Did South Carolina require rental-car airport surcharges and ways to avoid them to appear in rental agreements?

Plain-English summary

A legislator asked whether South Carolina's rental-car airport-surcharge disclosure rule applied only to rental-rate advertising or also required the surcharge and ways to avoid it to be stated in the rental agreement. The Attorney General read the statutory words literally. The quoted provision required clear and conspicuous disclosure in advertisements of a rental rate, and it did not mention rental agreements. The AG therefore concluded that this particular disclosure duty applied to the ads, not to rental agreements.

The opinion also pointed to the 1989 act's stated purpose of regulating rental-car advertising. A footnote narrowed the answer: the office was not endorsing a particular company's disclosure policies or deciding other possible obligations.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1998. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later
AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current
legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy
mentioned here.

Common questions

Did the cited statute require airport surcharges in rental-rate ads? A: Yes. The opinion quoted the duty to disclose applicable surcharges clearly and conspicuously in advertisements of a rental rate.

Did it require the means of avoiding the surcharge to be advertised? A: Yes. The quoted provision required that information in rental-rate advertisements to which the surcharge might apply.

Did that same provision govern rental agreements?
A: The AG said no. It read the provision as limited to advertisements and noted that it did not mention agreements.

Did the opinion approve any rental company's full disclosure policy? A: No. Its footnote expressly limited the letter to the statutory question presented.

Background and statutory framework

Section 56-31-30(A) addressed airport surcharges that did not apply to every customer. The opinion relied on its repeated reference to advertisements and the 1989 act's stated focus on rental-car rate advertising. It did not analyze a specific advertisement or contract.

Citations and references

The opinion quoted Section 56-31-30(A) and the purpose statement of the 1989 act. The official PDF contains both passages and the limiting footnote.

Official title

Interpreting Section 56-31-30(A) of the South Carolina Code of Laws.

Requester

The Honorable Daniel T. Cooper, Member, House of Representatives

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/october-27-1998/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/98oct27cooper.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES M. CONDON •
AITORNEY GENERAL

October 27, 1998

The Honorable Daniel T. Cooper
Member, House of Representatives
P.O. Box 160
Williamston, South Carolina 29697
RE:

Informal Opinion

Dear Representative Cooper:
Your recent opinion request has been forwarded to me for reply. You have asked for an interpretation of Section 56-31-30(A) of the South Carolina Code of Laws. Specifically, you ask whether the portion of this statute which requires rental companies to disclose airport surcharges and methods to avoid these charges is limited to disclosure in advertisements of the rental rate or whether it also encompasses disclosure of such in rental agreements. Section 56-31-30(A) provides in pertinent part as follows:

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ii

Airport surcharges which do not apply to every customer may be quoted and charged but must be disclosed clearly and conspicuously in all advertisements of a rental rate either as a specific fee or as a range of fees. The means of avoiding airport surcharges must be disclosed clearly and conspicuously in all advertisements of a rental rate to which airport surcharges may apply. A number of principles of statutory construction are important in resolving your inquiry. First and foremost, in interpreting a statute, the primary purpose is to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. State v. Martin, 293 S.C. 46, 358 S.E.2d 697 (1987). The words of a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation. Bryant v. City of Charleston, 295 S.C. 408, 368 S.E.2d 899 (1988). The Court must apply the clear and unambiguous terms of a statute according to their literal meaning. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991).

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The Honorable Daniel T. Cooper
Page 2
October 27, 1998

I

As I read Section 56-3 I-30(A). it is clear and unambiguous. It provides that''[ a]irport surcharges ... must be disclosed clearly and conspicuously in all advertisements of a rental rate .... '' (emphasis added). Further, ''[t]he means for avoiding airport surcharges must be disclosed clearly and conspicuously in all advertisements of a rental rate to which airport surcharges may apply." (emphasis added). As you can see, the portion of the statute addressing the disclosure of airport surcharges is used directly in connection with the advertisement of rental rates and makes no mention of rental agreements. Therefore, applying the aforementioned principles of statutory construction leads me to the conclusion that the portion of 56-31-30(A) requiring the disclosure of airport surcharges and the means to avoid such charges applies only to advertisements of rental rates and not to rental agreements. 1 This conclusion is consistent with the purposes of the legislation. Chapter 31 of Title 56 was added by Act No. 177of1989. In Section 1 of the Act, the General Assembly stated its purpose in enacting this legislation: The purpose of this act is to regulate advertising by rental car companies particularly for rental car rates. This act provides for restrictions to be placed on mandatory fees and surcharges including, but not limited to, required fuel surcharges in addition to the rental rate. (emphasis added). This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated assistant attorney general and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion. With kindest regards, I remain Very truly yours,

72!.f.~

Paul M. Koch
Assistant Attorney General

1

This opinion is limited to the specific legal question raised in your opinion request. Nothing herein shall be viewed as an endorsement of a particular rental company's disclosure policies.