. A pertinent statutory provision is S.C. Code Ann. § 59-63-30 (1990) which states that a child may attend public schools free of charge, if among other reasons, the child resides with his or her parent or legal guardian and the parent or guardian either reside in the district or " ... (c) the child owns real estate in the district having an assessed value of three hundred dollars or more .... " According to your constituent, the children own property in a district in which they attend the schools as non-residents, but the school district claims that they must now pay to attend schools in that district pursuant to§ 59-63-45 (A) (Supp. 1998) which provides, in part, as follows:

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(A) ... a nonresident child otherwise meeting the enrollment requirements of this chapter may attend a school in a school district which he is otherwise qualified to attend if the person responsible for educating the child pays an amount .. . [as specified therein ... ] (D) Non-resident students enrolled in the schools of a district no later than September 9, 1996. shall not be required to meet the conditions of subsection (A) of this section as long as the student is continuously enrolled in the district and as long as the student meets the qualifications provided by law for attending the schools of the district.

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The Honorable Ronald P. Townsend
October 6, 1999
Page 2
The information provided by your constituents is that the students meet the requirements of paragraph (D), supra, including enrollment since September 9. 1996, but the school district has informed the family that it will not apply the exemption of paragraph (D) because at one point during this period, the family moved back into the district and lived in rental property. Therefore. the question is whether, under these circumstances, the simple move of the family into and out of the district after September 9, 1996 would remove this exemption.

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The "... primary function in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature." South Carolina Department of Highwavs and Public Transportation v. Dickinson, 288 S.C. 134, 341 S.E. 2d 134 (1986). "Where the terms of a statute are clear and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation and we must apply them according to their literal meaning." Id. The language of paragraph (D) supra, is plain and indicates no exception for the moves of families. The only continuity requirement therein is the continuous enrollment of the children, and the date for fixing qualifications for the exemption from Paragraph (A) is September 9, 1996. Accordingly, assuming that the children otherwise meet the requirements of paragraph (D), they are entitled to the exemption therein, even though their family moved back into the district for some period of time after September 9, 1996. This letter is an informal opinion. It has been written by the designated Assistant Deputy Attorney General and represents the opinion of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally reviewed by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. If you have further questions, please let me know.

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