Did a Carlisle town council member forfeit office after pleading guilty to disorderly conduct?

Plain-English summary

Carlisle’s mayor asked whether a council member who pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct forfeited office or could be removed. The Assistant AG said Section 5-7-200(a)(3) required forfeiture after conviction of a crime of moral turpitude, but State v. LaBarge classified disorderly conduct as outside that category. The plea therefore did not automatically vacate the council seat.

The author then surveyed provisions for removal or suspension of certain public officers. He said the cited rules for state or county officers did not cover a municipal council member on these facts, and the provisions involving embezzlement or crimes of moral turpitude did not appear applicable. The letter did not identify an available removal route for the situation described. It was an informal opinion.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1997. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did the guilty plea automatically vacate the council seat? A: No. The opinion said disorderly conduct was not a crime of moral turpitude and so did not trigger automatic forfeiture under the cited section.

Q: Did the cited state or county officer suspension rules apply? A: The author said those rules addressed state or county officers, not this municipal council member.

Q: Did the AG identify another applicable removal provision? A: No. He said none of the provisions he reviewed seemed to apply to the described facts.

Background and statutory framework

Section 5-7-200(a)(3) tied municipal office forfeiture to a conviction for a crime of moral turpitude. The letter applied State v. LaBarge, then separately considered statutes and a constitutional provision concerning suspension or removal of other public officials.

Citations and references

Statutes discussed: Section 5-7-200(a)(3); Section 8-1-100; Section 8-1-110. Case cited: State v. LaBarge.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/october-27-1997/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/97oct27stevens.pdf

Original opinion text

The State of South Carolina

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHARLES MOLONY CONDON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

October 27, 1997

The Honorable Ann Stevens
Mayor, Town of Carlisle
P.O. Box 305
Carlisle, South Carolina 29031
Re:

Informal Opinion

Dear Mayor Stevens:
Your recent opinion request has been forwarded to me for reply. You have advised this Office that a member of the Carlisle Town Council has pled guilty to the crime of disorderly conduct. In light of this guilty plea, you ask whether this member of council has forfeited his office or if he may be removed from office. Pursuant to Section 5-7-200(a)(3), a member of municipal council shall forfeit his office if he is convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. However, the crime of disorderly conduct is not a crime of moral turpitude. State v. LaBarge, 275 S.C. 168, 268 S.E.2d 278 (1980). Accordingly, since disorderly conduct is not a crime of moral turpitude, the fact that a member of town council pied guilty to that crime would not automatically result in forfeiture of office.

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As to your question of removal, the South Carolina Code contains various provisions as to removal or suspension of certain public officials. At this time, however, none of these sections seem to apply to the situation raised in your request. Section 1-3240 et seq. provides a procedure whereby the Governor may remove county or state officers guilty of misconduct, persistent neglect of duty, and the like. Section 8-1-100 gives the Governor the discretion to suspend any state or county officer indicted for any crime. The preceding two sections address county and state officers and not municipal officers such as members of town council. Section 8-1-110 permits the Governor to suspend public officials deemed "probably guilty of embezzlement," upon indictment. A')

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POST OFFICE Box 115-19

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COLUMBIA.

s.c. 29211 - 1549

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T ELEPHONE:

803- 734-3970

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FACSIM ILE: 803-253-6283

The Honorable Ann Stevens
Page 2
October 27, 1997
Article VI, § 8 of the State Constitution permits the Governor to suspend certain officers of the State or its political subdivisions when those officers are indicted for embezzlement, misappropriation or a crime of moral turpitude. This letter is an informal opinion only. It has been written by a designated assistant attorney general and represents the position of the undersigned attorney as to the specific questions asked. It has not, however, been personally scrutinized by the Attorney General nor officially published in the manner of a formal opinion.

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With kindest regards, I remain

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Paul M. Koch
Assistant Attorney General