Could a golf cart cross a South Carolina primary highway between parts of a golf course under the old golf-cart permit law?

Plain-English summary

A senator asked whether a golf cart could cross a numbered South Carolina highway between sections of a golf course without meeting the rules for operation on public roads. The Attorney General concluded that crossing a primary highway still counted as operating a vehicle on it. The golf-cart statute then permitted limited operation on secondary highways or streets for licensed drivers who obtained a permit and showed financial responsibility; it did not provide a primary-highway crossing exception.

The opinion reasoned that even if the golf-cart provision was not the exclusive rule, a cart operated on a primary highway would still have to satisfy generally applicable vehicle requirements. It pointed to other states that had expressly enacted crossing exceptions and suggested that legislation might resolve the requester's problem.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1998. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the 1998 golf-cart permit cover primary-highway crossings?
A: The opinion found no such exception. It read the permit provision as authorizing specified operation on secondary highways or streets, not crossings of a primary highway.

Q: Was a quick crossing treated differently from driving along a highway?
A: No. The AG said crossing a primary highway was encompassed by “operation” on that highway.

Q: What solution did the opinion identify for a golf-course crossing?
A: It pointed to legislative action, noting that some other jurisdictions had written express golf-cart crossing exceptions.

Background and statutory framework

The request concerned a crossing near a golf course in Colleton County. The opinion quoted Sec. 56-3-115's limited secondary-road permit rule and reviewed earlier AG views that vehicles operated on state highways generally had to meet licensing, registration, equipment and other requirements. Its conclusion was tied to the statute as written in 1998.

Citations and references

• Sec. 56-3-115, the golf-cart permit provision quoted and applied by the opinion.

Official title

Questioning whether or not Section 56-3-115 prohibits golf carts from crossing a numbered highway in South Carolina to go from one part of the golf course to another without first getting a license to operate on the roads of this State.

Requester

The Honorable Glenn F. McConnell, Senator, District No. 41

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/october-6-1998/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/98oct6mcconnell.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES M. CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

October 6, 1998

The Honorable Glenn F. McConnell
Senator, District No. 41
3 11 Gressette Building
Columbia, South Carolina 29202

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Re: Informal Opinion
Dear Senator McConnell:
You have enclosed a copy of a letter you received from Mr. Kruger B. Smith. You note that it appears that the Colleton County Sheriff's Department is interpreting S. C. Code Ann. Sec. 56-3-115 as prohibiting the crossing from one golf course to another of a golf cart on a public road. You state that"[ o]bviously, the statute was written to prevent operation of these down the lanes of traffic without a license. It certainly was not meant to restrict the use of the vehicle to cross a highway on a golf cart crossing." Your question is therefore ('o/;'

... whether or not Section 56-3-115 prohibits golf cmis from crossing a numbered highway in South Carolina to go from one part of the golf course to another without first getting a license to operate on the roads of this State.

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By way of further background, Mr. Smith has enclosed a copy of§ 56-3-115 with the following notation written thereupon by a Colleton County Deputy Sheriff:
[t]his Law [§ 56-3-115] pertains to secondary highways only. Hwy. 174 or commonly known as Palmetto Blvd. is a U.S.

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Senator McConnell
Page 2
October 6, 1998
primary highway, therefore, it is against the law to operate a golf caii on Hwy. 174 [and] ... crossing is operating on a primary highway. [emphasis in original]. Law I Analvsis

S. C. Code Ann. Sec. 56-3-115 provides as follmvs:

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[t]he owner of a vehicle commonly known as a golf cart, if he has a valid driver's license, may obtain a permit from the department upon the payment of a fee of five dollars and proof of financial responsibility which permits him to operate the golf cart on a secondary highway or street within two miles of his residence during daylight hours only. A number of principles of statutory construction are relevant to your inquiry. In interpreting any statute, the primary purpose is to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. State v. Martin, 293 S. C. 46, 358 S.E.2d 697 (1987). Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, its terms must be given a literal meaning. Crown Cork and Seal Co., Inc. v. S. C. Tax Comm. 302 S. C. 140, 394 S.E.2d 315 (1990). It is the duty of the court to given an unambiguous statute effect according to the clear meaning of the statute. Helfrich v. Brasington Sand and Gravel Co., 268 S.C. 236, 233 S.E.2d 291 ( 1977). Laws pertaining to the same subject-matter must be construed together and effect given to each. Cola. Gaslight Co. v. Mobley, 139 S.C. 107, 137 S.E. 211 (1927). The enumeration of particular things in a statute excludes the idea of something else not mentioned. Pennsylvania Natl. Mutual Casualtv Ins. Co. v. Parker, 282 S. C. 546, 320 S.E.2d 458 (1984) ["expressio unius est exclusio alterius "]. In an Opinion of this Office, dated September 10, 1980, we responded to the question of whether a golf cart" may be legally driven on the public highways of this State." Therein, we referenced an earlier Opinion of May 30, 1978, in which it was concluded that golf ca1is would fall within the definition of a "motor vehicle" as defined by§ 56-5-130. In the 1980 Opinion, we noted that §56-5-4410 ''prohibits any person from driving any vehicle which does not contain equipment required by various other code sections."
[t]here are numerous provisions in the Code which require such equipment as proper brakes, lighting requirements, bumpers,

Senator McConnell
Page 3
October 6, 1998
horns and warning devices, mirrors, etc. See for example, Code of Laws of South Carolina§§ 56-5-4850-56-5-4900; 56-5-4450. et seq.; 56-5-4910-56-5-4940; 56-5-4950; 56-5-4990; 56-55040; and 56-5-5020. Unless the vehicle is so equipped, it should not be operated on the public highways of this State ....

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If the golf ca1i is properly equipped with all equipment required by law, then the vehicle should be licensed and registered and have secured the applicable insurance as required by other sections of the Code.

And, in Op. No. 87-59 (June 12, 1987), we reiterated andreaffinned the May 30, 1978 and September 10, 1980 Opinions, applying the reasoning of these Opinions to the question of motorized carts and wheelchairs operating on State highways. We concluded as follows:

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[r]eferencing the above, and consistent with the May 30, 1978 and September 10, 1980 opinions of this Office, for any vehicle, including motorized carts and wheelchairs operated by the handicapped, to be operated upon the highways of this State, it must meet the various requirements imposed on vehicles operating on State highways generally, such as being properly registered, licensed, equipped [etc.] ... This Office is unable to construe the provisions of Section 43-33-25 and 43-33-20 concerning the handicapped as auth01izing avoidance of State law requirements for vehicles operated on highways in this State. Moreover, municipalities are not authorized to enact provisions in conflict with State requirements pertaining to vehicles on highways. Subsequently, by way of the 1987-88 Appropriations Act [Act No. 170, Pa1i IL§ 45], the General Assembly enacted§ 56-3-115. It would appear that the General Assembly has now expressly pe1mitted the operation of a golf cart on a secondary highway or street within two miles of his residence in daylight hours if he has a valid driver's license and has obtained a permit from the Department of Highways and Public Transportation and shown proof of financial responsibility. There is no indication or suggestion in the statute of any exception for "crossing" a primary highway. Even if§ 56-3-115 is not deemed exclusive, and there is no indication to the contrary, still, in order to "operate" the golf caii on a primary highvvay,

Senator McConnell
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October 6, 1998
the requirements of proper, equipment, license, registration, etc. emphasized in our earlier opinion vvould have to be met, including the possession of a valid driver's license. \Ve have previously concluded that the meaning of operation of a motor vehicle on the public highways of South Carolina is to be broadly construed Op. Atty. Gen., June 10, 1969. It is evident that crossing a primary highway in a golf ca11 would be encompassed within such ten11.

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Comis in other jurisdictions as well as the opinions of other Attorneys General have agreed that the operation of a golf cati on a public highway constitutes a ''motor vehicle". See e.g., Nepstod v. Rendall, 152 N.W.2d. 383 (S. D. 1967). In Ohio Op. Atty. Gen., Op. No. 90-043 (June 20, 1990), for example, it was stated that "[a] golf cati may not lawfully be operated on public streets and highways unless it satisfies the statutory requirements that are applicable to motor vehicles." The Ohio Attorney General found that such included a valid drivers license, proof of financial responsibility and operating requirements applicable to any other motor vehicle. And, in Fla. Op. Atty. Gen., AGO 91-41 (June 10, 1991 ), the Florida Attorney General determined that a statute similar to § 56-3-115 was exclusive and that''[ w ]here the Legislature has prescribed the conditions and exceptions under which golf ca1is may be operated on public roads and streets, no others may be inferred.'' Applying this same statute, and the principle of statutory construction of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius", the Florida Attorney General has also concluded that "until and unless judicially or legislatively determined to the contrary, that a golf cart may not cross a state road at a controlled intersection of a city street and a state road." Fla. Op. Atty. Gen., AGO 83-101 (December 29, 1983). See also, N. C. Op. Atty. Gen., (Oct. 14, 1982). Finally, in 73 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 273 (September 26, 1990), the California Attorney General observed that "those traffic safety considerations for a combined use street or highway are just as compelling in the situation where a golf cart crosses a street or highway, as when it travels along it." See also Del E. Webb Cactus Development, Inc. v. Jessup, 176 Ariz. 541, 863 P.2d 260 (1993) [no exception in statute for golf cart crossing public highway; thus Comi would not "expand deliberate statutory exceptions; Court therefore rejected contention that the golf ca1i "crossing of the highvvay was merely incidental to playing around of golf', and thus held the cart operator and owner of golf course jointly and severably liable for accident with automobile.] Accordingly, it appeat·s that Mr. Smith's remedy lies in the legislative arena. I would note that other jurisdictions have created express exceptions for golf cat1s crossing a highway. For example, § 14-1 of the General Statutes of Connecticut excludes from the definition of "motor vehicle"

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Senator McConnell
Page 5
October 6, 1998
... golf carts operated on highways solely for the purpose of crossing from a part of the golf course to another. ... See, East v. Labbe, 1998 WL 123068 (March 9, 1998). It may well be that legislation is the sole means of resolving Mr. Smith's problem.

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This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated Assistant Deputy Attorney General and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I am Very tryJy yours, I I

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Robert D. Cook
Assistant Deputy Attorney General
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