Did a school violate South Carolina law by asking a driver to leave a football game because of a political sign?

Plain-English summary

The South Carolina Attorney General did not determine whether a driver’s removal from a public high school football game for displaying a political sign violated section 16-17-560. It recognized the candidate sign as protected political speech. But the statute’s ban on ejecting someone from “a rented house, land, or other property” did not, in the AG’s view, fit a school parking lot because “rented” modified each type of property.

The remaining question was whether the school intimidated the driver because of political expression or applied a content-neutral sign rule. The opinion said the answer required facts about the school’s policy, treatment of other signs and whether the lot was a public forum. It did not establish those facts or make a criminal-liability finding.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2006. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Was the candidate sign protected political speech?
A: Yes. The AG described a sign supporting a candidate as political expression protected by the First Amendment.

Q: Did asking the driver to leave violate the rented-property clause? A: The AG thought not. It read “rented” as modifying house, land and other property, and did not apply that clause to the school parking lot.

Q: Could the school still have violated the intimidation clause? A: Possibly, but the AG did not decide. It said the answer depended on the sign policy, the treatment of other signs and whether the decision targeted political content.

Q: Did the opinion approve removal under any sign rule?
A: It said a policy prohibiting all signs would be valid in the described setting, while discriminatory treatment based on a sign’s message would require a different analysis.

Background and statutory framework

The solicitor described a large candidate sign in a truck bed; a school representative asked the driver to leave, while other cars with political bumper stickers remained. The AG said the statute criminalized intimidation because of political opinions or rights, but found no directly matching precedent. It distinguished the rented-property clause from the intimidation clause. A uniform rule against all signs would, in the opinion’s analysis, be valid; content discrimination would present a different issue. The AG left factual questions unresolved.

Citations and references

• S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-560

Source

• Landing page: https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/october-2-2006/
• Original PDF: https://www.scag.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/06oct2-Gowdy.pdf

Original opinion text

HENRY MCMASTER

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October 2, 2006

The Honorable Trey Gowdy
Solicitor, Seventh Judicial Circuit
180 Magnolia Street
Spartanburg, South Carolina 29306
Dear Solicitor Gowdy:

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In a letter to this office you referenced a situation where an individual lawfully operating a motor vehicle has a large sign in the bed ofhis truck supporting a particular political candidate. That individual drives the truck with the sign in the back to a public high school football game where he is then asked to leave because ofhaving the sign in the back of his truck. You indicated that it did not appear that the person was asked to leave because ofthe particular candidate being supported but rather because of the sign itself in the back of the truck. The sign did not appear to pose a safety or security risk to anyone. Other cars with political bumper stickers were allowed to park and the drivers were allowed to attend the game. You have questioned whether such conduct by or on behalf of someone appearing to be an agent ofthe public school would violate S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-560. Such provision states that
[i]t is unlawful for a person to assault or intimidate a citizen, discharge a citizen from employment or occupation, or eject a citizen from a rented house, land, or other property because of political opinions or the exercise of political rights and privileges guaranteed to every citizen by the Constitution and laws of the United States or by the Constitution and laws of this State. The violation of such provision is a criminal misdemeanor subject to a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or imprisonment not more than two years or both. Based upon my research, r have been unable to find any case law or attorneys general opinions that deal with a factual situation such as that addressed above. The only case law that [ have located specificalty dealing with the referenced South Carolina provision involved alleged wrongful discharge from employment addressed by such statute. See, e.g., Keiger v. Citgo. Coastal Petroleum. Inc., 326 S.C. 369, 482 S.E.2d 792 ( 1997).

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The Honorable Trey Gowdy
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October 2, 2006

There is no question that having a sign in the back of a truck supporting a candidate would qualify as the exercise of political speech protected by the First Amendment. See: Coady v. Steil, 187 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 1999) (sign advocating a particular individual for the office of mayor atop a car was political speech). In examining the statute as to the situation you addressed, it must be considered whether the act of asking the driver of the truck to leave the parking lot constituted intimidation or the ejectment of a citizen "from a rented house, land, or other property".

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As to the latter dealing with ejectment of a citizen, in the context of the situation addressed by your letter, the use of the term "property'' would appear to be at issue. Generally, resort to subtle or forced construction for the purpose oflimiting or expanding the operation of a statute should not be undertaken. Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165, 318 S.E.2d 14 (1984). Moreover, criminal statutes must be strictly and narrowly construed in favor of a defendant and against the State. State v. Prince, 335 S.C. 466, 517 S.E.2d 229 (Ct. App. 1999). Recognizing such, in the opinion of this office, the term "rented" modifies not only the terms "house" and "land" but also "other property". It appears that the purpose of the statutory prohibition is to prevent obstacles to the free exercise of political will merely because the individual expressing a political opinion resides on or is associated with rental property. As a result, the prohibition dealing with the ejectment of a citizen in such circumstances would not appear to be applicable to the situation you addressed at the parking lot of a public high school football game. The only other possible consideration is the prohibition making it unlawful to "intimidate a citizen" because of the exercise of guaranteed political rights and privileges. As stated in Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 506 (5 1h Cir. 1999), "[t]here is no question that political expression .. .is protected speech under the First Amendment." See also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) ("[T]he Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the heirarchy [sic] of First Amendment values and is entitled to special protection."); Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (71h Cir. 1982) ("A public endorsement of a candidate for public office is an expression of views protected by the First Amendment). I have been unable to find any case law or attorneys general opinions that indicate that circumstances such as you described in your letter dealing with asking a person to leave certain premises because of the presence of a sign constitutes intimidation of the exercise of political rights and privileges. Then, the question would be whether the "intimidation" was because of political views or because of a content neutral sign policy? You indicate that the removal was due not to content of the sign but the existence of a sign. The question would then be factual in nature. Did the school have a policy regarding removal of signs? Were other signs allowed? Was a public forum existent? Stewart v. District of Cola. Armory Brd., 863 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1988). A public entity can regulate the time, place, and manner of speech. If the school had a policy prohibiting all signs, such would be valid. If, however, there was discrimination due to content of speech, this would not be the case. A review of such questions would be necessary in determining whether there was a violation of Section 16-17-560 in this instance.

The Honorable Trey Gowdy
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October 2, 2006

If there is anything further, please advise.
Sincerely,

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Charles H. Richardson
Senior Assistant Attorney General

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REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

Assistant Deputy Attorney General

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