Could a county or city require historic rehabilitation to begin after its local ordinance to qualify for a special tax assessment?

Short answer The Assistant AG predicted that a court would invalidate a local ordinance substituting a later start date for the state statute’s January 1, 1987 eligibility date. The letter addressed that particular statutory condition, not whether any given property met every requirement.
State
South Carolina
Opinion
1997-october-28-1997-1
Issued
October 28, 1997
Issued by
Office of the South Carolina Attorney General
Requested by
Richard T. Runnels, Deputy Director, South Carolina Department of Archives and History

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 1997. Ask about yours and see what current South Carolina law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official South Carolina Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed South Carolina attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original AG opinion (PDF)

Plain-English summary

The Department of Archives and History asked whether local governments could limit a special property-tax assessment to historic rehabilitations begun after a local ordinance. The relevant state statute made a rehabilitated historic property eligible for certification only if rehabilitation began after January 1, 1987, among other conditions. The Assistant AG predicted that an ordinance substituting a different date would conflict with state law and likely be invalid.

The letter did not say every property meeting the start-date condition automatically received the assessment. It addressed the local government’s ability to rewrite that one state eligibility rule. Its conclusion was a prediction of what a court would do and was identified as an informal opinion.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1997. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could a local ordinance move the qualifying rehabilitation start date? A: The AG predicted that a court would find a different local date in conflict with the state statute.

Q: What date did the statute use in the opinion?
A: It required rehabilitation to have commenced after January 1, 1987.

Q: Did the opinion certify a particular property?
A: No. It interpreted the state eligibility condition rather than applying every condition to a property.

Background and statutory framework

Section 4-9-195 governed special assessments for rehabilitated historic property and certain rental property. The opinion quoted § 4-9-195 (B)(5) and applied the principle that a municipal ordinance could not conflict with general state law.

Citations and references

Statutes discussed: Section 4-9-195; § 4-9-195 (B)(5); § 5-7-30. Case cited: Connor v. Town of Hilton Head Island.

Source

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CH A RLES MOLONY CON DON
ATTORNE Y GENERAL

October 28, 1997

I

Richard T. Runnels, Deputy Director
South Carolina Department of Archives and History
Post Office Box 11,669
Columbia, South Carolina 29211
Re:

Informal Opinion

Dear Mr. Runnels :
Your opinion request has been forwarded to me for reply. You request an opinion regarding Section 4-9-195 of the South Carolina Code of Laws. This Section sets forth the authority of counties and municipalities to grant special property tax assessments to rehabilitated historic properties and low and moderate income rental properties. The question is whether all properties meeting the requirements of 4-9- l 95(B)( 5) automatically qualify for the special tax assessment or if a local governing body is permitted to change these requirements by ordinance. You mention that the agency feels that they may restrict the assessments to properties rehabilitated after passage of the local ordinance, but the wording of the statute leaves some doubt.

.

~

:

,

Section 4-9- l 95(B) sets forth the requirements which must be met in order for a "Rehabilitated historic property" to be eligible for certification as such. One of these requirements is that the "rehabilitation was commenced on the property after January 1, 1987, and the rehabilitation was not commenced or undertaken as a result of a natural disaster, catastrophe, accident, or force majeure." S.C. Code Arm. § 4-9-195 (B)(5). It is well settled that a municipal ordinance cannot conflict with the Constitution and the general law of this State. See Connor v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 314 S.C. 251 , 442 S.E.2d 608 (1994) ; S.C. Code Arm. § 5-7-30; 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corporations § 374. Here, the General Assembly has passed a general State statute authorizing these special tax assessments and defining those properties which are eligible R EMBERT

,

c DENNIS B UILDING

•

POST OFFICE B o x

~d.A~ r-W,, "77-7-,

11 549

•

C OL UMnl A, S,C 292 11 - 1549

•

T ELEPHON E:

803-734-3970

•

F ACSIMILE: 803-253-628 3

Mr. Runnels
Page 2
October 28, 1997

for certification as a "Rehabilitated historic property." One of these requirements is that the rehabilitation was commenced after January 1, 1987. If a local governing body attempted to redefine this requirement by ordinance stating that the rehabilitation must occur at a date other than January 1, 1987, such redefinition would conflict with the State statute setting forth eligibility requirements. Therefore, in my opinion, if a court were to address this issue, a court would likely determine that the ordinance would be in conflict with general State law and find the ordinance invalid.

I
I

This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated assistant attorney general and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kindest regards, I remain Very truly yours,

/Zf_j J{oJ
Paul M. Koch
Assistant Attorney General

What does South Carolina law say today, for your facts?

This opinion is from 1997. Ezel checks the current South Carolina statutes and case law, applies them to your situation, and cites what it relies on.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace