Would South Carolina's AG answer a video-poker operator's questions after a Revenue Department citation?

Plain-English summary

In 1999, the South Carolina Attorney General's office declined a senator's questions about regulation of a video-poker establishment. The Department of Revenue had already issued an administrative citation, and the office said Revenue had authority to address the questions through its administrative procedure. It would not issue an opinion that superseded the agency's decision or its interpretation of its own regulation. If the notice of intent to revoke was on appeal, an administrative law judge might decide some of the questions.

The office also said it did not opine on questions that had become, or would become, moot. It believed a recent South Carolina Supreme Court ruling would make many video-gaming questions moot as of June 30, 2000. The letter did not decide the merits of the establishment's regulatory dispute and was expressly informal.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1999. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did the AG decide whether the video-poker establishment violated a rule? A: No. The office declined to answer the regulatory questions and identified the Department of Revenue as the authority to address them.

Why did the administrative citation matter?
A: The opinion said an agency citation and available administrative procedure meant the AG's office would not issue an opinion superseding the agency's authority. An administrative law judge might decide issues if the revocation notice was appealed.

Did the opinion say the questions could become moot?
A: Yes. It said a recent state Supreme Court ruling would make many questions about video-gaming regulation moot as of June 30, 2000.

Background and statutory framework

A senator sent several questions about a video-poker establishment. The office applied its policy of leaving matters to an agency that had jurisdiction and had already acted, and its separate policy against opinions on moot questions. It gave no ruling on the establishment's facts.

Citations and references

The letter cited Griggs v. Hodge on agency authority and referred to Joytime Distributers and Amusement Co. v. State in its mootness discussion.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/october-27-1999/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/99oct-27-reese.pdf

Original opinion text

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The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLIE CONDON
ATIORNEY GENERAL

October 2 7, 1999

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The Honorable Glenn G. Reese
Senator, District No. 11
l l 7 Sun Valley Drive
Boiling Springs, S. C. 29316

Re:

Informal Opinion

Dear Senator Reese:
Thank you for your letter, dated September 21, 1999, to Attorney General Condon, which has been referred to me for a response. You have multiple questions concerning the regulations of a video poker establishment. Because your questions are more properly directed to the Department of Revenue, we are unable to advise you in this matter. It is the policy of this Office not to issue an opinion if another agency which has jurisdiction over the matter has already ruled or advised on the matter. In cases such as this, where an administrative citation has been issued by an agency and there is an administrative procedure and remedy available, this Office will not attempt by issuing an opinion to supersede the administrative authority or discretion of any officer, agency, or public body. Griggs v. Hodge, 229 S.C. 245, 92 S.E.2d 654 (1956). Additionally, state law gives considerable deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations and the courts generally do not "second guess" such interpretation unless clearly erroneous. Thus, this Office does not second guess, by the issuance of an opinion, an agency's interpretation of its O'vVTI regulation and will leave such review to the courts. Op. Any. Gen. Sept. 12, 1985. Therefore. the Oepartmenr of Revenue is the appropriate authority to rule on the questions presented in your letter and advise you on this matter. If the case which gave rise to the Notice of Intent to Revoke is on appeal. an administrative law judge may decide one or more of the questions presented. It~ however, the law is unclear, or there is no South Carolina law on the subject. legislative clarification or a declaratory judgement by the courts should be sought. See S. C. Code Ann.§ 15-53-10 et seq.; Parker v. Bates, 216 S.C. 52. 56 S.E.2d 723 ( l 950).

The Honorable Glenn G. Reese
Page 2
October 27, 1999

It is, furthermore, the policy of this Office not to issue an opinion on any question which has or will become moot. Mathis v. S.C. Highway Dept., 260 S.C. 344, 195 S.E.2d 713 (1973); QJh Attv. Gen Sept. 19, 1983. The recent ruling of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Joytime Distributers and Amusement Co. v. State upheld the severability clause of Act No. 125, 1999 S.C. Acts. This ruling effectively renders moot, as of June 30, 2000, many of these questions concerning the regulation of video gaming.

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This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated senior assistant attorney general and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kind regards, I remain Very truly yours,

Nathan Kamins , .
Senior Assistant Attorney Ge

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